Daljeet and Co. (P) Ltd. vs State of Punjab and Others

N.K. Sodhi, J.—On the request of counsel for both the parties, this writ petition along with Civil Writ Petition No. 3810 of 1993 have been taken on Board for final hearing.

This order will dispose of two connected writ petitions filed by the same petitioner against two workmen and in which similar questions of law and facts arise. Since the main arguments were addressed in Civil Writ Petition No. 3809 of 1993, the facts are being taken from this case.

Phuman Singh, respondent No. 3 (hereinafter called the workman) claims that his services had been terminated by his employer and he raised an Industrial Dispute by serving a demand notice u/s 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short the Act). This notice was served on the following three Companies including the petitioner:-

(i) Ambala Bus Syndicate (P) Ltd, Ropar, through its Managing Director.

(ii) Daljit & Company (P) Ltd., Ropar, (Petitioner);

(iii) Chandigarh Transport Company (P) Ltd., through its Managing Director.

The Conciliation Officer on receipt of the notice initiated the conciliation proceedings with a view to settle the dispute and sent a notice to all the three aforesaid Companies for appearance on November 4, 1989. The workman appeared in person whereas Harpreet Singh represented the petitioner. No one appeared on behalf of the other two Companies. In the course of the proceedings held on November 4, 1988, the workman stated that he joined the services of Ambala Bus Syndicate (P) Ltd. as a Head Mechanic and worked for several years. He was getting a salary of Rs. 600/- per month from this Company. He further stated that his employers had also been taking work from him in Chandigarh Transport Company, which is stated to be a sister concern of Ambala Bus Syndicate. It was categorically stated by the workman that he never worked at the petrol pump. It was not disputed before me that the petitioner is carrying on the business of a petroleum dealer and is running three petrol pumps at Kharar, Kurali and Ropar. The conciliation proceedings were adjourned to December 2, 1988 when the representative of the petitioner stated that the workman had no connection with it as he was never its employee. It appears that the conciliation proceedings proved abortive and the State Government referred the Industrial Dispute for adjudication u/s 10(1) of the Act to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patiala. All the three Companies were mentioned in the reference as employees and a copy thereof was endorsed to each of them. On receipt of the reference the Labour Court issued notices to these Companies and arrayed them as respondents. The Ambala Bus Syndicate was respondent No. 1, the petitioner herein was respondent No. 2 whereas Chandigarh Transport Company was cited as Respondent No. 3.

None of the respondents appeared before the Labour Court and they were proceeded against ex parte. The workman appeared as his own witness in support of his claim petition and did not press his claim against respondent No. 1 i.e. the Ambala Bus Syndicate Private Limited, Ropar. While accepting the statement of the workman, the Labour Court held that the order of termination passed by respondent No. 2 and 3 before it was neither justified nor in order and consequently, the workman was directed to be re- instated by these respondents with continuity of service and full back wages. The workman was further directed to report for duty to respondents No. 2 and 3 within 30 days of the publication of the award. Soon after the award was given to the petitioner, who was respondent No. 2 before the Labour Court, filed an application for the setting aside of the ex parte award dated August 3, 1990. This application was dismissed on August 27, 1992 for want of evidence. The ex parte award and the order refusing to set aside the same have been impugned in the present petitions.

Shri R.S. Mittal, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, challenged the impugned award on the ground that the reference made by the State Government was against the three Companies without specifying as to which of them was the employer of the workman against whom relief was claimed. He further contended that the Labour Court could have proceeded ex parte against the management but it had to specify as to which of the Companies the workmen were claiming re-in-statement from all of them. The State Government referred the dispute mentioning all the three Companies as the employer and the Labour Court too directed the petitioner and one Chandigarh Transport Company which was respondent No. 3 before it to reinstate the workman. This was so because the workman while appearing before the Labour Court had given up his claim against Ambala Bus Syndicate Private Limited. The Labour Court may have been justified in proceeding ex parte against the management for their non-appearance but it was its duty to determine as to which of the three Companies was the actual employer of the workman with whom he was working. Having failed to determine this vital aspect of the dispute the Labour Court then directed the petitioner and Chandigarh Transport Company to re-instate the workman. How can an employee be re-instated by two Companies? It is surprising to note that the workman in the course of conciliation proceedings stated that he was the employee of the Ambala Bus Syndicate whereas before the Labour Court he gave up his claim against this Company and sought re-instatement from the other two. It appears that the workman was not sure as to which Company was his employer. In the result, the award directing the petitioner and Chandigarh Transport Company to re-instate the workman cannot be sustained. The writ petitions are, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders therein quashed. The case is sent back to the Labour Court with a direction to dispose of the reference on merits and in accordance with law after determining as to which of the three Companies was the employer of the workman. Since the reference in the instant case was made in March 1989 the Labour Court is further directed to dispose of the same expeditiously but not later than December 31, 1994. There is no order as to costs.