Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd. vs Yes Bank Ltd.

S. Tamilvanan, J.—O.A. No. 489 of 2013 has been filed under Order 14, Rule 8 of High Court Original Side Rules read with Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking an Order of Interim Injunction restraining the First Respondent-Bank from in any manner alienating or encumbering the Suit properties morefully described in the Petition Schedule mentioned properties.

O.A. No. 490 of 2013 has been filed under Order 14, Rule 8 of High Court Original Side Rules read with Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking an Order of Interim Injunction restraining the First Respondent-Bank, their men, servants, agents and representatives from in any manner interfering and/or disturbing with the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company''s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Schedule properties, including its basic amenities such as water, electricity, sewerage, etc, more fully described in the Petition Schedule mentioned properties.

The Applicant/Plaintiff is a reputed Company and is carrying on business of publishing English Daily Newspaper Deccan Chronicle printed and published in Hyderabad, Chennai and several other centres in the country and also Telugu Newspapers and according to the Plaintiff, Newspapers published by the Plaintiff-Company have wide circulation in various States in India and abroad. Apart from the business of printing and publishing Newspapers, the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company is also having Subsidiary Companies known as Deccan Chronicle Sporting Ventures Ltd., and Odessey India Ltd. One of the Subsidiary Company, viz., Deccan Chronic Sporting Ventures Ltd., was also a franchisee under the Board of Control for Cricket in India/Indian Premier League, owning a Cricket Team known as Deccan Chargers, which was participating in the IPL T20 Cricket tournaments rights from the inception of IPL till recently. For the purpose of expanding its participation in the IPL tournaments and other business, the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company approached the First Respondent-Bank, viz., Yes Bank Ltd., to avail various credit facilities and the First Respondent-Bank agreed to grant the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company a short-term loan of Rs. 50 crores and also another sum of Rs. 50 crores as Working Capital Demand Loan (WCDL). For the short-term loan of Rs. 50 crores, the First Respondent-Bank sought and obtained Personal Guarantee of the Directors of the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company, viz., (1) Mr. T. Venkatram Reddy, (2) Mr. T. Vinayak Ravi Reddy, and (3) Mr. P.K. Iyer and thus, the short-term loan was secured by way of Personal Guarantees. Similarly, for the Working Capital Demand Loan of Rs. 50 crores, as well. Personal Guarantees, the Directors of the Company have executed the documents. Besides, the Personal Guarantees, the said loans were also secured by Pronotes, Loan Agreements and certain other blank papers, which were got signed and obtained by the First Respondent-Bank and all the said documentations were obtained by the First Respondent-Bank, in pursuance of their Letter, dated 12.12.2010 towards sanctioning the aforesaid loans to the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company.

It is seen that the Applicant/Plaintiff has sought Judgment and Decree against the First Respondent/D1, by way of declaration that the Deeds of Conveyance had fraudulently obtained by the First Defendant-Bank from the Plaintiff-Company under duress and coercion in respect of the Plaint Schedule properties, hence, the same are void, ab initio, invalid and non est in law. The Applicant/Plaintiff has stated that the Deed of Conveyance, dated 21.09.2012, registered as Document No. 2143/2012, 2144/2012, 2146/2012, 2147/2012, 2141/2012, 2142/2012, 2145/2015. The second prayer is for a Decree of Permanent Injunction restraining the First Defendant, its men, agents, servants and anyone claiming under it, from in any manner disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Plaintiff, in respect of the Plaint Schedule properties and from in any manner claiming any right in the aforesaid properties, based on the Conveyance Deeds.

The Application in O.A. No. 489 of 2013 has been filed under Order 14, Rule 8 of High Court Original Side Rules read with Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking an Order of Interim Injunction restraining the First Respondent-Bank from in any manner alienating or encumbering the Suit properties morefully described in the Petition Schedule mentioned properties.

The Application in O.A. No. 490 of 2013 has been filed under Order 14, Rule 8 of High Court Original Side Rules read with Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking an Order of Interim Injunction restraining the First Respondent-Bank, their men, servants, agents and representatives from in any manner interfering and/or disturbing with the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company''s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Schedule properties, including its basic amenities such as water, electricity, sewerage, etc., more fully described in the Petition Schedule mentioned properties.

