Tribunals and CommissionsFull Bench(2026) 11 ITAT CK 1668

DCIT vs PC Jeweller Ltd.

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal · Decided on 4 November 2026

RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
ITA No. 3576/Del/2024

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Judgment

203 paragraphs · 19,137 words

Per Satbeer Singh Godara, Judicial Member:

This Revenue’s appeal for Assessment Year 2017-18, arises against the CIT(A)/NFAC, Delhi’s DIN & order No. ITBA/NFAC/S/250/2024-25/1065664311(1) dated 14.06.2024, in proceedings u/s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”).

2.

Heard both the parties at length. Case file perused.

3.

This Revenue’s appeal raises the following substantive grounds:

“1.

Whether, on the facts and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in holding the excise duty subsidy as capital receipts on the basis of various judicial pronouncements without appreciating the provisions of Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act which stipulates that any assistance in the form of subsidy by central/state government to the assessee is income i.e. revenue in nature."

2.

"Whether on the facts of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in holding that the word "Exemption’" is not included in the ambit of the definition of the section 2(24)(x) of the Income Tax Act inserted by Finance Act, 2015."

3.

"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in accepting the additional ground for treatment of excise subsidy as capital receipts whereas the assessee company has Itself the same as revenue in nature in the AY 2010-11 to AY 2015-16 and in the Instant AY 2016- 17 and also not revised the claim by the way of filing of revised ITR."

4.

"Whether on the fats and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in allowing the claim of the assessee in treating the share issue expenses as revenue in nature, which is in contravention to the provisions of section 35D of the Act, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case without appreciation that this issue is sub-judice before the Hon'ble High Court."

4.

Both the parties at this stage inform us at the outset that the Revenue’s above extracted substantive grounds are no more res integra being in the nature of recurring issue which stand settled in the tribunal recent order dated 06.06.2025 in it’s twin appeal ITA No. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 in assessment years 2015-16 and 2016-17 as under:

“3.

The Revenue has raised following grounds of appeal:

1.

Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld.CIT(A) was right in allowing the claim of the assessee in treating the share issue expenses as revenue in nature, which is in contravention to the provisions of Section 35D of the Act, relying on the decision of the Hon'ble ITAT in assessee's own case without appreciation that this issue is sub-judice before the Hon'ble High Court?

2.

Whether on the facts of the case and in law, the Ld.CIT(A) was right in holding the excise duty subsidy as capital receipts whereas the same was received on revenue account and not for the purpose of acquiring any capital asset?

3.

Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld.CIT(A) was right in accepting the additional ground for treatment of excise subsidy as capital receipt whereas the assessee company has itself been showing the same as revenue in nature in the AY 2010-11 to Α.Υ. 2014-15 and in the instant A.Y 2015-16 and also not revised the claim by way of filing of revised ITR?

4.

Whether on the facts of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was correct in condoning the delay of 1537 days without any reasonable cause?

4.

The facts of the cases are that the assessee is a public limited company engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of jewellery. It has filed his return of income for Assessment Year 2015-16 on 30.11.2015 declaring total income at ₹ 4,22,28,69,410/-under the normal provisions of the Act and book profit of ₹ 3,78,22,63,064/-under section 115JB of the Act. The Return of income filed by the assessee was processed under Section 143(1) of the Act by and under the intimation dated 24.07.2016 at the same return of income of ₹ 4,22,28,69,410/-under the normal provisions of the Act and book profit of ₹ 5,39,31,62,130/-under Section 115JB of the Act. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said order under intimation the assessee preferred an appeal and wherein and under the order dated 14.03.2024 Ld. CIT(A) allowed the appeal. Relevant to mention that the additional ground raised by the appellant before the Ld. CIT(A) to this effect that the excise duty exemption is a capital receipt was allowed by the Ld. CIT(A). Against the said order the revenue is in appeal before us.

5.

The Revenue is in appeal in respect of the claim of expenditure incurred on initial public offer (IPO) under Section 35D of the Act in computing total income under the normal provisions of the Act which has been allowed by the Ld. CIT(A) following the order passed by the ITAT in assessee’s own case. In this respect the assessee made the following submissions before the Ld. CIT(A):

“1.1

During the A.Y. 2013-14, the appellant raised Rs. 601.28 crores by issue of share capital to the public through Initial Public offer (IPO). In connection with the issue, the appellant incurred expenditure aggregating to Rs. 38 crores.

1.2

Out of the total proceeds of Rs. 601.28 crores, the appellant incurred Rs. 41.02 crores on setting up of new showrooms, Rs. 475.83 crores for the procurement of Inventory, Rs. 46.43 crores for General corporate purposes and balance Rs. 38 crores for the share issue expenses.

1.3

From the perusal of the above it can be seen that the appellant has utilized 92% of the receipts on account of public issue on working capital and balance 8% was spent on capital expenditure.

1.4

The appellant claimed Rs. 60.80 lacs [1/5th of Rs. 3.04 crores (being 8% of the share issue expenses i.e. 38 crores)] to be allowed as deduction in each of the five successive previous years (commencing from A.Y. 2013-14) u/s 35D of the Act as an additional ground before Hon'ble ITAT. Hon'ble ITAT in the appellant's own case has allowed the aforesaid claim of the appellant vide order dated 07-12-2021. Copy of the order is attached as Annexure- 2. (Refer page no. 15 to 42 of PB).

1.5

The assessment year under consideration i.e. A.Y. 2015-16 is the 3rd year to claim 1/5th of the said expenditure as allowable in computing deduction u/s 35D of the Act. The appellant wishes to claim deduction of 1/5th of the said expenditure u/s 35D of the Act.”

6.

Considering the order passed by the ITAT in assessee’s own case for assessment year 2013-14 and 2014-15 in ITA No. 6649/D/2017 and 6650/D/2017, wherein the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court was duly taken care of, the Ld. CIT(A) granted the relief to the assessee by allowing the said claim with the following observation:

“The order of the Hon'ble ITAT in the appellant's own case filed by the appellant has been perused. The Hon'ble ITAT while deciding the same issue for previous AYs has referred to various judgments of coordinate branch ITAT, High Court and Supreme Court. The Hon'ble ITAT gave following decision on the issue:

"Hence, the claim of the assessee that the expenditure is in the nature of revenue expenses and hence allowable u/s 37(1) of the Act for the years in appeal in computing the total income under the normal provisions of the act as the fund raised is used as working capital by the company except an amount of Rs. 41.02 crores. As the assessee has utilised 92% of receipts on account of public issue on working capital and hence 92% of Rs.38 crores of share issue expenditure would be revenue expenditure and balance 8% of share issue expenditure which was spent on capital expenditure would not be treated as revenue expenditure. The proceeds utilized for capital expenditure, is allowable u/s 35D of the Act. Appeal of the assessee on this ground is allowed."

In view of the fact that the exactly similar issue has already been dealt in detail by Hon'ble ITAT as mentioned above, I agree with the decision taken by ITAT and hence the claim of appellant is accepted. In the result, ground no. 3 raised by the appellant is allowed.”

7.

Having regard to the observation made by the Ld. CIT(A) keeping in view the order passed by the Coordinate Bench of ITAT in assessee’s own case and further the order passed by the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court and the Hon’ble Apex Court on identical issue, the order impugned is found to be just and proper so as to not warrant any interference. This ground of 7 ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 C.O. Nos. 67 & 96/Del/2024 appeal as raised by the Revenue therefore fails. This ground of appeal is applied mutatis mutandis in Assessment Year 2016-17 having regard to the identical facts and circumstances of the matter.”

5.

The Revenue is equally fair in not specifically pin pointing any distinction on facts or law, being identical in all these assessment years. We thus adopt the learned above co-ordinate bench detailed discussion mutatis mutandis to reject the Revenue substantive ground raised herein in very terms. Ordered accordingly.

6.

This Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.

PER AVDHESH KUMAR MISHRA, AM:

7.

I am unable to persuade myself with the finding of the Ld. Brother in the draft order in case of DCIT, Circle-19(l), CR Building, IP Estate, New Delhi Vs. P C Jewellers Ltd., C-54, Preet Vihar, Vikas Marg, New Delhi [ITA No,3576/Del/2024], wherein he dismissed the Revenue’s appeal by holding that the case in hand is squarely covered by the coordinate bench decision in the case of assessee in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 [order dated 06.06.2025]. The draft order neither discusses the facts of the case nor the relevant laws to hold that how the decision of coordinate bench in the case of assessee in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 would apply mutatis mutandis in this appeal. The case was heard and pronouncement unilaterally hardly 3 minutes after the Ld. Authorized Representative (‘AR’) of assessee, at outset, submitted that the case was covered by the decision of coordinate bench in the case of assessee in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 before the Revenue submit facts and present its case as it is Revenue’s appeal. In such situation, it is our duty, being final fact finding authority, to cull out the full facts of the case for proper appreciation before applying correct provisions of the Act on facts of the case in hand.

8.

The first issue raised by the Revenue (Ground Nos. 1 and 3) is that whether the excise duty subsidy is income chargeable to tax under section 2(24) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘Act’) being revenue in nature. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of in Chaphalkar Brothers in Civil Appeals Nos. 6513-6514 of 2012 reinforces the principle laid in its earlier judgments that the “purpose test” is the determinative factor for the nature of any subsidy, incentive, etc., irrespective of the form in which it is granted. However, it is pertinent to note that the Finance Act, 2015 [relevant for financial year (FY) 2016-17 onwards] has amended the definition of income to bring parity with the provisions of Income Computation and Disclosure Standards (ICDS). The new definition includes any assistance in the form of subsidy/grant/cash, etc., received from the government as income for the purposes of the Act, if not reduced from the cost of assets in accordance with the provision of Explanation 10 to Section 43(1) of the Act. Thus, the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is of no relevance for subsidies granted after FY 2015- 16. The present case is of the AY 2017-18. Hence, any decision on this issue pertaining to AY 2016-17 and prior to that has no relevance due to amendment in the law made in the definition of income under section 2(24) of the Act by the Finance Act, 2015. A new sub-clause (xviii) was inserted to the said section which came into force w.e.f. 01.04.2016 and shall accordingly apply to AY 2016-17 onwards. As per the amendment, assistance of any sort (by whatever name called) given by the Central Government or a State. Government or any authority or body or agency, shall be considered as income of the assessee except where the assistance is taken into account .for determination of actual cost of asset in accordance with the provision of Explanation 10 to Section 43(1) of the Act. The sub-clause (xviii) to Section 2(24) of the Act as inserted by FA 2015 was amended by the Finance Act, 2016, where one more exception was inserted that the subsidy or grant received by the Central Government for the purpose of the corpus of a trust/institution established by the Central or State Government, shall 'not be considered as income. Further, there is no distinction in the nature/kinds of assistances for considering the same as income of an assessee under Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act. Therefore, all sorts of subsidy received by an assessee from the specified persons, irrespective of its nature as capital or revenue is taxable as income of the assessee unless the same falls in the exclusion category.

