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Judgment
Sharad Sharma, J
Before venturing into the intricacies of law as argued by the respective counsels for the parties, brief narration of facts is essentially required to be
considered to give a logical shape to the controversy.
The case of the petitioner allegedly claiming to be the workman has its foundation from an apprenticeship declaration, which was made on
10.08.2009 in his favour. According to the said document as per clause 1 the apprenticeship was to continue for a period of three years from the date
of reporting/joining and it laid a condition that it could be terminated at any time at the discretion of the management, in an event of unsatisfactory
progress of work. It is not in dispute that the condition for extension of apprenticeship under the declaration of 10.08.2009, which covered the
conditions of apprenticeship, was based upon the implications of satisfactory performance of service, as contemplated under clause 4 of the document
dated 10.08.2009, which is quoted hereunder:
“4. Your Apprenticeship period will be extended from first year to second year and second year to third year only if your progress of
apprenticeship is found to be satisfactory at the expected level.â€
The Labour Court rejected the reference by the award dated 30.10.2014, the petitioner filed restoration under Rule 16(2) of the rules framed under
the Act, which was rejected on 17.09.2015.
The entire tenure of apprenticeship was splitted over year-wise appreciation of the work, which was required to be performed by the apprentice.
The condition enshrined in the declaration of 10.08.2009, it contained clause 13 on which a strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for
the respondents to the effect that the declaration of 10.08.2009 was on an application of petitioner to be appointed as apprentice, by virtue of which a
right was created in favour of the petitioner to function as an apprentice, which was accepted by him, hence the petitioner cannot read over the
declaration dated 10.08.2009 by splitting the contents of the said documents. Meaning thereby, for the purposes of continuance of apprenticeship the
petitioner ought to have complied with the conditions of clause 4 & 13 i.e. adhering to the rules of punctuality, attendance and leave of absence as well
as that of satisfactory service at the expected level contemplated by Clause 13 is quoted hereunder:
“13. You shall strictly adhere to the rules in regard to attendance punctuality and leave of absence.â€
In other word it meant to postulate that attendance and punctuality played one of the most pivotal role for continuance of apprenticeship. The case
of the respondent-employer is that the petitioner voluntarily on his own w.e.f. 06.05.2011, had stopped coming to the establishment to perform his
duties as apprentice. It is further the case of the respondent employer that the petitioner was noticed on 09.05.2011 calling in explanation for his
absence. But no plausible reply was extended nor he joined back into the services even after receipt of notice. Consequently, the employer had no
option except to dispense the services of the petitioner w.e.f. 20.05.2011. It is thereafter that the petitioner has sought a reference of a dispute by
invoking the provisions of Section 4 K of Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as U.P. Act of 1947), thereby,
Labour Commissioner by its order no. 3050-55/ 0 0 / 0 027/2011 dated 22.05.2012 referred an industrial dispute, and an
Adjudication Case No. 2/2012 was registered before the presiding officer, Labour Court, Kashipur, District Udham Singh Nagar. The reference was
framed to the following effect:
“ , , , 0
, -, 20.05.2011 / ?
/ ? â€
On scrutiny of the reference it projected that it was a challenge which was given to the action of the employer of dispensing the services of the
petitioner w.e.f. 20.05.2011 without complying with the provisions contained under Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reference has been
answered against the petitioner by the impugned award dated 30.10.2014. On scrutiny of the impugned award under challenge the Labour Court has
dealt with the stand taken by the petitioner to the effect that:
(i) Prior to dispensing the services of the petitioner on 20.05.2011 he was neither noticed nor charge sheet was issued to him.
