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Judgment
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, "CrPC"), seeking quashment of the proceedings against the petitioners in C.C. No. 301 of 2023 on the file of the learned III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, City Criminal Court, Nampally, Hyderabad.
The petitioners are Accused Nos. 1 to 4 in the aforesaid Calendar Case arise out of private complaint filed by respondent No.2 alleging offences under Sections 352, 426, 447, 503, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "IPC"), in respect of the property situated at Film Nagar Co-operative Housing Society, Film Nagar, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad.
I have heard Mr. S.M. Rafee, learned counsel for petitioner No.1 and Mr.T. Raghuram, learned counsel for petitioner Nos.2 to 4; Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for respondent No.1-State and Ms. Ramaa Swetha Ogirala, learned counsel for respondent No.2-complainant.
Briefly stated, the relevant facts are that the complainant claims to have entered into a Lease Deed dated 26.08.2014 with petitioner No.1 in respect of the subject property. It is further alleged that, subsequently, the parties executed an Agreement of Sale dated 29.11.2018, whereby petitioner No. 1 agreed to sell the subject property to the complainant upon receipt of an advance sale consideration of Rs.5,00,00,000/-. According to the complainant, notwithstanding the said Agreement of Sale, petitioner No. 1 thereafter executed a registered Sale Deed in favour of his son, petitioner No. 2, in respect of the very same property, thereby giving rise to civil disputes, including a suit for specific performance instituted by the complainant. It is further alleged that, on 01.11.2022, certain unknown persons, allegedly acting at the behest of the petitioners, unlawfully trespassed into the subject property, dispossessed the complainant's security personnel, threatened the complainant and his staff, and erected a board asserting ownership over the property.
The complainant further asserts that, despite lodging a complaint with the police authorities, no action was taken, compelling him to institute a private complaint before the jurisdictional Magistrate. Upon recording the sworn statements of the complainant and one witness, the learned Magistrate, by order dated 19.01.2023, took cognizance of the alleged offences and issued summons to the petitioners.
Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the complaint is a clear abuse of the process of criminal law, as it arises entirely out of contractual and property disputes concerning the Lease Deed and the Agreement of Sale, which are already the subject matter of several pending civil proceedings. It is submitted that the complainant has resorted to criminal prosecution solely with a view to exerting pressure on the petitioners in the pending civil litigation.
It is further contended that the learned Magistrate committed a jurisdictional error in taking cognizance without referring the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly when the allegations involve unidentified persons and necessarily require police investigation. According to the petitioners, there is no prima facie material connecting them with the alleged offences, as the complaint is supported only by the sworn statements of the complainant and one of his employees. The alleged victim, namely, the security guard, who was purportedly dispossessed, was neither cited nor examined, nor were any independent witnesses from the locality examined.
It is also contended that the complainant's assertion of possession based solely on the Agreement of Sale is legally untenable, since an Agreement of Sale, by itself, does not confer either title or lawful possession of the property. Learned counsel further submits that the complainant has suppressed material facts relating to the unauthorised demolition, illegal constructions, unauthorised sub-leasing of the premises, and the subsequent demolition carried out by the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) pursuant to the directions of the High Court. It is further argued that the sub-tenants had voluntarily vacated the premises and handed over possession to petitioner No. 1 after acknowledging his ownership, thereby completely belying the allegations of forcible dispossession.
Learned counsel further contends that the allegations against the petitioners are vague, omnibus, and wholly speculative, resting merely on the assumption that certain unknown persons acted at their behest, without any supporting material. It is, therefore, submitted that the complaint is a malicious attempt to convert purely civil disputes into criminal prosecution for collateral purposes, and that the learned Magistrate failed to apply his judicial mind to the allegations and the material placed before him before issuing summons. It is accordingly urged that the continuance of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction by quashing the proceedings.