9.

The amendment under Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act has been made in order to align the provision of Income Computation and Disclosure Standard - VII, Governments Grants (ICDS-VII’) with the provisions of the Act. ICDS-VII is applicable w.e.f. AY 2017-18 and hence, from the said AY, for computing income under the Act, the government grants shall be recognised and dealt with as per the said ICDS. As per ICDS-VII, Govt. grant shall not be recognized until there is reasonable assurance that the person in receipt of the Govt. grant shall comply with the conditions attached to such subsidy. In order to align the recognition principles laid in various ICDS with the provisions of the Act, section 145B of the Act was inserted vide the Finance Act, 2018. As per clause (3) of section 145B of the Act, income referred in sub-clause (xviii) of section 2(24) of the Act shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in which it is received, if it is not charged to income tax in earlier year. Therefore, section 145B(3) of the Act provides that subsidy should be deemed to be the income of the year in which it is received which may have not accrued. The assessee has to recognize receipt of subsidy in the books of accounts as per Accounting Standard-12 or Indian Accounting Standard-20. ICDSs are applicable only for the purpose of computation of taxable income whereas Accounting Standards are applicable for the purpose of the maintenance of books of accounts; therefore, the recognition of subsidy by an assessee in its books of account does not match with the recognition under the provisions of the Act read with ICDS-VII.

10.

In view of the above and the amendment in definition of income under section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act with effect from 01st April, 2016 (A.Y. 2016-17), any subsidy in any form under any nomenclature is held taxable in the hands of the assessee. Therefore, the decision of coordinate bench on this issue in case of the assessee in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 order dated 06.06.2025 is held to have no relevance and thus, the same is not applicable in the case in hand. Consequentially, the Revenue’s Ground Nos. 1 and 3 that the excise duty subsidy is income chargeable to tax under section 2(24) of the Act and the same is revenue in nature are allowed as above. Ordered accordingly.

11.

The next issue raised by the Revenue in Ground No. 2 is that “whether on the facts of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) was right in holding that the word ‘Exemption’ is not included in the ambit of the definition of the section 2(24((x) of the Income Tax Act inserted by Finance Act, 2015”. It is evident from the perusal of the order of coordinate bench in case of the assessee in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 as reproduced in the draft order by my Ld. Brother that this issue has not been raised by the Revenue in the said appeal ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024. Therefore, I am in complete disagreement with the Ld. Brother that the decision of coordinate bench on this issue in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3O84/Del/2024 will apply mutatis mutandis in this appeal. Neither the Ld. CIT-DR nor the Ld. AR touched this issue. Therefore, this issue is left open.

12.

The last issue raised by the Revenue in Ground No. 4 is that whether IPO Expenses are allowable in proportionate with the nature of expenditure; capital or revenue under section 35D of the Act. This issue has been decided by the coordinate bench in favour of the assessee in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024. But I am not in agreement with the said decision. Subsection (2) of Section 35D of the Act enumerates the expenses that qualify for amortization. Clause(c)(iv) of this sub-section is particularly relevant for companies issuing shares or debentures to the public. The relevant part of section 35D of the Act reads as under:

“35D (1) Where an assessee, being an Indian company or a person (other than a company) who is resident in India, incurs, after the 31st day of March, 1970, any expenditure specified in sub-section (2),—

(2)

The expenditure referred to in sub-section (1) shall be the expenditure specified in any one or more of the following clauses, namely :—

(c)

where the assessee is a company, also expenditure—

(iv)

in connection with the issue, for public subscription, of shares in or debentures of the company, being underwriting commissions brokerage and charges for draftings typing? printing and advertisement of the prospectus;”

13.

Section 35D of the Act deals with the amortisation of certain expenses incurred on public subscription of shares or debentures, over a period of five years subject to certain conditions. The provision lists specific expenses which are covered within its ambit: ‘being underwriting commission, brokerage and charges for drafting, typing, printing and advertisement of the prospectus’. The Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Shree Synthetics Ltd. 162 ITR 819 (MP) (decision dated 22.08.2006) held that the term “being” used in the provision is illustrative, thereby permitting a broader range of the IPO related expenses to qualify for deduction. On the other hand, the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Ashok Leyland Ltd. (T.C (A) Nos. 1253, 1254, and 1256 of 2005) following its decision in the case of Adar Tea Products Company [2009] 314 ITR 38 has held that “the assessee’s proposal to expand production capacity qualifies as an extension of an industrial undertaking under section 35D, entitling the assessee to amortisation of certain preliminary expenses related to such expansion. The word “being” in section 35D(2)(c)(iv) of the Act is restrictive, limiting deductible expenditure to only those specifically enumerated (underwriting commission, brokerage, and charges related to the prospectus), thereby excluding other Euro issue expenses from amortisation. The appeals filed by both the Revenue and. the assessee (T.C (A) Nos. 1253, 1254, and 1256 of2005) are dismissed, with directions to the Assessing Officer to recompute deductions strictly in accordance with these interpretations. ” The Hon’ble Madras Court specifically disregarded the above-mentioned decision of the Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court. It also referred to section 35D(2)(d) of the Act, which provides that any other qualifying expenses must be notified by the CBDT. This interpretation of Hon’ble Madras High Court was affirmed by the Kerala High Court in the case of Kerala Chemicals & Proteins Ltd. in ITA No. 245 of 2009 & 88 of 2009 (order dated 26.08.2016).

14.

In view of contra decisions of the Hon’ble High Courts on this issue, I do not subscribe the view of the coordinate bench decision in the case of assessee in hand. The issue of claim under section 35D and 37 of the Act was dealt by the coordinate bench in its decision in ITA No. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 in the case of assessee. I have gone through many decisions of the Hon’ble High Courts and the coordinate bench decision in this case in ITA No. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024. The coordinate bench, in this case in ITA No. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 has categorically held that the 92% of IPO expenses of Rs.38 Crores is revenue expenditure on the reasoning that 92% of share capital received in IPO has been utilized for business in setting of new showroom and procurement of stock-in-trade. Accordingly, the coordinate bench allowed 92% of IPO expenses of Rs.38 Crores under section 37 of the Act in the year of expenditure and remaining 8% of IPO expenses of Rs.38 Crores has been held as capital expenditure allowable under section 35D of the Act in 5 years. The case in hand is of 5th year of amortization of expenses under section 35D of the Act.

15.

The major issue of allowability of 92% of IPO expenses of Rs.38 Crores under section 37 of the Act is not an issue in the year. Here, the issue is in respect of l/5th of 8% of IPO expenses of Rs.38 Crores under section 35D of the Act. According to me, bifurcation of IPO expenses of Rs.38 Crores into two heads based on the nature of utilization of share capital receipt in IPO is not justified as the share capital is in the nature of capital receipt and that is why it does not get reflected in the Trading Account and Profit & Loss Account. I am of the considered view that the utilization of share capital should not be determinative factor for nature of IPO expenditure as it gives convoluted interpretation of law. The provisions of section 35D of the Act, being specific provisions dealing with the IPO expenses, have to prevail over the general provisions of the Act. The IPO expenditure is capital expenditure and that is why the same is found mentioned under section 35D of the Act. Therefore, the IPO expenditure specified under section 35D of the Act can be allowed therein otherwise not. Section 37 of the Act allows a deduction for any expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business or profession, provided it is not capital or personal in nature, and not covered under other provisions. Here, the IPO expenses are specifically covered under section 35D of the Act. The case of Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. (PSIDC) is a landmark decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court 225 ITR 792 that has clarified the tax treatment of expenses, particularly the fees paid to the Registrar of Companies (ROC) for increasing authorized share capital. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PSIDC (supra) has held that the fees paid to the ROC for the enhancement of share capital are capital expenditure and it is not the revenue expenditure. Therefore, the IPO expenses are not deductible from profits under the general provisions of section 37(1) of the Act. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PSIDC (supra) has held that while share issue expenses are generally capital in nature, they may be eligible for amortization as "preliminary expenses" under Section 35D of the Act, but only if specific conditions are met. For expenses related to share capital to qualify for deduction under section 35D of the Act, they must be incurred for specific purposes. Qualifying expenses under section 35D of the Act can be amortized and claimed as a deduction in five equal annual instalments, up to a limit of 5% of the project's cost or the capital employed in the business. It was emphasized that the direct link to capital expansion overrides any ancillary advantage to the business.

16.

The coordinate bench in its decision in ITA No. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 has followed it earlier decision in this case. In this case the coordinate bench is particularly instructive, as it permitted a proportionate deduction of IPO expenses based on the portion of proceeds earmarked for working capital, provided the taxpayer could substantiate the utilization. It may be pertinent to note that in this case the Tribunal took into consideration the ruling of the Supreme Court in Brooke Bond 225 ITR 798. However, the facts of the case Brooke Bond and reference made by the ITAT to the Hon’ble High Court, according to me, is held distinguishable and thus is of no relevance here as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the IPO expenses is ‘capital’ in nature, however, a more recent line of judicial reasoning supports the view that where share issue proceeds are used for working capital or operational needs, the related expenses may be treated as ‘revenue’ in nature and thus deductible under Section 37. This appears to be a more logical and rational approach. However, this position is not free from doubt, and therefore any expense claim made by the companies should be backed by clear documentation demonstrating the end-use of funds, and care must be taken to exclude expenses that are specifically treated as capital.

17.

Subject to above and following the decision of the coordinate bench in allowing 8% of IPO expenses of Rs.38 Crores under section 35D of the Act in the case in hand in the relevant year, the ground No. 4 raised by the Revenue is dismissed. Ordered accordingly.

18.

In the result, the appeal of the Revenue is partly allowed.

19.

It was in this factual backdrop that hon’ble President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, in exercise of his powers u/s. 255(4) of the Act, made reference to the ‘Third Member’, who has decided the same as under : -

PER MAHAVIR SINGH, VICE PRESIDENT (AS THIRD MEMBER):

By the order of President, ITAT vide U.O. No.F.28-Cent.Jd/Ad/AT/2025 dated 23.03.2026, the undersigned has been nominated to adjudicate the difference of opinion between the learned Accountant Member and learned Judicial Member.

2.

The first issue raised by learned Judicial Member as well as learned Accountant Member on the issue of pronouncing of order vide different questions, whether in the given facts and circumstances of the case, the order is pronounced unilaterally and in haste without hearing the Revenue i.e. the appellant and further each ground is decided or not separately before pronouncing the order. For this Ld. Judicial Member has framed the following question:-

2.

Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in light of the fact that the bench had admittedly pronounced the final outcome in the Revenue’s appeal herein at the conclusion of the hearing on 01.10.2025 as “dismissed”, a different view could be allowed to be taken thereafter without putting parties to notice regarding any subsequent change of opinion?

3.

However, Ld. Accountant Member has raised the following question nos. 1 & 4:

1.

Whether in law and facts, it is justified to pronounce the decision unilaterally in haste without hearing the appellant Revenue first and appreciating the full facts of the case and law?