(ii) Secondly submitted that since his period of apprenticeship stood extended in terms of clause 4 of the declaration dated 10.08.2009, he would be
treated as to have satisfactorily functioned. In the cross-examination the petitioner has rather admitted the fact that he had applied for being appointed
as apprentice and that his nature of appointment happens to be that of apprenticeship in terms of the declaration dated 10.08.2009, which was passed
on his application for which he has applied for being appointed as apprentice. He further admits the employer did send notice to petitioner which was
received by him. Accordingly, the Labour Court held that since the term of apprenticeship was for three years, which is already over no right would
be created in favour of the petitioner, thus, a reference was adjudicated against him, Labour Court while scrutinizing declaration held that petitioner
agreed while being appointed that he will not be entitled to any benefit as of regular employees
The challenge by the petitioner to the award on the ground that he was not given notice nor charge sheet was issued to him, this Court is unable to
accept the contention of the petitioner because the petitioner was bound by the terms of the Apprenticeship Declaration dated 10.08.2009, which in its
Clause I provides that, termination could be at any time at the discretion of the employer, obviously this termination was as per the terms contained
therein, it will not be governed by the terms under Section 6-N of Industrial Disputes Act. Being an apprentice no regular proceedings are provided or
required to be held prior to termination, but in the instant case a notice was sent to the petitioner on 09.05.2011 before dispensing his services. Merely
because the period stood extended will not mean that it will lead to unrebuttal conclusion that the services of petitioner was satisfactory, because
extension under Clause 4 was based on year to year assessment of satisfactorily work, as satisfactory service for the previous year, for a fresh
appointment or extension a fresh assessment has to be done this is what is intended by Clause 4, every year fresh assessment of satisfactory service
is need, extension given are will not interfere that for all time the work would be deemed to be satisfactory.
During the course of argument the learned counsel for the petitioner has altogether argued tangent to the case, which was projected before the
Labour Court and what was projected in the declaration dated 10.08.2009. What he wanted to submit was that he intended to bring himself outside the
purview of the definition of apprentice by arguing to the effect that according to the stipend, which was paid by the respondent, since there was a
deduction of EPF contribution and ESI contribution, which is only payable and deducted from the workman, he would be treated to be as a workman,
thus proceedings ought to be taken as per U.P. Act of 1947. He further argued from the view point that since he was assigned with ESI and the EPF
code the same consequence would follow. This Court is afraid to accept this contention of the petitioner. The reason being the petitioner cannot travel
beyond the document dated 10.08.2009 by virtue of which his existence came in the respondent’s organization. Further before a Writ Court
ceased with jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution, a party cannot plead a new case for first time, and particularly when the contrary case has
been set up before Court below.
Admittedly, the veracity of the declaration dated 10.08.2009 was not in question before Labour Court, and if that be so, the interpretation of
declaration dated 10.08.2009 cannot be splitted for settling the rights of the petitioner. Further more, because even the stipend slip on which the
reliance has been placed, where the petitioner has tried to extract certain part of it, which pertains to his registration in the ESI and the EPF will not
take away the part of the assertions made in the said document that petitioner’s registration was bearing a apprenticeship code no. UKDA0075,
that too, when before Labour Court he accepted his status as that of apprentice and accepted the declaration dated 10.08.2009.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has made an endeavour to support his argument from the provisions as contained in the definition clause of
Employees State Insurance Act of 1948, in particular, Section 2(9) is quoted hereunder:
“2(9) “employee†means any person employed for wages in or in connection with the work of a factory or establishment to which this Act
applies andâ€
(i) who is directly employed by the principal employer, on any work of, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with the work of, the factory or
establishment, whether such work is done by the employee in the factory or establishment or elsewhere; or
(ii) who is employed by or through an immediate employer, on the premises of the factory or establishment or under the supervision of the principal
employer or his agent on work which is ordinarily part of the work of the factory or establishment or which is preliminary to the work carried on in or
incidental to the purpose of the factory or establishment; or
(iii) whose services are temporarily lent or let on hire to the principal employer by the person with whom the person whose services are so lent or let
on hire has entered into a contract of service;
[and includes any person employed for wages on any work connected with the administration of the factory or establishment or any part, department
or branch thereof or with the purchase of raw materials for, or the distribution or sale of the products of, the factory or establishment] [or any person
engaged as apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of 1961), [and includes such person engaged as
apprentice whose training period is extended to any length of time] but does not include]â€
(a) any member of [the Indian] naval, military or air forces; or
(b) any person so employed whose wages (excluding remuneration for overtime work) exceed [such wages as may be prescribed by the Central
Government] a month:
Provided that an employee whose wages (excluding remuneration for overtime work) exceed [such wages as may be prescribed by the Central
Government] at any time after (and not before) the beginning of the contribution period, shall continue to be an employee until the end of that period;]
Principally if analysis of Section 2(9) on which the reliance has been placed there has had to be a plea to be raised by the petitioner before the
Labour Court because the interpretation of the term employee would not mean a literal interpretation which would include in it a factual interpretation
also to bring himself within the purview of workman. Factual interpretation would mean the interpretation of conditions of appointment. There is
another aspect that this argument of the petitioner may not attract for the reason that the Labour Court was not called upon by the petitioner to deal
with this controversy pertaining to his status being that of apprentice or of a workman rather to the contrary before he admitted himself to be
apprentice, and the Labour Court has proceeded on a premise that he was a workman on the ground that term of appointment was over. Hence, it is
no more open for the petitioner to raise this ground regarding his status being that of the workman seeking its clarification by attracting the provisions
contained under Section 2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act.
