Daler Singh vs The High Court of Himachal Pradesh and Another

Bhawani Singh, J.—The Petitioner is an, Advocate at Sarkaghat of Distnct Mandi. In pursuance of the Notification by Respondent No. 1 inviting applications from the eligible candidates for recruitment to the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges in the cadre of Higher Judicial Service, constituted under the Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1973, the Petitioner applied for appointment along with other eligible candidates. According to him a panel of selected candidates was prepared and he was one of the candidates on that panel. After the appointment of the candidate above him in the panel, his name should have been recommended for appointment to the existing vacancy but instead of doing so, Respondent No. 1 issued fresh notification inviting applications for three temporary posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges, out of which one post was reserved for the candidates belonging 1o Scheduled Tribes. Therefore, by this petition, he claims that the first Respondent should exhaust the earlier panel prepared in the year 1987 by making appointment out of the same instead of resorting to fresh recruitments.

The claim of the Petitioner has been contested by Respondent No. I. It is submitted that the Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1973 have been supplemented by certain ''instructions known as "the Principles and Procedure for appointment to the Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service by direct recruitment" (Annexure R-1/A). Under paragraph (E) thereof, the merit list, prepared on September 22, 1987, remained operative only for one year, that is, up to September 21, 1988. The vacancies available during this period were filled up in accordance with the merit list in question. No vacancy for appointment of the Petitioner as direct recruit became available up to September, 1988. Thereafter it was only in January, 1989 that the new vacancies were anticipated and fresh advertisement was issued.

We have examined the matter in the light of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties and the record of this case. No vacancy existed during the course of one year when the merit list in question was to remain in operation. The panel stood exhausted on September 21, 1988 since it was to last for one year only. Then came a gap of months where after certain posts were demanded from the State Government and the advertisement of January 19, 1989 pertained to these anticipated posts and there was, therefore, a justification to invite fresh applications regarding these vacancies.

The submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that candidates from the earlier list should have been appointed against these vacancies is not tenable since paragraph. (E) of the aforesaid principles and procedure makes adoption of such a course inadmissible as the panel was to remain in operation for a period of one year only. Reference to Prem Prakash Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, was made. This decision, with respect, does not apply to the facts of the present case as the Court in that case was directly concerned with the implications of a notification dated February 8, 1982 by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, where under this kind of argument could possibly be taken, but in the present, it h not possible in view of the aforesaid supplementary instructions where under the merit list is to remain in operatic a for a period of one year only. Unless the Rules specifically provide for the continuance of the panel beyond the period of one year and to take candidates out of the list till all the names are exhausted, the submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner cannot be accepted. Further, it also appears that vacancies in the case mentioned above were available but the candidates were not appointed against them, but this is not so in the present case.

The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.