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Judgment
Ajay Mohan Goel, Judge (Oral)
By way of this petition, the petitioners have, inter alia, prayed for the following reliefs:-
“a)Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, quashing and set aside the impugned Revised condition/clause of the door step delivery Policy i.e., clause. No. 5 (b)(i) & 5 (b)(ii) as it make ownership of the vehicle in the name of the individual applicants or his/her family members an essential eligibility condition for undertaking the work of door step delivery of ration vide dated 28.07.2026 (Annexure P-2);
b)Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that eligibility for participation in the door step delivery scheme ought to be determined on the basis of the applicant actual capacity and ability to ensure timely, uninterrupted and efficient delivery of ration and not merely on the basis of ownership of the vehicle in his/her own name or in the name of family member.”
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, we have heard the case on merit itself.
The grievance of the petitioners is with regard to Annexure P-2, which is the revised Policy formulated by the respondent-State for fixation of transportation charges for delivery of food grains upto the doorstep of Fair Price Shops in terms of the provisions of Section 24(2)(a) of the National Food Security Act, 2013.
The case of the petitioners is that they are unemployed educated youth and their livelihood is dependent on local private jobs like transportation of goods from one place to another, including the transportation of Government supplies within the local area. It is further their case that they have been participating in the tender process for transportation of ration items from wholesale godown to the retail sale depots of the Government within the local area for some time. In terms of the earlier practice, which was prevalent for the last so many years, tenders were invited for transportation of different items and upon satisfying the condition that the bidder had adequate arrangement of vehicles of different kind, to ensure timely supply for which, along with the tender, the person participating in the tender had to upload the RCs of the vehicle owners, who were willing to let their vehicles be plied by the bidder, tenders were being allotted. Thus, it was not a condition precedent that a person like the present petitioners, who intended to participate in the tender process, mandatorily had to own his or her own vehicle. However, in terms of the revised Policy (Annexure P-2), a new Clause has been incorporated therein, i.e., Clause 5(i)(a)(b), in terms whereof, condition has been put that an individual bidder shall have, in case of a wholesale godown having more than 400 MT monthly allocation of specified essential commodities, one heavy vehicle with carrying capacity of 9 MT or above and two light commercial vehicles with carrying capacity of 3 MT or above, in his own name or in the name of his family, i.e., spouse, unmarried daughters and sons and married sons and their wives and in case of wholesale godown having less than 400 MT monthly allocation of specified essential commodities, two light commercial vehicles with carrying capacity of 3 MT or above shall be sufficient, provided that the vehicles mentioned should be registered in the name of the bidder or in the name of his family members, i.e., spouse, unmarried daughters and sons and married sons and their wives.
According to the petitioners, this Clause is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, as it ousts from the competition, persons like the petitioners, who are now barred from participating in the process only because that they do not own vehicles, ignoring their previous experience in the transportation business, which even the respondents admit to be satisfactory.
Learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that the conditions which have been imposed in terms of the revised policy, wherein, a bidder must possess vehicles, as are mentioned in the revised policy, is not sustainable in law. She submitted that in terms of Article 19 of the Constitution of India, a citizen of India has a right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business and this right of the petitioners stands arbitrarily infringed in terms of the revised policy, which now makes it mandatory for a bidder to own a vehicle, as is mentioned in the revised Policy. She further submitted that the impugned conditions are also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as there is no valid classification, nor the classification has any nexus with the object and indeed, a monopoly is being created in favour of the persons, who own vehicles, to the deterrent of poor people like the petitioners, who earlier were surviving on the business of transportation by hiring or engaging the vehicles of a third party.
Learned counsel also drew the attention of the Court to Clause 5(iii) of the revised policy and submitted that said Clause calls upon a bidder to attach minimum three heavy vehicles or five light vehicles, which is again arbitrary, as what was earlier directly permitted to be done, is otherwise also now being indirectly permitted to be done.