Besides this for bringing one within the definition of employee as defined in ESI Act 1948, one has to satisfy the conditions given under Section
2(a) of the Act, the said case has neither been pleaded by petitioner before any Court, apart from it the definition means a person has to be a directly
employed by the principal employer, that too, in a work which is done by the employee in the factory or establishment. That means it has to be an
engagement by immediate employer and draws wages and not stipend. Its not the case of the petitioner, that he was not appointed as per the Act of
1961 so as to bring him within the amidst as per amendment made in the Act of 1961, by Act No. 29 of 1989, w.e.f. 20.10.1989.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that no benefit could be extended to the petitioner by taking shelter to the
provisions contained under Section 2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act or U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, under Section 2(z) which while
defining workman includes within its ambit apprentice. Section 2(z) of Industrial Disputes Act is quoted hereunder:
“2(z) ""workman"" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational,
clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under
this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a
consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person--
(i) who is subject to any Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force Act, 1950 or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iii)who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv)who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the
nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.â€
To elaborate his stand to the effect that he was not a workman, rather what is submitted by the respondent is that the petitioner was inducted as
an apprentice, he continued to be as an apprentice which he admits and he abandoned his job as an apprentice and hence once he has not raised this
issue before the Labour Court he cannot raise it for first time at this stage in the Writ Petition. Rather another ground, which has been raised by the
learned counsel for the respondent, which is more appealing, is from the view point that under the Apprentices Act, 1961 the apprentice had been
defined under Section 2 (aa), which is quoted hereunder:
“2. Definitions-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(aa) “apprentice†means a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship.â€
which in the instant case happens to be of 10.08.2009.
On a simplicitor reading of a definition of apprentice, it means a ‘training’, which undoubtedly will not commensurate to be an
‘employment’, and further more, that training too would be in terms of the “contract of apprenticeâ€. Both terms undoubtedly i.e. training
and employment have a different objective to be attained. Though training connotes to be an experience given to person under a contract and
obviously employment means a regular appointed to discharge services in terms of appointment made through regular process by directly recruitment
by employer and their exists master and servant relationship. Meaning thereby, looking to the definition and the nature of the appointment itself, the
status of the petitioner would not be that of a workman. Further more, the learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Section 18 (b) of
the Apprentices Act, 1961, which reads as under:
“18. Apprentices are trainees and not workers- Save as otherwise provided in this Act,-
(b) the provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply to or in relation to such apprenticeâ€
By virtue of sub clause (b) of Section 18 it excludes the applicability of all law in relation to labour over governing the conditions of service of
apprenticeship.
In that view of the matter the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner taking recourse to Section 2(2) of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act and Section 2(9) of Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 is not sustainable, the reason being the Apprentices Act of 1961 being a
special statute under which the petitioner had been working in the organization of the respondent, he is bound by the contract governing his terms of
training. The learned counsel for the respondent further placed reliance on the judgment as reported in 2007(1) SCC 214 ‘National Small Industries
Corpn. Ltd. vs. V. Lakshminarayan’. Paragraph nos. 19, 24 & 25 of which are quoted hereunder:
“19. From the above, it will be seen that on the one hand while an apprentice is also treated to be a workman for the purposes of the 1947 Act, by
virtue of Section 18 of the 1961 Act, it has been categorically provided that apprentices are not workers and the provisions of any law with respect to
labour shall not apply to or in relation to such apprentice.
