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Judgment
E. Padmanabhan, J.—In all sixty writ petitions have been filed challenging the acquisition of land for Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation, an
undertaking of the State Government.
Twenty eight writ petitions have been filed by M/s. Dalmia Cements ; Ten writ petitions have been filed by M/s. Madras Cements; Six writ
petitions have been moved by Ms. Nilgiris Cements ; Four writ petitions have been filed by Ms/. Dharani Cements now known as M/s. Grasim
Industries ; Seven writ petitions have been filed by M/s. Alagappa Cements and Two writ petitions have been filed by M/s. K.G. Minerals Pvt.
Ltd., besides seven individuals have moved separate writ petitions challenging the land acquisition for the same purpose, under different Section
4(1) Notifications and Section 6 Declarations..
M/s. Dalmia Cements (Bharat) Ltd., have filed the following Twenty eight writ petitions seeking to quash the Section 4(1) Notification and
Section 6 Declarations issued in the following G.O.s :
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4(1) Date Section 6 Date
Notification G.O. Nos. Declaration G.O. Nos.
1 6484/95 255 21.09.1993 182 08.11.1994
2 6485/95 268 18.10.1993 193 30.11.1994
3 11476/95 313 25.11.1993 15 03.01.1995
4 11474/95 314 25.11.1993 14 31.01.1995
5 1369/96 141 08.08.1994 187 06.09.1995
6 1367/96 142 08.08.1994 192 11.09.1995
7 1368/96 140 08.08.1994 193 11.09.1995
8 15692/95 102 09.05.1994 116 06.07.1995
9 15691/95 104 09.05.1994 115 06.07.1995
10 1370/96 123 14.06.1994 146 27.07.1995
11 13253/95 120 09.06.1994 138 19.07.1995
12 13254/95 117 09.06.1994 140 19.07.1995
13 13251/95 119 09.06.1994 137 19.07.1995
14 13252/95 118 09.06.1994 139 19.07.1995
15 11510/95 96 11.04.1994 104 08.06.1995
16 17718/97 12 04.01.1996 32 20.02.1997
17 17715/97 22 18.01.1996 53 10.03.1997
18 17716/97 266 28.12.1995 24 18.02.1997
19 17717/97 270 28.12.1995 26 18.02.1997
20 17719/97 273 28.12.1995 44 03.03.1997
21 17720/97 8 04.01.1996 23 18.02.1997
22 17721/97 14 14.01.1996 25 18.02.1997
23 17713/97 10 04.01.1996 46 03.03.1997
24 17725/97 11 04.01.1996 47 03.03.1997
25 17724/97 271 28.12.1995 37 25.02.1997
26 17723/97 15 04.01.1996 38 25.02.1997
27 17714/97 69 14.03.1996 66 04.04.1997
28 17722/97 267 28.12.1995 39 25.02.1997
M/s. Madras Cements Ltd., have filed the following Ten writ petitions seeking to quash the Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6 Declaration
issued in the following G.O.s:
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4(1) Date Section 6 Date
Notification G.O. Nos. Declaration G.O. Nos.
1 4380/99 11 04.01.1996 47 03.03.1997
2 5843/99 45 01.02.1996 79 02.05.1997
3 2125/99 9 04.01.1996 33 20.02.1997
4 5844/99 46 01.02.1996 70 09.04.1997
5 5845/99 69 16.03.1996 69 09.04.1997
6 2126/99 275 28.12.1995 34 20.02.1997
7 2124/99 272 28.12.1995 31 20.02.1997
8 4741/99 24 18.01.1996 56 12.03.1997
9 3898/99 53 13.02.1996 65 04.04.1997
10 6185/00 780 24.11.1998 979 24.12.1999
M/s. Nilgiris Cements Ltd., have filed the following six writ petitions seeking to quash the Section 4 (1) Notification and Section 6 Declaration
issued under the following G.O.s:
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4 (1) Date Section 6 Date
Notification G.O. Nos. Declaration G.O. Nos.
1 1888/97 313 25.11.1993 15 03.01.1995
2 467/99 8 04.01.1996 23 18.02.1997
3 466/99 15 04.01.1996 38 25.02.1997
4 692/99 45 01.02.1996 79 02.05.1997
5 468/99 61 05.03.1996 68 04.09.1997
6 2616/99 272 28.12.1995 31 20.02.1997
M/s. Grasim Industries Ltd., (formerly known as Dharani Cements) moved the following four writ petitions seeking to quash the Section 4 (1)
Notification and Section 6 Declaration issued in the following G.O.s:
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4 (1) Date Section 6 Date
Notification G.O. Nos. Declaration G.O. Nos.
1 3632/97 255 21.09.1993 182 08.11.1994
2 8981/97 270 28.12.1995 26 18.02.1997
3 10939/97 46 01.02.1996 70 09.04.1997
4 10628/00 780 24.11.1998 979 24.12.1999
M/s. Alagappa Cements Ltd., moved the following three writ petitions seeking to quash the Section 4 (1) Notification and Section 6 Declaration
issued in the following G.O.s:
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4(1) Date Section 6 Date
Notification G.O. Nos. Declaration G.O. Nos.
1 6629/97 275 28.12.1995 34 20.02.1997
2 6630/97 16 04.01.1997 30 18.02.1997
3 6631/97 269 28.12.1995 29 18.02.1997
M/s. K.G.M. Minerals Pvt. Ltd., have filed the following two writ petitions seeking to quash the Section 4 (1) Notification and Section 6
Declaration issued in the following G.O.s :
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4(1) Date Section 6 Date
Notification G.O. Nos. Declaration G.O. Nos.
1 7678/97 141 08.08.1994 187 06.09.1995
2 7679/97 12 04.01.1996 32 20.02.1997
The following seven individuals have filed separate writ petitions seeking to quash the Section 4 (1) Notification and Section 6 Declaration
issued in the following G.O.s:
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4(1) Date Section 6 Date
Notification G.O. Nos. Declaration G.O. Nos.
1 18376/96 255 21.09.1993 182 08.11.1994
2 19462/96 268 18.10.1993 193 30.11.1994
3 7795/97 268 18.10.1993 193 30.11.1994
4 18340/96 313 25.11.1993 15 03.01.1995
5 17401/96 313 25.11.1993 15 03.01.1995
6 17924/96 314 25.11.1993 14 31.01.1995
7 11202/97 69 14.03.1996 66 04.04.1997
Heard Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. Sathish Parasaran, Mr. R. Gandhi, learned senior counsel appearing
for Mr. R.G. Narendhiran, Mr. A.L. Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for Mr. V. Suthakar, Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior
counsel appearing for Mr. S. Silambanan, Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned counsel appearing for Mr. Mr. M. Mohan, Mr. T. Sellapandian,
learned counsel appearing for Mr. C. Selvaraj, Mr. K.S. Viswanathan and Mr. C. Prakasam, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in
respective writ petitions, Mr. Gomathi Nayagam, learned Special Government Pleader (Land Acquisition) assisted by Ms. D. Malarvizhi, learned
counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. K.V. Sundararajan, learned counsel appearing for the third respondent.
In all the writ petitions, the beneficiary, M/s. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd., hereinafter referred to as TANCEM, moved for
impleading itself as third respondent and impleading has been ordered. On behalf of TANCEM, Mr. K.V. Sundararajan, learned counsel
appeared in all the writ petitions.
As seen from Section 4 (1) Notifications and Section 6 Declarations, which are impugned in this batch of writ petitions, vast extent of lands is
notified u/s 4(1) and Declaration was issued u/s 6 for a public purpose, namely, for mining limestone by Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd.,
Ariyalur. The acquired lands are located in Valajanagar, Reddipalayam, Pudupalayam, Periyanaganallur, Kairalabad, etc., villages in Ariyalur
Talukv in Trichy District. The beneficiary M/s. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd., a Government of Tamil Nadu Undertaking has located its
factory at Ariyalur. The lands, as per Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6 Declarations are acquired for mining limestone for TANCEM. Since
there is no dispute as to the survey numbers and the land or extent of the land as well as the total extent, it is not necessary to refer to the details of
survey numbers or extent or other details required to notify the lands nor it is relevant for the purpose of the present writ petitions.
It is the specific case of M/s. Dalmia Cements, M/s. Madras Cements, M/s. Nilgiris Cements, M/s. Alagappa Cements, M/s. Grasim
Industries and M/s. K.G.M. Minerals that they have purchased the lands to mine limestone for their existing industry or proposed industry or for
expansion as the case may be or for exploiting the limestone deposits. It is the main contention of the said six companies that when their object is to
quarry and use limestone in their respective cement factory or for other chemicals and their use also being a public purpose, totally there is no
justification or warrant to acquire their lands. The said companies also point out that for the expansion of their cement factories, lands with
limestone deposits are required, while TANCEM holds extensive lands, where substantial quantity of deposit of limestone is available, which
would enure for next century or two.
The petitioner companies also pointed out that prior to their by purchase, they have moved the State Government for prior permission u/s 37-
B of The Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961, to acquire lands for limestone deposit as they already hold extensive lands for
their respective cement industries or for lime stone deposit. It is stated that only after getting prior permission of the State Government, the lands in
question were purchased. It is therefore contended that having granted permission u/s 37-B of The Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land)
Act to acquire the lands for the limestone deposits, it is not open to the respondents to acquire the lands and confer monopoly on the State owned
TANCEM.
It is also contended that the lands were initially reserved for mining u/s 56 of The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,
1957 for the purpose of TANCEM and such a notification providing for reservation was the subject matter of challenge in a batch of writ petitions.