Learned counsel has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vinishma Technologies Private Limited versus State of Chhattisgarh and another, 2025 INSC 1182. No other point was urged.
On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that there is neither any arbitrariness nor any illegality in the impugned revised guidelines, which have been issued by the Government. Learned Additional Advocate General referred to the reply filed to the petition and submitted that the revised Policy was formulated in the larger public interest by the Competent Authority, in light of the provisions of Section 24(2)(a) of the National Food Security Act, 2013 and Section 8(3) of the Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2015.
Learned Additional Advocate General argued that in terms of the Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2015, the State Government is bound to ensure, through authorized agencies, physical delivery of food grains to fair price shop by the end of the month, preceding the allocation month and in any case not later than the first week of the allocation month. He submitted that in light of the said provisions, delivery of food grains is a time bound activity and it is mandatory for the State Government to ensure delivery of specified essential commodities at the doorstep of the fair price shop. It is in this backdrop that the revised policy has been formulated. Learned Additional Advocate General also argued that though earlier the petitioners were eligible to participate in the process of transportation of the food grains, but, as now a decision has been taken in the larger public interest, that an incumbent who intends to participate in the process, must have a minimum fleet of vehicles to ensure the unobstructed delivery of the food grains at the doorstep of fair price shop, the necessary changes have been made. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that otherwise also, it is a policy decision, taken by the Government in the larger public interest and simply because earlier there was no requirement for a bidder, to have a minimum fleet of vehicles owned or possessed in the mode and manner in which it is now prescribed in the policy, that does not mean that the State Government could not have introduced such a Clause later on. He further argued that it is not the case of the petitioners that the policy has been tailor-made to suit a few.
Learned Additional Advocate General also argued that there is neither any violation of Article 14 nor Article 19 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the petitioners are still free to participate in the process and the only eligibility criteria is that depending upon the kind of bid they intend to give qua the transportation of the essential commodities from the godown to the fair price shop, they have to possess a minimum fleet of vehicles and thereafter, they can participate in the said process.
Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that the reason this was done, was that there have been occasions where the delivery of the food articles was delayed on account of the successful bidder not being able to provide the transportation and the reason for the same primarily was that the bidder did not have his own fleet, as an owner and the dependency of the bidder on the vehicles owned by others was creating practical issues even in emergent situations. He, therefore, submitted that as there is no illegality in the revised policy, the present petition being devoid of any merit, was liable to be dismissed.
We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners as also learned Additional Advocate General and have also carefully gone through the pleadings as well as documents appended with the petition.
The moot issue involved in this petition is in a very narrow compass, i.e., whether Clause 5(i)(a)(b) and Clause (iii) thereof, which have been introduced in the revised policy (Annexure P-2) dated 28.07.2026 is sustainable in the eyes of law or is hit by the provisions of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India.
Annexure P-2 is the revised policy for fixation of transportation charges for delivery of food grains upto the doorstep of fair price shop under Section 24(2)(a) of the National Food Security Act, 2013. In terms of the impugned Clause thereof, in case any individual bidder intends to participate in the tender/bid for delivery of specified essential commodities from the wholesale godown to the fair price shop, then, if the wholesale godown had more than 400 MT monthly allocation of specified essential commodities, the bidder should have one heavy vehicle with carrying capacity of 9 MT or above and two light commercial vehicles with carrying capacity of 3 MT or above, either in his name or in the name of his family as is prescribed in the Clause. It is further provided in terms of the impugned condition that in case of the wholesale godown having less than 400 MT monthly allocation of specified essential commodities, the bidder should have in his own name or in the name of his family, as is mentioned therein, two light commercial vehicles with carrying capacity of 3 MT or above. In addition, in terms of sub-Clause (c) of Clause 5(i), minimum three heavy vehicles or five light commercial vehicles must be attached with the individual bidder.