4.

Whether in law and facts, it is justified to not decide each ground of appeal of the appellant separately before pronouncing the decision in the Bench?

4.

Brief facts of the case are that the assessee is a Public Limited Company and is in the business of manufacturing and trading of jewellery. For the assessment year under consideration i.e. AY 2017-18, the assessee filed its return of income on 30.11.2017. The assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny assessment u/s. 143(3) read with section 144 of the Income Tax Act 1961(herein after ‘the Act’) and AO passed the assessment order dated 10.05.2021. The said assessment order was challenged before the Ld. CIT(A) by raising the ground claiming excise duty exemption to be treated as capital receipt. The Ld. CIT(A) vide his order dated 14.06.2024 deleted the disallowance and allowed the Additional Ground raised by the assessee by holding that excise duty exemption is capital receipt. Aggrieved, revenue came in appeal before the Tribunal. The Appeal for AY 2017-18 i.e. the present appeal was finally heard by the ‘C’ Bench on 01.10.2025 and unanimously dismissed the appeal of the Revenue by pronouncing its decision in the Open Court. The contents of the said order sheet dated 01.10.2025 read as under:-

“The Appeal was called out today and heard by the Bench constituted by Bench: C Shri Satbeer Singh Godara, Judicial Member 7 Shri Avdhesh Kumar Mishra, Accountant Member

संगठित न्यायपीठ द्वारा अपील/ विविध आवेदन/ स्थगन आवेदन को आज बुला या गया और सुनाया।

01-Oct-2025 Assessee represented by: Sh. S.S. Nagar, CA & Sh. Gaurav Sachdeva, CA (Wednesday) Department represented by: Sh. D.S. Sidhu, CIT-DR

HEARD Appeal is heard and dismissed.

Order pronounced in the open Court.

Sd/-Sd/-AVDHESH KUMAR MISHRA SATBEER SINGH GODARA ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER”

4.1

Thereafter, Ld. Judicial Member drafted the order and placed the same before the Ld. Accountant Member on 06.10.2025. Learned Accountant Member vide his dissent order dated NIL consisting of 10 pages which was transmitted by covering letter dated 16-01-2026. Consequently on this dissent order of learned Accountant Member, learned Judicial Member framed question for reference to Third Member on difference of opinion on 13-02-2026 and the same was forwarded to ld. Accountant Member. The learned Accountant Member vide his covering letter dated 19-02-2026 transmitted the questions framed i.e. different set of questions. The questions framed by the learned Judicial Member as well as learned Accountant Member on the issue of pronouncement of order are reproduced above vide para nos. 2 & 3 of this order respectively on this issue of pronouncement. Learned counsel for the assessee brought to my notice the statutory scheme and procedure governing the appeal before the Tribunal which is summarized hereunder:-

“Section 253 of the Act provides for appeal to the Tribunal and the contents of memorandum of appeal and documents to be accompanied with the appeal is prescribed under rule 8 & 9 of the Income-Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 [‘the Rules’];

(i)

Section 254 of the Act states how the order of Tribunal is |to be passed, the relevant portion is reproduced hereunder:

“Orders of Appellate Tribunal.

254.

(1) The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the par-ties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit.

2)

The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within six months from the end of the month in which the order was passed, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer : Provided that an amendment which has the effect of enhancing an assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee, shall not be made under this sub-section unless the Appellate Tribunal has given notice to the assessee of its intention to do so and has allowed the assessee a reasonable opportunity of being heard: ……”

(iii)

Section 255 of the Act, prescribes the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal, the relevant portion is thereof is reproduced hereunder:

“Procedure of Appellate Tribunal.

(255)

(1) The powers and functions of the Appellate Tribunal may be exercised and discharged by Benches constituted by the President of the Appellate Tribunal from among the members thereof. ………….. ………….

(4)

If the members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point, the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority, but if the members are equally divided, they shall state the point or points on which they differ, and the case shall be referred by the President of the Appellate Tribunal for hearing on such point or points by one or more of the other members of the Appellate Tribunal, and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the members of the Appellate Tribunal who have heard the case, including those who first heard it.

(5)

Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure and the procedure of Benches thereof in all matters arising out of the exercise of its powers or of the discharge of its functions, including the places at which the Benches shall hold their sittings. ………”

(iv)

Rule 33 of the Rules states that the proceedings before Tribunal shall be open to public, however, discretion is vested with the Tribunal to direct that the proceedings will not be open to public.

(v)

Rule 34 of the Rules prescribes that the order of Tribunal is to be pronounced signed and dated, relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

“(1)

The order of the Bench shall be in writing and shall be signed and dated by the Members constituting it.

(2)

The Members constituting the Bench or, in the event of their absence by retirement or otherwise, the Vice-President, Senior Vice-President or the President may mark an order as fit for publication.

(3)

Where a case is referred under sub-section (4) of section 255, the order of the Member or Members to whom it is referred shall be signed and dated by him or them, as the case may be.

(4)

Bench shall pronounce its orders in the Court.

(5)

The pronouncement may be in any of the following manners:

(a)

The Bench may pronounce the order immediately upon the conclusion of the hearing.

(b)

In case where the order is not pronounced immediately on the conclusion of the hearing, the Bench shall give a date for pronouncement.

(c)

in a case where no date of pronouncement is given by the Bench, every endeavour shall be made by the Bench to pronounce the order within 60 days from the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case, the Bench shall fix a future day for pronouncement of the order, and such date shall not ordinarily be a day beyond a further period of 30 days and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given on the notice board.

However, where the Bench is not functioning or for any other good reason the pronouncement of order in the Court is not possible or practicable, a list of such order(s) shall be prepared duly signed by the Members showing the result of the appeal and the same would be put on the Notice Board of the Bench and it shall be deemed pronouncement of the order.”

4.2

The Learned counsel for the assessee elaborate his arguments on the issue of pronouncement of order in the open court and argued that the order is pronounced in the open court and the order had become operative and cannot be altered thereafter. He narrated the facts that in the present case i.e. in Revenue’s appeal, the order for dismissal was pronounced in the open court on 01-10-2025 and the said order sheet was duly signed by both the Ld. Members. For the sake of ready reference, the contents of the recording of the order sheet dated 01.10.2025 is reproduced in para 4 of this order.

4.3

He further argued that pursuant to the unanimous pronouncement in the open court and delivering thereof, there is no ambiguity regarding the outcome of appeal before the Tribunal. However, the detailed order was not uploaded on the website of the Tribunal for a long time and to assessee’s utter surprise vide reply dated 20.02.2026, it was communicated that copies of difference of opinion be issued to the parties after nomination of Third Member. He argued that apparently such reply was in clear contradiction of the unanimous decision delivered by the Bench on 01.10.2025. Learned counsel for the assessee stated that in terms of section 254(1) of the Act read with Rule 34 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963(herein after ‘the Rules’), the said order has become operative and could not have been altered thereafter. He further stated that although the Tribunal is a quasi-judicial authority, but the same is bound by the aforesaid statutory provisions and the general jurisprudence of natural justice and conduct of Court is squarely applicable to the same. So the learned counsel for the assessee stated that the position in law is settled that the judgment is a final decision of the Court intimated to the parties by formal pronouncement or delivery of decision in open court. He argued that it is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial manner and the decision which is pronounced and delivered in the open court is a declaration of the minds of the courts as it is at the time of pronouncement. For this, he relied on the following decisions:-

i)

Surendra Singh &Ors. Vs. State of UP (2 SCC 468)

ii) Vinod Kumar Singh vs. Banaras Hindu University (1 SCC 80).

iii) Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 21.10.2024 in the case of Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmar and Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 11000 of 2024.

iv) Judgement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fakir Mamad Suleman Suneja & Ors. Vs. Adani Ports and Special Economic Zones Ltd. and Ors. (MA No. 1276 of 2006) in Civil Appeal No. 536 of 2026.

v)

Judgement of Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of Malaya Ranjan Dash vs. State of Odhisda (WP(C) 28874/2023.

vi) Judgement of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of KripaShanker Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2017 ALL MR (Cri) Journal 492)

5.

On the other hand, Ld. CIT(DR) argued that the assessee has challenged this order sheet entry before the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in WP(C) 7128/2026, CM APPL. 34911/2026 & CM Appl. 34912/2026 and the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 21.05.2026. According to the CIT (DR) in the present case before me, the order is not yet pronounced, due to dissent views among the Hon’ble Members on the issue of pronouncement as well as on merits also. Ld. CIT (DR) further argued that Ld. AM has clearly brought out in the very question framed that the pronouncement of decision was unilaterally and in haste without hearing the revenue first and without appreciating the full facts of the case and law. When a query was put to Ld. CIT (DR) whether any objection was raised at the time of pronouncement of the order by the Revenue and subsequently any time, he could not reply and could not controvert either by evidence or by filing of affidavit that the pronouncement of decision on that very date was objected to at that point of time.

6.

I have heard the rival contentions on the issue and gone through the facts of the case. I noted that vide order sheet entry dated 01.10.2025 revenue’s appeal was heard and dismissed and the said decision was unanimously pronounced in the open court on that very date and signed by both the Members. However, Ld. AM contradicted in his order by observing as under (relevant portion in para 1 at page 1 of the order of ld. AM):-

“…………….The case was heard and pronouncement unilaterally hardly in 3 minutes after the Ld. Authorised Representative (AR) of assessee, at outset, submitted that the case was covered by the decision of Coordinate Bench in the case of the assessee in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 before the Revenue submit facts and present its case as it is Revenue’s appeal. In such situation, it is our duty, being final fact finding authority, to cull out the full facts of the case for proper appreciation before applying correct provisions of the Act on facts of the case in hand.”

7.

In this regard, it is to be noted that in the order sheet on conclusion of hearing on 01.10.2025 the revenue’s appeal was heard and dismissed and the order was pronounced in the open court which is signed by the Ld. AM as well as Ld. JM. The relevant order pronouncing the appeal heard and dismissed is reproduced in para 4 above. Admittedly, there is nothing on record showing any objection raised by the Ld. AM at that point of time i.e. at the time of hearing rather he signed the order sheet entry dismissing the appeal. Subsequently, Ld. JM after authoring the final order, placed the same before the Ld. AM on 06.10.2025. Ld. AM wrote his dissent order in 10 pages and transmitted to the Ld. JM on 19.02.2026 along with the drafted questions for reference to Third Member. It does not transpire from record or order of Ld. AM that any discussion on draft order was done with Ld. JM.

8.

Now the question arises whether the Tribunal can turn back and state that the order was not pronounced in the open court immediately after conclusion of hearing or can unilaterally reverse the same once pronounced. The jurisprudence on this is available in the case of Surendra Singh &Ors. (Supra). Ld Counsel for the assessee took us through para no. 7 to 10 of the said judgement, which reads as under:-

7.