The petitioners'' have successfully challenged the said notification. Therefore, it is contended that the State Government and TANCEM, what they
could not achieve directly, are now trying to achieve indirectly by invoking the power of eminent domain. It is also pointed out that after the repeal
of Section 56 of The Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, no question of reservation of lands could be made and,
therefore, there cannot be any acquisition also.
Apart from the above contentions advanced by the said six companies, the petitioners have also advanced other contentions such as violation
or non compliance of Section 4 or Section 5-A or Section 6 or The Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu) Rules, etc. The main contentions advanced by
the six companies will be taken up for consideration, while the other contentions advanced will be taken up at the first instance.
According to the petitioners, the lands are not at all required for TANCEM as vast extent of lands with substantial deposit of limestone are
available with TANCEM and recently the State Government released lands in favour of two other companies, namely, M/s. Alagappa Cements
Ltd. and M/s. Venkateswara Cements Ltd. from and out of the lands reserved for TANCEM by separate G.O.s from the lands already held by
TANCEM, there is substantial reserve over 77 Million Metric Tons of limestone, which will be sufficient for several decades on a moderate
estimate. Further, TANCEM has not been able to achieve even 100% productivity and, therefore, the acquisition will seriously destroy the public
interest as the petitioner-companies could always maintain maximum production capacity and they will be throttled or disabled with total stoppage
in production by the acquisition of their land and as a consequence public interest will suffer in several ways, besides the State will also sustain loss
in revenue such as Sales Tax, Excise Duty and Direct Taxes and the workers have to be retrenched once the limestone deposits owned as of
today by the petitioner-companies get exhausted.
On behalf of the respondents detailed counter has been filed in few of the writ petitions and the same has been adopted in the other writ
petitions as well. TANCEM has also adopted the counter filed by the first respondent, the State Government. To the counter a reply/rejoinder has
also been filed by some of the writ petitioners.
The points that arise for consideration are divided into two parts, namely, challenge to the acquisition by the six existing companies or cement
factories and second part being challenge to the acquisition on other grounds, namely, failure to follow or violation of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act and Rules framed thereunder. The points that arise for consideration in this batch of sixty writ petitions are taken up one by one for
consideration. The respondents contend that the writ petitions are highly belated and liable to be dismissed. Further, writ petitions by subsequent
purchasers are not maintainable. The writ petitions are not maintainable after passing of award and taking possession of the land.
20.In this batch of writ petitions, the following points arise for consideration and it is taken as Part I :-
I)Whether the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of latches or delay in challenging the acquisition and filing writ petitions after
passing of award and/or taking possession ?
II)Whether the writ petitions filed after passing of the award is liable to be rejected summarily ?
III)Whether Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6 Declaration were factually published according to the Land Acquisition Act ? and, whether
the publication of Section 4(1) Notification in the two Tamil dailies is valid and in compliance with Section 4(1) ?
IV)Whether Section 6 Declarations have been issued after a lapse of one year from the date of publication of Section 4(1) Notification and
whether the proceedings are liable to be quashed on that score ?
V)Whether there is a failure to follow Rule 4 in conducting the enquiry u/s 5A and whether the acquisition is vitiated on that score ?
VI)Whether the Declaration is liable to be quashed on the ground that it proceeds as if the entire compensation is to be borne by the State, while
factually the compensation is to be paid out of the funds of TANCEM ?
VII)Whether the grant of permission u/s 37 B granting prior permission under The Land Reforms Act in favour of M/s. Dalmia Cements takes
away the power of eminent domain ? Whether the respondents are estopped by grant of such prior permission ?
VIII)Whether the acquisition is liable to be quashed on the ground that the names of the present owners have not been set out in Section 4(1)
Notification ?
IX)Whether failure to serve notice on the present owners under Sec.5A vitiates the acquisition ?
X)Whether the petitioners who are purchasers after Section 4(1) Notification could maintain the writ petitions ?
XI)Whether failure to issue notice to subsequent purchasers is violative of principles of natural justice and whether the same vitiates the acquisition
proceedings ?
XII)Whether the Land Acquisition Officer was informed of the sales in favour of the petitioners by their vendors during Section 5A enquiry ?
21.The following points are framed in Part II for consideration :-
A) Whether the acquisition is for a public purpose? and Whether the purpose set out in Section 4(1) Notification is capable of being achieved at
all? Whether it is necessary to acquire lands with limestone deposits when the limestone reserve already available with TANCEM is more than
sufficient for its purpose for future as well?
B) Whether the impugned acquisition defeats the legitimate expectations of the petitioners by their being granted permission to acquire the lands u/s
37-B of The Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act ?
C) Whether the acquisition for TANCEM is a colourable exercise of power, in that what could not be done directly is sought to be achieved
indirectly and to circumvent Rule 58 of The Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, which has since been repealed ?
D) Whether after repealing of Rule 58 of MMRD Rules, the acquisition proceedings could be resorted to without complying with Section 17A of
the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,1957 ?
E) Whether the acquisition have been undertaken with undue haste without analyzing the imminent captive requirements of the writ petitioner for
limestone in their factory as against that of TANCEM, which has sufficient reserves ?
F) Whether the acquisition of lands owned by the Cement Factories is a colourable exercise of power and when the limestone, a major mineral,
falls under the control of Central Government, whether lands could be acquired for limestone deposits by the State Government fro TANCEM ?
PART I
POINT NO. I : Whether the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of latches or delay in challenging the acquisition and filing
writ petitions after passing of award and/or taking possession ?
One of the main objections advanced by Mr. Gomathinayagam, learned Special Government Pleader (Land Acquisition) being that there is
delay in challenging the acquisition proceedings, in that the petitioners have not challenged the validity of Section 4(1) Notifications and Section 6
Declarations immediately after their publication or issue, but came before the Court after passing of the award and in most of the cases after taking
possession of the land by the Land Acquisition Officer. Therefore, it is contended that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on this short
ground. It is contended that there is no justification to entertain the writ petitions and the writ petitions should have been dismissed at the threshold.
In this respect, the learned Special Government Pleader relied upon the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Reliance Petroleum Ltd. Vs. Zaver
Chand Popatlal Sumaria and Others, as well as Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt
Ltd., and others, and Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana and Others, .
In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay case reported in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. The Industrial Development
Investment Co. Pvt Ltd., and others, , the Apex Court after analyzing the entire case law on the subject as well as a catena of its decisions, held
thus :-
In Ram Chand v. Union of India, another Bench of three Judges of this Court had held that because of inordinate delay in approaching the
court after the entire process of acquisition was over pursuant to notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6, the court was not justified in quashing
the same. Same view was reiterated in Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti
Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar. 29. It is thus well-settled law that
when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should
be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the
notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was
passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into
consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for
interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing
the writ petition on the ground of laches.
The same view has been reiterated in Starwire India Ltd., case reported in Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana and Others, , wherein
the Apex Court held thus :-
In Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana, this Court had held that a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to challenge the legality of the acquisition
proceedings on the ground of lack of publication of the notification. In Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and Sneh Prabha v. State of U.P.,
this Court had held that the alienations made by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of the notification u/s 4(1), do not bind either the
State Government or the beneficiary for whose benefit the land was acquired. The purchaser does not acquire any valid title. Even the colour of
title claimed by the purchaser was void. The beneficiary is entitled to have absolute possession free from encumbrances. In U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., this Court had further held that the purchaser of the property, after the notification u/s 4(1) was published, is devoid of
right to challenge the validity of the notification or irregularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration u/s 6.
Identical view has also been taken in Executive Engineer, Jal Nigam Central Stores Division, U.P. Vs. Suresha Nand Juyal alias Musa Ram
(Deceased) by LR''s and others, as well as The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, , where U.C.
Baneerjee, J., speaking for the Bench, while analyzing the case law, held thus :-
In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder.
This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N.) this Court
observed as below:
The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ''the Act'') in GOR No.
1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil
Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The
acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the
company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear
that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership,
was transferred in GO Ms No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th
respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on
leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GO Ms No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GO Ms No.
546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GO Ms No. 1392 Industries
dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are
entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having
already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the
notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
Similar is the view in an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment
Co. (P) Ltd. Incidentally, the decision last noted was also on land acquisition and requisition under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning
Act, 1966 and in para 29 of the Report this Court observed:
It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings
have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution to quash the notification u/s 4(1) and declaration u/s 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic
consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is
a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in
the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the
learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.