Section 24(2)(a) of the National Food Security Act, 2013 provides that under the Targeted Distribution System, it shall be the duty of the State Government to take delivery of food grains from the designated depots of the Central Government in the State, at the prices specified in Schedule-I, organize intra-state allocations for delivery of the allocated food grains through their authorized agencies at the door-step of each fair price shop and thereafter, ensure actual delivery or supply of the food grains to the entitled persons at fair prices specified in Schedule-I.
The Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution has issued an order, i.e., Targeted Public Distribution System Control Order, 2015, copy of the extract whereof, is appended with the reply filed by the respondents as Annexure R-3/1.
In terms of Clause 8(3) of the 2015 order, the State Government has to ensure through the authorized agencies, physical delivery of food grains to the fair price shop by the end of month preceding the allocation month and in any case not later than the first week of the allocation month and delivery of the essential commodities from the godown to the fair price shop.
Thus, in terms of the provisions of the National Food Security Act, 2013 as also the Targeted Public Distribution System Control Order, 2015, onus is upon the State Government to ensure the physical delivery of the food grains to the fair price shop either by end of the month preceding the allocation month or in any case, delivery thereof not later than the first week of the allocation month. This delivery by the State Government has to be through the authorized agency. The authorized agency, which the State Government can engage for the purpose of this work has not been specified either in the 2013 Act or in the 2015 order and, thus, obviously, the authorized agency has to be, as the State Government deems fit in the circumstances, which can ensure compliance of the 2013 Act, as well as of the 2015 order.
It is in this backdrop that in terms of the revised policy to take care of whatever discrepancies existed earlier on account of the bidder not possessing a minimum of the fleet of the vehicles required for transportation, condition of possessing certain vehicles has been imposed, as has been mentioned hereinabove. A bidder now must have a minimum fleet of vehicles either registered in his name or in the name of his family, to render the person eligible to participate in the process.
According to us, this condition now introduced in the Revised Policy cannot be termed to be arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Article 14 of the Constitutions provides that there has to be equality before law, meaning thereby that equals are to be treated alike and unequals are not be treated alike.
Article 14 allows classification, provided the classification is based on intelligible differentia and has some rational nexus with the object to be achieved on the basis of the said classification.
In the present case by introducing in the revised policy that a person participating in the transportation process, must have minimum fleet of vehicles, a classification has been created by the State between those who own a minimum fleet which is required to be eligible to participate in the process and those who do not own the minimum fleet. Therefore, this classification which is based on a party’s possessing the minimum fleet of transport vehicles, obviously is based on an intelligent differentia, as on one hand, we have a Class, which owns the minimum fleets, which is required as per the policy and on the other hand a Class, which does not own the minimum fleet.
Now, the rational nexus which this classification has with the object, is that as the object behind the policy itself is to ensure the compliance of the statutory provisions of the National Food Security Act, 2013, as also the 2015 order, in terms whereof, onus is upon the State Government to ensure that the essential commodities are transported to the doorstep of the fair price shop either by the end of the month preceding the allocation month, or in any case not later than the first week of the allocation month, the State Government is now ensuring that only those who have the minimum fleet of vehicles in their own name or in the name of their family are eligible to participate in the process. This has been done so that successful bidders for the purpose of ensuring the delivery of the essential commodities timely are not always at the mercy of the third party. Therefore, it cannot be said that either the classification is not based on any intelligible differentia or that this intelligible differentia does not have any rational nexus with the object to be achieved.
Now, coming to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that sub-Clause 3 of Clause 5(iii) permits such an incumbent to have minimum of three heavy vehicles or five light commercial vehicles attached with it, also does not improve the case of the petitioners. According to us, this is an additional condition which eligible person has to fulfill besides owning the minimum fleet of the vehicles, as is mentioned in Clause 5(b)(i) (ii).
This means that a person who owns the minimum fleet as is mentioned in 5(b) (i) and 5(b) (ii), still has to maintain an additional fleet attached to the individual bidder. This does not obliterate the earlier condition of the bidder having a minimum fleet of vehicle in his or her name or in the name of the family, in terms of Clause 5(b) (i) and (ii).
Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that this condition is either arbitrary or creates a monopoly in the favour of who own vehicles.
We repeat that this is an additional condition and it does not confer any advantage on those who are otherwise eligible as per Clause 5(b) (i) and (ii), because, unless and until they fulfill the criteria provided in 5(b) (iii) also, even if they fulfill the provisions contained in Clause 5(b)(i) and (ii), they will be in-eligible to participate in the process.
Now, coming to Article 19 of the Constitution of India, in terms of Article 19(i)(g) all citizens of India have a right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business. However, this Constitutional right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business is subject to fulfillment of requisite criteria that may be laid either by the State Government or by other organizations or bodies wherein such persons intend to practice any profession or carry on any occupation, trade, or business.
For example, Article 19 of the Constitution of India cannot be construed that anyone can come to a Court and claim the right to practice the profession of law, until and unless a person fulfills the eligibility criteria provided in the Advocates Act, 1961.
Similarly, no citizen of India can go to a Hospital and say that I want to practice the profession of a Doctor, until and unless he or she possesses MBBS degree.
Thus, the provisions of Article 19(i)(g) of the Constitution of India cannot be construed in the mode and manner in which the petitioners want the Court to construe it. It does not confer an unfettered power to a citizen and the right is subject to reasonable restrictions.
There is no embargo on the petitioners in exercising their constitutional right to undertake the distribution of food items in terms of the policy that is Annexure P-2, but, then because there is an eligibility condition prescribed therein, which condition as per this Court, is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, until and unless the petitioners fulfill that eligibility criteria, they cannot claim a right to participate in the process, simply on the ground that are citizens of India and they have a right to carry on any profession or trade.
Besides this, we are also of the considered view, as was urged by the learned Advocate General that simply because earlier, persons like the petitioners were allowed to participate in the bidding process, this does not mean that the State Government could not have revised the policy and introduced a policy in the larger public interest, which has done in terms of the revised policy.
Otherwise also, it is not the case of the petitioners that the revision in the policy has been done by the State Government to suit a few individuals, that is to say, that it is a tailor-made policy.
A three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Kirloskar Ferrous Industries Limited and another versus Union of India and others, (2025) 1 Supreme Court Cases 695, has been pleased to hold as under on the scope of the judicial review of policy decision:-
“54.Judicial restraint is rooted in the understanding that courts should respect the decisions made by the legislative and executive branches, provided these decisions are legally sound and constitutionally valid. By adhering to judicial restraint, courts avoid overstepping their constitutional role and thereby prevent potential conflicts with the executive and legislative branches. The principle of separation of powers supports the idea that each branch has a unique role, and mutual respect between these branches is essential for the proper functioning of government. The courts are to ensure that laws and policies do not infringe upon citizens’ rights or exceed the authority granted by law. However, this role does not extend to evaluating whether a policy is “wise” or whether a better one could be devised, and rather this process is entrusted to the legislature and executive, which have the expertise to make these determinations.
55.The doctrine of judicial restraint, which is central to this discussion, emphasizes that courts should exercise caution and avoid involvement in policy decisions, as these are complex judgments that require a balancing of diverse and often competing interests. Policies are crafted based on thorough analysis of social, economic, and political factors, considerations beyond the court’s purview. The court is tasked with ensuring that policies do not breach constitutional provisions or statutory limits; however, they should not replace policymakers’ judgments with their own unless absolutely necessary.
56.Policy decisions often require the expertise of professionals and specialists in fields such as economics, public health, national security, and environmental science. These domains involve specialized knowledge that judges, as generalists in legal matters, may lack. For instance, in economic policy, the executive may decide on trade tariffs or subsidies based on extensive data and projections that aim to balance domestic industry support with global trade commitments. The courts, lacking the same level of economic expertise and without the authority to make trade-offs among competing policy objectives, is typically not equipped to second-guess these kinds of decisions.
