Damanjot Singh Anand vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors.

By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 24.09.2024 passed by the Joint Secretary, Mines, whereby the revisional authority has set aside the order dated 10.07.2024 passed by the appellate authority and restored the demand of Rs.9,92,11,996.82/- raised against the petitioner on account of alleged illegal mining. The petitioner has also questioned the consequential proceedings relating to cancellation of Mining Lease No.68/2008.

The facts, in brief, are that Mining Lease No.68/2008 was originally executed on 04.04.2011 in favour of the father of the petitioner under the applicable mining concession rules. Upon the death of the original lessee on 04.07.2016, a supplementary mining lease was issued in favour of the petitioner on 01.08.2016. The petitioner, thus, stepped into the shoes of the original lessee and became entitled to operate the mining lease in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease and the statutory rules governing the same.

It is the case of the petitioner that his mining lease is surrounded by certain adjoining mining leases, and the original cluster plan identifies a Fixed Reference Point, namely, “Kanhaiya Lal Ka Kua”. According to the petitioner, any proper determination of the boundaries of his mining lease or the adjoining mining leases was required to be undertaken by reference to the said fixed reference point, the approved pillars and demarcation documents.

It is pleaded that an inspection of the site was conducted by the mining authorities on 05.04.2023. During the said inspection, an illegal mining pit was allegedly found on adjoining khatedari land bearing Khasra No.1702. The inspection authorities recorded that the area of development was towards Mining Lease No.68/2008 and a mining pillar relating to the petitioner's lease was found outside the boundary. According to the respondents, the inspection further revealed that the petitioner's lease area was being used for access and transportation of mineral illegally excavated from the adjoining land.

Pursuant to the inspection, a show-cause notice dated 06.04.2023 was issued to the petitioner requiring him to explain the allegations of illegal mining. A demand of Rs.9,92,31,996.80/-was thereafter raised. The petitioner approached this Court by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.6325/2023. By order dated 09.05.2023, this Court set aside the demand order and directed the authorities to provide an adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and thereafter pass a well-reasoned and speaking order in accordance with the principles of natural justice.

Thereafter, the petitioner submitted a representation disputing his involvement in any illegal mining and requested that a fresh inspection be conducted in his presence. He asserted that the mining pillars had been correctly placed and no illegal mining whatsoever had been undertaken by him on Khasra No.1702.

In order to reconsider the matter, the Superintending Mining Engineer constituted a committee to examine the facts and submit its report. The petitioner was informed about the proposed inspection and a joint inspection was thereafter conducted on 21.06.2023 in the presence of the petitioner, mining officials and the Halka Patwari. The petitioner, however, disputed the manner in which the inspection was conducted and the conclusions recorded therein. According to the petitioner, no proper demarcation was carried out with reference to the fixed reference point and no complete field-book or proper geographical particulars were recorded. The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the inspection was undertaken by technical officers, and the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to remain present during the exercise.

After the joint inspection, further proceedings were initiated. The petitioner requested for a copy of the inspection report. According to the respondents, the report and notice were sent to the petitioner at the address furnished by him and were duly served. According to the petitioner, however, the relevant report was not effectively supplied to him and the demand order dated 29.08.2023 was consequently passed without affording him an adequate opportunity of effectively meeting the allegations.

The Mining Engineer passed the order dated 29.08.2023 confirming the demand of Rs.9,92,11,996.82/-against the petitioner. The petitioner preferred a statutory appeal against the said order. In the meantime, proceedings for cancellation of the mining lease were initiated on account of non-payment of the demand. The petitioner also instituted a civil suit challenging the demand and consequential action; and secured an interim order from the civil court. Civil suit was also withdrawn later on by the Petitioner.

Subsequently, the competent mining authority proceeded to cancel the mining lease. The petitioner challenged the proceedings relating to cancellation before this Court by way of filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition no. 20494/2023, while disposing of the above writ petition vide order dated 21.12.2023, the Petitioner was directed to pursue his statutory remedy. The appeal relating to cancellation was thereafter transferred by ADM Kota to another appellate authority to avoid any possible objection arising out of his earlier association with the proceedings leading to cancellation.

The appellate authority, by order dated 10.07.2024, allowed the appeal of the petitioner. The appellate authority found deficiencies in the inspection and demarcation process and expressed doubts regarding the correctness of the panchnamas and inspection reports. The Appellate Authority observed, that proper verification with reference to the fixed reference point and mining pillars had not been established from the material placed before it. It also doubted the methodology adopted for assessment of the allegedly excavated mineral and the recovery percentage. Consequently, the appellate authority set aside the earlier orders and issued directions for fresh verification and demarcation of the adjoining mining leases.

Aggrieved by the appellate order, proceedings were initiated before the revisional authority under the relevant provisions of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Rules of 2017’). After considering the material available on record and hearing the parties, the revisional authority, by the impugned order dated 24.09.2024, set aside the order dated 10.07.2024 passed by the appellate authority and upheld the demand against the petitioner. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order passed by the revisional authority.