These rules provide for four different situations: (1) for judgments which are pronounced at once as soon as the case has been heard; (2) for those which are pronounced on some future date, (3) for judgments which are oral, and (4) for those which are written. These rules use the word "pronounced" in some places and "delivered" in others. Counsel tried to make capital out of this and said that a judgment had to be both "pronounced" and "delivered" and that they were two different things.

8.

We do not intend to construe these rules too technically because they are designed, as indeed are all rules, to further the ends of justice and must not be viewed too narrowly; nor do we desire to curtail the jurisdiction which the Privy Council point out is inherent in courts to make good inherent defects caused by accidents such as death. As this decision of the Judicial Committee was relied on in the arguments we will quote the passage which is relevant here. It is at page 295 of Firm Gokal Chand v. Firm NandRam(1). The facts are not the same as here because the judgment was actually delivered in open court and both the judges who constituted the Bench were present and concurred in it. But before it could be signed, one Judge went on leave. (1) A.I.R. 1938 P.C. 292.The rules required the judgment to be signed and dated at the time that it was pronounced. Their Lordships said:-

"The rule does not say that if its requirements are not complied with the judgment shall be a nullity. So startling a result would need clear and precise words. Indeed the rule does not even state any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. The time is left to be defined by what is reasonable. The rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty in the ascertainment of what the judgment was. It is a rule which Judges are required to comply with for that object. No doubt in practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A Judge may die after giving judgment but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it. The court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing the judgment may call for more comment, but even so the convenience of the court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity. But in truth the difficulty is disposed of by sections 99 and 108, Civil Procedure Code."

9.

That was a civil case. This is a criminal one. But section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code does much the same thing on the criminal side as sections 99 and 108 do on the civil. The principle underlying them is the same. But even after every allowance is made and every effort taken to avoid undue technicality the question still remains what is a judgment, for it is the "judgment" which decides the case and affects the rights and liberties of the parties; that is the core of the matter and, as the Privy Council say, the whole purpose of these rules is to secure certainty in the ascertainment of what the judgment was. The question as- sumes more importance than ever in a criminal case because of section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code which provides that

“369 Court not to alter judgement - "Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force or, in the case of a High Court, by the Letters Patent or other instrument High Court, no court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical error."

10.

In our opinion, a judgment within the meaning of these sections is the final decision of the court intimated to the parties and to the world at large by formal "pronouncement" or "delivery" in open court. It is a judicial act which must be performed in a judicial way. Small irregularities in the manner of pronouncement or the mode of delivery do not matter but the substance of the thing must be there :that can neither be bluffed nor left to inference and conjecture nor can it be vague. All the rest the manner in which it is to be recorded, the way in which it is to be authenticated the signing and the sealing, all the rules de- signed to secure certainty about its content and matter@an be cured; but not the hard core, namely the formal intimation of the decision and its contents formally declared in a judicial way in open court. The exact way in which this is clone does not matter. In some courts the judgment is delivered orally or read out, in some only the operative portion is pronounced, in some the judgment is merely signed after giving notice to the parties and laying the draft on the table for a given number of days for inspection.

9.

Ld. Counsel for the assessee further pointed out that Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered four different situations in para 7 and for the first situation the judgement which are pronounced at once as soon as the case has been heard, this was answered in the case of Sh. Surendra Singh and Ors. (Supra) wherein, it has been held as under:-

14.

As soon as the judgment is delivered, that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court. The law then provides for the manner in which it is to be authenticated and made certain. The rules regarding this differ but they do not form the essence of the matter and if there is irregularity in carrying them out it is curable. Thus, if a judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently acted on and executed, the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered, would stand good despite defects in the mode of its subsequent authentication.

15.

After the judgment has been delivered provision is made for review. One provision is that it can be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality, except notice to the parties and a rehearing on the point of change should that be necessary, provided it has not been signed. Another is that after signature a review properly so called would lie in civil cases but none in criminal; but the review, when it lies, is only permitted on very narrow grounds. But in this case the mere fact that a Judge is dead and so cannot review his judgment does not affect the validity of the judgment which has already been delivered and has become effective. For this reason there is a distinction between judgments which have not been delivered and so have not become operative and those which have. In the former case, the alteration is out of court. It is not a judicial act. It is only part of a process of reaching a final conclusion; also there is no formal public declaration of the Judges' mind in open court and consequently there is no "judgment' which can be acted upon. But after delivery the alteration cannot be made without notice to the parties and the proceeding must take place in open court, and if there is no alteration there is something which is final and conclusive and which can at once be acted upon. The difference is this. In the one case, one cannot know, and it would be against public policy to enquire, whether the draft of a judgment is the final conclusion of the Judge or is only a tentative opinion subject to alteration and change. In the second case, the Judge has publicly declared his mind and cannot therefore change it without notice to the parties and without hearing them afresh when that is necessary; and if there is no change the judgment continues in force. By change we mean an alteration of the decision and not merely the addition or subtraction of part of the reasoning.

10.

It is to be pointed out that para 15 of the above judgment, the Ld. CIT(DR) also relied. CIT (DR) however, relied on the relevant portion that, “for this reason there is a distinction between judgments which have not been delivered and so have not become operative and those which have. In the former case, the alteration is out of court. It is not a judicial act. It is only part of a process of reaching a final conclusion; also there is no formal public declaration of the Judges’ mind in open court and consequently there is no "judgment' which can be acted upon. But after delivery the alteration cannot be made without notice to the parties and the proceeding must take place in open court, and if there is no alteration there is something which is final and conclusive and which can at once be acted upon. The difference is this.”

11.

Ld. Counsel for the assessee further relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Singh (Supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case has clearly held that pronouncing of a judgement in a court whether immediately after hearing or after reserving the same to be delivered later should ordinarily be considered as a final act of the Court with reference to the case. There must be exception to the rule, for instance, soon after the judgement is dictated in the open court, a feature which had not been placed for consideration of the court is brought to its notice by counsel or any of the parties or the court discovers some new facts from the record in that eventuality the matter may be placed for consideration upon notice to the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court finally held in para 8 to 11 as under:-

8.

We have extensively extracted from what Bose J. spoke in this judgment to impress upon everyone that pronouncement of a judgment in court whether immediately after the hearing or after reserving the same to be delivered later should ordinarily be considered as the final act of the court with reference to the case. Bose J. emphasised the feature that as soon as the judgment is delivered that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court. That would mean that the judgment to be operative does not await signing thereof by the court. There may be exceptions to the rule, for instance, soon after the judgment is dictated in open court, a feature which had not been placed for consideration of the court is brought to its notice by counsel of any of the parties or the court discovers some new facts from the record. In such a case the court may give direction that the judgment which has just been delivered would not be effective and the case shall be further heard. There may also be cases-though their number would be few and far between-where when the judgment is placed for signature the court notices a feature which should have been taken into account. In such a situation the matter may be placed for further consideration upon notice to the parties. If the judgment delivered is intended not to be operative, good reasons should be given.

9.

Ordinarily judgment is not delivered till the hearing is complete by listening to submissions of counsel and perusal of records and a definite view is reached by the court in regard to the conclusion. Once that stage is reached and the court pronounces the judgment, the same should not be reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstance or a review is asked for and is granted. When the judgment is pronounced, parties present in the court know the conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such pronouncement, they proceed to conduct their affairs. If what is pronounced in court is not acted upon, certainly litigants would be prejudiced. Confidence of the litigants in the judicial process would be shaken. A judgment pronounced in open court should be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature and if there be any such, the same should appear from the record of the case. In the instant matter, we find that there is no material at all to show as to what let the Division Bench which had pronounced the judgment in open court not to authenticate the same by signing it. In such a situation the judgment delivered has to be taken as final and the writ petition should not have been placed for fresh hearing. The subsequent order dismissing the writ petition was not available to be made once it is held that the writ petition stood disposed of by the judgment of the Division Bench on 28.7.1986.

10.

The record of the proceedings of the High Court which is before us does not contain the judgment delivered in court on 28.7.1986 but there is no dispute that the writ petition had been allowed. On the conceded position that the appellant's writ petition was allowed by the High Court, the University is directed to admit the appellant to the Master's Course in Law in the current session.

11.

We understand that the University's courses of study have now been changed. The University shall take such steps as are practicable to give effect to this decision.

12.

Another facet argument made by the Ld. Counsel for the assessee is that post pronouncing of orders, Members of the Bench will become ‘functus officio’ and for this he relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of Malaya Ranjan Dash (Supra) wherein, the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa has held as under:-

12.

The public trust and confidence in the judiciary should not go in vain. If confidence in the Judiciary goes, the due administration of justice definitely suffers. The judiciary is the guardian of the Rule of law and is the central pillar of the democratic State. The foundation of the judiciary is the trust and the confidence of the people in its ability to deliver fearless and impartial justice. In a Division Bench, when the judgment/order is dictated in open Court by one Judge and the other Judge does not express his dissent either by dictating his opinion/view and remains silent instantly and subsequently passes a dissenting judgment/order, the public will be confused and there will have no sanctity in the dictation of an order or judgment in open court and they have to wait till they verify the order or judgment after it is signed by both the Hon’ble Judges.

13.

Ext.A marked on behalf of the petitioner in the departmental inquiry, which is a downloaded copy of the order dated 07.04.2021 passed in W.P.(C) No.11802 of 2020 by the same Division Bench which has got nexus with the matter in which the order dated 24.02.2021 was passed, on the basis of which Suo Motu Proceeding was registered. In Ext.A, it is stated as follows:-

"In the suomotu proceeding, the order which was passed in the Court on 24.2.2021 was served on the learned counsel who were engaged as Amicus Curiae on 26.2.2021 with the signature of one of the Hon'ble Judge. However, on 2nd March, 2021 the Hon'ble second Judge of the Bench has passed another order dissenting the views of the Presiding Judge and put his signature. The said order came to the light of the day on the aforesaid date i.e. (2.3.2021)."

Thus from such order, it is apparent that the order was passed in the open Court on 24.2.2021 and dissenting view to the order dated 24.2.2021 came only on 02.03.2021.

In such a scenario, in our humble view, when the order dated 24.02.2021 was dictated in open Court by the Hon’ble Senior Member of the Division Bench and the other Judge did not express his dissent either by dictating his opinion/view immediately in the Court itself on that day nor there is anything on record that he informed the counsel appearing for the parties and the parties, if any present in the Court, that he did not agree with the view expressed by the Senior member of the Bench and that he would be delivering his judgment/order recording dissent soon, such an order becomes operative even without signature of the learned Judges.

Thus, we are of the humble view that the order dated 24.02.2021 which was pronounced in the open Court by the Senior member of the Bench, became operative and such order to be operative does not await signing thereof by the Court as signing is a formality to follow after such pronouncement.

14.

In the case in hand, as appears from the records that the copy of the order 24.02.2021 after its dictation in open Court, unaccompanied with the dissenting order (which came only on 02.03.2021), was placed with the note sheet before the petitioner on 26.02.2021 by the Deputy Registrar (Judicial).

