AI Structured Summary
Facts, law points, precedents, ratio and the final ruling — distilled from the full judgment
AI Structured Summary
Facts, law points, precedents, ratio and the final ruling — distilled from the full judgment
Facts
Appellant/original plaintiff was a contractor who undertook special repairs of Taharabad Bandhara constructed by respondents/original defendants, the Zilla Parishad, Nasik. After the work was completed, measurements were taken and a final bill for Rs. 2861 was prepared on 25-3-1970 and sanctioned on 31-3-1970. The amount was not paid despite correspondence; the last demand notice was given on 15-5-1970. The Zilla Parishad did not dispute the liability but refused payment on the ground that the amount was adjusted in previous arrears due in respect of some other work carried out in 1963. The plaintiff therefore filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 2861 and interest by way of damages. The trial Court decreed the suit, holding that there was no justification, legal or factual, for withholding the sanctioned amount; no maintainability point was raised by the defendants in the written statement or at the hearing. The Zilla Parishad appealed. In appeal, for the first time, it was argued that the suit was not maintainable because no notice as contemplated under section 280 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 was given and the suit was not filed within three months from the date of the act complained of. The Appellate Court allowed that question to be raised for the first time in appeal, upheld it and dismissed the suit only on that ground. Hence this appeal by the original plaintiff.
Law Points
Whether the suit was not maintainable for want of notice and for being filed beyond three months as contemplated by section 280 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961; whether such a point could be raised for the first time in appeal; whether non-payment of an undisputed claim for actual work done on the basis of a contract could be said to be 'anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act' within section 280; and whether the Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the suit solely on that ground.
Acts & Articles
Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 — section 280. The judgment also refers to section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 and section 64 of the Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948 as provisions containing similar expressions. No constitutional article is referred to.
Judgments Referred
The Trustees of Port of Bombay Vs. The Premier Automobiles Ltd. and Another (Supreme Court), referred to for the holding that a suit for damages for breach of contract would not attract section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879. Bombay Housing Board (now the Maharashtra Housing Board) Vs. Karbhase Naik and Co., Sholapur (Supreme Court), referred to for the holding that non-payment of money as damages for breach of contract is not an act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act, and hence the said provision was not attracted.
Obiter Dicta
The Court observed that such an expression as 'anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act' in some form or the other finds place in several enactments. It also observed that it was not inclined to remand the matter and subject the parties to another round of avoidable litigation after a lapse of 23 years for a small sum of about Rs. 3000, and that the trial Court had given unassailable reasons for decreeing the suit.
Ratio Decidendi
A suit for recovery of an undisputed contractual amount for actual work done, where non-payment is complained of, is not a suit in respect of 'anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act' within section 280 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961. Every action of the Zilla Parishad, though made and done for the purposes of the Zilla Parishad, cannot be said to have been done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act. Accordingly, the notice and three-month limitation requirement in section 280 was not attracted, and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing the suit solely on that ground; there was also no justification for raising that point for the first time in appeal.
Final Ruling
The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court are set aside and the decree passed by the trial Court is restored. The respondents are to pay the costs of this appeal. The effect is that the plaintiff's suit for recovery of the sanctioned amount of Rs. 2861 and interest by way of damages stands decreed as originally ordered by the trial Court.
Plain-Language Gist
A contractor did repair work for the Zilla Parishad and his bill was sanctioned, but the Zilla Parishad refused to pay, saying it had adjusted the amount against old dues from earlier work. The trial court ordered payment, but the appellate court dismissed the suit because no notice was given under section 280. The High Court held that section 280 does not apply to a simple claim for unpaid contractual work, and restored the trial court's decree.
AI-generated summary — verify against the full judgment text before relying on it in practice.
Judgment
V.A. Mohta, J.—Appellant/Original Plaintiff is a contractor. He undertook to make special repairs of "Taharabad Bandhara" constructed by the respondents/Original defendants - the Zilla Parishad, Nasik. After the work was completed, measurements were taken and final bill for Rs. 2861/- was prepared on 25-3-1970 and was sanctioned on 31-3-1970. But the amount was not paid despite correspondence. Last demand notice was given on 15-5-1970. The Zilla Parishad did not dispute the liability to pay the said amount, but refused to pay saying that the amount was adjusted in the previous arrears due in respect of some other work carried out in the year 1963. Since there was no positive response, ultimately the suit was filed for recovery of a sum of Rs. 2861/- and interest by way of damages.
The trial Court decreed the suit holding that there was no justification - legal or factual - for withholding the sanctioned amount. No other point about maintainability of the suit was raised by the defendants either in the written statement or at the time of hearing.
The Zilla Parishad appealed against the said judgment and decree. In the Appeal, for the first time, a point was raised that the suit was not maintainable as no notice as contemplated u/s 280 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 ("the Act") was given and the suit was not filed within three months from the date of act complained of. The Appellate Court allowed this question to be raised for the first time in Appeal, upheld the point and dismissed the suit only on that ground. Aggrieved thereby, this Appeal has been filed by the Original Plaintiff.
After hearing the parties, I am satisfied that the judgment and decree passed in Appeal cannot stand legal scrutiny. In the first place, there was no justification for raising this point for the first time in Appeal. Non-payment of undisputed claim for the actual work done on the basis of the contract could not be said to be "anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act" as contemplated u/s 280. Every action of the Zilla Parishad, though made and done for the purposes of Zilla Parishad, cannot be said to have been done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act. Such expression in some form or the other finds place in several enactments. Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act, 1879 is one such provision. In the case of The Trustees of Port of Bombay Vs. The Premier Automobiles Ltd. and Another, , the Supreme Court has held that the suit for damages for breach of contract would not attract this section. Other provision is section 64 of the Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948. In the case of Bombay Housing Board (now the Maharashtra Housing Board) Vs. Karbhase Naik and Co., Sholapur, , the Supreme Court has held that non-payment of money as damages for breach of contract is not an act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act and hence the said provision was not attracted.
The Appellate Court has not considered the case on merits but I am not inclined to remand the matter and subject the parties to another round of avoidable litigation after a lapse of 23 years for a small sum of about Rs. 3000/-. The trial Court has given unassailable reasons for decreeing the suit and in the whole background I straightway restore the decree passed by the trial Court.
To conclude, the Appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored. The respondents to pay the costs of this Appeal.