While opposing the writ petition, the respondents filed reply to the writ petition and raised a preliminary objection regarding the limited scope of interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is contended that the petitioner is seeking a reappreciation of disputed facts and technical evidence, which is beyond the permissible scope of judicial review. According to the respondents, a writ of certiorari can be issued only where there exists a jurisdictional error, patent illegality, perversity, violation of principles of natural justice or an error apparent on the face of the record. It is submitted that merely because another view of the material may be possible would not justify interference with the order passed by the statutory revisional authority.

On merits, it is submitted in reply to the writ petition that the inspection of the mining area of the petitioner, conducted on 05.04.2023, revealed an illegal mining pit outside the sanctioned mining lease area on adjoining Khasra No.1702 and it was observed that the petitioner's mining lease was being used for access and transportation of illegally excavated mineral establishing clear connection of the petitioner with the said illegal mining. The quantity of illegally excavated mineral was assessed by the competent technical officers as per established method. A show-cause notice was issued and, after the earlier order of this Court dated 09.05.2023, the matter was reconsidered after granting further opportunity to the petitioner.

The respondents submitted that the petitioner himself sought a joint inspection and accordingly, the inspection dated 21.06.2023 was conducted in his presence. The committee constituted by the competent authority independently examined the site. According to the respondents, the petitioner was unable to furnish any satisfactory explanation regarding the existence of the illegal mining pit and the access through his mining lease. It is also submitted that the petitioner refused to sign the inspection report, however, such refusal cannot invalidate the inspection.

The respondents further submitted that the notices were duly issued to the petitioner and the inspection report was also made available to him. It is contended that the notice was dispatched at the address furnished by the petitioner and, therefore, the allegation of denial of opportunity is an afterthought. The respondents reiterated that the demand order dated 29.08.2023 was passed only after the matter had been reconsidered pursuant to the order of this Court and after the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to participate in the proceedings.

It is further submitted that the appellate authority exceeded the permissible scope of the appeal while setting aside not only the cancellation order but also the inspection report and other foundational proceedings, which were not under challenge. According to the respondents, the appellate authority entered into a fresh factual and technical exercise beyond its scope, and directed demarcation on issues which did not form the foundation of the proceedings in the manner subsequently assumed by the appellate authority.

The respondents contended that the revisional authority was competent under the statutory scheme to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the appellate order. The revision was duly considered by the competent statutory authority after notice and hearing of both the parties. The respondents denied the allegation that the proceedings were vitiated because of any opinion expressed by the earlier authority i.e. ADM, Kota. It is contended that once the competent revisional authority exercised its independent statutory jurisdiction, the validity of its order cannot be defeated merely because the revision proceedings were initiated on information or at the instance of a ADM, Kota, who might have earlier recused to hear appeal filed by the petitioner.

It was further submitted that the impugned order is based upon relevant material and the petitioner has failed to establish any jurisdictional error, perversity or violation of principles of natural justice, hence, the respondents accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

Mr. S.S. Hora, learned counsel for the petitioner, while pressing the challenge to the impugned order, submitted that the entire action against the petitioner rests upon inspection reports which are fundamentally unreliable. It is contended that the alleged illegal mining took place on land comprising Khasra No.1702, which admittedly belonged to other khatedars, and there is no direct evidence establishing that the petitioner carried out such illegal mining. The mere alleged existence of access through the petitioner's mining lease, by itself, cannot constitute conclusive evidence that the petitioner was responsible for the so called illegal excavation.

Learned counsel submits that proper demarcation of the petitioner's mining lease was never undertaken from the fixed reference point, namely, “Kanhaiya Lal Ka Kua”. According to the petitioner, neither the inspection dated 05.04.2023 nor the subsequent inspection dated 21.06.2023 recorded sufficient geographical particulars or demonstrated a proper measurement of the boundaries of the petitioner's lease and adjoining leases, which is apparently against the guidelines laid down by the Allahabad High Court in Radhika Constructions through its Proprietor Mr. Rakesh Tiwari vs. State of U.P. thru. Secy Deptt. Of Geology and Mines Lko. & Another, 2023 SCC OnLine All 119. It is argued that the appellate authority correctly identified these deficiencies and, therefore, the revisional authority could not have set aside its findings without specifically demonstrating that how those findings were erroneous.

It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the revisional authority exceeded the permissible limits of revisional jurisdiction by reappreciating the inspection reports and substituting its own factual conclusions for those of the appellate authority. Reliance has been placed upon judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 to emphasise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction, and it is contended that a revisional authority cannot interfere merely because it prefers another possible view of the evidence.

Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the proceedings for recovery and cancellation of the mining lease were contrary to Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) read with Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2017. According to the petitioner, a demand arising from an allegation of illegal mining cannot automatically be treated as “dues” under the mining lease so as to justify cancellation for non-payment. It is contended that the statutory procedure governing termination of a mining lease and the requirement of notice and opportunity must be strictly complied with. While placing reliance upon judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat Jodhpur in the case of Takhat Singh Vs State of Rajasthan & Others, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5368/ 2025 decided on 13.04.2026, it was also argued that no proper show-cause notice proposing cancellation of the lease was served upon the petitioner. It was emphatically argued that the demand order and cancellation proceedings were distinct matters and therefore, an opportunity to contest the demand cannot be treated as an opportunity to show cause against termination of the mining lease.

Learned counsel also challenged the invocation of Rule 54 relating to illegal mining and submitted that the petitioner never sought compounding of any offence. It is argued that the petitioner consistently denied undertaking any illegal mining and, therefore, the authorities could not proceed as though the alleged violation had been admitted or compounded by the petitioner. In order to support argument in this regard, learned Counsel for the petitioner sought indulgence of this court on judgment dated 08.05.2018 passed in Khushal Gari & Another vs The Collector Ujjain & Others by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, at Indore in W.P. No. 16959/2017. Learned counsel added that it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Mangilal Vs State of M.P., (2004) 2 SCC 447, that if an statute is silent about procedure, then it implies requirement of compliance with principles of natural justice and fair procedure, which as per counsel, has not been done in the present case.

Learned counsel submitted that the revisional proceedings themselves were not validly initiated. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the concerned quasi-judicial authority (ADM) had become functus officio and could not assume the role of an aggrieved party for the purpose of challenging the order of the superior appellate authority. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, while referring the observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohtesham Mohd. Ismail Vs Spl. Director, Enforcement Direcorate & Another, (2007) 8 SCC 254, contended that the revision could not be treated as a genuinely suo motu proceeding when it was initiated on the basis of the opinion or intervention of an authority connected with the earlier proceedings.

It was lastly submitted that the entire sequence of events discloses apparent bias and premeditation. Learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the doctrine of legal malice as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Another vs. Gurdial Singh & Others, (1980) 2 SCC 471 and highlighted the fact that cancellation proceedings were initiated while his appeal against the demand remained pending, and also highlighted that an authority which had subsequently declined to deal with the appeal on account of its earlier involvement, surprisingly expressed an opinion to ensure filing of revision against the subsequent appellate order. It was, therefore, prayed that the impugned revisional order be quashed and the appellate order dated 10.07.2024 be restored.

Per contra, Mr. Vigyan Shah, learned Additional Advocate General, while defending the impugned orders submitted that in view of the limited scope of judicial review in writ jurisdiction the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek a complete reappreciation of disputed facts and evidence. It was argued that the existence and location of the mining pit, the access to the pit, the findings of technical officers and the inferences arising from the inspection reports are all matters of factual assessment. The revisional authority, being statutorily empowered to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the appellate order, has considered the record and restored the demand. No case of manifest jurisdictional error or perversity in revisional order has been established by the petitioner. While citing the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Haryana Financial Corporation & Another vs Jagdamba Oil Mills & Another, (2002) 3 SCC 496 and West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Others vs Abdul Rahim & Others, (2019) 18 SCC 39, it was argued that this court while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decision taken by the quasi-judicial authority in Revision Petition.

Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that the order dated 09.05.2023 passed by this Court was duly complied with and accordingly, the petitioner was afforded a fresh opportunity and, at his own request, a joint inspection was conducted in his presence. The petitioner was well aware of the allegations and actively participated in the proceedings. Therefore, he cannot be subsequently allowed to raise a plea that he was allegedly denied a reasonable opportunity.

It was further argued by learned Additional Advocate General that the appellate authority travelled beyond the appeal before it and virtually conducted a fresh inquiry into matters that did not warrant interference with the technical findings. The revisional authority was, therefore, justified in correcting the appellate order.

Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that initiation of revision, if any, by a subordinate authority did not render the revisional jurisdiction invalid. What is material is that despite initiation by a subordinate authority, whether the competent revisional authority independently applied its mind and exercised the statutory power vested in it, or not. The impugned order clearly demonstrates that the revisional powers were in fact exercised suo-motu and upon altogether independent consideration. In support of aforesaid submission learned Additional Advocate General relied upon judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India vs. Delhi International Airport Limited & Others, (2024) 15 SCC 345 and Indian National Congress (I) vs Institute of Social welfare & Others, (2002) 5 SCC 685.

With regard to the cancellation proceedings, learned Additional Advocate General clarified that due procedure under the Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) read with Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2017 was complied with in letter and spirit, where the petitioner was repeatedly made aware of the demand and the consequences of non-payment by way of issuing valid notices and letters.

