D. Sayanna vs The Managing Director, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Another

C.V. Nagardjuna Reddy, J.—The petitioner in this writ petition questions the order passed by the 1st respondent in his proceedings dated 11.08.1995 confirming the order dated 30.11.1990 passed by the 2nd respondent whereunder a minor penalty of censure was imposed on the petitioner besides directing that the period of suspension till the date of his reinstatement in service shall be treated as "not on duty" for the purpose of salary.

The petitioner was a Driving Instructor of the A.P. State Road Transport Corporation and at the relevant point of time he was working as such in Warangal. The petitioner along with two other officers viz., A.V.D Souza, the training officer and a training inspector were faced disciplinary proceedings. Three charges were framed, which are extracted hereunder:

For planning, organizing collection of illegal gratis of Rs. 300/- (Rupees Three hundred only) per driver trainee candidates of RTS/KRMR through S/Sri M. Kumara Swamy, S. Sadanandam, K. Narsaiah and B. Sarangapani, Trainee agents for payment to Sri A.V.D Souza, training officer from the trainees of Warangal division and others.

For having collected and paid illegal grants of Rs. 7500/- (Rupees Seven thousand and five hundred only) to Sri A.V.D. Souza, training officer, to see that the trainees are not detained during the practical test.

For having transported domestic goods such as, rice, fire wood etc., in the training vehicle from various places to the residence of training officer, Sri A.V.D Souza at Hyderabad.

A joint enquiry was ordered against all the three delinquents. The enquiry officer, after completing the enquiry, submitted his enquiry report holding that charge Nos. 1 and 2 are not proved against the petitioner and that charge No. 3 was proved. As mentioned earlier, the 2nd respondent, who is the disciplinary authority, passed the order of imposing a minor penalty of censure and denying the petitioner the salary for the suspension period by directing that the said period shall be treated as "not on duty". Though two writ petitions were filed successively, the petitioner was relegated to file an appeal before the appellate authority, who is the 1st respondent herein. The petitioner accordingly, filed an appeal, which was rejected by the 1st respondent by his order, dated 11.08.1995. It is these two proceedings of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 which are subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition.

Heard the learned Counsel for both sides.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that having been exonerated of charge Nos. 1 and 2 which are grave in nature, the respondents ought not to have denied the petitioner''s salary for 23 months during which he was placed under suspension pending enquiry. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the punishment of treating the suspension period as "not on duty" is highly disproportionate and harsh warranting the interference of this Court.

On the other hand, the learned Standing Counsel contended that the respondents 1 and 2 have applied their mind and that since the imposition of penalties lie within the discretion of the respondents, no interference is called for with such a discretion exercised by them.

From the charges extracted above, it is clear that charges1 and 2 are very serious in nature. It is not in dispute that the enquiry officer has exonerated the petitioner of the two serious charges. Even in the opinion of the 2nd respondent, charge No. 3 does not relate to any act involving any moral turpitude. The observations of the 2nd respondent are extracted hereunder:

I agree with the findings of the Enquiry officer. The delinquent employee should not have allowed the rice bags to be carried in the bus, which is meant for imparting training to the driver trainees. However, since the charge held proved does not relate to an offence involving any moral turpitude as the charged employee will be retiring from service w.e.f. 30.11.1990. I take a lenient view and he be censured.

According to the 2nd respondent, the charge of which the petitioner is found guilty does not involve any moral turpitude. Purporting to take a lenient view by imposing the minor penalty of censure, a very harsh condition has been imposed by directing that period of suspension shall be treated as "not on duty". In my considered view this condition is too harsh and disproportionate to the gravity of the charge held proved against the petitioner. By the very nature of the charge, it can be said that the petitioner was rather indiscrete in using an official vehicle for transporting certain household articles to his superior officer viz., the training officer. Though, technically this may constitute misconduct, as rightly pointed out by the 2nd respondent himself it does not involve any element of moral turpitude.

Regulations 21(2)(a) and (b) of APSRTC (Classification, Control and Appeal) Regulations read as under:

(2)(a) Where such competent authority holds that the employee has been fully exonerated or, in the case of suspension, that it was unjustifiable, the employee shall be granted the full pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or suspended, as the case may be.

(b) In all other cases, the employee shall be granted such proportion of such pay and allowances as such competent authority may direct.

From a reading of this regulation, it is clear that no doubt a discretion is vested with the competent authority to make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances payable to an employee under suspension consequent on the completion of the departmental proceedings, it is needless to say that such a discretion has to be exercised properly and in a just and proper manner.

On the facts of this case, I am of the view that the respondents failed to use the discretion vested in them in a just and fair manner and the decision to treat the suspension period as "not on duty" is too harsh that it shocks the judicial conscience of the Court. Though, ordinarily the Court would not interfere with the discretion exercised by the authorities in the imposition of penalties, in exceptional cases where the punishment imposed is too disproportionate and harsh to the gravity of the act complained of, the Courts would interfere. As I am fully satisfied that this is one such case, which falls within those exceptions, I am inclined to set aside the orders of the respondents1 and 2 and direct the 2nd respondent to reconsider the decision regarding the pay and allowances payable to the petitioner during his suspension period, in the light of the findings and observations made by this Court hereinabove.

The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.