In the absence of any such material, it is difficult to understand the reasoning of the Labour Court that the respondent was not an ""apprentice
trainee"" but a ""workman"" who was made to perform a full-time job under the guise of an Apprentice Trainee. The High Court appears to have been
impressed by the reasoning of the Labour Court with regard to the finding that although designated as an apprentice, the respondent was not
undergoing training, but was an employee doing full time work in the establishment. Such a view, in our judgment, is not supported by the materials on
record and is completely contrary to the appointment letter issued to the respondent on 26th April, 1990 and the respondent's own letter dated 29th
April, 1992, in admission of such fact.
Had such a letter of appointment not been available, the Labour Court and/or the High Court could justifiably have embarked on an exercise as to
whether the respondent was in effect a ""trainee"" under the Apprentices Act, 1961, or a ""workman"" within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the 1947
Act. There is nothing on record to indicate that the respondent's services had ever been regularized or that he was brought on the rolls of the
permanent establishment.
Even if it is accepted that the respondent was a workman within the meaning of the 1947 Act, on account of his contractual tenure, his case would
come within the exception of clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) thereof. In such a case also, the provisions of Section 25F of the said Act would have no
application to the respondent's case. â€
Even as per pleadings before the Labour Court, it was neither the case of petitioner nor proved by evidence that he was workman, or even despite
being appointed as apprentice was in the full time employment under the guise of apprenticeship. In the absence of there being any material on record
that service of petitioner was regularized or he was ever taken in the regular establishment. Besides this since the appointment being a fix term
contractual appointment as apprentice. The expression “apprentice†has been included in the definition of “workman†contained in Section
2(s) of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but the reason of a subsequent parliamentary legislation, namely, the Apprentices Act, 1961,
the term “apprentice†has been defined in Section 2(aa) to mean “a person who is undergoing apprenticeship†training in a designated trade in
pursuance of a contract of apprenticeshipâ€. Section 18 of the 1961 Act provides that apprentices are trainees and not workers save as otherwise
provide in the Act. The term “employee†under various labour laws has been defined by different expressions but Section 18 of the 1961 Act
carves out an exception to the applicability of labour laws in the event the person concerned is an apprentice as contra-distinguished from the
expressions “workerâ€, “employee†and “workmanâ€, used in different statute. “Apprentice†under the general law means a person
who is bound by a legal agreement to serve an employer for an agreed period and the employer is bound to instruct him.
Even as per the definition of apprentice given under U.P. Industrial Disputes Act under Section 2(a) would mean person employed in a
establishment as a trainee to gather experience, which is an employment under the welfare scheme prepared by the Government. Section 2(a) reads
as under:
“2. Definitions- (a) “Apprentice†means a person employed in an industry for the purpose of training therein in accordance with a scheme
prepared in that behalf and approved by the State Government.â€
The Hon’ble Apex Court was dealing with the impact of Section 18 vis-à -vis its interpretation to its applicability to the workman and the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the apprentices are not the workers and the provisions of any law with respect to labours shall not applied to or
in relation to such apprentices. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 25 of the said judgment has laid down that looking to the tenure of
appointment being contractual in nature and under the prescribed terms and conditions which may vary from one such appointment to other, which
would be coming to an end within a stipulated period as specified in the contract, for example, in this case dated 10.08.2009, the case would be falling
within the exemption clause as contemplated under Section 2(aa) and 2(aaa) of Apprentice Act, 1961. Section 2(aaa) of Act of 1961 reads as under:
“2(aaa)
“apprenticeship training†means a course of training in any industry or establishment undergone in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship and
under prescribed terms and conditions which may be different for different categories of apprentices.â€
In an another judgment on which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent as reported in 2004(8) SCC 387
‘Mukesh K. Tripathi vs. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC and Others’ the Hon’ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 29 of the said
judgment as under:
“29. 'Apprentice' under the general law means a person who is bound by a legal agreement to serve an employer for an agreed period and the
employer is bound to instruct him. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Volume 16, it is stated :
Form and parties. A contract of apprenticeship is unenforceable if it is not in writing. Usually the contract is effected by deed under which the
apprentice is bound to serve a master faithfully in a trade of business for an agreed period and the master undertakes to give the apprentice instruction
in it and either to maintain him or pay his wages. Technical words are not necessary.