It was further argued that the petitioner pursued multiple proceedings before different forums against notices and actions emanated from the same original proceedings, either by suppressing the relevant material or by placing distorted facts before the concerned forums, and on remaining unsuccessful from all the forums, now cannot be allowed contend that he remained unaware either of the allegations or of the proposed statutory consequences. It was submitted even before this court the petitioner has not come out with clear hands and has deliberately made so many misstatements, therefore, conduct of the petitioner, in itself, disentitles him from getting any relief in equitable writ jurisdiction in view of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme court in the cases of K.D.Sharma vs Steel Authority of India Limited & Others, (2008) 12 SCC 481 and State of Orissa & Another vs Laxmi Narayan Das (dead) through Legal Representatives & Others, (2023) 15 SCC 273.

This Court has considered the rival submissions, examined the pleadings and the material placed on record and gone through the impugned order as well as the order passed by the appellate authority.

At the outset, it is necessary to bear in mind the nature of jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ Court does not sit as another court of appeal over the findings recorded by statutory authorities. As held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tata Cellular Vs Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 and Jagdish Mandal vs State of Orissa & Others, (2007) 14 SCC 517, judicial review in writ jurisdiction is directed primarily against the decision-making process and not against every conclusion of fact which the statutory authority is competent to draw from the material before it. Interference is warranted where the decision suffers from want or excess of jurisdiction, manifest perversity, consideration of irrelevant material, exclusion of material which was required to be considered, violation of statutory provisions or principles of natural justice, or an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

In the present case, the controversy principally arises out of the allegation of carrying out illegal mining on land comprising Khasra No.1702, which is admittedly adjoining to petitioner’s mining area, and the consequential determination of liability against the petitioner. It is undoubtedly true that the petitioner at the outset disputed his involvement and contended that the land in question belongs to other khatedars. However, the question as to whether the circumstances recorded during inspection were sufficient to connect the petitioner with the illegal excavation is essentially a question of fact dependent upon an appreciation of the technical material and the surrounding circumstances.

The record reveals that the first demand order was set aside by this Court on 09.05.2023 passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition no. 6325/2023 earlier filed by the Petitioner, and the authorities were directed to reconsider the matter after affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner submitted his representation and himself sought a site inspection in his presence. A technical committee was thereafter constituted and a joint inspection was conducted on 21.06.2023 when the petitioner was present. Thus, the subsequent proceedings cannot be equated with the original ex-parte inspection alone.

The petitioner has seriously questioned the adequacy and methodology of the second inspection. According to him, the fixed reference point was not properly utilised, the mining boundaries and coordinates were not comprehensively demarcated and sufficient technical particulars were not incorporated in the report. These objections were accepted to a considerable extent by the appellate authority. However, acceptance of such objections by the appellate authority does not, by itself, render the contrary view taken by the revisional authority jurisdictionally unsustainable.

This court finds that Rule 64 of the Rules of 2017 confers upon the revisional authority an effective jurisdiction to examine the correctness, legality and propriety of the order under challenge. Revisional power can be exercised on application by the aggrieved party or even on its own motion by the Revisional Authority. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction must undoubtedly remain within the statutory limits. However, where the appellate authority has set aside statutory proceedings by drawing conclusions regarding the adequacy and evidentiary value of technical material, the revisional authority is not rendered powerless to examine whether the appellate authority has properly exercised its jurisdiction or whether its conclusions are legally sustainable on the record. As per Rule 64 and 65, the Revisional Authority can confirm, modify or set aside the appellate order.

The petitioner has placed substantial reliance upon the decision of the appellate authority regarding the alleged deficiencies in the inspection reports. However, it is significant that the appellate authority proceeded beyond merely setting aside the order of cancellation and also nullified the foundational inspection proceedings, which were not even under challenge before the appellate authority, and simultaneously directed a fresh demarcation exercise of all adjoining mining leases. The respondents were, therefore, entitled to contend before the revisional authority that the appellate authority had travelled beyond the controversy arising from the order under appeal and had undertaken a wider factual exercise.

This Court cannot hold, merely because the appellate authority had recorded detailed observations regarding the inspection methodology, that the revisional authority was legally bound to accept each of those observations. The jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be converted into a process whereby this Court chooses between two possible assessments of disputed technical material. Unless the view taken by the revisional authority is shown to be wholly unsupported by the record or manifestly perverse, this Court would not substitute its own factual conclusions.

The contention that the inspection reports are nullities, merely because the petitioner disputed the adequacy of geographical particulars or even pleaded lack of established coordinates, also does not merit acceptance in the facts of the present case. The absence or inadequacy of a particular mode of recording measurements may constitute a relevant circumstance while assessing the reliability of an inspection, but such circumstance does not automatically render every inspection legally non-existent. The evidentiary worth of the inspection has to be considered in the context of the entire material, including the existence of the mining pit, the circumstances noticed by the technical officials, the location of the petitioner's lease and the explanation, if any, furnished by the petitioner.

