Deepee Shoe Fabrics Private Limited vs Pallava Leathers and Products

N. Arumugham, J.—The above four Revisions have been filed challenging the propriety and legality of the orders passed by the learned

Judicial Magistrate No. II, Walajah in Crl. M.P. 1882 of 1995 in C.C. No. 168 of 1994; Crl. M.P. No. 1883 of 1995 in C.C. No. 153 of 1994

and Crl. M.P. No. 1881 of 1995 in C.C. No. 167 of 1994, on 16-11-1995. As consented to by the bar for the respective parties, these four

Revisions are heard and disposed of by pronouncing this common order as the nature of transaction and the respective parties and the factual

aspects in all the four cases are identical and similar.

It appears from the case records that the common case among the parties is that the Petitioner M/s. Deepee Shoe Fabrics Private Limited

represented by its Director, Mrs. Meenakshi Natarajan had placed an order for the supply of finished leather goods from the

Respondent/complainant M/s. Pallava Leathers and Products represented by their Partner P. Srinivasan, Bharathi Nagar, Ranipet and accordingly

goods were supplied, for the value of which, four cheques were drawn by the Petitioner herein on different dates for different amounts in favour of

the Respondent and all got bounced subsequently when presented for encashment. This was followed by the exchange of legal notice and reply

among themselves. However, the demand made by the Respondent for the payment of the amounts referred to under the instruments had not been

complied with. Therefore, for the offence Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, four cases above referred were filed by the Respondent

against the Petitioner before the Court below. After the issue of process and before commencement of the trial, petitions on behalf of the Petitioner

was filed praying for discharge on the ground firstly that the name of the company has not been properly brought in the complaint and that secondly

the Court in which the prosecution was launched has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as the drawing of the cheque in favour of the

Respondent, handing over the same, presentation of the same for encashment and bouncing had happened within the jurisdiction of Madras and

that therefore no cause of action arises outside Madras so as to entertain the complaint in Walajah Court. The grounds raised were resisted on

behalf of the complaint/Respondent. Upon hearing both sides on merits, learned Magistrate has not accepted the grounds projected by and on

behalf of the Revision Petitioner and consequently rejected the Petitions for discharge by passing the impugned orders. Aggrieved, the Petitioner

has come forward with these Revisions challenging the property and legality of the impugned orders as referred to supra.

I have heard Mr. David Tyagraj, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, in reiterating the same grounds raised before the Court below, however,

added with the case laws by assailing the impugned orders and the contra from Mr. S.D.N. Vimalanathan, learned Counsel for the

Respondent/Complainant justifying the impugned orders.

3-A. Before proceeding further, it has become relevant to advert to Section 175 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the procedural law relating to

the second contention raised by the Bar on behalf of the Petitioner. Section 178 Code of Criminal Procedure runs as follows:

Place of inquiry or trial-(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

(b) Where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

(c) Where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

(d) Where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such

local areas.

It therefore follows that the above provision of law provides the jurisdiction for inquiry or trial to be conducted by the Courts when it is uncertain in

which or several local areas an offence was committed and the offence was committed partly in one area and partly in another and when such

offence is a continuing one in more local areas than one or otherwise by the Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. The reading of

the above Section would imply a wider scope for the jurisdiction of the Courts to conduct the trial or inquiry and it is enough for the said purpose,

part of commission of offence should have taken place and not that the whole commission of offence should have taken place in the jurisdiction of

a particular Court alone.

The Provisos to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, have also become relevant to be adverted, which run as follows:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless:

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity,

whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by

giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of

the cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee, or as the case may be, to the holder in due

course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

Explanation: For the purposes of this Section ""debt or other liability"" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

It would clearly mean from the wordings of the above Section of law that in the place where the legal notice is given to the drawer of the negotiable

instrument making the demand to pay and in the event of which has not been complied with, would also give rise to a cause of action for the

purpose of the existence of the debt or other liability as provided in the explanation added to die above Section.

If the above is the unambiguous position of law provided for conducting the trial in a Court of law for the offences u/s 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, having considered the factual aspects of the case from the very face of the complaint itself, particularly, in the first paragraph, the

Respondent/complainant happens to have a situs at Ranipet within the jurisdiction of the Walajah Court, where the finished goods were ordered

and in accordance of which the said goods were despatched for the value of the consideration to be paid by the Revision Petitioner, irrespective of

the fact that the drawing of the four cheques in the respective cases were made and given to the Respondent at Madras and got bounced at

Madras by itself, would not take away the jurisdiction or the cause of action arisen within the jurisdiction of the Walajah Court and that therefore,

for the reason of bouncing of the cheques and the consequent non-payment of the value of the goods supplied, despite the bouncing of the

negotiable instrument and the demand made was at Madras, learned Judicial Magistrate No. II at Walajah has got every competency to entertain

the complaint and that under the circumstances, I am totally unable to persuade myself to accept the contention made so strenuously by Mr. David

Tyagaraj for and on behalf of the revision Petitioner.

The other attack dealt by the learned Counsel that the company has not been added properly in the complaint and that therefore the complaint

involved in all the four cases have no legal competency, may not have any force to stand for the very reasonings that the name of the Company,

namely, M/s. Pallava Leathers and Products, Ranipet, has clearly been referred to in the complaint and in whose favour alone the four cheques in

question were drawn by the revision Petitioner and that therefore, there cannot be any infirmity or legal laches in the complaint entertained by the

trial Court. On this ground also, the revision cannot be entertained.

Mr. S.D.N. Vimalanathan, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent has justifiably supported the impugned orders passed by the learned

trial Magistrate for all the reasonings given above, and accordingly, for the same reasonings, I have no hesitation to endorse my view with the

contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent. However, if for any technicalities in the complaint pointed out by the Petitioner/accused

during the trial, for which, it is always open for him to do so, and it could he looked into by the trial court and adjudicated upon it in accordance

with law only in the trial. These revisions which lack in merits have become liable to be rejected.

It is result, for all the foregoing reasonings given above and my findings and observations, all the four revisions fail and accordingly stand

dismissed. Consequently, the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Wallajah in Crl. M.P. No. 1882 of 1995 in C.C. 158 of 1994; Crl.

M.P. No. 1883 of 1995 in C.C. No. 153 of 1994; Crl. M.P. No. 1884 of 1995 in C.C. No. 154 of 1994; Crl. M.P. No. 1881 of 1995 in C.C.

No. 187 of 1994 on 16-11-1995 are hereby maintained and confirmed.