High CourtsSingle Bench(1999) 02 AP CK 0010

D. Venkata Reddy vs Principal, P.B. Sidhardha Law College and Another

Andhra Pradesh High Court · Decided on 1 February 1999 · Citation: AIR 1999 AP 166

HON’BLE JUDGES
B. Sudershan Reddy, J
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition Miscellaneous No''s. 4281, 30577, 36415 and 37415 of 1998

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Judgment

21 paragraphs · 2,508 words

B. Sundershan Reddy, J.

Heard.

1.

This Court by an order dated 4-11-1998 issued ex pane interim directions directing the respondents viz., the Principal, P.B. Siddardha Law College, Vasantha Nagar, Vijayawada and the Registrar, Nagarjuna University, Nagarjuna Nagar, Guntur District to provide admission to the petitioner into III year B. L. Degree course commencing from 1998 in the 1st respondent-college. In effect, the petitioner is directed to be admitted into III year B. L. Degree course in the 1st respondent-college. It is this order that is sought to be vacated by the Convener, LAWCET-98.

2.

I do not propose to go into the merits of the case and decide as to whether the petitioner is entitled for any relaxation in the qualifying marks in the LAWCET on par with the SC and ST candidates but proceed to decide as to whether this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can pass any interlocutory order compelling the University/College to admit any student during the pendency of the writ petition. The facts in brief may be noticed only for the purpose of disposing of this interlocutory application.

3.

The petitioner claims to belong to BC-B category. Having completed his graduation, he applied for the entrance test conducted by the Convener, LAWCET, 1998 and appeared for the entrance test conducted on 14-6-1998. There is no dispute whatsoever that the State Government framed rules governing the common entrance test for admission into V years and III years undergraduate courses in law called as Law Common Entrance Test (LAWCET) and the Rules are called as A.P. Institutions of Law (Regulation of Admissions into Courses in Law through Common Entrance Test) Rules, 1989 (for short ''the Rules''). The admissions into the law course are regulated by these Rules. No private college or for that matter even colleges run by the Universities are entitled to directly admit the students into the said law college unless the candidates are sponsored by the Convener, LAWCET for such admission. Admission into a particular college would depend upon variety of factors including the percentage of marks secured by the candidate in the entrance examination. The Convener has to follow the rule of reservation provided in favour of local candidates. All that a successful candidate can do is to exercise and indicate his preference and name the college into which he would like to be admitted. On consideration, a candidate may get admission in the college preferred by him or may not get and has to necessarily join in the college to which he is allotted by the Convener.

4.

According to the Rules, a candidate has to secure 35% of qualifying marks in the entrance test for General Category of candidates and so far as SC and ST candidates are concerned, no minimum qualifying marks are prescribed and they are automatically entitled to be admitted into the law course as no qualifying marks are prescribed. It is the case of the petitioner that the candidates belonging to the backward class community also should have been given the same opportunity to prosecute their studies without prescribing any minimum qualifying marks.

5.

Questioning the action of the Government in not providing such relaxation in favour of the BC candidates, the Vijaywada (Urban) Zilla Settibalija Sangam represented by its Secretary and the petitioner herein fifed W.P. No. 25642 of 1998 and obtained an interim direction directing the respondents therein to admit the candidates belonging to the BC community including the petitioner herein into law colleges. However, the respondents in this writ petition are not the respondents in the said writ petition but the Convener, LAWCET-98 has been impleaded as one of the respondents. It is the case of the petitioner that in spite of such direction, the respondents are declining to provide admission and the Convener, LAWCET failed to sponsor the name of the petitioner for admission into law college. It is under those circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed.

6.