The reliance placed by the petitioner on the fact that the alleged illegal mining was found on land belonging to other khatedars is also insufficient, by itself, to completely exonerate the petitioner in writ jurisdiction. The question before the statutory authorities was not merely one of title over the land but whether the material collected during inspection and the circumstances surrounding access and transportation established involvement of the petitioner. Such inference is fundamentally a matter of factual evaluation. The writ Court cannot undertake a fresh trial for determining who physically excavated each portion of the mineral, however, this court finds that under the scheme of the Rules of 2017, the Revisional Authority after examining the entire record and available material can assess or reassess the correct factual aspect relating to the aforesaid dispute.

The allegation of denial of natural justice as pleaded by the petitioner also does not persuade this Court to interfere with the impugned revisional order. The petitioner was fully aware of the allegations arising out of the inspection. After the earlier demand order was set aside, he submitted a detailed representation, sought a fresh inspection and participated in the joint inspection conducted thereafter. A subsequent notice was issued before the demand order dated 29.08.2023 was passed. The petitioner thereafter availed the statutory remedy of appeal and also pursued other legal proceedings. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was kept in complete ignorance of the material or allegations forming the basis of the proceedings.

Even assuming that there existed some dispute regarding the precise mode of service of the inspection report or notice, the petitioner has not demonstrated any real prejudice of such nature as would render the entire proceedings void. The petitioner has consistently disputed the allegations on merits, raised objections regarding demarcation, coordinates and boundaries, and carried those objections before the statutory authorities. Thus, the petitioner had adequate knowledge of the substance of the case which he was required to meet and had, in fact, availed repeated opportunities to contest the same.

The principle of natural justice is intended to secure fairness and not to provide a technical weapon for invalidating every proceeding notwithstanding the absence of any actual prejudice. Where the person concerned has participated in the proceedings, is aware of the allegations and has effectively raised his objections before the competent statutory forums, an alleged procedural irregularity is not necessarily sufficient to annul the entire action.

The contention regarding cancellation of the mining lease and the applicability of Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) of the Rules of 2017 also requires consideration in the light of the scheme of the Rules, hence, Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) & (b) and relevant part of Schedule-IV of the Rules of 2017 are being reproduced hereunder:

Conditions No. 4(11), 4(21) and 4 (22) of the lease deed also have material bearing to examine the impugned action and are, therefore, also quoted as under:

The petitioner contended that no independent show-cause notice specifically proposing cancellation was issued and notice emanating from the demand arising from alleged illegal mining could not be treated as sufficient notice for the purpose of cancellation. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that where the statute prescribes a particular procedure before termination of a mining lease, the authority is required to substantially comply with the statutory safeguards. Termination of a mining lease has serious civil consequences and cannot ordinarily be treated as an automatic or mechanical consequence of every alleged violation.

However, in the present case, the impugned order before this Court is principally the revisional order dated 24.09.2024 whereby the demand proceedings and the appellate order have been considered. The petitioner cannot obtain quashing of the impugned revisional order merely by raising every objection relating to the earlier consequential cancellation proceedings, particularly where the statutory authorities have considered those proceedings separately and where the challenge essentially involves disputed questions concerning the legal effect of non-payment of the demand.

Moreover, in the present case, the record reveals that on request of the petitioner, joint inspection was conducted on 21.06.2023, followed by a notice dated 10.07.2023 disclosing that as per report of joint inspection, by way of carrying out illegal mining the petitioner has illegally dispatched 70865.712 Ton Limestone mineral, for which penalty of ten times of royalty under Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 in the tune of Rs. 9,9211996.80 in addition to compounding fees of Rs. 20000/- can be levied against the petitioner, hence he was called upon to submit his explanation in this regard. Petitioner alleged vide letter dated 24.07.2023 that copy of site inspection report was not provided to him. Thereupon, vide further letter/ notice dated 02.08.2023, required copy of the site inspection report was sent to the petitioner again requiring explanation against him against proposed penalty and compounding fee, failing which demand was to be created and confirmed, and necessary legal action was required to be taken against the petitioner. Although the petitioner alleged that the said report with fresh notice since, was sent on his old address and not actually received by him, yet such plea raised by the petitioner is against the admitted record where the petitioner himself has confirmed that 12, Vallabhnagar, Kota was his valid address. Even when the petitioner filed statutory appeal and civil suit against the impugned proceedings, he himself wrote his address as 12, Vallabhnagar, Kota and even the notices of impugned revision proceedings were served upon the petitioner on the above address, and after receiving the same, the petitioner contested the proceedings without raising any such objection. Even there is reference of online postal trekking report regarding service of communication dated 02.08.2023 in the proceedings under question. In so many subsequent notices and letters also, duly admitted by the petitioner, letters and notices were duly received by the petitioner at 12, Vallabhnagar, Kota. Thus, on this ground no plea of violation of principles of natural justice or procedure cannot be entertained by this court.