In the present case, the following are the relevant dates and a perusal of the same would show that most of the petitioners have come before
this Court after passing of the award and taking possession of the land:-
S. No. W.P. No. Date of Date of Date of Date of Date of
Publication of G.O. Section 6 Declaration Passing of Award Taking Possession filing Writ Petition
1 6484/95 21.09.1993 08.11.1994 07.11.1996 11.12.1996 27.04.1995
2 3632/97 21.09.1993 08.11.1994 07.11.1996 11.12.1996 17.03.1997
3 18376/96 21.09.1993 08.11.1994 07.11.1996 11.12.1996 10.12.1996
4 6485/95 18.10.1993 30.11.1994 29.11.1996 11.12.1996 27.04.1995
5 19462/96 18.10.1993 30.11.1994 29.11.1996 11.12.1996 03.01.1997
6 7795/97 18.10.1993 30.11.1994 29.11.1996 11.12.1996 02.06.1997
7 11476/95 25.11.1993 01.03.1995 31.01.1997 27.02.1997 24.08.1995
8 18340/96 25.11.1993 01.03.1995 31.01.1997 27.02.1997 04.12.1996
9 17401/96 25.11.1993 01.03.1995 31.01.1997 27.02.1997 20.11.1996
10 1888/97 25.11.1993 01.03.1995 31.01.1997 27.02.1997 12.02.1997
11 11474/95 25.11.1993 31.01.1995 31.01.1997 28.02.1997 31.07.1995
12 17924/96 25.11.1993 31.01.1995 31.01.1997 28.02.1997 04.12.1996
13 1369/96 08.08.1994 09.06.1995 12.07.1997 21.08.1997 07.02.1996
14 7678/97 08.08.1994 09.06.1995 12.07.1997 21.08.1997 02.06.1997
15 1367/96 08.08.1994 09.11.1995 14.07.1997 21.08.1997 07.02.1996
16 1368/96 08.08.1994 09.11.1995 07.02.1996
17 15692/95 09.05.1994 07.06.1995 04.07.1997 04.09.1997 15.11.1995
18 15691/95 09.05.1994 07.06.1995 04.07.1997 04.09.1997 15.11.1995
19 1370/96 14.06.1994 27.07.1995
20 13253/95 09.06.1994 19.07.1995 17.07.1997 21.07.1997 26.09.1995
21 13254/95 09.06.1994 19.07.1995 17.07.1997 26.08.1997 15.09.1995
22 13251/95 09.06.1994 19.07.1995 17.07.1997 26.08.1997 25.09.1995
23 13252/95 09.06.1994 19.07.1995 17.07.1997 26.08.1997 25.09.1995
24 11510/95 11.04.1994 06.08.1995 06.06.1997 23.06.1997 24.08.1995
25 17718/97 04.01.1996 20.02.1997 13.01.1997 10.03.1999 26.03.1999
26 7679/97 04.01.1996 20.02.1997 13.01.1997 10.03.1999 03.06.1997
27 17715/97 18.01.1996 03.10.1997 06.07.2000 25.02.1998
28 17716/97 28.12.1995 18.02.1997 17.02.1999 10.03.1999 28.11.1997
29 17717/97 28.12.1995 18.02.1997 31.12.1999 05.01.1999 23.06.1997
30 8981/97 28.12.1995 18.02.1997 31.12.1999 05.01.1999 28.11.1997
31 17719/97 28.12.1995 03.03.1997 28.06.2000 05.01.1999 28.11.1997
32 17720/97 04.01.1996 18.02.1997 10.12.1998 05.01.1999 24.11.1997
33 467/99 04.01.1996 18.02.1997 10.12.1998 05.01.1999 12.01.1999
34 17721/97 14.01.1996 18.02.1997 08.11.1997
35 17713/97 04.01.1996 03.03.1997 02.03.1999 22.03.1999 24.11.1997
36 17725/97 04.01.1996 03.03.1997 02.03.1999 26.03.1999 28.11.1997
37 4380/99 04.01.1996 03.03.1997 02.03.1999 26.03.1999 17.03.1999
38 17724/97 28.12.1995 25.02.1997 24.02.1999 22.03.1999 24.11.1997
39 17723/97 04.01.1996 25.02.1997 24.02.1999 22.03.1999 28.11.1997
40 466/99 04.01.1996 25.02.1997 24.02.1999 22.03.1999 21.07.2000
41 5843/99 01.02.1996 05.02.1997 12.04.1999 08.02.2000 07.04.1999
42 692/99 01.02.1996 05.02.1997 12.04.1999 08.02.2000 22.03.1999
43 468/99 05.03.1996 09.04.1997 19.02.1999 29.03.1999 12.01.1999
44 17714/97 14.03.1996 04.04.1997 26.03.1997 17.05.1999 28.11.1997
45 11202/97 14.03.1996 04.04.1997 26.03.1997 17.05.1999 28.07.1997
46 2125/99 04.01.1996 02.20.1997 19.02.1999 15.02.2000 11.02.1999
47 5844/99 01.02.1996 04.09.1997 06.04.1999 04.06.1999 05.04.1999
48 10939/97 01.02.1996 04.09.1997 06.04.1999 04.06.1999 12.03.1999
49 5845/99 16.03.1996 04.09.1997 06.04.1999 01.06.1999 07.04.1999
50 6629/97 28.12.1995 20.02.1997 19.02.1999 10.03.1999 30.04.1997
51 2126/99 28.12.1995 20.02.1997 19.02.1999 10.03.1999 11.02.1999
52 17722/97 28.12.1995 25.02.1997 24.02.1999 22.03.1999 24.11.1997
53 2124/99 28.12.1995 20.02.1997 19.02.1999 22.03.1999 09.02.1999
54 2616/99 28.12.1995 20.02.1997 19.02.1999 22.03.1999 18.02.1999
55 4741/99 18.01.1996 03.12.1997 11.03.1999 30.04.1999 24.03.1999
56 3898/99 13.02.1996 04.04.1997 26.03.1999 26.04.1999 10.03.1999
57 6630/97 04.01.1997 18.02.1997 17.02.1999 25.04.1999 28.04.1997
58 6631/97 28.12.1995 18.02.1997 17.02.1999 20.04.1999 30.04.1997
59 6185/00 24.11.1998 24.12.1999 28.11.2001 NIL 06.04.2000
60 10628/00 24.11.1998 24.12.1999 28.11.2001 NIL 28.06.2000
Even in case where the award has not been passed, the writ petitioner has approached this Court one year after the issuance of Section 6
Declaration. On a perusal of the above dates, in particular Section 4(1) Notification, Section 6 Declaration, passing of the award and taking
possession and the fact that the petitioners have come before this Court, in most of the cases, after making of Section 6 Declaration / after taking
possession or long after the award or long after Section 6 Declaration and such a delay is fatal to the writ petition. Hence, on this ground all the
above writ petitions except W.P. Nos. 6484/95, 18376/96, 11476/95, 11474/95, 15691/95, 15692/95, 13253/95, 13254/95, 13251/95,
13252/95 and 11510/95 are liable to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed.
POINT NO. II : Whether the writ petitions filed after passing of the award is liable to be rejected summarily?
In The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, it has been laid down that after passing of the award,
no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition or any proceedings thereunder. This is the consistent view of the Supreme Court. In that
respect the Supreme Court held thus:-
In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder.
This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N) this Court
observed as below :-
The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published u/s 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short ''the Act'') in GOR No.
1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil
Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The
acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the
company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear
that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership,
was transferred in GO Ms No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th
respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on
leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GO Ms No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs No.
546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GO Ms No. 1392 Industries
dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are
entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having
already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the
notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed.
M/s. Dalmia Cements have filed 28 writ petitions, some of them belatedly after passing of the award and taking possession and some before
passing of the award and taking possession and in three of the writ petitions, award has not been passed. The original owner, from whom they
have purchased the lands have not filed their objections, so also the purchasers within the time prescribed.
S. No. W.P. No. Dt.. of Date of Date of Date of
Sec. 4(1) Notn. Sec. 6 Decl. Passing of Award taking Possession
1 6484/95 21.09.1993 11.08.1994 07.11.1996 11.12.1996
2 6485/95 18.10.1993 11.30.1994 29.11.1996 11.12.1996
3 11476/95 25.11.1993 01.03.1995 31.01.1997 27.02.1997
4 11474/95 25.11.1993 01.31.1995 31.01.1997 28.02.1997
5 1369/96 08.08.1994 09.06.1995 12.07.1997 21.08.1997
6 1367/96 08.08.1994 09.11.1995 14.07.1997 21.08.1997
7 1368/96 08.08.1994 11.11.1995
8 15692/95 09.05.1994 07.06.1995 04.07.1997 04.09.1997
9 15691/95 09.05.1994 07.06.1995 04.07.1997 04.09.1997
10 1370/96 14.06.1994 27.07.1995
11 13253/95 09.06.1994 07.19.1995 17.07.1997 21.07.1997
12 13254/95 09.06.1994 07.19.1995 17.07.1997 26.08.1997
13 13251/95 09.06.1994 07.19.1995 17.07.1997 26.08.1997
14 13252/95 09.06.1994 07.19.1995 17.07.1997 26.08.1997
15 11510/95 11.04.1994 06.08.1995 06.06.1997 23.06.1997
16 17718/97 04.01.1996 02.20.1997 13.01.1997 10.03.1999
17 17715/97 18.01.1996 03.10.1997 06.07.2000
18 17716/97 28.12.1995 02.18.1997 17.02.1999 10.03.1999
19 17717/97 28.12.1995 02.18.1997 31.12.1999 05.01.1999
20 17719/97 28.12.1995 03.03.1997 28.06.2000 05.01.1999
21 17720/97 04.01.1996 02.18.1997 10.12.1998 05.01.1999
22 17721/97 14.01.1996 18.02.1997
23 17713/97 04.01.1996 03.03.1997 02.03.1999 22.03.1999
24 17725/97 04.01.1996 03.03.1997 02.03.1999 26.03.1999
25 17724/97 28.12.1995 02.25.1997 24.02.1999 22.03.1999
26 17723/97 04.01.1996 02.25.1997 24.02.1999 22.03.1999
27 17714/97 14.03.1996 04.04.1997 26.03.1997 17.05.1999
28 17722/97 28.12.1995 02.25.1997 24.02.1999 22.03.1999
31.This point is answered in favour of the respondents and against those writ petitioners who have filed the writ petition long after Section 6
Declaration, passing of award as well as taking delivery of possession.