In the said order, it was directed that the brief along with copy of the order was to be supplied to the learned Senior Advocates engaged as Amicus Curie by 26th February 2021 i.e., on that day itself. Since there was a stipulated date of compliance, obviously, it could not have been unless a case is registered. The petitioner approved the note sheet for registration of SuoMotu Writ Petition, on the last day of its stipulated date of compliance.

13.

Further, ld. Counsel for the assessee also relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the case of Kripa Shanker Singh (supra) wherein, it has been observed that how to deal with the dissenting opinion of the companion Judge, after pronouncement of judgement by another Judge in the open court. Hon’ble Court held that while judgement is pronounced by one judge in open court, if another Judge does not agree, he must express his dissent then and there or at least, the parties should be informed about his dissent and that a dissenting judgement would be delivered (Emphasis). But if it is not done, the judgement is pronounced and signed, it become operative pronouncement of court with no scope of alteration therein. Ld. Counsel for the assessee relied upon the para no. 7 to 8.3 which read as under:-

7.

Ordinarily, a judgment and order is not delivered till the hearing is complete after hearing the submissions of counsel and perusal of records and a definite view is reached by the court in regard to the conclusion. Once that stage is reached and the court pronounces the judgment, the same should not be reopened unless there be some exceptional circumstances or a review is asked for and is granted. Two situations are envisaged in which a judgment/order is pronounced (dictated). First, immediately on conclusion of the arguments, the situation as has arisen for our consideration in the instant case, and two, where the matter is closed for judgment and is pronounced on some subsequent date, may be by dictating it in the open Court or by simply pronouncing the operative portion of the prepared/ready judgment. If it is dictated in the open Court and if the other Judge does not agree with the view expressed (dictated) in open Court, he would have to pronounce his view/dissent immediately in the Court itself and if the prepared judgment is pronounced and signed in the open Court, the question of dissent would not arise. When the judgment is pronounced, parties present in the court know the conclusion in the matter and often on the basis of such pronouncement, proceed to conduct their affairs. If what is pronounced in the Court is not acted upon, certainly litigants would be prejudiced. A judgment pronounced in open court should be acted upon unless there be some exceptional feature and if there be any such cause, the same should appear from the record of the case.

8.

In the present case, as observed earlier, we do not wish to enter into the controversy whether the companion Judge on the Bench had expressed his dissent in the course of arguments and conveyed it to the senior member of the Bench, and in that event what was the responsibility of the senior member of the Bench. We have considered the question referred to in light of the judgments noticed above and keeping in view the situation where the judgment/order granting bail was pronounced (dictated) in the open Court immediately on conclusion of arguments. In a case where the matter is closed for judgment/order on conclusion of the arguments, what transpires between the Judges in the process of making or preparing a judgment till the matter is again placed before the Court for pronouncement may not be relevant insofar as parties and the advocates appearing for them are concerned.

8.1

The Judges may, and often do, discuss the matter amongst themselves once it is closed for judgment. They exchange draft judgments and may, in a given case, as observed by the Supreme Court in Surendra Singh (supra), even sign the draft judgment. Even then, that is not a judgment until the final operative act, namely, its formal declaration in the open Court is made. That is what constitutes a judgment. Even judgments which are dictated and pronounced in the open Court can be altered or amended as long as the conclusion or operative portion thereof is not changed. A judgment that has been pronounced in the open court can be changed completely only after notice to the parties and a re-hearing on the point of change should that be necessary, provided it has not been signed. Once the judgment is both pronounced and signed, alterations or additions or a complete change of view is not permissible, except where review is asked for and is granted insofar as civil matters are concerned. (See: Vinod Kumar Singh (supra).

8.2

Once the judgment is pronounced (dictated) in the open Court on conclusion of arguments, the companion Judge on the Bench, if he does not agree with the view expressed in the dictated/pronounced judgment, he should express his dissent either by dictating his opinion/view immediately thereafter in the open Court itself or should at least inform counsel appearing for the parties and the parties, if they are present in the Court, that he does not agree with the view expressed by the senior (other) member of the Bench and that he would be delivering his judgment recording dissent in Chambers. If he fails to do so, the decision which is so pronounced (dictated) becomes a declaration of the mind of the Bench (Court) and becomes the operative pronouncement of the Court. After the judgment becomes the operative pronouncement of the Court, it can be altered or amended and, as observed earlier, even changed completely, only with notice to the parties and a re-hearing on the point of change should that be necessary, provided it has not been signed.

8.3

Having regard to the settled position of law, in the present case, the dissent ought to have been expressed in the open Court on conclusion of dictation by the senior member of the Bench. Mere expression of views in the course of arguments or only to the senior member of the Bench would not be sufficient. Silence or a lack of vocal assertion would in fact be indicative of a lack of dissent and may be liable to be viewed as concurrence of opinion and affirmation of the decision pronounced. The Judges sitting in a Division Bench, irrespective of their standing as a Judge inter se are equal in all respects. It is only for convenience that a senior member of the Bench is referred to as 'the senior member' of the Bench and who leads the Bench and decides who has to write the judgment in a matter. This, however, does not stop the other member of the Bench from writing a concurring or dissenting view, if he so desires. Where a judgment is dictated in the open Court and, if one member of the Bench desires to express dissent, as observed earlier, he should do so in the open Court immediately on conclusion of the dictation by the other member of the Bench or at least inform the advocates/parties about his dissent at that stage itself and then prepare the dissent judgment/order in chamber if not pronounced (dictated) in open Court.

14.

Ld. Counsel for the assessee also relied on another judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Fakir Mamad Suleman Suneja & Ors.(Supra) , wherein, vide para no. 29 it has been held as under:-

“29.

The intent of the judge while making the dictation, therefore becomes material. The court might dictate a draft to keep the facts fresh in the mind and the draft so dictated then becomes final only after signing, subject to corrections and alterations which do not amount to a material change in the order. The signed order is what embodies the final unalterable opinion of the Court, it is the only version of the Court’s order which is reached after multiple rounds of correction after dictation in Court. This practice, born out of necessity, is not only in line with Order XII of the Supreme Court Rules, but also acknowledged in the judgement of UP Housing (supra) where this Court had observed that an order dictated in open court can be altered and changed so long as no material changes are being made in the order, at which stage re-hearing would be required.”

15.

I noted from the above jurisprudence that delivery of judgement is a solemn act which carries with it serious consequences for the person or persons involved. The Tribunal procedure under section 254(1) of the Act read with Rule 34 of the Rules clearly describes how order of tribunal is to be pronounced signed and dated. Rule 34(5) of the Rules bring out the manner of pronouncing the order that Bench may pronounce order immediately upon conclusion of hearing. In the present case also the Bench has clearly pronounced the order upon conclusion of hearing i.e. on 01.10.2025 and both the Members constituted the Bench Ld. JM and Ld. AM signed the pronouncement of order upon conclusion of hearing in open court. Pursuant to the unanimous pronouncement in the open court and delivery thereof, shows that there was no ambiguity. In the present case before the tribunal on 01.10.2025 there was no subsequent notice to the parties for any clarification or alteration in the decision. The Rule 34 of the Rules is perimateria to the provisions of section 336 and 424 of the Criminal Procedure Code by virtue of which the High Court appears to make their own rule and power is conferred under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. Perimateria provisions are there in section 152 or section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure in very exceptional cases under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even the provision in Order 20, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure indicates the position and permits alterations and additions to a judgement so long as it is not signed except notice to the parties and rehearing on the point of change. Similarly, the Tribunal has also framed its Rule 34 of the Rules for pronouncement of order and the present dispute is answered in Rule 34 of the Rules. The issue has been dealt by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Singh (Supra) wherein it is categorically held that as soon as the judgement is delivered that becomes the operative pronouncement of the court. That would mean that the judgment to be operative does not await signing thereof by the court. There may be exceptions to the rule, for instance, soon after the judgement is dictated in open court, a feature which had not been placed for consideration of the court is brought to its notice by counsel of any of the parties or the court discovers some new facts from the record. In such a case the court may give direction that the judgement which has just been delivered would not be effective and the case shall be further heard. In such situation, the matter may be placed for further consideration upon notice to the parties and the judgement delivered is intended not to operative, good reasons should be given. In the case in hand, as appears from the records that order was pronounced in the open court on 01.10.2025and the dictated order was placed before the Ld. AM on 06.10.2025 and without placing before the parties for objection the Ld. AM wrote the dissent order and hence, the present dissent order on the same.

16.

Further, in the case of Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs. AS Guna Shenoy [1991] 100 CTR 66 (Ker), while disposing of an appeal, both the Judicial Member and the Accountant Member of the ITAT unanimously decided an issue. However, on later date the Accountant Member, by a separate order departed from the unanimous decision. In this case, Hon’ble High Court of Kerala held that separate dissent note attached with the order, which was unanimously agreed upon cannot be considered as valid since it runs contrary to the earlier order. Even otherwise, once an authority exercising quasi judicial power, takes a final decision, it cannot review its decision unless the relevant statute or rules permit such review. Since the order was duly delivered by pronouncing in the open court and duly signed by both the Members, the Tribunal had no power, whatsoever, to completely turn its dictum upside down.

17.

Further, as per Office Manual dated 15.4.2014 at Point No. 78, it states how to deal with the dissenting cases wherein, it has been mentioned that point streamlines the procedure to be followed by ITAT, in cases where dissent has been recorded by the Members of the ITAT and the matter has been referred to the President. The said point states that the difference of opinion between the two Members of the ITAT who heard the appeal on any point or points shall be referred to the President under section 255(4) of the Act, which implies dissent note and reference to the President should be made at the time when the matter stands heard but before pronouncement of judgement/order. It is trite law that points of difference cannot be recorded once the order is pronounced in open court, since the Members become functus officio. Once the members become functus officio, no contrary view thereafter can be taken by him, least for recording a dissent or referring a matter. In any case, if as an exception it has to be done, then a notice of hearing of prospective change in outcome be given to parties.

18.

In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and respectfully following the binding aforesaid precedents, it is abundantly clear that an unanimous decision of dismissal of appeal was signed and delivered in the open court on 01.10.2025, thus there is no doubt to the fact that there was no dissent at the time when the order was pronounced and delivered in the open court. However, it was only an afterthought, that one Member intended to record its dissent taking a completely contrary view then the one expressed in the open court, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Admittedly, there is no evidence that Ld. AM disagreed with the pronouncement on 01.10.2025 or any agitation was placed on record till the dictated order was placed before him on 06.10.2025. Even now before me, during the course of hearing, Ld. CIT(DR) could not point out or could not produce any evidence that the order was pronounced in haste or opportunity of being heard was not provided to Revenue. No such allegation was leveled by Revenue while arguing before Third Member. Even Revenue has not placed any petition immediately after conclusion of hearing and pronouncement thereof alleging that opportunity was not provided to the revenue to argue its case. Rather, nothing is brought on merits to show that any contention or material was left out of hearing due to incomplete opportunity of hearing. Thus, I agree with the findings of the Ld. Judicial Member that Bench had pronounced the final outcome in the revenue’s appeal herein at the conclusion of the hearing on 01.10.2025 as “dismissed”. Thus, a different view could not be allowed to be taken thereafter without putting parties to notice regarding any subsequent change of opinion, which is not permissible under the law. Hence, as regards to question No.2 of learned Judicial Member, the same is answered in affirmative agreeing with the view of the learned Judicial Member and question No.1 of learned Accountant Member is answered in negative by disagreeing with the view of learned Accountant Member.