Even after issuance of another notice along with copy of site inspection report, when the petitioner did not submit any reply/ objections, on 29.08.2023 demand of above penalty was crystallized and communicated to the petitioner. This order was also sent to the petitioner on the above address 12, Vallabhnagar, Kota. Demand order was followed by notice dated 01.09.2023 directing the petitioner to deposit the aforesaid demand failing which necessary legal action including cancellation of lease deed was to be taken against the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner was admittedly informed through the communication dated 01.09.2023 regarding the consequences of non-payment of the amount determined against him. After receiving the above notice, the petitioner himself wrote a letter on 29.09.2023 requesting the authorities to extend the time to deposit the penalty from 30 days to 90 days. He thereafter pursued an appeal and other remedies. Therefore, the question cannot be examined in complete isolation from the entire sequence of proceedings. The petitioner was aware that non-compliance with the demand would entail further statutory consequences. Thereafter, one letter dated 11.10.2023 was written by the Mining Engineer, Ramganzmandi to the Superintending Mining Exngineer, Kota informing therein that the petitioner has not remedied the breach by depositing the penalty amount, hence, proposal was sent to cancel the lease deed in the light of Rule 28(2)(xvii) (a) and (b) of the Rules of 2017 and conditions number 4(21) and (22) of the Lease deed. Copy of letter dated 11.10.2023 was also sent to the petitioner. The aforesaid letter was followed was similar letter dated 10.11.2023 written by the SME, Kota to ADM, Kota reiterating that the petitioner despite notices has not deposited the penalty, therefore permission was sought to cancel the lease deed in accordance with the Rules. Copy of letter dated 10.11.2023 was also undisputedly served upon the petitioner. In response to aforesaid letter dated 10.11.2023, on account of non-compliance of the earlier notices, the ADM Kota vide letter dated 16.11.2023 conveyed its approval to cancel the lease deed and directed to proceed further and to take possession of the lease, as well as to send proposal for auction of the lease deed. Undeniably copy of the letter dated 16.11.2023 was also served upon the petitioner. Subsequently, in furtherance of aforesaid proceedings vide office order dated 15.12.2023, lease deed of the petitioner was cancelled by the Superintending Mining Engineer, Kota. Thus, in the present case, in view of number of notices and letters mentioned here-in-above, violation of provisions of Rule 28(2)(xvii) read with Schedule IV of the Rules of 2017 cannot be alleged by the petitioner.

The judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Takhat Singh (supra) relied upon by the petitioner in support of strict compliance with the procedure for cancellation cannot be applied mechanically without examining the statutory context and factual foundation of the particular case. A precedent dealing with termination on the basis of a different factual and statutory setting cannot automatically invalidate the revisional order.

In Takhat Singh (supra), the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while considering the validity of cancellation of a mining lease under Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) of the Rules of 2017, held that termination of a mining lease is a serious and drastic consequence and the authority is required to strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed under the Rules. The mere fact that an earlier notice contained a general stipulation regarding possible termination could not dispense with the requirement of a specific 30-days' notice contemplated by the second proviso to Rule 28(2) (xvii)(a) before taking the final decision to terminate the lease. The Court further held that the authority was required to consider the explanation submitted by the lessee and to examine whether the lesser consequence of imposition of penalty, instead of termination, would meet the ends of justice. The court further took note of the significant fact that in that case, the petitioner Takhat Singh admittedly remedied the alleged breach by depositing the entire penalty. Accordingly, the orders determining the liability and terminating the mining lease were quashed and the respondents were directed to restore the mining lease, subject to compliance with the applicable statutory conditions and payment of lawful dues. Facts of the present case are altogether different. In the present case, it is undisputed that unlike the case of Takhat Singh (supra), breach has not been remedied by the present petitioner by depositing the penalty amount, and further, as referred here-in-above, not only one but several notices/ letters were regularly and consistently served upon the petitioner, which is sufficient compliance of the Rule 28(2)(xvii) read with Schedule-IV of Rules of 2017.

In considered opinion of this Court, the judgment in Takhat Singh (supra) should not be understood as laying down that a mining lease must be restored even where the lessee has never remedied the breach or deposited the penalty/dues. A proper reading of Rule 28(2)(xvii)(a) read with Schedule IV of the Rules of 2017 shows that the remedying of the breach remains an important condition. Schedule IV provides a graded consequence: if the breach is remedied within the notice period, no adverse consequence follows; if it is remedied after the notice period but within 45 days, the prescribed penalty is attracted; and if the breach continues beyond 45 days, determination of the lease becomes permissible. Significantly, clause (ii) of Schedule IV provides that if the breach is remedied before the order of termination is actually passed, the lease shall not be determined, subject to the prescribed forfeiture. Takhat Singh’s judgment emphasises this aspect and holds that the 45-day period is not an absolute cut-off beyond which the lessee loses the opportunity to cure the breach. However, this does not mean that a lessee who has allowed the breach to continue and has neither deposited the amount nor otherwise remedied the breach acquires an absolute right to restoration after termination. While examining the manner in which termination was effected and absence of the mandatory specific 30-days' notice preceding termination, the Court additionally found that the petitioner in that case had subsequently paid the revised dues under the Amnesty Scheme and also considered that similarly situated lessees had been restored after such payment. These circumstances materially influenced the direction for restoration. In absence of similar circumstances, the aforesaid judgment of Takhat Singh does not advance case of the petitioner. The judgment itself records that the petitioner Takhat Singh had deposited the entire revised penalty under the Amnesty Scheme and obtained a No Dues Certificate, and the Court also found discriminatory treatment because similarly situated lessees had been restored. Thus, the restoration direction cannot safely be divorced from those additional facts.