POINT NO. III : Whether Section 4(1) Notification and Section 6 Declaration were factually published according to the Land Acquisition Act
? and, whether the publication of Section 4(1) Notification in the two Tamil dailies is valid and in compliance with Section 4(1) ?
Admittedly Section 4(1) Notification as well as Section 6 Declaration were published in the Tamil Dailies apart from the gazette and affixture in
the notice board of various officer as prescribed by Rule 2. The respondents have placed the file to show that substance of 4 (1) Notification as
well as Section 6 declaration were published in the locality besides copies have been affixed in the Offices of the Collector and Tahsildar. The only
challenge in respect of publication is that Section 4(1) Notifications were published in two insignificant Tamil dailies namely, (i) Madurai Mani and
(ii) Dinamalar and the two newspapers having no circulation in the locality, and this vitiates the acquisition proceedings. Section 4(1)mandates that
the Notification shall be published in the official gazette and in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality of which one shall be in the
regional language. In this batch of writ petitions publications were effected in two tamil dailies. Relying upon a recent pronouncement of the
Division Bench, it is being contended that the publication in the two insignificant dailies is not in conformity with Section 4(1) of the Act and the
acquisition is vitiated.
It is rightly pointed out by Mr. Gomathinayagam, Special Government Pleader (Land Acquisition) that in none of the affidavits filed in support
of the writ petitions a specific averment has been set out to the effect that the two dailies have no circulation in the locality. Excepting simply stating
that publication is defective, there is no specific averment that the two dailies have no circulation in the locality.
In the counter affidavit it has been stated that the two dailies have wide circulation in the locality. In the absence of any specific averment, it is
unnecessary to examine this contention any further. It is the specific case of the respondent that the two dailies have circulation in the locality. No
material has been placed by anyone of the petitioners to show that the two dailies have no circulation at all in the locality. The petitioners could
have secured affidavit of local newsagents affirming that the two papers have no circulation or even if they are being circulated, they are
insignificant. No such attempt has been made by any of the petitioners. Hence this court will not be justified in examining this contention for want of
minimum pleadings or material. The presumption is that the two dailies being registered newspapers have circulation in the locality. In respect of the
daily Dinamalar, it is fairly admitted that it has a wide circulation throughout the State and it is being published from almost all the District
Headquarters. Therefore, in substance, there is a valid publication of Section 4(1) Notification in the two Tamil dailies. The reliance placed by the
petitioners on the judgment of the Division Bench in V. KRISHNAN VS. GOVERNMNET OF TAMIL NADU AND OTHERS, reported in
2001 (4) CTC 108 is distinguishable on facts. This contention cannot be countenanced in the absence of any averment or basic material in this
behalf and in those cases the court recorded a finding that the dailies in the said two reported cases have no circulation at all or they are
insignificant dailies. This contention advanced by the petitioners has to necessarily fail and it is rejected.
This court finds from the files produced as well as from the counter affidavit in respect of al the impugned Section 4(1) Notifications, the said
Notifications were published in the Government Gazette, two Tamil dailies in the locality, at convenient places by beat of tom tom, by affixture on
village Chavadi, on the notice boards of the Collector as well as Tahsildar, Local Police Station etc., as prescribed by the Rules. The point is
answered against the petitioners and in favour of the respondents.
POINT NO. IV : Whether Section 6 Declarations have been issued after a lapse of one year from the date of publication of Section 4(1)
Notification and whether the proceedings are liable to be quashed on that score ?
For the purpose of calculation, in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 6, the last of the publication of Section 4(1) Notification is the relevant
date and from the said date within one year, Section 6 Declaration should have been issued. As per the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in
Eugenio Misquita and Others Vs. State of Goa and Others, and AIR 2002 187 (SC) , it is sufficient if G.O. is issued and it is not necessary that
Section 6 Declaration should be published within one year from the date of publication of Section 4(1) Notification.
The following are the dates on which Section 4(1) Notification issued, 4 (1) Notification gazetted, Sec. 4(1) Notification substance published
in the locality and issue of Section 6 Declaration :-
S. No. W.P. No. Section 4(1) Section 4(1) Locality Publication Date
Notification Date Section 6 Declaration
1 6484/95 21.09.1993 10.11.1993 08.11.1994
2 3632/97 21.09.1993 10.11.1993 08.11.1994
3 18376/96 21.09.1993 10.11.1993 08.11.1994
4 6485/95 18.10.1993 02.12.1993 30.11.1994
5 19462/96 18.10.1993 02.12.1993 30.11.1994
6 7795/97 18.10.1993 02.12.1993 30.11.1994
7 11476/95 25.11.1993 03.02.1994 03.01.1995
8 18340/96 25.11.1993 03.02.1994 03.01.1995
9 17401/96 25.11.1993 03.02.1994 03.01.1995
10 1888/97 25.11.1993 03.02.1994 03.01.1995
11 11474/95 25.11.1993 03.02.1994 31.01.1995
12 17924/96 25.11.1993 03.02.1994 31.01.1995
13 1369/96 08.08.1994 30.09.1994 06.09.1995
14 7678/97 08.08.1994 30.09.1994 06.09.1995
15 1367/96 08.08.1994 30.09.1994 11.09.1995
16 1368/96 08.08.1994 27.09.1994 11.09.1995
17 15692/95 09.05.1994 27.09.1994 06.07.1995
18 15691/95 09.05.1994 30.06.1994 06.07.1995
19 1370/96 14.06.1994 09.08.1994 27.07.1995
20 13253/95 09.06.1994 30.06.1994 19.07.1995
21 13254/95 09.06.1994 09.08.1994 19.07.1995
22 13251/95 09.06.1994 20.07.1994 19.07.1995
23 13252/95 09.06.1994 25.07.1994 19.07.1995
24 11510/95 11.04.1994 20.07.1994 08.06.1995
25 17718/97 04.01.1996 20.07.1994 20.02.1997
26 7679/97 04.01.1996 10.06.1994 20.02.1997
27 17715/97 18.01.1996 23.02.1996 10.03.1997
28 17716/97 28.12.1995 23.02.1996 18.02.1997
29 17717/97 28.12.1995 13.03.1996 18.02.1997
30 8981/97 28.12.1995 19.02.1996 18.02.1997
31 17719/97 28.12.1995 08.04.1996 03.03.1997
32 17720/97 04.01.1996 08.04.1996 18.02.1997
33 467/99 04.01.1996 05.03.1996 18.02.1997
34 17721/97 14.01.1996 19.02.1996 18.02.1997
35 17713/97 04.01.1996 19.02.1996 03.03.1997
36 17725/97 04.01.1996 19.02.1996 03.03.1997
37 4380/99 04.01.1996 19.02.1996 03.03.1997
38 17724/97 28.12.1995 06.03.1996 25.02.1997
39 17723/97 04.01.1996 06.03.1996 25.02.1997
40 466/99 04.01.1996 06.03.1996 25.02.1997
41 5843/99 01.02.1996 26.02.1996 02.05.1997
42 692/99 01.02.1996 26.02.1996 02.05.1997
43 468/99 05.03.1996 26.02.1996 04.09.1997
44 17714/97 14.03.1996 07.05.1996 04.04.1997
45 11202/97 14.03.1996 07.05.1996 04.04.1997
46 2125/99 04.01.1996 25.04.1996 20.02.1997
47 5844/99 01.02.1996 15.04.1996 09.04.1997
48 10939/97 01.02.1996 15.04.1996 09.04.1997
49 5845/99 16.03.1996 22.02.1996 09.04.1997
50 6629/97 28.12.1995 15.04.1996 20.02.1997
51 2126/99 28.12.1995 15.04.1996 20.02.1997
52 17722/97 28.12.1995 15.04.1996 25.02.1997
53 2124/99 28.12.1995 22.02.1996 20.02.1997
54 2616/99 28.12.1995 22.02.1996 20.02.1997
55 4741/99 18.01.1996 26.02.1996 12.03.1997
56 3898/99 13.02.1996 22.02.1996 04.04.1997
57 6630/97 04.01.1997 22.02.1996 18.02.1997
58 6631/97 28.12.1995 14.03.1996 18.02.1997
59 6185/00 24.11.1998 12.04.1996 24.12.1999
60 10628/00 24.11.1998 19.02.1996 24.12.1999
The above date would show that all the declarations in all the 60 writ petitions have been made within one year from the date of last of the Section
4(1) Notification and the contention advanced in this respect deserves to be rejected.
POINT NO. V : Whether there is a failure to follow Rule 4 in conducting the enquiry u/s 5A and whether the acquisition is vitiated on that
score ?
As regards the alleged illegalities u/s 5A enquiry, as seen from the files, wherever objections have been filed, the same was forwarded to the
requisitioning body, which in turn submitted its remarks, which was forwarded to the objector and, thereafter, Section 5A enquiry was also held.
This means that Section 5A and Rule 4 have been complied with. Therefore, it cannot be contended that Section 5A enquiry is not in conformity
with Rule 4 of The Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu) Rules. Therefore, the said contention also fails. That apart, in most of the writ petitions,
objections have not been filed within 30 days as prescribed by Section 5A and most of the writ petitions have been filed belatedly after passing of
award and/or taking possession and, therefore, this Court will be justified in rejecting this contention also apart from the fact that Section 5A
enquiry has been conducted in accordance with Rule 4 read with Section 5A of the Act. Hence, this contention also fails.
In State of Mysore Vs. Abdul Razak Sahib, , a Three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held thus :-
Now, we may turn to Section 5-A(1) of the Act which says:
5-A. (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified u/s 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public
purpose or for a Company may, within thirty days after the issue of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the
locality, as the case may be.