An apprentice cannot be bound without his own consent, and consent without execution of the instrument is insufficient. The instrument must be
executed by the apprentice himself, for no one else has a right to bind him. In the case of a minor his father or mother or other guardian, although not
necessary parties to the contract, usually execute it too in order to covenant for the apprentice's due performance of the contract since, in the absence
of a local custom, an apprentice who is a minor cannot be sued on his own covenant. A contract of apprenticeship is binding on a minor only if it is on
the whole beneficial to him.
It is not essential that the master should execute a deed of apprenticeship, but where a master had in fact executed one part of an instrument of
apprenticeship, a recital in that part of the instrument that the apprentice had bound himself apprentice to the master is evidence against the master
that the apprentice had executed the other part of the instrument. A corporation may take an apprentice."" â€
It is held that the rights, duties and obligations of an apprentice appointed under a contract of apprenticeship is to be strictly bound by the terms of
the contract. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph nos. 27 & 28 has dealt with as to how and in what manner the workman as defined under
Section 2(z) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the apprentice as defined under Section 2(aa) read with Section 18 Apprentice Act has to be dealt with
and has held that apprentice is in contradistinction from the expression ‘work’ or the ‘workman’ and they altogether enjoy a different
status under a different statute.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2003(6)SCC 416 ‘Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd. vs. Nashik
Workers Union & Others’. The ratio as laid by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said judgment may not be of any help to the petitioner because
it was a case where the Hon’ble Apex Court had dealt with the concept of unfair labour practice, under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade
Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practice Act. Though in that case management projected the workmen as trainees but in their case as plead
had admitted that these trainees were not permitted to resume work, whereas the present case is where petitioner has abandoned the work of
apprenticeship has not joined after rendering one year and nine month period of apprenticeship despite of notice of the employer in paragraph 8 of the
judgment admitted the fact company had no permanent workman and all person employed were trainees. Paragraph 8 of the judgment is quoted
hereunder:
“We are of the view that the High Court has not transgressed the limitations inherent in the grant of the writ of certiorari. The High Court had
rightly perceived of patent illegality in the impugned award warranting interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The High Court is right in
pointing out that the material evidence especially the admissions of the witness examined on behalf of the Management were not considered at all.
Moreover, the conclusions reached are wholly perverse and do not reasonably follow from the evidence on record. For instance, the fact that no
appointment letters were issued or filed does not possibly lead to the conclusion that the Management's version must be true. Similarly, if the workers'
unions had taken the stand that ante-dated appointment letters were issued describing the employees as trainees after the dispute had arisen, it is
difficult to comprehend how that would demolish the case of the Union that the concerned persons were really employed as workmen (helpers) but
not as trainees. The Industrial Court makes a bald observation that there was no satisfactory evidence on record to suggest that these persons were
employed by the respondents as 'regular' employees at any point of time. This bald conclusion/observation, as rightly pointed out by the High Court,
ignores the material evidence on record. In fact, the evidence has not been adverted to at all while discussing the issues. There was total non-
application of mind on the part of the Tribunal to the crucial evidence. The Management's witness categorically stated that the concerned workers
were engaged in production of goods and that no other workmen were employed for production of goods. In fact, one of the allegations of the
Management was that they adopted go-slow tactics and did not turn out sufficient work. According to the Industrial Court, the fact that the 'trainees'
were employed for performing the regular nature of work would not by itself make them workmen. The question then is, would it lead to an inference
that they were trainees? The answer must be clearly in the negative. No evidence whatsoever was adduced on behalf of the Management to show
that for more than one and half years those persons remained as 'trainees' in the true sense of the term. It is pertinent to note the statement of the
Management's witness that in June-July, 1989, the Company did not have any permanent workmen and all the persons employed were trainees. It
would be impossible to believe that the entire production activity was being carried on with none other than the so-called trainees. If there were
trainees, there should have been trainers too. The Management evidently came forward with a false plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees
so as to resort to summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. On the facts and evidence brought on record, the conclusion was inescapable
that the appellant-employer resorted to unfair labour practice. There would have been travesty of justice if the High Court declined to interfere with
the findings arbitrarily and without reasonable basis reached by the Industrial Court.â€
This case is altogether dealing with different situation and circumstances and hence would not apply to present case.
