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Judgment
M.M. Punchhi, J.—The State of Punjab, in exercise of its executive power, transferred 400 acres of land at Hissar, for a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs to the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Limited, Delhi, a company registered under the Indian Companies Act, vide registered deed dated 3-9-1956. The purpose of transfer was to enable the DCM to set up a Textile Mill but subject to certain terms and conditions as embodied in the deed of transfer. With effect from 1-11-1966, the State of Haryana came into being and Hissar fell within its territory. The Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, was enacted to impose ceilings on the holdings of the landowners and for the purpose a unit of land known as ''permissible area'' was allowed to be kept with the landowner and the surplus was to vest in the State of Haryana. A complete machinery was provided in the Act to determine the surplus area and lay aside the permissible area of the landowner. The task was enjoined on a Prescribed Authority to do the exercise : the crucial cut off date being 24-1-1971, on which date the holding of a particular landowner had to be computed.
In exercise of the power so vested under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972, the Prescribed Authority decided to compute the area in the hands of the DCM and determine surplus area in its hands, if any. The DCM in these circumstances rushed to the Civil Court and obtained an ex-parte interim injunction restraining the Prescribed Authority from proceeding further in the matter. After contest, the interim injunction was vacated. The DCM appealed before the Additional District Judge, Hissar, but to no avail. And now the DCM is, in revision, claiming the interim injunction.
Mr. N C. Jain, Sr. Advocate, appearing for the DCM, has vehemently contended that the petitioner has a prima facie case in its favour for the grant of a temporary injunction for the following reasons :--
1) The State of Punjab, the predecessor of the State of Haryana, itself having transferred the land to the petitioner could not attempt to take it away through the agency of the Prescribed Authority. A kind of an estoppel is pleaded in the same breath.
2) The deed of conveyance itself stipulates that on the breach of conditions, there was a right of resumption with the Government and on the vacation of breach there was a right of restoration. A kind of ouster of jurisdiction of the Collector in these circumstances is pleaded.
3) In the deed of conveyance, there is an arbitration clause, on the strength of which the dispute as to whether the land transferred has been utilised for the purposes of the Mill or not, can properly be gone into. A kind of ouster of jurisdiction is pleaded against the Prescribed Authority in its effort to determine whether the land with the petitioner falls within the definition of land under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972; and
4) the Civil Court alone is competent to determine the question whether the land in dispute is or is not ''land'' for the purposes of ceiling law and whether the revenue records prepared by the State relating to the crucial date of 24-1-1971 reflect the true state of affairs. Here, the ex facie wrong entries of the Jamabandi continuing the State of Haryana to be owner of the land in dispute is pleaded.
Neither of the reasons appeals to me despite abundant vehemence with which they have been pressed into service. The Government of Haryana, in exercise of its executive powers, transferred the land to the petitioner at one point of time. This does not mean that for ever the land had a protective umbrella from any subsequent legislation. In a democracy, the ultimate power is with the people and the people exercise it through their duly elected government in accordance with their Constitution. Here, the executive is in no position to flout the legislature. The legislature is alone the competent body to pass laws and have them carried out from the executive. The State of Haryana having passed the ceiling law, in exercise of its legislative functions, has the duty and the mandate to carry it out in exercise of its executive functions. Thus, the Prescribed Authority, who is a statutory authority under the ceiling law, has the power to examine and compute the holding of the petitioner and see if there is any surplus area with it. For the purpose of ceiling law, the definition of ''land'' is as follows :--
3 "(g) "land" means land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village and is occupied or has been let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture, and includes--
(a) the sites of buildings and other structures on such land, and
(b) banjar land;
Now, if the land of the DCM is occupied as a building, which term, I suppose, has to be construed liberally, then the land with the petitioner would not fall within the definition of the word ''land'' as known to the ceiling law. That is for the Prescribed Authority to determine in the first instance. But if there is land which is occupied or has been let out for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture, or for pasture and has been put to other exclusive uses as known to the ceiling law, then again it is for the Prescribed Authority to determine That such determination is exclusively within his domain is clear from the provisions of the ceiling law. Its order is appealable and revisable respectively before the Commissioner and Financial Commissioner under the Act. Section 26 thereof clearly bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with any matter which under the Act is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector or the Prescribed Authority. In view of this clear cut provision creating a specific jurisdiction in the hierarchy of officers known to the ceiling law, it is idle for the petitioner to contend that it is for the Civil Court to determine the question whether the land in possession of the petitioner falls within the meaning of the word ''land'' used in the ceiling law. If this base is knocked out, the other reasons fall like a house of cards. In an analogous context, the Supreme Court in Custodian of Evacuee Property Punjab and Others Vs. Jafran Begum, while considering the scope of section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, held that no Court can entertain any suit or adjudicate upon any question whether a particular property or right to or interest therein is or is not evacuee property. In the same sense, no Court can adjudicate upon the question whether a particular piece of land is or is not ''land'' within the meaning of the ceiling Act, except the Prescribed Authority and the Officers in the hierarchy, conferred with appellate'' and revisional powers.
A light advertence is needed to the clauses in the conveyance deed, in which suggestedly there are powers of resumption and a reference of disputes to an Arbitrator. All these matters do not touch even remotely the legislative measures and action which might operate in the future. That aspect cannot be allowed to cloud the issue in the instant case. That aspect has a narrow confine to govern the interests of the contracting parties in that field and none other. It is quite possible that the executive power of the State under the conveyance may even tend to go supplemental to the legislative action, but it can in no way obstruct it for any reason. In the same breath, it need be observed, as in relation to the other argument, that, the entries in the revenue records, though raise presumption of varying degrees, are nevertheless rebuttable. In these matters, the nature of jurisdiction conferred on the Prescribed Authority would have it determined by it and then conclude whether on the crucial date there was any land with the petitioner coming within the definition of the ceiling law and how much'' of it was surplus to be retrieved from it.
Besides the aforesaid reasoning, to deny the interim injunction to, the petitioner, there is the salutary rule that no temporary injunction can be issued against a statutory authority performing its statutory functions. No case has been brought to my notice in which ever such an injunction has been granted to restrain a statutory authority to stop obeying the mandate of the law which created it. Rather, that would be contrary even to the spirit of section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, for an injunction cannot be granted to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceedings in a Court not subordinate to that from which an injunction is sought. The injunction in the instant case has been sought not only against the Prescribed Authority for not undertaking the enquiry but in a sense against the State of Haryana too to stop prosecuting it before that authority. Such a course is not permissible under the law. The effort of the petitioner has thus to be scuttled.
For the foregoing reasons, this petition is utterly devoid of merit. Accordingly, it is dismissed with costs. However, it is observed that the discussion aforemade is meant to govern the fate of the interim injunction and none other.