Section 5A empowers the interested person to object to the acquisition of any land but his objection should be filed within thirty days from the date
of the issue of the notification. Any objection filed thereafter need not be considered as the same is filed after the time stipulated in Section 5A(1).
The reliance placed on the Division Bench Judgment in TAMIL NADU REAL ESTATES LTD. & OTHERS VS. THE SPECIAL
TAHSILDAR & OTHERS reported in 2002 WLR 1 is of no assistance as in this case, as Rule 4 has been complied with and wherever
objections have been filed within time, the remarks of the requisitioning body has been forwarded to the objector and the objector has been
afforded opportunity of hearing as well before overruling the objections.
POINT NO. VI : Whether the Declaration is liable to be quashed on the ground that it proceeds as if the entire compensation is to be borne
by the State, while factually the compensation is to be paid out of the funds of TANCEM ?
One of the contentions advanced being in terms of Section 6 Declaration the entire compensation is to be paid out of public revenue while
factually the compensation is paid by TANCEM and therefore according to the petitioners, the acquisition is bad and it is illegal. In this respect, the
attention of the court is drawn to Explanation (2) to Section 6 of the Act by Mr. Sundararajan, learned counsel appearing for TANCEM.
Explanation (2) to Section 6 provides that where the compensation is to be awarded by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State such
compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenue. This amendment, which came to be introduced is a complete
answer to the petitioners'' contention and it is unnecessary to refer to any other pronouncement.
POINT NO. VII : Whether the grant of permission u/s 37 B granting prior permission under The Land Reforms Act in favour of M/s. Dalmia
Cements takes away the power of eminent domain ? Whether the respondents are estopped by grant of such prior permission ?
The purpose of securing prior permission u/s 37B is to acquire lands in excess of ceiling limit for industrial purpose. It may be that the petitioner
M/s. Dalmia Cements have acquired the lands by purchase for quarrying lime stone deposit which they may require in course of time. Section 37B
is an enabling provision which enables the State Government to grant prior permission if either an industry or establishment or an institution or
factory requires the land in excess of the ceiling area. Such prior permission, if at all just enables the petitioner to acquire lands and it cannot be a
ground to hold that the power of eminent domain is lost. There cannot be a plea of estoppel in this respect nor such a plea is sustainable.
At no point of time the State Government has represented or made the petitioner M/s. Dalmia Cements and others similarly placed to believe
that in the event of the said entrepreneur acquiring the lands by purchase, the lands will not be acquired at all. There is no such plea at all. That is
not the ground on which the challenge is made. By mere grant of permission u/s 37 B of The Land Reforms Act it cannot be contended that the
State Government has lost its power of eminent domain to acquire under The Land Acquisition Act. But for Section 37 B, the petitioners would
not have validly acquired the land. Such acquisition without prior permission results in the lands being transferred automatically and it vests with the
State Government. Prior permission u/s 37 B does not mean that the State Government has granted blanket permission in favour of the petitioner
not only to acquire the lands but to possess it for all time to come by way of implied exemption or in relaxation of the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act or its power. No such representation has been made nor such a case has been pleaded. Hence these contentions deserve to be
dismissed. That apart, the conditional permission granted u/s 37 B was only for a limited period. The said condition has not been complied with.
The prior permission u/s 37 B will not enure beyond two years as seen from the very proceedings. After the lapse of two years only acquisition
proceedings were initiated. Hence, this contention cannot be countenanced.
POINT NO. VIII :
i)Whether the acquisition is liable to be quashed on the ground that the names of the present owners have not been set out in Section 4(1)
Notification ?
ii)Whether failure to serve notice on the present owners under Sec.5A vitiates the acquisition ?
iii)Whether the petitioners who are purchasers after Section 4(1) Notification could maintain the writ petitions ?
iv)Whether failure to issue notice to subsequent purchasers is violative of principles of natural justice and whether the same vitiates the acquisition
proceedings ?
v)Whether the Land Acquisition Officer was informed of the sales in favour of the petitioners by their vendors during Section 5A enquiry ?
All the above five contentions could very well be considered together.
In W.P. No. 2124/1999, Mr. R. Gandhi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, M/s.Madras Cements Ltd., contended that the
petitioner purchased the lands on 25.12.1995 from the respective vendors and the sale deeds were registered on the same date in respect of
survey Nos. 185/6 and 185/7 on 25.12.95 and in respect of survey Nos. 185/4-A and 185/5-A on 22.1.96 and on the same date of respective
purchase, the petitioner applied for mutation of revenue records. From the date of purchase, it is claimed that the petitioner-company is in
possession. In Section 4(1) Notification issued on 28.12.95, the name of the vendors alone finds a place and the name of the petitioner-company
does not find a place.
In the counter it has been stated that though the writ petitioner has purchased the lands on 21.11.95 and 22.11.95, there is no mutation of
patta in favour of the petitioner and, therefore, the name of the owner as found in the revenue records has been set out in Section 4(1) Notification.
In the counter affidavit in para-16 it is stated that neither the original land owners nor the petitioners have sent their objections nor the original
owners have intimated the purchase by M/s. Madras Cements Ltd., at any point of time or at the time of Section 5A enquiry. As no objection has
been filed by the land owners whose name finds a place in the permanent land register and there being no serious objection, declaration has been
issued. Had it been brought to the notice of the Land Acquisition Officer about the sale and purchase by the land owners in favour of the petitioner,
the Land Acquisition Officer should have definitely served a notice. Therefore, non-mentioning of the name of the purchaser, namely, M/s. Madras
Cements Ltd., will not vitiate Section 4(1) Notification or Section 6 Declaration. Had the vendor intimated about the sale in favour of M/s. Madras
Cements Ltd., and if there is omission to serve a notice on M/s. Madras Cements Ltd., at the belated stage, as held by the Full Bench judgment
1989 (2) LW 381 the acquisition could be invalidated as violative of principles of natural justice.
In W.P. No. 2124 of 1999, it is rightly pointed out the purchase was three days after Section 4(1) Notification. Therefore, the writ petition is
liable to be dismissed on the ground that he is a subsequent purchaser and the petitioner cannot advance the contention that the name of the
petitioner does not find a place in Section 4(1) Notification or Section 6 Declaration as the case may be. There is no requirement to serve Sec.5A
enquiry notice on the persons who were not owners on the date of Sec. 4(1) Notification. If the owner fails to submit objections within 30 days of
Publication of Sec. 4(1) Notification, either Gazette or Newspaper or locality Publication, there is no requirement to serve a notice for enquiry
under Sec.5A read with Rule 4 of the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu) Rules.
One another objection being that few of the writ petitioners are purchasers subsequent to Section 4(1) Notification and, therefore, they are not
entitled to challenge the acquisition nor they could invoke the writ jurisdiction challenging the validity of Section 4(1) Notification or Section 6
Declaration as the case may be as they have no locus standi to challenge the acquisition. The learned Special Government Pleader relied upon the
judgment in Smt. Sneh Prabha etc. Vs. State of U.P. and Another, and Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, . In Smt.
Sneh Prabha etc. Vs. State of U.P. and Another, and Yadu Nandan Garg Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, , wherein it has been laid down that
alienation made by the erstwhile owner of the land after publication of Section 4(1) Notification do not bind either the State or the beneficiary for
whose benefit the land is acquired.
In GURMUKH SINGH VS. STATE OF HARYANA reported in 1996 SCC (CRI) 505, Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India
and Others, as well as in U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and another Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow and others, , it
has been held that the purchaser of property after publication of notification u/s 4(1) has no right to challenge the validity of Notification or
irregularity in taking possession of the land before the publication of Declaration u/s 6. In this respect, the Apex Court in Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs.
State of Haryana and Others, , after analyzing the earlier case laws, held thus :-
As regards laches in approaching the Court, this Court has been consistently taking the view starting from State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai wherein a
Constitution Bench had held that it is not either desirable or expedient to lay down a rule of universal application but the unreasonable delay denies
to the petitioner the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or any other relief. The same view was reiterated in a catena of
decisions, viz., Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India; State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan; Aflatoon Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi; Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi; State of T.N. v. L. Krishnan; Improvement Trust v. Jagjit Singh; State of Punjab v. Hari Om Coop. House Building
Society Ltd.; Market Committee v. Krishan Murari and State of Haryana v. Dewan Singh wherein this Court had held that the High Court was not
justified in interfering with the acquisition proceedings. This Court in the latest judgment in Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial
Development & Investment Co. (P) Ltd. reviewed the entire case-law and held that the person who approaches the Court belatedly will be told
that laches close the gates of the Court for him to question the legality of the notification u/s 4(1), declaration u/s 6 and the award of the Collector
u/s 11.
In this batch of writ petitions, M/s. Grasim Industries has filed W.P. Nos. 3632/97, 8981/97, 10939/97 and 10682/00. The four writ petitions,
the writ petitions were filed respectively on 17.3.1997, 20.6.1997, 22.7.1997 and 28.6.2000. In W.P. No. 3632/97, Section 4(1) Notification
has been published in the name of Pachaiappan son of Chinnasamy, whose name finds place in the revenue records so also Section 6 Declaration.
In the writ petition, the petitioner claims to have entered into an agreement on 2.11.1993 and the conveyance or sale has not been completed
either on the date of Section 4(1) Notification or on the date of Section 6 Declaration. Hence, M/s. Grasim Industries, the petitioners in W.P. Nos.