The short question that would arise for consideration is as to whether any direction could be issued as against the respondents directing them to admit the petitioner herein into the 1st respondent college even during the pendency of the writ petition. In my considered opinion, any such direction from this Court would amount to not only allowing the writ petition but would amount to directing the respondents herein to act contrary to law. It is settled law that no such Writ of Mandamus could be issued by this Court compelling the authorities to act in violation of the Statute or the Rules. There is no dispute whatsoever that according to the Rules, as they stand as on today, the petitioner is not qualified to be admitted into law college. It is also an admitted fact that no law college in the State is entitled to admit any student directly and the admissions are regulated by the Rules where candidates are required to be sponsored for admission into law colleges by the Convenor. Such allotment depend upon variety of factors including the merit obtained by each of the candidates in the common entrance lest. What remains if this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India grants an interlocutory order compelling the Colleges/Universities to admit candidates into colleges opted by them? Would it not amount to allowing the writ petition itself? The learned senior counsel Sri V.V.S. Rao would urge that in a given case this Court can always pass appropriate orders compelling the Universities/Colleges to admit the students provided a case is made out for such an admission. The learned senior counsel would urge that this Court''s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is in no manner can be said to be fettered merely because the case relates to admission of a candidate into the University/College. As rightly contended by the learned senior counsel, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever about the jurisdiction of this Court to pass even an interlocutory order directing admissions. It is not the question of jurisdiction but the question is one of exercise of that jurisdiction. Should this Court exercise its discretion and pass an order in a manner which would virtually amount to allowing the writ petition itself without affording any opportunity to the other side and without deciding the question as to the entitlement of a candidate for such admission into a particular course.

7.

The question is not res integra. The Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others Vs. Km. Ramona Perhar, observed that "the power to grant interim orders is coupled with the duty to consider all the relevant facts and legal principles relevant in that behalf. Admissions to educational institutions should not be granted by interim orders -- at any rate, not without fully hearing the respondents." It is further observed by the Supreme Court that the matters relating to admissions into colleges and Universities cannot be dealt with as a matter of course without reference to the relevant legal principles governing the power of judicial review vested in High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

8.

In State of Maharashtra and others Vs. Admane Anita Moti and others, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the scope of granting interlocutory orders by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India relating to admissions into educational institutions and observed that;

''''misplaced equities encourage indiscipline and the managements of those educational institutions which are gradually degenerating and converting such institutions into commercial houses, flout the orders of educational authorities and the Government, fleece the students their parents and then leave the students to invoke sympathy of the Court to protect them from the exploitation suffered by them and save their career from being ruined."

9.

In Central Board of Secondary Education Vs. Nikhil Gulati and Another, the Supreme Court held that the casual discretions by the Court is nothing but an abuse of the process and it would be apt to recall the observations made by the Apex Court:

"Occasional aberrations such as these, whereby ineligible students are permitted, under Court orders, to undertake Board and/or University examinations, have caught the attention of this Court many a time. To add to it further, the Courts have almost always observed that the instance of such aberrations should not be treated as a precedent in future. Such casual discretions by the Court is nothing but an abuse of the process; more so when the High Court at its level itself becomes conscious that the decision was wrong and was not worth repeating as a precedent. And yet it is repeated time and again. Having said this much, we hope and trust that unless the High Court can justify its decision on principle and precept, it should better desist from passing such orders, for it puts the "Rule of Law" to a mockery and promotes rather the "Rule of Man".

10.

In Tamil Nadu Dr. M.G.R. Medical University v. Meenakshi Ammal Trust , while considering the scope and power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to grant an interlocutory order relating to grant of affiliation to educational institutions the Supreme Court observed that "an interlocutory direction of this kind would virtually render the appeal infructuous by granting in advance the main relief in the appeal. It is well known that such orders build up expectations in the students and in the ultimate analysis render it difficult to unsettle the effect of the interlocutory directions."

11.

Thus, it is clear that the law is very well settled though the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner made an attempt to submit that the law is not clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in this regard. In my considered opinion any interlocutory order from this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India compelling the Universities/Colleges/Conveners to directly admit the students into courses offered by them without providing an opportunity to such Universities/Colleges would amount to compelling the authorities to act contrary to law. No such order could be passed by this Court virtually compelling the authorities to act contrary to law. Such a course would be destructive of Rule of Law. Such interlocutory orders, in my considered opinion cannot be granted by this Court without affording an opportunity to the affected parties. This Court may have jurisdiction in a given case to pass such an interlocutory order. But, the question is exercise of that jurisdiction. It can be exercised only in rarest of rare cases where there is no possibility of taking any other view other than the one raised by a candidate seeking admission into a particular course in a particular college.

12.

Admittedly, the petitioner herein is not qualified as he has not secured the required percentage of marks. His case has to be considered by this Court on merits and he would be entitled for admission only if this Court comes to the conclusion that he is entitled for the relaxation in the qualifying marks as in the case of SC and ST candidates. But that question is yet to be decided.

13.

A word about as to in what manner the petitioner secured an interim order from this Court. Admittedly the petitioner herein is one of the petitioners in W.P. No. 25642 of 1998 wherein he obtained an interim direction from this Court to provide admission into III year B. L. Degree course commencing from 1998 in any of the colleges by permitting him to participate in counselling pending disposal of the Writ Petition No. 25642 of 1998 filed by him. That direction was obviously obtained against the Convener, LAWCET-98 also as he was impleaded as the 2nd respondent in that writ petition. The order is dated 25-9-1998. The Convener promptly filed W.V.M.P. No. 3259 of 1998 on 12-10-1998 for vacating the said interim direction on various grounds mentioned in the affidavit filed by the Convener. The said W.V.M.P. came up for hearing before this Court on 11-11-1998 and the petitioner is stated to have taken an adjournment. The fact remains that the Convener who is impleaded as one of the respondents in the said writ petition has already filed an application to vacate the interim order obtained by the petitioner. Obviously, after having knowledge of the said W.V.M.P., the petitioner promptly filed the present writ petition on 3-11-1998 and obtained an interim direction on 4-11-1998 in this writ petition. In this writ petition, the petitioner conveniently has not impleaded the Convener LAWCET-98 as one of the respondents. As a matter of fact, the petitioner has not impleaded any of the respondents in W.P. No. 25642 of 1998 in this writ petition as respondents. The present writ petition is filed against a private college which perhaps is too willing to support the case of the petitioner and admit him into its college. It is not as if the petitioner is not aware that the admissions are centralised and it is the Convener who is clothed with the jurisdiction and the authority to allot the students into various colleges including the private colleges. The 1st respondent-college is not entitled to admit any student on its own unless the candidates are sponsored by the Convener. The facts speak for themselves. In my considered opinion, the petitioner has abused the judicial process and for that reason alone, the interim order obtained by him is liable to be vacated.

14.

The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Sri V.V.S. Rao, however would submit that the petitioner has mentioned about filing of the said writ petition and the fact that he obtained an interim order in his favour. May be so. It may not be a case of suppression of any material facts but one of the course adopted by the petitioner. How can the petitioner be committed to file this writ petition with the same relief as the one claimed by him in W.P. No. 25642 of 1998?

15.

Viewed from any angle, I have no doubt in my mind that the petitioner is guilty of abuse of judicial process.

16.

For all the aforesaid reasons, the interim order granted by this Court in W.P.M.P. No. 37415 of 1998 shall stand vacated and the W.P.M.P. shall accordingly stand dismissed. W.V.M.P. No. 4281 of 1998 is allowed.

17.

However, the learned senior counsel submits that the matter is required to be heard expeditiously as the 1st year examinations of L.L.B. are likely to be held in the month of April, 1999 and the petitioner has to know as to where he stands. The learned counsel brings to my notice that the very same question as the one involved in this W.P. had already been referred to a Division Bench by an order dated 24-12-1998 in W.P. No. 25642 of 1998. Hence, post this writ petition along with W.P. No. 25642 of 1998.