57.While courts have the power of judicial review to ensure that executive actions and legislative enactments comply with the Constitution, this power is not absolute. Judicial review is meant to act as a safeguard against actions that overstep legal boundaries or infringe on fundamental rights, but it does not entail a comprehensive re-evaluation of the policy’s wisdom. The judicial review of policy decisions is limited to assessing the legality of the decision-making process rather than the substantive merits of the policy itself. For example, if a government policy infringes on fundamental rights or discriminates against a particular group, the courts have a duty to strike down such policies. However, in the absence of constitutional or legal violations, the courts should respect the policy choices made by the executive or legislature.
58.The duty of the court in policy-related cases is primarily to determine whether the policy falls within the scope of the authority granted to the relevant body. If the policy decision is within the executive’s legal authority and has been made following proper procedures, the courts should defer to the expertise and discretion of the policy-makers, even if the policy appears unwise or imprudent. This restraint ensures that the courts do not impose its own perspective on policy matters that are rightly the responsibility of other branches.
59.Economic and social policies often involve significant redistribution of resources, prioritization of interests, and balancing of public needs, which requires careful consideration by those with specialized knowledge and broad perspectives. In the realm of economic policy, for instance, questions regarding the allocation of subsidies, fiscal deficits, or budget allocations are best managed by the executive, which has access to economic data and is accountable to the public for its financial management. Judicial interference in such areas risks creating disruptions in the economic balance that policy-makers are trying to achieve.
60.Courts should assume that policy-makers act in good faith unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. As long as the policy does not contravene the Constitution or violate statutory provisions, it is not the role of the courts to question the wisdom or fairness of such policy.
61.While judicial restraint is essential in respecting the boundaries of each branch of government, it does not mean that courts abdicate their responsibility to protect constitutional rights. The courts must still intervene if a policy infringes on fundamental rights, discriminates unfairly, or breaches statutory provisions. The role of the court in such instances is to protect individuals and groups from unlawful actions while maintaining the overall integrity of the policy-making process. This balance ensures that while courts do not interfere in matters of policy wisdom, they remain vigilant guardians of constitutional rights.”
Before parting, we would like to refer to the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
The grievance raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the appellant therein was qua the impugned tender condition which prescribed that bidders must have supplied Sports Kits worth at least Rs.6.00 Crores (cumulative) to State Government agencies of Chhattisgarh in last 3 financial years, which as per the appellant was violative of Articles 14 and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India, as it excluded competent suppliers from outside the State and discouraged wider participation and fosters cartelisation. In the backdrop of this factual contention, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that said condition was arbitrary as the object of public procurement was to secure quality goods and services for the benefit of public exchequer and said object could be achieved by requiring the bidders to demonstrate financial capacity, technical experience, and past performance in contracts of similar nature, regardless of place of performance of the contract. Hon’ble Supreme Court also held that to confine the eligibility to participate in the tender, within one State was not only irrational but it was also disproportionate to the goal of ensuring effective delivery of Sports Kits.
In our considered view, this judgment is of no assistance to the petitioners herein.
The condition which is under challenge before this Court, as has been observed by us hereinabove also, is neither violative of Article 14 nor of Article 19(i)(g) of the Constitution of India.
The eligibility condition of owning a minimum fleet of certain vehicles so as to participate in the process of tender or distribution of essential commodities cannot be said to be violative of the above-said constitutional provisions.
Obviously, as transportation has to be done through vehicles, by incorporating a condition that a person participating in the process must have a minimum of the fleet as is mentioned in the revised policy, either in his or her name or in the name of family, is a rational condition. Simply because the petitioners who do not own vehicles are now in-eligible to participate in the process, this does not render the condition to be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, in light of the above discussion as also the law discussed hereinabove, as we do not find any merit in the present petition, the same is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stands disposed of.