The Division Bench of Patna High Court (Ranchi Bench) in a case reported in 1998(80) FLR 399 ‘Ram Dular Paswan & Others vs. P. O.
Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City & Others, in its paragraph has held as under:
“4. The apprentice is expressly included in the definition or workman. According to the said definition every person, including an apprentice
employed in an industry to do the kind of works mentioned therein is a workman. In H.R. Adyanthaya etc. etc. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd., etc. etc., (1995-
I-LLJ-303), the Supreme Court while considering the definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the I.D.Act has laid down as under:
.......... Hence, the position in law as it obtains today is that a person to be a workman under the I.D.Act must be employed to do the work of any of
the categories, viz., manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory.
Every person or every apprentice working in an industry cannot be a workman. It is the type of work a person performs and the nature of duties,
which he discharges, which is the determining factor in order to find out as to whether he is or is not a workman. The same test will apply to an
apprentice also. If he is performing the type of work mentioned in Section 2(s) of the I.D.Act, he is a workman to whom the said Act will apply.
Section 2(aa) of the Apprentice Act, 1961, defines the ""apprentice"" as under:-
2(aa) ""apprentice"" means a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship.
Section 3 of the said Act has laid down the eligibility qualifications for being engaged as an apprentice. Section 4 states that no person shall be
engaged as an apprentice to undergo apprenticeship training in a designated trade unless he has entered into a contract of apprenticeship. Sub-sections
(4) and (5) of the said Section require the apprenticeship contract to be registered. Section 6 deals with the period of apprenticeship training and
Section 7 provides for termination of apprenticeship contract. Section 18 of the said Act, which has laid down that apprentices are trainees and not
workers, being relevant is reproduced below:-
Apprentices are trainee and not workers - Save as otherwise provided in this Act-
(a) every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in an establishment shall be a trainee and not a worker; and
(b) the provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply to or in relation to such apprentice.
According to the above provisions an apprentice is a trainee and not a worker and the provisions of the I.D. Act shall not apply to him.
There is no conflict between the provisions of the two Acts. The purposes and objects of two Acts are different and they operate in different fields.
The Apprentice Act has been enacted in order to regulate and control the training of apprentices and to provide for matters connected therewith. As
regard the scope of the Apprentice Act and the nature of job of the apprentices, the Supreme Court in The Employees' State Insurance Corporation
and Anr. v. The Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd. and Anr., (1976-I-LLJ-81) has observed thus:-
The object of 1961 Act is to provide for the regulation and control of training of apprentices in trades and for matters connected therewith. By the
definition clause under this Act, namely, Section 2(a)'apprentice' means a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in
pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship"". It is, therefore, inherent in the word 'apprentice' that there is no element of employment as such in a trade
or industry but only on adequate well-guarded provision for training to enable the trainee after completion of his course to be suitably absorbed in
earning employment as a regular worker. The fact that a trainee may have been absorbed in the company where he is undergoing the training, is not
relevant for the purpose of comprehending the content of the term.
The apprentices are mere trainees who are given training in specified trade. They are not employees of the person, who has engaged them. So long
as they act as trainees they will be governed by the Apprentice Act and the I.D.Act cannot be applied to them. But if an apprentice does ""any manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward"", he will be a workman to whom I.D. Act will apply and,
therefore, will not be governed by the Apprentice Act, even if he was enrolled as an apprentice trainee. It is not the label a person has, but the type of
work which he does, which is relevant criteria for determining as to whether he is or is not a workman.â€
No other point was argued by the learned counsel for the parties. In that view of the matter and looking to the factual aspects, which has been
brought before this Court, coupled with the fact that the stand taken by the respondent in the counter affidavit has not been controverted by petitioner
by filing the rejoinder affidavit, this Court is of the considered view that no fault could be pointed out in the award dated 17.09.2015 rejecting the
reference. As such the Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.
However, there would be no order as to cost.