19.

As regards to question No.4 referred by learned Accountant Member, I agree with learned Accountant Member that each ground of appeal be separately decided and learned Accountant Member has rightly adjudicated the issue in his order. Since there is no contrary view of learned Judicial Member is available on the issue of whether the share expenses claimed by assessee as revenue in nature in terms of provisions of Section 35D of the Act are allowable, I agree with the view of learned Accountant Member. Hence, question No.4 is answered in the affirmative and, I agree with the view of learned Accountant Member.

20.

The second issue raised by learned Judicial Member as well as learned Accountant Member whether the excise duty subsidy is chargeable to tax under section 2(24) of the Act being revenue in nature For this Ld. Judicial Member has framed the following question:-

1.

Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned CIT(A)’s lower appellate findings accepting the assessee’s substantive ground(s) claiming the impugned excise duty subsidy as a capital receipt; both for the purpose of normal as well as “MAT” computation, deserve to be upheld?

21.

However, Ld. Accountant Member has raised the following Ground nos. 2 & 3:

2.

Whether in law and facts, it is justified to apply the decision of coordinate bench in the case of the assessee in ITA No. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 mutatis mutandis without appreciating the full facts of the case and law?

3.

Whether in law and facts, holding the receipt of excise duty subsidy as non-taxable after amendment in section 2(24)(xviii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 w.e.f. 01.04.2016, is justified?

22.

Brief facts of the case are that assessee is a public limited company inter alia engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading of jewellery. The assessee filed its return of income for AY 2017-18 on 30.11.2017, declaring total income of Rs. 374,78,48,870/- under normal provisions of the Act and the book profit of Rs. 430,53,88,117/- u/s. 115JB of the Act. The AO completed the assessment by passing the order u/s. 143(3) of the Act dated 10.05.2021 determining the total income of Rs. 375,22,25,501/- after making various additions. Aggrieved, assessee appealed before the CIT(A). The assessee has raised an additional ground in relation to the issue of claim of excise duty exemption as capital receipt in computing tax under normal provisions of the Act and u/s. 115JB before CIT(A). The assessee has set up undertaking in F-50, UPSIDC Industrial Area, Selaqui, Dehradun, Uttarakhand and claimed Excise Duty Exemption as per Central Excise Notification 50/2003 CE dated 10.06.2003. As per the provision of section 80IC of the Act the assessee is also claiming deduction u/s. 80IC of the act on the said undertaking and the same was allowed by the department for period of 10 years. In terms of said notification, the said undertaking was entitled to 100% Excise Duty Exemption for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement of commercial production. During the year consideration, being the 7th year the assessee has availed excise duty exemption of Rs. 1,33,52,63,271/-. The Ld. CIT(A) remanded the matter back to the file of the AO for remand report and the AO vide letter dated 03.06.2014 sent the remand report wherein the AO has himself admitted that since the undertaking is located in backward area, it was entitled to excise duty exemption. Thus, Ld. CIT(A) by considering the decision of the Hon’ble Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Shree Balaji Alloy & others vs. CIT [2011] 333 ITR 335 (J&K) wherein, it was held that excise duty subsidy is capital receipt has held that the excise duty exemption amounting to Rs. 1,33,52,63,271/- was treated as capital receipt. Aggrieved, revenue is in appeal before the Tribunal.

23.

The Appeal for AY 2017-18 i.e. the present appeal was finally heard by the ‘C’ Bench on 01.10.2025 and unanimously dismissed the appeal of the Revenue by pronouncing its decision in the Open Court. Thereafter, Ld. Judicial Member drafted the order and placed the same before the Ld. Accountant Member on 06.10.2025. Learned Accountant Member vide his dissent order dated NIL consisting of 10 pages which was signed by the learned Accountant Member by covering letter dated 16-1-2026. Consequently on this dissent order of learned Accountant Member, learned Judicial Member framed question for reference to Third Member on difference of opinion on 13-02-2026 and the same was forwarded to learned Accountant Member. The learned Accountant Member vide his covering letter dated 19-2-2026 framed different set of questions. The questions framed by the learned Judicial Member as well as learned Accountant Member on the issue of Excise Duty Exemption are reproduced above vide para nos. 19&20 of this order respectively.

24.

Before me, ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the assessee has set up an undertaking in specified backward area of Uttarakhand. Consequently, the assessee availed excise duty exemption by virtue of Central Excise Notification No. 50/2003– CE dated 10.06.2023 amounting to Rs. 1,33,52,63,271/- . The assessee raised the claim of excise duty as capital receipt by way of additional ground of appeal before the CIT(A), who allowed the claim of the assessee by remanding back the matter to the file of the AO for obtaining remand report and AO vide his letter dated 03.06.2024 sent the remand report to the CIT(A) wherein he himself admitted that since the undertaking is located in backward area, it was entitled to excise duty exemption. He further submitted that this issue is no more res Integra in view of the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in the case of Shree Balaji Alloy & others (Supra) wherein, it has been held that excise duty exemption is capital receipt. He further submitted that the said view was affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT vs. Shree Balaji Alloy (In Civil Appeal No. 10061 of 2011). He further relied upon the decision of the Delhi Tribunal in the case of Crystal Crop Protection Limited vs. DCIT (ITA No. 1539/Del/2016) wherein the Tribunal has allowed the ground of Excise Duty subsidy and interest subsidy as capital receipt by following the decisions of the Hon’ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir in the case of Shri Balaji Alloys (Supra) and Hon’ble Supreme Court. He further submitted that against the Tribunal decision in the Case of Crystal Crop Protection Limited (supra), the Department approached the Hon’ble High Court in appeal, wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in its decision dated 25.07.2022 has upheld the decision of the Tribunal in treating the Excise Duty as a capital receipt. He further submitted that in assessee’s own case in AY 2016-17 vide ITA No. 3084/Del/2024 order dated 6.6.2025 has dealt the identical issue and on identical facts, held that the Excise Duty exemption received by assessee was to be treated as capital receipt and not as revenue receipt. It was further held by the Tribunal that Excise Duty exemption being capital in nature not chargeable to tax under normal provisions of the Act and thus cannot be included as part of book profits for computing minimum alternate u/s. 115JB of the Act. He further submitted that Amritsar Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Gravita Metal Inc. in ITA No. 594/Asr/2019 (AY 2016-17) vide order dated 15.06.2023 has held that exemption from excise duty do not fall in the definition of income as envisaged u/s. 2(24)(xviii) of the Act, meaning thereby the same is capital receipt and not taxable under the provisions of the Act. This decision has been affirmed by the Hon’ble J&K High Court in the case PCIT vs. Gravita Metal Inc. [2024] 168 taxmann.com 379. He further submitted that the ITAT, Mumbai in the case of DCIT vs. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (184 taxmann.com 436) while dealing the similar and identical issue, and allowed the excise duty exemption claimed by the assessee.

25.

In view of the aforesaid discussions, Ld. Counsel for the assessee requested that order of the Ld. Judicial Member may be upheld wherein, he upheld the order of the Ld. CIT(A) in treating the excised duty exemption as capital receipt.

26.

On the other hand, Ld. CIT(DR) submitted that in view of the amendment in definition of income under section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act w.e.f 1.4.2016 any subsidy in any form under any nomenclature is held taxable in the hands of the assessee. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal in assessee’s own case has no relevance, thus the same is not applicable and excise duty subsidy is income chargeable to tax u/s. 2(24) of the Act being revenue in nature. In view of above, he submitted that the order of the Ld. AM may be upheld.

27.

I have heard the rival contentions and gone through the facts of the case. It is an admitted fact that assessee has set up an undertaking in specified backward area of Uttarakhand. Consequently, the assessee availed excise duty exemption by virtue of Central Excise Notification No. 50/2003–CE dated 10.06.2023 amounting to Rs. 1,33,52,63,271/-. The assessee raised the claim of excise duty as capital receipt by way of additional ground of appeal before the Ld. CIT(A), who vide his order dated 14.06.2024 allowed the claim of the assessee by remanding back the matter to the file of the AO for obtaining remand report and AO vide his letter dated 03.06.2024 sent the remand report to the CIT(A) wherein he himself admitted that since the undertaking is located in backward area, it was entitled to excise duty exemption.

28.

I further note that the issue in dispute was in assessee’s own case in AY 2016-17 in ITA No. 3084/Del/2024 vide order dated 6.6.2025 wherein, the Tribunal has dealt the similar and identical issue and held that the Excise Duty exemption received by assessee, was to be treated as capital receipt and not as revenue receipt. It was further held by the Tribunal that Excise Duty exemption being capital in nature not chargeable to tax under normal provisions of the Act and thus cannot be included as part of book profits for computing minimum alternate u/s. 115JB of the Act. The relevant portion of the ITAT decision is reproduced as under:-

“38.

So far as this identical ground of appeal for AY 2016-17 is concerned, the revenue has challenged the decision of the Ld. CIT(A) in regard to the amendment in Section 2(24) of the Act by insertion of clause (xviii) by Finance Act 2015, w.e.f. 01.04.2016.

39.

The Ld. AR submitted that the exemption from excise duty as availed by the assessee on account of Notification No. 50/2003 issued by Central Govt. does not fall within the newly inserted clause in Section 2(24) of the Act. He submits that legislature in its wisdom has specifically includes the words subsidy, grant, cash incentive, duty drawback, waiver, concession & reimbursement and hence, in the absence of inclusion of word 'exemption' under the said clause, the said amendment is not applicable to it and thus exemption from excise duty is capital receipt for the year under consideration i.e. Assessment Year 2016-17. He, thus, submitted that the scope of the section cannot be enlarged to include exemption by interpreting ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 C.O. Nos. 67 & 96/Del/2024 that it is subsidy. Further in support of this contention, he has also placed reliance upon judgments placed in paper book filed by assessee. 40 We have heard the rival submissions made by the respective parties. On this issue of newly inserted clause to section 2(24) of the Act, by Finance Act' 2015, w.e.f. 01.04.2016, as applicable to Assessment Year 2016-17; which reads as under:

"Definitions.

2.

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-- ..

(24)

"income" includes--....

(xviii)

assistance in the form of a subsidy or grant or cash incentive or duty drawback or waiver or concession or reimbursement (by whatever name called) by the Central Government or a State Government or any authority or body or agency in cash or kind to the assessee other than the subsidy or grant or reimbursement which is taken into account for determination of the actual cost of the asset in accordance with the provisions of Explanation 10 to clause (1) of section 43;

41.