Another contention of the petitioner that proceedings under Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 could not have been undertaken because the petitioner never sought compounding also does not justify interference in the present writ petition. The controversy requires consideration of the scope and ambit of Rule 54 of the Rules, 2017 which deals with illegal mining, transportation and storage of minerals. Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 lays down as under:

Meticulous examination and analysis of the aforesaid Rule would make it evidently clear that sub-rule (1) prohibits any person from undertaking prospecting or mining operations without a valid mineral concession, permit or other permission and further prohibits dispatch of mineral except from the licensed quarry area and without a valid rawanna or transit pass. Sub-rule (2) similarly prohibits transportation or storage of mineral otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Rules. Thus, Rule 54 is intended to regulate not only the activity of extraction of mineral, but also its subsequent transportation and storage. Sub-rule (3) provides the penal consequence for contravention of sub-rules (1) and (2), namely, imprisonment which may extend to five years or fine which may extend to five lakh rupees, or both. The proviso thereto confers power upon the specified mining authorities to compound the offence, either before or after institution of prosecution, upon payment of the cost of mineral and the prescribed compound fee. The use of the expression “may” in this provision makes it clear that compounding is a statutory mode of dealing with the offence and is not an automatic consequence of every case of alleged illegal mining. Ordinarily, therefore, compounding involves an act of settlement of the offence in accordance with the statutory power conferred upon the competent authority.

However, Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 is not confined to the mechanism of compounding. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 constitutes an independent and comprehensive provision dealing with seizure and recovery. Where any person, without lawful authority, raises any mineral from any land otherwise than under a valid mineral concession or other permission and brings upon such land any tool, equipment, vehicle or other thing for that purpose, the mineral as well as such vehicle, equipment or other property may be seized by the competent authority. The Rule further provides that the seized vehicle, equipment or mineral may be released upon deposit of the cost of mineral together with the compound fee specified in sub-rule (3).

A separate situation is contemplated by the third proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017, namely, where the mineral so excavated has already been dispatched or consumed. In such a situation, physical recovery of the mineral is no longer possible. The Rule, therefore, expressly provides that the competent authority shall recover the cost of mineral along with the compound fee specified in sub-rule (3). The use of the expression “shall recover”, as contrasted with the expression “may compound” occurring in sub-rule (3), is significant and indicates that the recovery contemplated by the third proviso is a statutory consequence of the unauthorised raising of mineral and its subsequent dispatch or consumption.

The expression “compound fee” occurring in the third proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 cannot, therefore, necessarily be construed to mean that the offence has in every case been voluntarily compounded by the person proceeded against. Compounding of an offence under sub-rule (3) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 and recovery of the amount contemplated by sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 operate in different fields. Compounding is a statutory mode by which the offence may be settled upon payment of the prescribed amount, whereas the third proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 provides for recovery of the prescribed monetary liability in a situation where the mineral has already been dispatched or consumed. To construe the latter provision as dependent upon the voluntary consent or option of the offender to compound the offence would render the expression “shall recover” substantially ineffective and would enable the person proceeded against to defeat the statutory recovery merely by declining to compound the offence.

Thus, where the competent authority establishes that mineral was raised without lawful authority and such mineral has already been dispatched or consumed, the fact that the person proceeded against has not opted for compounding, or has expressly declined to compound the offence, by itself does not take away the statutory power and obligation to recover the cost of mineral along with the prescribed compound fee under the third proviso to Rule 54(5). Such recovery, however, cannot be equated with a finding of criminal guilt or with an order of compounding of the criminal offence. If prosecution has been instituted and the offence has not been compounded, the question of criminal liability remains subject to adjudication by the competent criminal court in accordance with law.

The distinction between the two provisions may thus be stated simply in the manner that sub-rule (3) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 deals with the power to compound the offence, whereas sub-rule (5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017, particularly its third proviso, deals with the statutory consequences of unauthorised extraction where the mineral is no longer available for seizure because it has already been dispatched or consumed. Consequently, payment or recovery of the amount prescribed under Rule 54(5) of Rule 54 of the Rules of 2017 does not, by itself, amount to compounding of the criminal offence. In the present case also, it is evident from material available on record that the illegally excavated mineral was already dispatched by the petitioner, hence, recovery under Rule 54 was rightly created and enforced by the authorities.

