Delhi Development Authority vs Khushbu Kumari

C. Hari Shankar, J.

This application seeks condonation of delay of 22 days in re-filing the present petition.

For the reasons stated in the application, the delay is condoned. Application is disposed of.

This is yet another case which makes us feel that the government should put in place a litigation policy regarding service matters, especially regarding service matters arising from orders of the Central Administrative Tribunal^{11.“the Tribunal” hereinafter} which should be made subject matter of challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. There is a litigation policy in place in tax matters, providing that tax disputes involving tax effect below a specified amount should not be challenged before higher fora. Cases of government employees are far more sensitive, and we do not see why no such policy has been put in place in such cases.

This becomes especially significant as we are finding orders passed by the Tribunal, even in respect of cases of persons who are differently abled, and which are on their face eminently wholesome, being challenged by way of writ petitions under Article 226.

To our mind, this should not be done. Even in cases where a bona fide belief may exist that the correctness of the order passed by the Tribunal may be open to debate, if the case deals with persons who are differently abled, we feel that the executive authorities should be not only sensitized, but also sensitive to the issue of whether the matter should be carried further to the Court. Litigation is no fun, and in the case of an order which is clearly fair in terms, and where the candidate concerned is a person suffering with disability, we are of the view that greater circumspection is expected before orders passed by the Tribunal are carried further in appeal or in other proceedings.

This case presents a classic example.

The respondent is admittedly visually impaired. She is, therefore, entitled to the facility of a scribe while undertaking written examinations in terms of Office Memorandum dated 29 August 2018 issued by the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities^{22.“DEPWD” hereinafter}.

The said instructions, however, require that the scribe should be one degree below the candidate in so far as educational qualifications are concerned.

The respondent was not confirmed for appointment, at the stage of verification of documents, for appointment as Assistant Section Officer in the Delhi Development Authority^{33.“DDA” hereinafter}, on the ground that the respondent, as well as the scribe who assisted her in the written examination, were both graduates and that, therefore, the scribe was not competent to assist the respondent.

There can be no doubt about the fact that if the respondent as well as her scribe were both graduates, the scribe would in fact not be competent to act as a scribe and assist the respondent. The question is, however, whether, in fact, the scribe was in fact incompetent to assist the respondent in the present case.

The answer to this question, in turn, throws up the issue of the date with reference to which the satisfaction of this requirement has to be ascertained. Para 2.11.6 of the recruitment notification, pursuant to which the respondent applied, becomes relevant in this context, and may be extracted as under:

(Emphasis supplied)

The order cancelling the respondent’s candidature, issued on 7 May 2025, provided, as the reason for cancellation, the comment “not fulfilling the criteria for using scribe in CBT examination.”

Aggrieved by the cancellation of her candidature, the respondent approached the Tribunal. The Tribunal has, by judgment dated 14 May 2026, allowed the OA and set aside the cancellation of the respondent’s candidature.

The DDA has assailed the said decision before us by means of the present writ petition.

We have heard Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, learned Counsel for the DDA.

Apart from Clause 2.11.6, Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia places reliance on Clause 3.4 of the recruitment notice, which read thus:

The dispute arises in this case because the respondent was, on the closing date for submission of an application for the aforesaid recruitment, i.e., 2 July 2023, a graduate. The written test, which forms subject matter of controversy, took place on 25 September 2023 and 28 September 2024.

Ms. Ahluwalia candidly acknowledges that, both on the closing date for submission of application as well as on the date of undertaking the aforesaid examinations, the scribe was in fact one step below the respondent in so far as educational qualifications were concerned. On the closing date for submission of applications, the respondent was a graduate while the scribe was intermediate. Before the first written test was held on 25 September 2023, the respondent had become a post graduate and the scribe was a graduate. At both points of time, therefore, the scribe was in fact, as per educational qualifications, one step below the respondent.

We may also observe that in Clause 2.11.6, the use of the words “writing the examination” would indicate that, in fact, the comparison of the educational qualifications of the candidate and the scribe should ideally take place on the date when the examination is undertaken, and not on the last date for submission of applications. Clause 3.4, to which Ms. Ahluwalia has drawn our attention, deals with the eligibility of the candidate, and not with the qualification of her scribe to act as a scribe and assist her in the written examination, for which the relevant clause is Clause 2.11.

In the present case, however, this distinction may be academic, as the scribe was in fact one step below the respondent in educational qualifications both on the last date for submission of application as well as both the dates when the written examination was undertaken by the respondent.

The Tribunal is, therefore, correct in holding that the scribe was not disqualified from assisting the respondent. The ground for cancellation of the respondent’s candidature is therefore clearly incorrect.

We find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the Tribunal which is therefore affirmed in its entirety.

The writ petition is dismissed in limine.