3632/97, 8981/97, 10939/97 and 10682/00, Section 6 Declarations were issued much earlier to the purchase. Hence, the above four petitions
are liable to be dismissed on the ground that the writ petitioner was not the owner on the crucial date. Hence, these four writ petitions are
dismissed on this ground.
In ten writ petitions, W.P. Nos. 2124 to 2126/99, 4380/99, 4741/99, 5843/99 to 5845/99, 6185/00 and 3898/99 filed by M/s. Madras
Cements Ltd., in respect of various extent of lands in various survey numbers of Reddipalayam / Pudupalayam / Valjanagaram / Kayralabath
Villages, Section 4(1) was published during 18.1.96, gazetted on 21.2.1996, Section 6 Declaration was published on 20.2.97, 3.3.97, 12.3.97,
4.4.97, 9.4.97, 2.5.97, & 24.12.99 respectively, but the writ petitions have been filed only during the year 1999 after taking of possession.
Apart from there being delay, M/s. Madras Cements purchased the lands on the following dates and so far as M/s. Madras Cements are
concerned, these are the dates on which the lands were purchased vis-...-vis the date of Section 4(1) Notification :-
S. No. W.P. No. Date of Purchase of Lands Date of Section 4(1)Notification
(under various sub-divisions)
1 2124/1999 25.12.1995 22.01.1996 28.12.1995
2 2125/1999 22.11.1995 21.11.1995 06.02.1996 04.01.1996
3 2126/1999 29.09.1995 22.01.1996 28.12.1995
4 3898/1999 28.07.1995 13.12.1996
5 4380/1999 03.11.1995 04.01.1996
6 4741/1999 30.10.1995 18.01.1996
7 5843/1999 03.07.1996 04.07.1996 01.02.1996
8 5844/1999 19.08.1996 20.08.1996 21.08.1996 22.08.1996
01.02.1996
9 5845/1999 19.08.1996 21.08.1996 29.08.1996 16.03.1996
10 6185/2000 22.12.1995 to 18.06.1996 24.11.1998
It is claimed that the petitioner has purchased the lands, but there has been no mutation in favour of the petitioner, M/s. Madras Cements and
Section 4(1) Notification as well as Section 6 Declaration were issued in the name of the original owner. The purchase was just a day or two prior
or after to Section 4(1) Notification. There is nothing to show on record that the original owner has intimated about the purchase of the land by the
writ petitioner giving details of the sale or purchase or the details of alienation or date of alienation. Had the original owner in whose name Section
4(1) Notification has been published had furnished, the details or dates of sale and the purchaser and if the purchase is prior to Section 4(1)
Notification, it is incumbent on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer to serve a notice u/s 5A as held by the Division Bench of this Court. In this
case there is nothing to show that the petitioner''s vendors have intimated about the purchase by the petitioners. Three of the vendors have not even
raised objections, namely, S. Srinivasan, owner of survey No. 217/1C, Rasu son of Arunachalam, owner of survey No. 475/14A and
Ponnammmal and 7 others as well as Govindasamy and others. Therefore, it is clear that the petitioner cannot rely uppn the pronouncement of the
Full Bench of this Court in NEYVELI LIGNITE CORPORATION LTD. VS. V. RANGASWAMI reported in 1989 (2) LW 381 and contend
that natural justice has been violated. In all the above writ petitions filed by M/s. Madras Cements, as seen from the details, award has been
passed during the year 1999 and in many of the cases the writ petitions have been filed long after the passing of the award and taking possession
and in some of the cases, the writ petitions have been filed before the passing of the award and taking possession. But it makes no difference as no
objections were filed within 30 days u/s 5A nor the factum of sale have been intimated nor mutation of patta has been effected in favour of those
purchasers.
This is one of the objections advanced by Mr. Gomathinayagam, Special Government Pleader (Land Acquisition). The legal position is well
settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal, etc. etc. Vs. Union of India and Others, . In this context, the Supreme
Court held thus :-
Another contention raised by Shri Ravinder Sethi is that the claimant in the first appeal had purchased the property after the declaration u/s 6
was published and that therefore he does not get any right to challenge the validity of the notification published u/s 4(1). Since his title to the
property is a void title, at best he has only right to claim compensation in respect of the acquired land claiming interest in the land which his
predecessor-in-title had. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi; Gian Chand v.
Gopala; Mahavir v. Rural Institute and Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute. We need not deal at length with this issue as is the
settled legal position. But since other appellants are owners of the lands who are challenging the validity of the notification and since we have
upheld the validity of the notification though others have challenged its validity, it is not necessary to dismiss the appeal of Bahadur Singh on this
ground alone as we are upholding the notification u/s 4(1) in the appeals of other appellants.
Being purchasers subsequent to 4 (1) Notification they have no right to challenge and this point is answered accordingly.
In few of the cases it is pointed out that petitioners have purchased lands just prior to Section 4(1) Notification. Admittedly there has been no
mutation of revenue records and, therefore, the name of the original owner alone finds a place. In the absence of mutation in the revenue registers,
the purchases though anterior to Section 4(1) Notification by few days, cannot complain as the respondents are well founded and have proceeded
on the basis of entries found in the revenue records. But in few cases it is pointed out that the original owners have submitted objections and
pointed out that they have sold the properties anterior to Section 4(1) Notification and also furnished the names of such purchasers. Yet, it is being
pointed out that no notice has been sent to those purchasers for Section 5A enquiry. The question whether notice should be served on those
purchasers is no longer res integra in view of the Full Bench Judgment of this court reported IN P.C.THANIKAVELU VS. THE SPECIAL
DEPUTY COLLECTOR FOR LAND ACQUISITION, MADRAS AND ANOTHER reported in 1989 1 MLJ 222. In the first
pronouncement, the Full Bench of this court held that when the Land Acquisition Officer is intimated of the sale and details of the alienees, it is
incumbent on him to issue a notice to those alienees and call upon them to state their objection and any failure or omission in this respect being
violative of principles of natural justice and it vitiates the acquisition proceedings.
61.In this case, the Full Bench held thus:-
....The result is that the collector may cause individual notices to be served only on those persons whose names are found in the revenue records,
but who have ceased to be interested in the land. The result is not far difficult to see. Such persons who have ceased to be interested in the land
may not respond to the notice, nor would they are to participate in the enquiry to be held u/s 5A of the Act. In such cases, the statutory enquiry u/s
5A of the Act which has not been dispensed with, would be completed without affording a reasonable opportunity to the persons who have an
existing right in the land under acquisition. Though it is incumbent upon the Revenue to keep their records up to date by effecting mutation of names
reflecting the actual state of affairs by showing the persons really interested in the land in their records, yet in a few cases it may so happen that the
revenue records are not made up to date and the person who is really interested in the land may not receive any notice from the Collector for the
enquiry u/s 5A of the Act. In such cases, if it is brought to the notice of the Collector by the erstwhile land owner or by any other person including
the present owner thereof if the name of the interested persons, the Collector as a statutory functionary cannot decline to afford an opportunity to
the person who is really interested in the land and close the enquiry. When such information is brought to the notice of the Collector, it is needless
to say that the principles of natural justice enjoin upon him an obligation to issue notice to the person who is found to be really interested in the land
even though his name may not be found entered in the revenue records. It is true that the Government has the prerogative to acquire lands
belonging to individuals for a public purpose sanctioned under the theory of eminent domain. But the rule of law which governs and controls the
executive functions is the thread that runs through the fabric of constitutional democracy. The rule of law behaves the Government to act fairly and
reasonably and the principles of natural justice are the quintessence of such fair play and reasonableness. The decision reported in Padmavathi Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu, 91 L.W. 80 does not reflect the true statement of law. The Supreme Court has held in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of
India (UOI), that even in the absence of express reference to observance of principles of natural justice, such principles should be followed
whenever it affects the rights of parties. It cannot be gainsaid that when the lands of an individual are acquired, albeit he may be paid
compensation, his civil rights may be affected. It is therefore elementary that, to be consistent with the principles of natural justice, such a person
should be put on notice before his lands are acquired and his objections heard and considered. The enquiry contemplated u/s 5A of the Act would
be full and complete only when the person who is really interested in the land is put on notice. But, at the same time, it is made clear that individual
notice is mandatory only to those persons whose names are found in the revenue records or who are found by the Collector as persons interested
on information received through reliable source.
Following the same this court holds that wherever the details of alienees has been disclosed and where the Land Acquisition Officer has failed
to serve a notice on those purchasers anterior to Section 4(1) Notification, the acquisition is liable to be quashed on that short ground. However,
each writ petition has to be considered separately and it is for the petitioner to plead and prove that their vendors have intimated the alienation to
the Land Acquisition Officer and the details of purchasers. However, objection in most of the writ petitions were either not filed or filed beyond
thirty days and this disabled the landowners from pursuing this contention. If the land owners fail to raise objections within thirty days as prescribed
by Section 5A, any objections filed on any latter date is of little consequence and the owners have to suffer. The sales in favour of the petitioners
were not brought to the notice of the Land Acquisition Officer either by the original owners or the writ petitioners at the stage of Section 5A
enquiry. Hence, this contention also fails. Hence, Point VII (i) to (vi) are also answered against the writ petitioneRs.
PART II
In this second part, the larger issues are considered, such as public purpose, etc. In this second part, the following points arise for
consideration :-
A) Whether the acquisition is for a public purpose? and Whether the purpose set out in Section 4(1) Notification is capable of being achieved at
all? Whether it is necessary to acquire lands with limestone deposits when the limestone reserve already available with TANCEM is more than
sufficient for its purpose for future as well?