From perusal of aforesaid extracts it is evident that the insertion of clause (xviii), which provides that income includes assistance in the form of a subsidy or grant or cash incentive or duty drawback or waiver or concession or reimbursement (by whatever name called) by the Central Government or a State Government or any authority or body or agency in cash or kind to the assessee other than the subsidy or grant or reimbursement ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 C.O. Nos. 67 & 96/Del/2024 which is taken into account for determination of the actual cost of the asset in accordance with the provisions of Explanation 10 to clause (1) of section 43, included in income. Now it is pertinent to analyse the Notification No. 50/2003 issued by the Central Govt. (supra), that the said notification provides the exemption from excise duty. Thus, we find force in the submission made by learned AR that legislature has not included the word 'exemption' and has specifically include the words subsidy, grant, cash incentive, duty drawback, waiver, concession & reimbursement and hence, in the absence of inclusion of word 'exemption' under the said clause, the said amendment is not applicable to the assessee herein. Our aforesaid view is also fortified with the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of The ACIT vs. Gravita Metal Inc. (ITA No. 594/Asr/2019) for Assessment Year 2016-17, placed at pages 74-90 of Assessee's Paper Book. Appeal filed by the revenue against the aforesaid decision of the Coordinate Bench before the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu & Kashmir And Ladakh in IT Appeal 1 of 2024 in the name of PCIT vs. Gravita Metal Inc. reported in 168 taxmann.com 379 (Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh) placed at pages 91-94 of Paper Book, filed by assessee, stood dismissed. Having regard to this aspect of the matter, respectfully following the decision of coordinate bench and High Court, in the present case, in the absence of word "exemption" in ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 C.O. Nos. 67 & 96/Del/2024 Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act, the scope of the Section cannot be enlarged to include "exemption".

42.

The further case made out by the assessee before us that the purpose and object of amendment was only to align with income computation and disclosure standards (ICDS) provisions. The above amendment under Section 2(24) of the Act was introduced directly in to Finance Act, 2015 with effect from Assessment Year 2016-17 without providing any background in the memorandum explaining the Finance Bill. However, in the Income Tax Act, it has been stated that it is applicable with effect from 01.04.2016. Further from the press release dated 06.07.2016 ICDS had been made applicable with effect from Assessment Years 2017-18, copy whereof has also been submitted before us by the Ld. Counsel appearing for the assessee. Apart from that the objective/intention of the legislature in relation to the introduction of this clause could be understood from the explanatory notes issued by another circular No. 19/2015 dated 27.11.2015 which read as "alignment of provisions relating to taxation of government grants with the provision of income computation and disclosure standards (ICDS). The above explanatory note explicitly states that the objective of insertion of clause(xviii) to Section 2(24) of the Act was to align with ICDS. In that view of the matter it is very clear that the amended Section 2(24)(xviii) having ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 C.O. Nos. 67 & 96/Del/2024 been brought into the legislature to align with the provision of ICDS can only be applicable with effect from Assessment Year 2017-18 onwards and not from Assessment Year 2016-17. We note that even otherwise also, in Income Tax Act, it has not been stated that it is applicable to assessment year 2016-17 or any other year rather it has been stated that it is applicable with effect from 01.04.2016 meaning thereby Financial Year 2016-17 relevant to Assessment Year 2017-18. Further, that even no explanation has been made in the memorandum explaining Finance Bill. This particular observation made by us hereinbefore has already been taken care of by the Learned Pune Bench in the case of DCIT Auangabad vs. M/s Bhagyalakshmi Rolling meal Private Limited in ITSS No. 07 TO 10 /PUN/2019. The relevant observation whereof is as follows:

"10.

Reverting to the facts of the present case, we find that in view of the above referred judgment, the whole purpose and the grant of subsidy under PSI 2007 by Government of Maharashtra was to promote industrial growth in the less developed areas of the State and also to provide employment in the area. Once this purpose is established the subsidy has to be a capital receipt. However, the position has changed w.e.f. 01.04.2016 relevant to A.Y. 2017-18 onwards with the amended provision of sub-clause (xviii) to sec. 2(24) of the Act. However, at present, we are concerned with A.Y. 2011-12 to 2015-16. Therefore, the amended provision of sec. 2(24) sub-clause (xviii) is not applicable to the years under consideration and thus as a natural consequence the subsidy received by the assessee would therefore, not form part of its total income. In view of the aforestated facts and circumstances and the judicial pronouncements, we do not find any reason to interfere with the findings of the Id. CIT(A) and the ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 C.O. Nos. 67 & 96/Del/2024 reliefs provided to the assessee is sustained. Therefore, the appeal of the Revenue in IT(SS) A No. 07/PUN/2021 for A.Y. 2011-12 is dismissed."

43.

Thus, we conclude that the said amendment in Section 2(24) is not applicable to the facts of the assessee. Therefore, in the result, we hold that the exemption from excise duty is capital receipt for the Assessment Year 2016-17 also and not chargeable to tax. This ground of appeal preferred by the revenue, therefore, fails.

CO No. 67/Del/2024 (Assessee's cross objection for A.Y. 2015- 16):

& CO No. 96/Del/2024 (Assessee's cross objection A.Y. 2016-17):

44.

The assessee respondent through its cross objections raised the ground that the excise duty exemption being capital in nature should also be excluded while computing the book profits under Section 115JB of the Act. At the time of hearing of the instant appeal the Ld. Counsel appearing for the assessee submitted before us that the issue is covered by an under the judgment passed by the Hon'bleGuahati High Court in the case of CIT vs. Greenply industries Ltd, reported in 172 taxmann.com 294 holding that the excise duty exemption being capital in nature not chargeable to tax under the normal provisions of the Act cannot be included as part of book profits for computing the Minimum Alternate Tax under Section 115 JB of the Act, a ITA Nos. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 C.O. Nos. 67 & 96/Del/2024 copy whereof has also been annexed to the paper book. The Ld. DR though raised objections to such, however not been able to cite any judgment contrary to the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Guahati High Court as discussed hereinabove.

45.

We have heard the rival contentions made by the respective parties and we have also perused the relevant materials available on record including the order passed by the Hon'ble Guahati High Court. It appears that while holding that the excise duty exemption being purely a capital receipt not chargeable to tax under the normal provision of the Act, the same cannot be included as part of book profit for computing minimum alternate tax as per provisions of Section 115 JB of the Act, the Hon'ble court has been pleased to observe as follows:

"32.

Dr. Saraf, learned senior counsel for the sole respondent, in this connection, has relied upon the decision of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax-IV v. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. [order, dated 04.01.2017, in Income Tax Appeal No. 1132/2014]. The High Court of Bombay, in the said decision, on consideration of a similar issue, proceeded to draw the following conclusions:

"(a)

The issue raised in this question is consequential to question no.(f). We have already held that the subsidy received by the respondent-assessee from the State of Bihar was in the nature of capital receipt. Hence the same cannot be added to arrive at book profits of the respondent-assessee under Section 115J of the Act.

(b)

However, it is pertinent to note that the question as proposed also seeks addition to book profits on account of excess depreciation along with subsidy received by the respondent-assessee. It is settled position in law as held by the Apex Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. v/s. CIT 122 Taxman 562/255 ITR 273 (SC) that the Assessing Officer while computing the book profit under Section 115J of the Act has only a power to examine whether the books of account have been maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act and have been duly audited. The book profits as reflected in the duly audited account have to be accepted by the Assessing Officer and the only limited power he has to increase/decrease the book profit as arrived at by the assessee is only in terms of the Explanation to Section 115J of the Act. In addition to the criteria listed in ITB 35.2 (a) (d), the following criteria shall apply.

In the present case, the Revenue is not invoking the explanation to Section 115J of the Act to vary the book profit declared in the audited accounts of the respondent-assessee. Thus, the question as proposed herein does not give rise to any substantial question of law as it also stands concluded against the Revenue by the decision of the Apex Court in Apollo Tyres Ltd. (supra)."

33.

It is to be noted that the present issue is also consequential to the substantial question of law No. 1, framed by this Court, vide order, dated 09.06.2023.

34.

We having already concluded that the excise duty exemption availed by the assessee being in the nature of a capital receipt in the hands of the assessee; we are also in respectful agreement with the decision of the High Court of Bombay that the same also cannot be added to arrive at the book profit of the assessee under the provisions of Section 115-JB of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

35 ...... .

36.

Accordingly, the decision of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Guwahati Bench at Kolkata, with regard to the Ground No. 2 raised before it by the assessee, would not call for any interference."

46.

Having regard to the reason assigned by the Hon'ble Guahati High Court we do not find any point to deviate from the same and respectfully relying upon the same we hold that excise duty exemption being purely a capital receipt not chargeable to tax as under the normal provision of the Act cannot be included in the book profit for computation for MAT under Section 115 JB of the Act. This cross objection raised by the assessee, is, therefore allowed.”

29.

I also note that the Amritsar Tribunal in the case of ACIT vs. Gravita Metal Inc. in ITA No. 594/Asr/2019 (AY 2016-17) Vide order dated 15.6.2023 has held that exemption from excise duty do not fall in the definition of income as envisaged u/s. 2(24)(xviii) of the Act, meaning thereby the same is capital receipt and not taxable under the provisions of the Act. The relevant portion of the aforesaid decision is reproduced as under:-

“6.

We have heard the rival contentions, perused the material on record, impugned order, written submission and case law cited before us. Admittedly, the assessee firm has claimed 100% exemption on refund of excise duty on the goods manufactured by it, as the capital receipt. The DR argued that since, the assessee is following mercantile system of accounting and hence, income is to be taxed on accrual basis and further, the assessee has passed this entry in the books of accounts maintained during the year under consideration. He contended that the Ld. CIT(A) was in error by not appreciating that as per the amended section 2(24)(xviii) of the IT Act, 1961 any assistance in the form of subsidy, grant, etc. provided by the Government or any other authority is to be considered as income/revenue receipt taxed accordingly. ……………………. ……………………..

16.

The Ld. AR argued that 'exemption' and 'subsidy' are two separate and independent words and which are not defined. He contended that therefore, the general meaning of these words are required to be considered, as per Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) wherein these two words are defined as under:-

'Exemption: Freedom from a general duty or service; immunity from a general burden, tax, or charge. Immunity from service of process or from certain legal obligations, as jury duty, military service, or the payment of taxes.' 'Subsidy: A grant of money made by government in aid of the promoters of any enterprise, work, or improvement in which the government desires to participate, or which is considered a proper subject for government aid, because such purpose is likely to be of benefit to the public'

17.