Mr. Vijayanarayanan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Applicant contended that the Applicant/Plaintiff is entitled to Interim Injunction as prayed for, till the disposal of the Suit, since the First Respondent-Bank is likely to alienate the property or disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property pending disposal of the Suit.

The averments of the Plaint and the alleged Cause of Action raised therein would show that the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company had executed the aforesaid Registered Conveyance Deeds in favour of the First Respondent Company, while getting the aforesaid loan amount from the Bank.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the First Respondent/D1 contended that as per the averments of the Applicant/Plaintiff is totally false and the First Respondent-Bank had not obtained the registered Deeds of Conveyance fraudulently from the Plaintiff-Company under duress and coercion in respect of the Plaint Schedule properties and hence, the averments are not legally sustainable, as there could be no possibility or necessity for the First Respondent-Bank to obtain any registered Conveyance Deed from the Plaintiff''s Company under duress and coercion and such allegations are incorrect and only false statements and not sustainable in law. Learned Senior Counsel for the First Respondent further submitted that the Applicant/Plaintiff had voluntarily approached the Bank and obtained heavy amount of loan by executing necessary documents, including registered Deeds of Conveyance and hence, the allegation that the Deeds were obtained fraudulently is totally false and the same is an unsustainable defence, hence, the Suit itself is liable to be dismissed.

Per contra, Mr. T.V. Ramanujam, learned Senior Counsel argued that the relief sought for is not at all legally sustainable, on account of the simple reason that there is no prima facie case and the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the Applicant/Plaintiff. Learned Senior Counsel mainly contended that after executing Deeds of Conveyance, by way of Registered Documents, the Applicant/Plaintiff-Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, cannot raise a plea that fraudulently the First Respondent-Bank had obtained the Deeds of Conveyance under duress and coercion. According to the learned Senior Counsel, it is a clear abuse of process of law and the Court and further submitted that after the Deeds of Conveyance, Application was made properly to the Corporation of Chennai and having considered the Application and the supporting documents, the ownership of the property was transferred from the name of the Applicant/Plaintiff in favour of the First Respondent D1, M/s. Yes Bank Limited. In the aforesaid circumstances, merely by raising a false plea that fraudulently the Registered Deeds were obtained under duress and coercion, the Applicant/Plaintiff cannot seek any Interim Injunction, as there is no prima facie case made out and no balance of convenience is available in favour of the Applicant/Plaintiff.

In support of the respective contentions, both the learned Senior Counsel have cited the following decisions:

1 Lakshmi v. E. Jayaram, AIR (2013) SC 2939;

2 Dalpat Kumar v. Pahlad Singh, AIR (1993) SC 276,

3 Rome Gowda v. Varadappa Naidu, AIR (2004) SC 4609;

4 N.A. Chinnasamy v. S. Vellingirinathan, 2013 (6) CTC 809.

5 Coffee Board v. Ramesh Exports Pvt. Ltd., 2014 (3) CTC 728.

6 State Bank of India v. Gracure Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2013 (6) CTC 789.

Mr. Vijayanarayanan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Applicant/Plaintiff drew the attention of this Court to the decision rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Lakshmi v. E. Jayaram, AIR 2013 SC 2939, wherein, while deciding the scope of Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the Civil Court, in granting Ad-Interim Injunction and very categorically observed in the Order that the respective rights of the parties would be decided at the time of final disposal of the Suit.

As per the referred case, the Second Plaintiff therein was in possession and enjoyment of the property, as a Tenant under the First Plaintiff and that was an undisputed fact, hence, interim protection was given to the Second Plaintiff against the threatened action of the Defendants to evict her without following the due process of law. There is no such circumstances in this case. Hence, this Court is of the view that the aforesaid decision would not support the case of the Applicant/Plaintiff, since the facts of the said case is entirely different.

In the instant case, admittedly, the Applicant Plaintiff-Company had executed the Registered Sale Deeds, hence, the said factum is not in dispute in the Suit. Copy of the Sale Deeds are also available in the typed set of papers, wherein the averments would read that the seller had handed over the peaceful, actual and vacant physical possession of the schedule of property, as per the execution of the Registered Sale Deed. Having admitted the execution of the Registered Sale Deeds and handing over the possession, as per the Deeds of Conveyance, the Applicant/Plaintiff is not entitled to raise a plea contrary to the admission made already. Hence, the plea of the Applicant Plaintiff that fraudulently the Sale Deeds had been obtained by the First Respondent-Bank from the Plaintiff''s Company under duress and coercion could not legally make out a prima facie case for getting Interim Injunction. Similarly, the balance of convenience is not in favour of the Applicant/Plaintiff, since the Plaint averments of the Applicant/Plaintiff is contrary to registered documents executed by the Plaintiff in favour of the Respondent-Bank.

Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the First Respondent/D1 submits that the Sale Deeds have been executed by the Applicant/Plaintiff on 21.09.2012, based on the strength of Board Resolution passed by the Plaintiff-Company on 7th September 2012 and approved by all the Board of Directors. There is no coercion and undue influence by the First Respondent/D1 in obtaining the registered Sale Deeds. The Applicant/Plaintiff being a Public Limited Company could not be coerced to execute a Sale Deed by a Bank, hence, the claim of the Applicant/Plaintiff that the Sale Deeds executed by them were under duress and coercion is not acceptable for granting Interim Injunction.

In Virgo Industries (Eng.) (P) Ltd. v. Venturetech Solutions (P) Ltd., 2013 (1) MWN (Civil) 224 (SC) : 2012 (5) CTC 359 (SC) : 2013 (1) SCC 625, relying on Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India, 2005 (2) CTC 582 (SC) : 2005 (4) SCC 315, it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, that the object behind the enactment of the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, CPC, is to prevent multiplicity of litigations on the same Cause of Action. The true object of the law would not stand fully subserved for holding a view that the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2, CPC would be applicable, only if the First Suit is disposed of and not in a situation where the Second Suit filed was during the pendency of the First Suit. It has been made clear that Order 2, Rule 2, CPC will apply to both the aforesaid situations.

In Maria Soosai and another v. Esakkiammal, 1999 (1) LW 727, this Court (S.S. Subramani, J.), relying on the decision rendered by the Hon''ble Apex Court in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, 1982 (2) AIR SCW 116, has held thus.

"Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of Court, especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the public and the Court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of Courts'' discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not, and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised and exercised only in special cases."

In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, 1998 (3) SCC 573, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held as follows:

"One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the Court is relitigation. It is an abuse of the process of the Court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. A proceeding being filed for a collateral purpose, or a spurious claim being made in litigation may also in a given set of facts amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the Court, especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The Court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and prevent the time of the Public and the Court from being wasted. Undoubtedly, it is a matter of the Courts discretion whether such proceedings should be stopped or not; and this discretion has to be exercised with circumspection. It is a jurisdiction which should be sparingly exercised, and exercised only in special cases. The Court should also be satisfied that there is no chance of the Suit succeeding."

Relying on the decision, K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, 1998 (3) SCC 573, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the First Respondent submitted that the Plaint has to be rejected on the ground of vexatious Suit and further contended that the First Respondent/First Defendant is entitled to claim damages for filing the Suit. However, it is seen that there, no Petition has been filed under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC, seeking an order to reject the Plaint, on the ground that there is no Cause of Action and the Suit is a vexatious one.

It is a well settled proposition of law that at this stage, the Court has to consider, whether there is any prima facie case made out and balance of convenience raised by the Applicant/Plaintiff for granting Interim Injunction, as contemplated under Order 39, Rules 1 & 2, CPC.

It is seen from the supporting materials and the arguments advanced by both the learned Senior Counsel, that the Applicant/Plaintiff had executed the registered Sale Deeds in favour of the First Respondent/D1, a Bank Merely by raising an allegation that the registered Sale Deeds were obtained by the First Respondent-Bank under duress and coercion, without establishing the same, the Applicant Plaintiff cannot convince the Court that there is a prima facie case and as contended by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the First Respondent/D1, the Deeds of Conveyance executed by the Applicant/Plaintiff reads that the possession of the property was handed over to the purchaser, namely, the First Respondent/D1.

After the execution of the Sale Deeds, transfer of title was also effected by the Corporation Authorities. On the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the view that there is no prima facie case made out and the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the Applicant/Plaintiff and hence, both the Applications are liable to be dismissed with costs.

In the result, both the Original Applications in O.A. Nos. 489 & 490 of 2013 are dismissed with costs.