B) Whether the impugned acquisition defeats the legitimate expectations of the petitioners by their being granted permission to acquire the lands u/s
37-B of The Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act ?
C) Whether the acquisition for TANCEM is a colourable exercise of power, in that what could not be done directly is sought to be achieved
indirectly and to circumvent Rule 58 of The Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, which has since been repealed ?
D) Whether after repealing of Rule 58 of MMRD Rules, the acquisition proceedings could be resorted to without complying with Section 17A of
the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,1957 ?
E) Whether the acquisition have been undertaken with undue haste without analyzing the imminent captive requirements of the writ petitioner for
limestone in their factory as against that of TANCEM, which has sufficient reserves ?
F) Whether the acquisition of lands owned by the Cement Factories is a colourable exercise of power and when the limestone, a major mineral,
falls under the control of Central Government, whether lands could be acquired for limestone deposits by the State Government fro TANCEM ?
While deciding Points A to F together, this Court has to examine and focus its attention to the following incidental issues as argued by the
learned counsel for the petitioners :-
i) Whether the acquisition for TANCEM is a bona fide exercise of power of colourable exercise of power ? Whether the requirement of
TANCEM is bona fide ?
ii) Whether deposit of limestone, a major mineral could be the subject matter of land acquisition proceedings under the Act ?
One of the substantial contentions advanced being that M/s. Dalmia Cements, M/s. Madras Cements, M/s. Nilgiris Cements, M/s. Grasim
Industries, M/s. Alagappa Cements and M/s. KGM Minerals have acquired the lands for the purpose of exploiting the limestone deposits
available. M/s. Dalmia Cements contended that they have secured prior permission for the acquisition of the land u/s 37 B of The Land Reforms
(Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961. On that basis it is contended that the respective petitioner also do hold the lands for public purpose and
using the limestone for the manufacture of the same product, viz., cement. The acquisition of the lands for the purpose of TANCEM for the
purpose of its factory cannot be a public purpose at all. In this respect, the petitioners'' relied upon the decision of Mishra, J., (as he then was) in
SAROJA SETHU VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & OTHERS reported in 1993 WLR 240 and vehemently contended that there is no
justification at all to acquire the lands for the purpose of TANCEM when the petitioners'' also propose to use the lands for the same purpose of
manufacture of cement in their factory. Much reliance was placed on the permission granted u/s 37 B of The Land Reforms Act.
A perusal of G.O. Ms. No. 1255 Revenue Department dated 19.9.1991 would show that M/s. Dalmia Cements (Bharat) Ltd., was granted
permission to acquire 17.46.4 Hectares of land to acquire/hold for mining limestone for the manufacture of cement within a period of two years
from the date of G.O. Concedingly, for the period of two years, though the lands were allowed to be purchased on the condition that the land
should be used within a period of two years for mining limestone as stipulated in the G.O. Therefore, the permission, if any, granted in favour of
M/s. Dalmia Cements (Bharat) Ltd., is of no consequence after the said period of two years. Had the petitioner been diligent enough, they would
have started mining operation within the said period of two years and as the petitioners'' have failed to comply with the condition, the permission
already granted lapses and it will not enure beyond the period of two years.
The six companies are either public limited companies or private limited companies registered under The Indian Companies Act. As against
these companies, TANCEM is a Government of Tamil Nadu Undertaking, which is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. TANCEM has
already established a cement factory and it is on full stream. The manufacturing process is going on for more than three decades. TANCEM
requires substantial quantity of limestone deposits. As set out in the counter affidavit, TANCEM has acquired lands earlier, but limestone deposits
available in those lands are either insufficient or the quality is very poor or inferior grade and, therefore, they are not suitable for the manufacture of
cement. That is the reason TANCEM has submitted fresh proposal for acquisition for further extent of land to meet its requirement. It cannot be
stated that the requirement of TANCEM is not a bona fide one nor it could be held that it is not a public purpose. In terms of Section 3 (f), the
expression ""public purpose"" includes provision of land for a Corporation owned or controlled by the State. TANCEM is a Corporation wholly
owned and controlled by the State of Tamil Nadu. Therefore, the requirement of TANCEM falls definitely within the expression public purpose as
defined in the Act.
Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act provides that Declaration issued u/s 6 shall be conclusive evidence that the land is acquired for a public
purpose. Nowhere it has been pleaded that the requirement of TANCEM is not bona fide or the decision taken by the State to acquire the land is
not bona fide or mala fide either factually or legally. In this respect, the following pronouncements are being rightly relied upon by the learned
Special Government Pleader :-
i) Indrajit C. Parekh of Ahmedabad and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, ;
ii) VGP GOLDEN BEACH RESORT LTD., VS. STATE OF TAMIL NADU - 1991 WLR 673.
In the circumstances, in the absence of any such allegations, it cannot be said that the acquisition for TANCEM is not for a public purpose and that
such an acquisition cannot be undertaken. Hence, this contention also fails.
69.In Smt. Somavanti and Others Vs. The State of Punjab and Others, , the majority of the five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held thus :-
The Government has to be satisfied about both the elements contained in the expression ""needed for a public purpose or a company"". Where
it is so satisfied, it is entitled to make a declaration. Once such a declaration is made sub-section (3) invests it with conclusiveness. That
conclusiveness is not merely regarding the fact that the Government is satisfied but also with regard to the question that the land is needed for a
public purpose or is needed for a company, as the case may be. Then again, the conclusiveness must necessarily attach not merely to the need but
also to the question whether the purpose is a public purpose or what is said to be a company is a company. There can be no ""need"" in the abstract.
It must be a need for a ""public purpose"" or for a company. As we have already stated the law permits acquisition only when there is a public
purpose or when the land is needed for a company for the purposes set out in Section 40 of the Act. Therefore, it would be unreasonable to say
that the conclusiveness would attach only to a need and not to the fact that that need is for a public purpose or for a company. No land can be
acquired under the Act unless the need is for one or the other purpose and, therefore, it will be futile to give conclusiveness merely to the question
of need dissociated from the question of public purpose or the purpose of a company. Upon the plain language of the relevant provisions it is not
possible to accept the contention put forward by learned counsel.
* * * * * * *
As already stated no attempt has been made in the to define public purpose in a compendious way. Public purpose is bound to vary with the
times and the prevailing conditions in a given locality and, therefore would not be a practical proposition even to attempt a comprehensive definition
of it. It is because of this that the legislature has left it to the Government to say what is a public purpose and also to declare the need of a given
land for a public purpose.
It is contended that when the land is kept for user of the petitioners for the purpose of mining lime stone for their cement factory being
manufacturing cement, it is not open to the respondents to acquire lands for the same public purpose and to benefit TANCEM. It is contended that
the lands are being already used or can be of use or likely to be used for one public purpose in the manufacture of cement, a building material, the
Legislature could not have intended to empower the Government to destroy that purpose and substitute in its place another public purpose. Such
an argument has been repelled by the Supreme Court in Abdul Husein Tayabali and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, by a three Judges
Bench. In this respect, the Apex Court held thus :-
Mr Sanghi then contended that the fact that the Government had been trying to acquire these lands since 1962 and has been issuing one
notification after another shows the exercise of the power to acquire was mala fide. No such inference can be drawn from such a fact only. The
fact, on the other hand, that the Government cancelled its first notification on the ground that these lands were not suitable for a fertiliser factory
gives a clear indication that it had applied its mind and negatives the allegation of mala fide exercise of power. The correspondence which the
Company produced during the hearing of the petitions shows that as soon as the decision in the first Arora Case was given the Government at
once cancelled the notification in spite of the Company''s request to continue it. This negatives any suspicion as to collusion between the Company
and the acquiring authority. It is true that Master''s opinion was adverse to acquisition but the Government was not bound to accept it. However,
the fact that a responsible officer of the Government gave an adverse opinion is yet another indication that he was acting independently without
being influenced by the Government or the Company. In our view, the appellants failed to establish their allegation either as to mala fide or the non-
application of mind by the State Government. The third proposition of Mr Sanghi therefore must fail.
As regards Proposition No. 4, the only argument urged was that when a particular land is being already used for one public purpose, in this
case the manufacture of ""sagol"", a building material made from lime, the legislature could not have intended to empower the Government to destroy
that purpose and substitute in its place another public purpose. We need only say that a similar argument was urged in Somavanti''s Case and
rejected by this Court.
The Full Bench in turn relied upon the judgment in Somavanthi''s case, reported in AIR 1963 SC 152.
Challenge is also made on the ground that substantial portion of the lands notified have been purchased by the writ petitioners for mining of
limestone, their application for quarrying is kept pending. In fact the State Government granted prior permission u/s 37B of the Land Reforms Act
to the petitioners, M/s. Dalmia Cements to acquire lands in question as the lands already held by the said Company is in excess of the area. While
granting prior permission u/s 37B the State Government was satisfied with the reason, namely the purpose of acquisition being for mining lime stone
for the cement factory established and run by the very same M/s. Dalmia Cements and other factories. It is contended that when the petitioners
have purchased the very same lands for the purpose of mining lime stone for their cement factories, there is no justification at all to notify the very
same lands for the purpose of TANCEM for the same purpose of quarrying lime stone for being used in its cement factories and this will not
constitute a public purpose and the decision to acquire in this respect is arbitrary and illegal.