Learned Additional Public Prosecutor and learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 2-complainant, per contra, contend that the allegations contained in the complaint, if taken at their face value, clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offences and, therefore, the learned Magistrate was fully justified in taking cognizance and issuing summons to the petitioners. It is submitted that the existence of civil disputes between the parties concerning the Lease Deed and the Agreement of Sale does not, by itself, bar the initiation or continuance of criminal proceedings, particularly when the allegations disclose distinct criminal offences. It is contended that the complaint specifically alleges that, on 01.11.2022, certain unknown persons, acting at the instance of the petitioners, unlawfully trespassed into the subject property, dispossessed the complainant's security guard, intimidated the complainant and his staff with threats, and erected a board asserting ownership over the property, thereby attracting the ingredients of the alleged offences. It is further contended that, after examining the complainant and one supporting witness on oath, the learned Magistrate found sufficient grounds to proceed against the petitioners and, therefore, there was no legal requirement to refer the matter for investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, as the Magistrate has the discretion either to take cognizance of the complaint or to direct investigation, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
It is submitted that, at the stage of taking cognizance, the Court is only required to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out and is not expected to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the defence set up by the accused. Learned counsel further contends that the issues relating to the validity of the Agreement of Sale, title to the property, alleged unauthorised constructions, sub-leasing, demolition by the GHMC, or the alleged voluntary surrender of possession by the sub-tenants are all disputed questions of fact constituting the defence of the petitioners, which cannot be examined in proceedings seeking quashment. It is further argued that the question of possession over the subject property, and the circumstances under which such possession was allegedly disturbed, are matters to be established during trial on the basis of evidence. It is also submitted that the non-examination of the security guard or other independent witnesses at the stage of taking cognizance is not fatal to the prosecution, as the sufficiency and reliability of the evidence are matters to be assessed during trial. As per the respondent No. 2, the allegations against the petitioners are specific and disclose their active involvement by asserting that the unknown persons acted at their instance, which is sufficient to justify the issuance of process. Accordingly, learned counsel prayed that the Criminal Petition be dismissed and that the petitioners be directed to face trial in accordance with law.
I have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record.
Admittedly, disputes exist between the parties in relation to the Lease Deed dated 26.08.2014 and the Agreement of Sale dated 29.11.2018, and several civil proceedings, including a suit for specific performance, are pending between them. However, it is equally well settled that the mere existence of a civil dispute or the availability of a civil remedy does not, ipso facto, bar the initiation or continuance of criminal proceedings, provided the allegations in the complaint disclose the commission of cognizable offences. The same set of facts may legitimately give rise to both civil liability and criminal culpability, and the existence of one remedy does not necessarily exclude the other.
In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a given set of facts may constitute both a civil wrong and a criminal offence, and that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because the dispute also gives rise to civil consequences. The Court observed that the criminal law cannot be set in motion to settle purely civil disputes; equally, where the allegations disclose the essential ingredients of a criminal offence, the pendency of civil proceedings cannot be a ground to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The said principle has consistently been reiterated in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751.
A careful reading of the complaint in the present case discloses specific allegations that, on 01.11.2022, certain unknown persons, allegedly acting at the instance of the petitioners, unlawfully trespassed into the subject property, dispossessed the complainant's security personnel, criminally intimidated the complainant and his staff, and erected a board asserting ownership over the property. These allegations, if accepted at their face value, prima facie disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged in the complaint and furnish sufficient grounds for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance. At the stage of taking cognizance, the Court is not required to undertake a meticulous examination of the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations, nor is it expected to appreciate the evidence as though conducting a full-fledged trial. The enquiry at this stage is confined to determining whether the complaint, the sworn statements, and the material produced disclose sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused.
The contention of the petitioners that the complainant's claim is founded merely upon an Agreement of Sale, which does not by itself confer title or lawful possession, cannot be examined while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. Whether the complainant was in lawful possession of the property on the date of the alleged occurrence, whether possession had already been surrendered by the sub-tenants, whether unauthorised constructions had been made, whether the complainant suppressed material facts relating to municipal proceedings, and whether the alleged acts of trespass and intimidation actually occurred, are all disputed questions of fact requiring appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. Such issues lie exclusively within the domain of the trial Court and cannot appropriately be adjudicated in proceedings invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court.