From the above definitions, it is apparently clear that word exemption is used in the conditions when assessee is given freedom from following any rules or regulations whereas subsidy is something which is given to the assessee to meet the cost of its project. In the present case, assessee is exempted from making payment of excise duty to the extent of 36% of the total excise duty collected. It is not subsidy given to meet cost of project. In our view, the exemption from excise duty do not fall in the definition of income as envisaged u/s 2(24)(xviii) of the Act. Meaning thereby, the amount of Rs.1,85,49,324/- is not an income but a capital receipt not taxable under the provisions of the Act.

18.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Commissioner of Custom Vs. Dilip Kumar & Co.", (Supra) by considering the decision of judgment of State of West Bengal Vs. Kesoram Industries Ltd. 10 SCC 201 decided by the bench of 5 judges, has laid down the principles applicable for interpretation of taxing statute that in interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. A taxing statute cannot be interpreted on any presumption or assumption. A taxing statute has to be interpreted in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any deficiency; that before taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the section; and that If the words are ambiguous and open to two interpretations, the benefit of interpretation is given to the subject and there is nothing unjust in a taxpayer escaping if the letter of the law fails to catch him on account of the legislature's failure to express itself clearly'.This principal of law is quoted referred by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of "Checkmate Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. CIT", (2022) 448 ITR 518 vide Para 50 of its judgement.

19.

Respectfully, applying the above settled principal of law, to the interpretation of the Notification No.56/2002 dtd. 14.11.2002 as amended by Notification No.19/2008 dt. 27.03.2008, the assessee is granted exemption from payment of excise duty to the balance part of 36% of total excise duty collected. Since, the word 'exemption' in not included in the of ambit the Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act, though it specifically includes the words subsidy, grant, cash incentive, duty drawback, waiver, concession & reimbursement. and hence, in the absence of inclusion of word 'exemption' under the said clause, we are of the considered view that the scope of this section cannot be enlarged to include exemption by interpreting that it is subsidy. Accordingly, the addition of Rs.1,85,49,324/-. confirmed by Ld. CIT(A) is held to be unjustified and bad in law. As such, the part addition confirmed by Ld. CIT(A) is directed to be deleted. Thus, the ground of the assessee is allowed.”

30.

The aforesaid decision has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case PCIT vs. Gravita Metal Inc. [2024] 168 taxmann.com 379 by holding as under:-

10.

The next contention of the appellant is that in view of insertion of Clause (xviii) to Section 2(24) of the Act, introduced by the Finance Act, 2015, any subsidy, grant, cash incentive, duty drawback, waiver, concession and reimbursement referred to in the said clause is considered as income and only because the word 'exemption' is not mentioned therein, it is not open for the tax payers to interpret the same as per their own convenience.

11.

Admittedly, as per Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition) 'exemption' means freedom from a general duty or service; immunity from a general burden, tax, or charge, immunity from service of process or from certain legal obligations, as jury duty, military service, or the payment of taxes. Whereas, 'subsidy' means a grant of money made by government in aid of the promoters of any enterprise, work, or improvement in which the government desires to participate, or which is considered a proper subject for government aid, because such purpose is likely to be of benefit to the public.

12.

In the present case, the assessee is exempted from making payment of excise duty to the extent of 36% of the total excise duty collected, meaning thereby the same is not subsidy given to meet the cost of the project. Therefore, we are also in full agreement with the learned Tribunal that exemption from excise duty does not fall in the definition of income as envisaged under Section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act and that the amount of Rs.1,85,49,324/- is not an income but a capital receipt not taxable under the provisions of the Income Tax Act.

31.

I further note that the Coordinate Bench of ITAT, Mumbai in the case of DCIT vs. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (184 taxmann.com 436) while dealing the similar and identical issue, allowed the excise duty exemption claimed by the assessee by observing as under:-

21.

Ground nos. 13 to 17 relates to issue of taxability of subsidies, which has already been dealt by us in ground nos.16 to 20, in appeal for Assessment Year 2015-16 (supra). In the year under consideration, i.e., A.Y. 2016-17, amendment brought in section 2(24)(xviii) by Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01.04.2016 becomes relevant. The issues dealt in these grounds have two components namely, one relating to excise duty exemption and the second relating to taxability of FMS and MEIS incentives.

21.1.

So far as the first component is concerned, i.e. excise duty exemption, the same stands covered in view of the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Gravita Metal Inc. (supra) which is relied upon while adjudicating on this issue for AY 2015-16 in the above paragraphs. Our observations and findings, while adjudicating on the excise duty exemption component for Assessment Year 2015-16, applies mutatis mutandis, since decision in the case of Gravita Metal Inc. (supra) dealt with Assessment Year 2016-17. Accordingly, assessee gets relief to the extent of excise duty exemption claimed by it of Rs.73.31 crores, both under the normal provisions of the Act as well as while computing the book profit u/s. 115JB.

32.

Ld. Counsel for the assessee heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Gravita Metal Inc. (Supra) whereas Ld. CIT(DR) relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Serum Institute of India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. UOI [2024] 463 ITR 582 (Bombay) wherein, a different view is taken holding the amendment in sub-clause (xviii) of section 2(24) inserted by the Finance Act, 2015 whereby all incentives given in whichever form by government and with whatever purpose or objective are to be treated as income irrespective of whether they are capital or revenue in nature. Hon’ble Bombay High Court has finally held that in para 41 to 43 as under:-

“41.

Matters of economic policy should be best left to the wisdom of the legislature. In the context of a changed economic scenario the expertise of the people dealing with the subject should not be lightly interfered with. While dealing with economic legislation, this court would interfere only in those few cases where the view reflected in the legislation is not possible to be taken at all. The case of petitioner certainly does not fall within this exception. We also do not find that by inserting the impugned sub clause there is any perversity or gross disparity resulting in clear or hostile discrimination.

42.

As noted earlier it is trite that the legislature is the best forum to weigh different problems in the fiscal domain and form policies to address the same including to create a new liability, exempt an existing liability, create a deduction or subject an existing deduction to new regulatory measures. In the very nature of taxing statutes, legislature holds the power to frame laws to plug in specific leakages.

The mere fact that the institution of tax by virtue of the impugned sub clause falls more heavily on petitioner cannot result in its invalidity.

43.

In light of the above, in our view, the amendment to section 2(24) by the insertion of sub-cause (xviii) of the Finance Act, 2015, is a perfect example of a legislative endeavour to align the definition of "income" with the evolving economic landscapes and judicial precedent of it being an inclusive and elastic term. The submissions of petitioner though appear to be of fiscal concern were, in our view, more an argument of diminished profits and a narrow interpretation of income which the Apex Court has time and again expanded. The submissions of petitioner fall short of appreciating the overarching legislative intent to foster a comprehensive and equitable taxation regime. The amendment to Section 2(24) by insertion of the impugned sub-clause that includes various subsidies and concessions only indicates the well established jurisprudential path ensuring that the income tax laws remain attuned to the economic realities and continue to serve as a vital cog in the nation's fiscal machinery. As submitted by ASG, it is the duty of the legislature to ensure that taxation policy reflects a balance between incentivizing economic activity and ensuring the equitable distribution of fiscal resources.”

33.

From the above, it is clear that on the issue of amendment by Finance Act, 2015 in section 2(24)(xviii), there are divergent views of two Hon’ble High Courts viz. Hon’ble Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the case of Gravita Metal Inc. (Supra) and of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Serum Institute of India Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). Now how to resolve the controversy in the present case before me whether the Excise Duty Exemption availed by assessee is capital receipt or revenue receipt, this has been answered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. [1973] 88 ITR 192 (SC), by holding that if the provisions of a taxing statute are clear and unambiguous, full effect must be given to them irrespective of any consideration of equity. Where, however, the provisions are given in language, which is not free from ambiguity and admits two interpretations, a view which is favourable to the subject should be adopted. The fact that such an interpretation is also in consonance with ordinary notions of equity and fairness would further fortify the Courts in adopting such a course. If the language is plain, the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting the provision. It is for the legislature to step in and removed the absurdity. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vegetable Products Ltd. (Supra) held that in case of legislative ambiguity, the assessee should be entitled to benefit of doubt and whenever there are two views possible, the view that favour the assessee should be favoured by the Courts.

34.

In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and respectfully following the binding aforesaid precedents, it is clear that exemption from excise duty do not fall in the definition of income as amended by the Finance Act, 2015 w.e.f. 01.04.2016 of section 2(24)(xviii) of the Act, meaning thereby the same is capital receipt and not taxable under the normal provisions of the Act as well as under the MAT provisions of Section 115JB of the Act. Thus, I agree with the findings of the Ld. Judicial Member.

35.

Now, I answer the questions referred as under:-

Questions framed by Learned AMAnswer to the Question
1. Whether in law and facts, it is justified to pronounce the decision unilaterally in haste without hearing the appellant Revenue first and appreciating the full facts of the case and law?In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and precedents and discussion carried out in para 18 of this order, the question is answered in negative. Thus, I do not agree with the view of the Ld. AM.
2. Whether in law and facts, it is justified to apply the decision of coordinate bench in the case of the assessee in ITA No. 2581 & 3084/Del/2024 mutatis mutandis without appreciating the full facts of the case and law?In view of facts and circumstances of the case as discussed in para 33 & 34, of this order, the question is answered in negative. Thus, I do not agree with the view of the Ld. AM.
3. Whether in law and facts, holding the receipt of excise duty subsidy as non-taxable after amendment in section 2(24)(xviii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 w.e.f. 01.04.2016, is justified?In view of the facts and judicial precedents discussed in para 33 & 34 of this order, the question is answered in affirmative. Thus, I do not agree with the view of the Ld. AM.
4. Whether in law and facts, it is justified to not decide each ground of appeal of the appellant separately before pronouncing the decision in the Bench?

This question is answered in the affirmative and I agree with the view of

the learned AM.

Question framed by Learned JMAnswer to the Question
1. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned CIT(A)’s lower appellate findings accepting the assessee’s substantive ground(s) claiming the impugned excise duty subsidy as a capital receipt; both for the purpose of normal as well as “MAT” computation, deserve to be upheld?In view of the facts and judicial precedents discussed in para 33 & 34 of this order, the question is answered in affirmative and I agree with the view of the Ld. JM.
2. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in light of the fact that the bench had admittedly pronounced the final outcome in the Revenue’s appeal herein at the conclusion of the hearing on 01.10.2025 as “dismissed”, a different view could be allowed to be taken thereafter without putting parties to notice regarding any subsequent change of opinion?In view of the facts discussed in para 18 of this order, the question is answered in negative. Thus, I agree with the view of the Ld. JM.
3. Relief?Needs no answer.

The matter shall now be placed before the regular Bench for passing appropriate order in accordance with the majority opinion.

That being the case, we hereby adopt the “majority” view u/s. 255(4) of the Act to uphold the Learned CIT(A) action reversing the Assessing Officer’s assessment findings interalia on the issues of (i) treating the excise duty subsidy as capital receipts and (ii) allowing the claim of the assessee in treating the share issue expenses as revenue in nature.

2.

In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.

Order pronounced in the open Court on conclusion of hearing on 04th November, 2026.