The submission that the revisional proceedings were invalid because the concerned authority (ADM Kota) was functus officio and could not be treated as an aggrieved person also does not carry the case of the petitioner any further. The relevant question is not merely who initiated or suggested the initiation of proceedings, but whether the competent revisional authority possessed statutory jurisdiction and independently exercised that jurisdiction.

A statutory power of revision, where exercisable suo-motu, is not extinguished merely because information regarding the possible illegality or impropriety of an order is brought to the notice of the competent authority by an officer or authority connected with the earlier proceedings. The source from which the information reaches the revisional authority and the independent statutory exercise of revisional jurisdiction are distinct matters.

In the present case, the petitioner was issued notice and was afforded an opportunity of hearing before the revisional authority. The impugned order is not shown to have been mechanically passed at the dictation of any other authority. Therefore, the mere fact that an earlier authority expressed an opinion regarding the availability of revisional remedy cannot, by itself, render the exercise of statutory revisional jurisdiction without authority of law.

The allegation of bias and legal malice is equally unsupported by sufficient material. Bias cannot be inferred merely because an authority takes a view adverse to a party or because the authority had earlier dealt with another stage of the same proceedings. A clear factual foundation giving rise to a reasonable apprehension that the competent decision-maker acted under prejudice, personal animosity or for an extraneous purpose is required.

The fact that the appeal against cancellation was transferred to another authority itself demonstrates that the statutory system took care to avoid any possible objection concerning the participation of an authority previously associated with the matter. The subsequent expression of an opinion regarding the availability of revision does not establish that the competent revisional authority acted with bias or surrendered its independent judgment.

The petitioner has also questioned the correctness of the revisional order on the ground that it did not specifically deal with every finding recorded by the appellate authority. It is settled that an authority is required to give reasons which disclose application of mind to the material issues. However, an order cannot be invalidated merely because it does not reproduce and answer each and every sentence or observation appearing in the order under challenge. On a consideration of the impugned order as a whole, this Court finds that the revisional authority has addressed the core controversy relating to the inspection, the material connecting the petitioner with the alleged illegal mining, the conclusions drawn by the appellate authority and the consequences arising from the findings of the mining authorities. The petitioner may disagree with the conclusions reached, but disagreement with the merits of the decision is not equivalent to absence of jurisdiction or perversity.

It is also relevant that the controversy involves technical matters concerning mining operations, measurement of excavation, boundaries and assessment of mineral. The statutory authorities constituted under the mining law possess specialised competence to examine such matters. Unless their conclusions are shown to be unsupported by any material or contrary to a mandatory statutory provision, the writ Court would exercise restraint in substituting its own assessment for that of the competent technical and statutory authorities.

The appellate authority and the revisional authority have taken different views of the material. However, that circumstance, by itself, does not justify interference by this Court. The writ jurisdiction is not intended to provide a third tier of factual adjudication. Once the competent revisional authority has examined the legality and propriety of the appellate order and has recorded reasons for interfering with it, this Court would not reappreciate the entire evidence for the purpose of determining which of the two statutory authorities had taken the preferable factual view.

The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the requirement of a proper show-cause notice, fair opportunity, limits of revisional jurisdiction and the necessity of an identifiable basis for imposing liability are founded upon well-established principles. However, those principles do not advance the petitioner's case in the absence of a demonstrated jurisdictional error in the impugned order. The applicability of a precedent necessarily depends upon the statutory scheme and factual circumstances of the case in which it is invoked.

Similarly, the principle that a quasi-judicial authority cannot ordinarily become a litigating party to defend its own order does not mean that a statutory revisional authority is prevented from exercising suo-motu jurisdiction as per Rule, when information regarding the legality or propriety of an order is brought to its notice by a departmental officer. The ultimate question remains whether the competent revisional authority independently exercised a power vested in it by statute. In the present case, this Court does not find that the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction merely because of the circumstances in which the revisional proceedings came to be initiated.

Upon an overall consideration of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to establish that the impugned order dated 24.09.2024 suffers from lack of jurisdiction, patent illegality, manifest perversity or violation of the principles of natural justice. The grounds raised by the petitioner substantially require a fresh appreciation of disputed factual and technical issues, which this Court cannot undertake in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

This Court also finds that the petitioner had multiple opportunities to contest the allegations and did, in fact, avail the statutory and legal remedies available to him. The mere existence of another possible interpretation of the inspection material or a disagreement with the conclusions of the revisional authority cannot furnish a ground for exercise of certiorari jurisdiction. Consequently, no case for interference with the impugned revisional order dated 24.09.2024 is made out.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. The impugned order dated 24.09.2024 does not warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.