Equally untenable is the contention that the complaint is supported only by the sworn statements of the complainant and one of his employees, and that the security guard or other independent witnesses have not been examined. At the stage of examination under Section 200 Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate is merely required to ascertain whether sufficient grounds exist for proceeding against the accused. The adequacy, reliability, or probative value of the evidence is not to be assessed at that stage. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose, AIR 1963 SC 1430, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Magistrate, while considering a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., is not required to weigh the evidence meticulously or determine whether the evidence would ultimately result in conviction. Similarly, in Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, (1976) 3 SCC 736, it was held that once the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding, the issuance of process ought not to be interfered with unless the complaint is patently absurd, inherently improbable, or barred by law. Whether the evidence adduced by the complainant ultimately inspires confidence is a matter to be tested during trial through cross-examination and appreciation of evidence. The absence of examination of every possible witness at the pre-summoning stage cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for quashing the proceedings.
The submission that the learned Magistrate ought to have referred the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., instead of taking cognizance under Section 200 Cr.P.C., is equally devoid of merit. The scheme of Chapters XII and XV of the Code confers discretion upon the Magistrate either to direct investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before taking cognizance or to take cognizance upon a private complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and thereafter proceed in accordance with Sections 200 to 204 Cr.P.C. The choice between the two courses depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and lies within the judicial discretion of the Magistrate.
In Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2001) 2 SCC 628, the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised that both courses are legally permissible and that the Magistrate has discretion to adopt either procedure. Likewise, in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287, while prescribing safeguards governing applications under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the Hon'ble Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Magistrate possesses discretion either to direct investigation or to proceed under Chapter XV.
In the present case, the learned Magistrate examined the complainant and one supporting witness on oath and, upon consideration of the complaint and the sworn statements, formed an opinion that sufficient grounds existed for proceeding against the petitioners. The order dated 19.01.2023 demonstrates due application of judicial mind before issuance of process. It is equally well settled that, at the stage of issuing process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is not required to record elaborate reasons resembling a judgment after trial. Once the order reflects consideration of the complaint and the material placed before the Court and records satisfaction regarding the existence of a prima facie case, the statutory requirement stands fulfilled.
The scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is no longer res integra. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court illustratively enumerated the categories of cases in which criminal proceedings may be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The Court categorically held that such power is extraordinary in nature and must be exercised sparingly, with great circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases to prevent abuse of the process of law or to secure the ends of justice. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Niharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, reiterated the principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction and authoritatively held that, while considering a petition for quashing, the High Court is not expected to conduct a roving enquiry into the genuineness of the allegations, appreciate disputed questions of fact, or evaluate the defence of the accused. If the allegations in the complaint, taken at their face value, disclose the commission of an offence, the criminal proceedings should ordinarily be permitted to continue. Similarly, in Neeharika Infrastructure, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasised that the defence sought to be projected by the accused cannot ordinarily be considered at the threshold unless the material relied upon is of sterling and incontrovertible character completely demolishing the prosecution case.
In the present case, the defence projected by the petitioners, namely, that the sub-tenants voluntarily surrendered possession, that the complainant violated the terms of the Lease Deed, that the municipal authorities demolished unauthorised constructions, and that the complaint has been instituted with an ulterior motive is entirely factual in nature. These are matters requiring evidence and adjudication during trial. Acceptance of such defences at this preliminary stage would necessarily involve appreciation of disputed facts and evaluation of evidence, which would amount to conducting a mini-trial, a course consistently deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Having regard to the allegations contained in the complaint, the sworn statements recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., the material placed before the learned Magistrate, and the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction, this Court is satisfied that the complaint discloses a prima facie case warranting trial. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the present case falls within any of the well-recognised categories warranting quashing of criminal proceedings as illustratively laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra) or under any other binding precedent. The contentions urged by the petitioners predominantly raise disputed questions of fact, which are matters for adjudication during trial and not in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. The proceedings in C.C. No.301 of 2023 pending on the file of the learned III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad, shall proceed in accordance with law uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order, which are confined solely to the adjudication of the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.