D. Naveen Babu vs Convenor, MBACET-1998 and others

B.S.A. Swamy, J. 1. Though the reliefs sought for in these two writ petitions are different, as they relate to the admissions to MBA Course and the petitioner being one and the same, both the writ petitions can be disposed of by a common order.

The petitioner having secured a rank of 2276 in the Common Entrance Test for MBA Course for the academic year 1998-99, applied for admission as the child of an ex-army personnel.

It is his case that he falls under preference No.11 for admission into the course. When the respondents having issued a call letter did not give admission to the petitioner on the ground that he has not produced the original disability certificate issued by the Ministry of defence in favour of his father, he filed Writ Petition No.27600 of 1998 seeking a direction to the Convenor to consider his case under category II for the seats earmarked for the children of ex-service man and obtained interim orders to that effect. As per the interim orders of this Court, the case of the petitioner was considered and he secured admission in the University college of Commerce and Business Management, Osmania University, As the relief sought for in the said writ petition was given by the University pursuant to the directions issued by this Court, no further orders are required to be passed in the said Writ Petition No.26700of 1998.

While the petitioner was prosecuting his MBA Course, he received a letter No.64/DBM/MBA/Admissions/99 dated 22-4-1999 stating that his admission stands cancelled and he was directed to seek admission into MBA programme in any affiliated college as per his merit. He was also asked to collect the fee paid by him from the University. Questioning these proceedings, the petitioner field Writ Petition No.12166 of 1999 and-obtained interim orders permitting him to attend the classes.

Now the question to be decided in this writ petition is whether the petitioner can seek admission under category II of the preferences given for admission in the seats earmarked for the children of ex-service army personnel. It is not in dispute that the petitioner''s father was receiving disability pension after he was medically boarded out for cervical spondylosis. On that ground now the petitioner is trying to seek admission under preference II which is as under :

''Children of army personnel disabled in action and invalidated out from service on medical grounds and who are in receipt of disability pension."

From this it is seen that under category II the children of the army personnel who were disabled in action and invalidated from service on medical grounds can alone seek admission. Admittedly the father of petitioner was not disabled while he was in action and as such, it is difficult to hold that his claim can be considered under this category. But Sri Venugopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner tried to justify the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner''s father was receiving disability pension. Mere receiving the disability pension is not sufficient to claim a seal under this category. The petitioner has to further prove that his father was disabled in action and invalidated from service on the basis of such disability. The word used in this clause is ''and'' but not ''or''. Hence the petitioner has to satisfy that he has fulfilled all the three conditions stipulated under this preference i.e., the father of the petitioner was disabled while he was in the battle field and because of the disability he was invalidated form service on that ground and by virtue of that invalidation he is also receiving medical disability pension. Admittedly in this case as observed supra, the father of the petitioner was medically boarded out in the ordinary course. But according to the respondents, he was boarded out at his own request. As the other two main ingredients of this clause are not satisfied, he is not entitled to claim the seat under this category.

Nextly the petitioner contends that the impugned order was passed without notice and the same offends the principle of audi alteram partem. I find sufficient force in this contention. The Convenor is expected to give a notice and hear the petitioner before passing the final order. On that ground, I have no option except to declare the order as bad in law. All the parties now concede that as the academic year 1998-99 has almost come to an end and the petitioner has to take final examination very soon, hence, I direct the respondents not to disturb the admission of the petitioner and the judgment of this Court is to be treated as declaration of law on the issue only for future guidance.

With the above directions, these two writ petitions are disposed of.

No costs.