72.This contention overlooks the statutory provisions. Further, it has to be pointed out that as of today in the lands notified and declared lime stone
deposits are available. The purpose of acquisition by the petitioners is for their cement factory or their expansion, namely, to quarry limestone and
use it in their respective cement factories. The impugned acquisition has been undertaken for the State undertaking namely TANCEM. The
requirement of TANCEM for its cement factories cannot but be held is a public purpose. It is a public undertaking by the State and the
requirement of TANCEM in this respect cannot be doubted at all, though it is contended that the lands already owned by TANCEM is substantial
and sufficient to meet its requirement for further few decades. It is fairly admitted by the petitioners that they have purchased the lands in question,
but the lands have been purchased by them as they have deposit of lime stone and it is only a potential user and definitely it is not being used as a
mine, no quarrying operation is being undertaken as of today, nor any licence has been secured as of today. The contention is that when the
petitioners propose to use the lands for quarrying lime stone on a future date for the same purpose, the lands cannot be acquired with the same
object of quarrying lime stone to benefit the State Undertaking and such an acquisition is not the public purpose at all. According to the petitioners
the petitioners will also quarry the lime stone and use it in the manufacture of cement like TANCEM and the cement is being marketed which has
been used as a building material by all. Therefore, it is contended that the object of acquisition of lands being identical user, there is no reason or
justification to notify the petitioners'' lands and confer a monopoly on the State Undertaking. This contention is devoid of merits as the acquisition is
not a mine, but the acquisition is in respect of agricultural lands simpliciter. It may be a potential mine, but it is not being used as a quarry nor it
could be contended that the lands ceased to be agricultural lands.
It is contended that the lands have been acquired for the purpose of TANCEM and it has large reserve of lands for mining limestone. It is also
asserted that TANCEM is unable to reach the daily production as was originally planned and therefore lime stone reserve already available at the
disposal of TANCEM being rich and substantial, it is contended that further acquisition is not required and there is no justification to deny the
private entrepreneurs, namely M/s. Dalmia Cements, M/s. Madras Cements, etc., who have purchased the lands for the same purpose. When
once the acquisition is complete and acquisition is valid, the same cannot be divested on the ground that the extent of the deposit of limestone is not
required for TANCEM. Such subsequent developments assuming the averment set out by the petitioners are correct, cannot be a ground to
interfere with the acquisition.
Incidentally, it is contended that the Sate Government is proceeding with disinvestment of TANCEM namely Ariyalur Cement Plant. It is
suggested that the State Government is proceeding with disinvestment. But there is no concrete material, much less concrete material in this respect
to show that the State Government has decided to disinvest TANCEM and transfer the Ariyalur Factory to Private entrepreneurs. There is not
even a plea as well. The disinvestment suggested assuming at the stage of proposal cannot be a ground also to interfere at this stage unless there is
plea and sufficient material to show the likelihood of disinvestment of the company or an undertaking of the State Government. That apart there is
no plea at all nor there is an iota of averment. In this respect in the affidavit so that the respondent could be called upon to answer. At the last stage
such a vague suggestion is made casually, which is not permissible even in a proceeding under Art.226. That apart no material or notification has
been placed to show that the State Government has notified the proposals to disinvest the Ariyalur Cement Plant. On mere assumptions, it cannot
be said that the acquisition for TANCEM is bad or that the deposit of limestone is no longer required or not required any further or there are
sufficient deposits already in the hands of TANCEM. Therefore this contention also cannot be countenanced and deserve to be rejected.
It is incorrect to contend that public purpose has already been achieved and lands are no longer required merely because a portion of the land
was released. The learned Special Government Pleader on instructions states that the lands are required for the purpose of TANCEM as
manufacture of cement is a continuous process and, therefore, it cannot be stated that the lands are no longer required for TANCEM. Being a
public purpose, it is well open to the State Government to acquire the lands under The Land Acquisition Act. In the absence of specific averments
it cannot be contended that the acquisition is not a bona fide one or vitiated by malice. There are no merits in these contentions.
One of the contentions advanced on behalf of M/s. Dalmia Cements is that it defeats the legitimate expectation of the petitioner. The foundation
for such contention being that the land has been acquired with prior permission u/s 37 B of The Land Reforms Act for the purpose of limestone
deposits. As already pointed out, the Section 37-B permission is a conditional one and it enured for a period of two years and it is not the case of
the petitioner that the permission has been revalidated or extended and, therefore, the contention that the petitioner''s legitimate expectation has
been defeated cannot be sustained. Hence, this contention also fails. This contention, viz., legitimate expectation is a misconception and has no
application to the facts of the case.
Nextly it was contended that limestone being a major mineral, it is governed by the provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and
Development) Act, which is controlled by the Central Government and, therefore, there cannot be any acquisition at all. It should not be forgotten
that the acquisition is not as a limestone mine or quarry where the limestone operation is being undertaken or is in progress. Acquisition is in
respect of agricultural lands, which has potentiality or deposit of limestone and it may be a potential mine, but as of today it is not a limestone mine.
Therefore, this contention cannot be countenanced as it is not being acquired as a mine, but it is acquired as agricultural land.
The purpose for the acquisition being for TANCEM and the object being to quarry limestone for manufacture of cement, which are available in
the lands. As on the date of Section 4(1) Notification or Section 6 Declaration, the lands are dry lands and they are ordinary agricultural lands,
which can be acquired under The Land Acquisition Act. The survey fields in question are not limestone quarries, but they are agricultural lands
simpliciter and its market value are to be assessed as such agricultural land and the proposed or potential user cannot be a ground to assess.
Section 24, fifth exclusion clause operates in this respect and it is on the point. Therefore, the lands could be acquired under The Land Acquisition
Act by exercise of powers of eminent domain by the State for the public purpose as it is an acquisition of agricultural lands only as against the
intended or proposed user by the writ petitioner companies on a future date. It is also pointed out by the respondents that it is only the petitioners,
who knew about the acquisition proposal, have purchased the very lands surveyed and they cannot now be allowed to advance such a contention.
This contention just deserves to be mentioned.
The contention that the exercise of power of eminent domain and the acquisition notified u/s 4(1) and the Declaration u/s 6 are colourable
exercise of power also cannot be sustained as there is neither a specific allegation nor there is factual malice nor legal malice nor it could be
contended that it is a colourable exercise of power. It is not as if TANCEM is not a public company and it is not as if TANCEM does not require
the lands for the purpose of carrying on the mining operations of limestone quarry for the manufacture of cement. It is a State undertaking and,
therefore, there is every justification to proceed with the acquisition by giving priority as against the respondents, which is not a State Undertaking.
Hence, these contentions also fail.
In Nripati Ghoshal, First Land Acquisition Collector and others, etc. Vs. Pramavati Kapur (Dead) by LRs. and others, , on the question
whether acquisition is mala fide, it was held that so long as public purpose subserves, the finding that acquisition is mala fide is ex-facie
unsustainable. In that respect, the Apex Court held thus :-
The question, therefore, emerges whether the acquisition is mala fide? So long as the public purpose subserves, the finding that the acquisition is
mala fide is ex facie unsustainable. No doubt there are laches on the part of the authorities, but so long as the acquisition proceedings were legal
and the defence personnel remain in possession of the premises for the defence purpose, the acquisition is for public purpose. Therefore, it cannot
be characterised to be mala fide. It is seen that by the time the second writ petition, which is the subject-matter ultimately in this appeal, came to be
filed, the acquisition had become final; the award had become final and the compensation was tendered. Under those circumstances, the High
Court, without going into the validity in that behalf, was not right in setting aside the acquisition on the specious finding that it is mala fide.
Based upon this, the contention that acquisition suffers for want of bona fides deserves to be rejected.
In MANUBHAI JEHTALAL PATEL & ANOTHER VS. STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. reported in 1983 (4) SCC 533, the Apex Court,
while upholding the constitutional validity of Section 4 of The Land Acquisition Act, held that even where the land is acquired for a company, the
State Government has the power to acquire the land for a public purpose. The State is acquiring lands to carry out a public purpose with the
instrumentality of the State Undertaking. Therefore, on the facts of this case the impugned acquisition is an acquisition for a public purpose.
In Scindia Employees'' Union Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , the Apex Court held that so long as the public purpose subsists, the
exercise of power of eminent domain cannot be questioned. While following the above pronouncement, this Court holds that it is for the State
Government to take a decision whether a particular land is needed for a public purpose or not and the Court cannot substitute its opinion on the
public purpose to that of the appropriate Government. So long as the public purpose continuous or subsists, the exercise of power u/s 6 is a
conclusive evidence of public purpose.
In the circumstances, it is clear from the facts as well as from the affidavit filed by the respondents, it is not only necessary to acquire the lands
for the object capable of being achieved. It is for the State to decide as to the quantum or extent of land required and it is not for the Court nor the
petitioner could contend that what is the extent of land available with the beneficiary is more than sufficient for future as well. From the counter
affidavit it is seen that the entire land, which is proposed to be acquired, is required as it is an expansion programme and requirement of limestone
is perennial in nature.
As already pointed out the acquisition is not a colourable exercise of power as it is an acquisition of agricultural land simpliciter. It is
unsustainable to contend that the respondents have resorted to acquisition indirectly and to circumvent Rule 58. There is no requirement to comply
with Section 17A of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, and the contention to the contra deserves to be rejected.
As regards the next contention, it has to be pointed out that the acquisition has not been undertaken with undue haste. The estimated requirement is
for TANCEM to decide and not for the Court nor it could be the subject matter of judicial review under Article 226. There is nothing to show or
even suggest that the exercise of power by the respondent is a colourable exercise of power. For the above reasons, all the above points are
decided against the petitioners and in favour of the contesting respondents.
In the result, these sixty writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs. Consequently, all connected writ
miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed.