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Judgment
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:-
The present challenge has been preferred against an order whe reby a learned Single Judge of this Court has disposed of the writ petition filed by the present appellants with liberty to the writ petitioners to prefer a statutory appeal under Section 11 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (in short “the 1926 Act”).
Learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioners/appellants argues that the order of the Registrar of Trade Unions dated July 20, 2023, which was impugned before the writ court, is palpably vitiated due to violation of principles of natural justice, primarily inasmuch as no copy of the information purportedly received by the Registrar from the respondent no. 3 was served at any point of time on the appellants , although the same formed a basis of the impugned order.
Learned senior counsel points out that the premise of the adjudication on the said issue was that the minimum requirement of members was not satisfied by the appellant no. 2-Trade Union, by taking into account all the outlets of the Peerless Inn in Kolkata, Hyderabad, Durgapur, Mukutmanipur, Port Blair etc. However, it is submitted that each of the said units are different entities, some of them being governed by different entities altogether. Therefore, all the said units of Peerless could not be clubbed together to assess whether the appellant no.2 met the minimum requirement of members. Since settlements were entered into only between the appellant no.2-Union and the Peerless Inn at Kolkata, the authorities were required to test whether the minimum requirement of membership was met by the appellant no.2 solely in respect of the Kolkata unit of Peerless Inn.
It is pointed out that as such, if the said information, furnished by the Peerless Inn, was intimated to the appellants beforehand, the appellants would have the opportunity to point out to the Registrar of Trade Unions that the observation of the Registrar was bad on such count, since the appellant no. 2 – Trade Union fully satisfied at all points of time the minimum requirement of members, that is 10% or 100, whichever is less, vis-à-vis the Peerless Inn, Kolkata.
Learned senior counsel further argues that on an earlier occasion, a writ petition was preferred by the present appellants against an earlier similar order, which was disposed of vide order dated April 3, 2023. In the said order passed in WPA 29125 of 2022, the learned Single Judge had categorically observed that although ordinarily, taking note of the submissions made on behalf of the State, the court would have directed the petitioners/appellants to file an appeal before the competent authority having jurisdiction, however, taking into consideration the fact that the notice/order passed by the Registrar was a non-speaking order, the remedy of appeal in the opinion of the court could not stand as a bar.
Accordingly, the learned Single Judge, on the earlier occasion, had directed the respondent-authorities to take into consideration the returns filed by the writ petitioners/present appellants in requisite Form H and readjudicate the matter.
It is submitted that such direction was flouted by the present impugned order passed subsequently by the Registrar of Trade Unions, which was under challenge before the writ court at the present instance.
Learned senior counsel submits that the findings of the Registrar of Trade Unions, West Bengal, vide order dated July 20, 2023 traversed beyond the grounds disclosed in the show cause notice, which was confined to non submission of annual returns for more than three years, as opposed to delayed submission of the same.
The other ground cited in the show cause notice was non compliance of Section 9A of the 1926 Act, as amended, pertaining to the minimum membership requirement not being satisfied, which has already been addressed by the earlier arguments of the appellants.
The learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the State, opposes the submissions of the appellants and contends that the order dated July 20, 2023 was not confined to the information which was allegedly not served on the appellants, but also adverted to several other statutory infractions. For example, the annual returns were not submitted by the appellant no. 2-Trade Union for eight successive years between 2014 and 2021 and nine annual returns were filed together at the end of October, 2022, that too by postal delivery.
Moreover, several other discrepancies in the said annual returns, as pointed out in the said order, were also discovered by the authorities, which also formed the ratio of the impugned order of the concerned authority.
In any event, it is argued that the learned Single Judge has merely referred the appellants to the appellate authority, such appeal being an equally efficacious alternative remedy under Section 11 of the 1926 Act, and as such, there was no fault on such count on the part of the learned Single Judge.
Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no. 3 controverts the allegations made by the appellants, to the effect that the respondent no. 3 had not furnished advance copy of the information -in-question to the appellants.
Learned senior counsel takes the court through the order dated July 20, 2023 and argues that despite getting several opportunities, the appellants chose not to be represented before the Registrar of Trade Unions, resulting in the impugned order.
It is further submitted that in view of the appellants having chosen not to attend by proper representation the hearings, it does not li e in the mouth of the appellants to argue that no copy of the information or documents relied on by the authorities were given to them.
Learned senior counsel further argues that the impugned order of the writ court cannot be faulted, since the learned Single Judge not only granted liberty to the appellants to file a proper statutory appeal but also granted further time to do so beyond the statutory limitation period. As such, no right the appellants was violated.
Learned senior counsel next contends that an alternative remedy, if provided by the statute, can be bypassed by interference under Article 226 of the Constitution only under certain specific conditions, including the violation of natural justice, the exercise being beyond jurisdiction or a nullity.
It is submitted that none of the said conditions are satisfied in the present case.
Learned senior counsel, by placing reliance on the relevant portions of the order dated July 20, 2023, also points out that although the hearing of the matter was concluded on June 26, 2023, even thereafter, the appellant no. 2-Trade Union did not turn up with its registers and records as sought by the Registrar of Trade Unions, nor did it submit the annual till the date of the impugned order for the year ended on December 31, 2022, the last date of submission of which was April 30, 2023 as per the Regulations 18 of the Bengal Trade Unions Regulations, 1927.
In view of such multifarious infractions of statutory provisions and norms, it is submitted that the impugned order was justified.
That apart, all the grounds taken before the writ court could very well be taken before the appellate authority.
Upon careful consideration of the arguments of the parties, we find substance in the arguments of the respondents.
Inasmuch as the observations of the learned Single Judge in the earlier writ petition are concerned, those were confined to a direction on the respondent-authorities to consider the returns filed by the appellants. Such direction cannot be construed per se to be a direction on the respondent-authorities to mandatorily accept the same or to validate the said annual returns if they were violative of law.
Moreover, the observation of the learned Single Judge in the earlier round of litigation to the effect that a writ petition was maintainable was tied up with the particular circumstances of the case where, as per the learned Single Judge, there was palpable infraction of natural justice, due to which the earlier order passed by the respondent-authorities was set aside and the matter remanded to the first authority.
However, merely on the strength of such observations, rendered in the factual circumstances in the earlier case, it cannot be said that a writ petition would be maintainable in the present case as well.
In the present instance, the order dated July 20, 2023, which was challenged before the writ court, did not cite only the information, which was allegedly not served upon the appellants, as the basis of the said order but also referred to several other perceived infractions, including the annual returns for eight successive years not being filed in time between 2014 and 2021 as well as several other perceived discrepancies in the returns which were placed before the authority.
Thus, per se, it cannot be said that the impugned order is violative of the earlier direction of the writ court passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court inasmuch as the returns filed by the appellants were indeed considered by the authorities and a reasoned order was passed, holding that those were violative of the law, by citing particular provisions of law.
Insofar as the merits of the order dated July 20, 2023, we are loath to enter into the merits of the same, since any observation thereon would definitely affect the final outcome of the appeal, if any preferred by the appellants against the said order.
Moreover, the limited scope for consideration before us is whether the writ court was justified not entertaining the writ on the ground of availability of the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 11 of the 1926 Act.
In view of our observations to the effect that the order dated July 20, 2023, assailed in the writ petition, was not confined to the information vis-à-vis which violation of natural justice has been alleged but was also based on other statutory infractions, which require a thorough adjudication on facts as well as law, the learned Single Judge, in our view, was justified in observing that an appeal under Section 11 of the 1926 Act would be the appropriate remedy. Such observation was one of the plausible views which could be taken in the facts of the case and cannot, thus, be readily interfered with in an intra-court appeal.
In any event, the scope of an appeal would be much wider than Article 226 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as disputed questions of fact and law can very well be adjudicated in such appeal, including the question of whether the copy of the information ought to have been given to the appellants.
We do not express any opinion on the merits of the matter.
However, in view of the aforesaid findings, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was justified in relegating the appellants to the appellate authority, subject to an appeal being filed by the appellants.
Accordingly, FMA No. 1656 of 2025 is dismissed on contest, thereby affirming the impugned order dated August 14, 2025 passed in WPA No. 16813 of 2025 and granting liberty to the appellants to prefer an appeal under Section 11 of the 1926 Act.
If such an appeal is preferred within thirty days from this date, the same will be decided by the appellate authority in accordance with law upon giving necessary opportunity of hearing to all concerned, independently and without being influenced by any of the observations made hereinabove or in the order impugned before us.
CAN 1 of 2026 is consequentially disposed of as well.
There will be no order as to costs.
Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.
I agree.