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Judgment
The facts in each of these ten writ petitions are substantially similar, and the question which falls for decision is also common. Therefore, all these writ petitions were clubbed and heard together, and they are being disposed of by this common judgment.
The private respondents in each of the writ petitions claim to be tribals and owners and occupiers of certain lands which are the subject matters of these writ petitions and situate in the Agency tracts of Adilabad District. The petitioners also claim to be the owners and occupiers of the same lands. Thus, there is a serious title dispute between the petitioners and the contesting private respondents over the lands. When the matters stood thus, the Government of Andhra Pradcsh initiated the proceedings under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for short ''the Act'', to acquire these lands for the public purpose, for submergence under the Vatti-Vagu Project by issuing Section 4(1) Notification and invoking the special power of urgency under sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 17 of the Act in the year 1996. Declaration u/s 6 was also made in the year 1996 itself. Eighty per cent of compensation was also paid to the petitioners as envisaged under sub-section (3-A) of Section 17 of the Act. In the Notification issued u/s 4(1) and the declaration made u/s 6, the names of the contesting private respondents in these writ petitions are shown as occupiers of the lands, whereas the names of the petitioners are shown as owners of the lands. In other words, the petitioners as well as the contesting private respondents arc parties to the land acquisition, proceedings initiated under the Act. The private contesting respondents filed suits in the Court of the Agent to the Government of Andhra Pradesh-cum-Collector, Adilabad District, Adilabad. In the suit filed by the second respondent in Writ Petition No.10445 of 1997 the following reliefs arc sought:
"(i)That the plaintiff be declared the absolute owner of the suit land bearing Sy.No.55(04-68) situated at village Mendrumeda of Tiryani Mandal District, Adilabad.
(ii) That, further the plaintiff be declared entitled to receive the total compensation in respect of suit land in the event of passing of such award by the Land Acquisition Officer, Utnoor, District Adilabad,
Any other relief or reliefs for which the plaintiff is entitled in the circumstances of the case may be awarded, for the ends of justice."
Identical reliefs are sought by the other respondents also. The petitioners were impleaded as defendants to the suits. On service of notice in the suits, each of the petitioners-defendants filed a petition in the concerned suit raising the preliminary objection against the maintainability of the suit itself. The petitioners-defendants contended that since the acquisition proceedings were already initiated, special power of urgency was invoked u/s 17(4) and (5) of the Act and the possession of the land was already taken over, the suits filed by the contesting private respondents are not maintainable and the suits are impliedly barred by the provisions of the Act. On the other hand, the contesting respondents-plaintiffs contended that the lands in question situate in Agency tracts and therefore the suits filed by them are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Agency Court and therefore, the suits are maintainable. The Agency Court after referring to the respective contentions of the parties rejected the petitions filed by the petitioners observing thus :
"Only after the claim for declaration of title over the suit land is decided, he can have cause of action to agitate before the Land Acquisition Officer for making payment of compensation at the time of award enquiry, u/s 11 of the Act, Otherwise, the plaintiff has no voice to agitate before the Land Acquisition Officer for making payment of compensation."
The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners and the learned Counsel appearing for the contesting private respondents reiterated the same contentions putforth before the Agency Court. Therefore, the only question which falls for consideration and decision in this batch of writ petition is whether the initiation of the land acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the Act explicitly or implicitly bars the jurisdiction of the Agency Court, and whether the suits filed by the contesting private respondents for the aforementioned reliefs are maintainable or not ?
Before dealing with the rival contentious of the parties, relevant statutory provisions be noted. The Governor, by virtue of the delegated power conferred upon him u/s 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, framed the rules called Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, 1924 for the administration of the Agency tracts of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Rule 1 of the Andhra Pradesh Agency Rules, among other things, confers on the Collector and District Magistrate of Adilabad District the power of the District Judges within the Agency tracts included in that district. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 1 provides that for the trial and determination of suits coming before the Agency Court, the Agent to the State Government is vested wide the same powers as are vested in the district and revenue Courts. Therefore, it is quite clear that under the Agency Rules, the Collector and District Magistrate of Adilabad district is conferred with the power of the District Judge within the Agency tracts included in Adilabad District. The dispute raised by the contesting respondents in the suits filed by them in the Agency Court is a dispute of ''civil nature'''' within the meaning of that term u/s 9, Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in the ordinary course, the Agency Court would have jurisdiction to try any suit of civil nature inasmuch as it is vested with the same powers as are vested in the District Judges. The normal rule of law is that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance is either expressly or by necessary implication excluded.
There is no explicit bar in the Land Acquisition Act ousting the jurisdiction of the Agency Courts to try the suits filed by the contesting private respondents. It is well-settled principle that where there is no express exclusion of the jurisdiction, an examination of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability and provides remedy for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the Tribunal or the Court so constituted and the question whether remedies are normally associated with the action in Civil Courts or prescribed by the statutes or not require examination. Therefore, each case requires examination whether the statute provides right and remedy and whether the scheme of the Act is that the procedure provided will be conclusive and thereby excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect thereof.
Another relevant aspect to be noted is that there is no separate law providing for acquisition of the lands situate in the Agency tracts for the public purpose by the State authorities. In other words, if any land situated in the Agency tract is required for any public purpose, the State authorities can acquire such land by resorting to the provisions of the Act.
The Land Acquisition Act is a special enactment covering the entire field of land acquisition, and is a complete Code in itself in the field occupied by it. The Act provides for initiation of the land acquisition proceedings, holding of enquiry, determination of the compensation payable to the owners and the other interested persons, seeking enhancement of the compensation by way of reference u/s 18 of the Act. If any dispute arises as to the apportionment of the compensation or any part thereof or as to persons to whom the same or any part thereof is payable, the Act vests the power in the Collector to refer such dispute to the decision of the Court u/s 30 of the Act. Section 31 provides that on making an award u/s 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the person interested entitled thereto according to the award and if they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference u/s 18 would be submitted. If the amount of compensation awarded by the reference Court is not acceptable to the claimants, appeal is provided to the High Court u/s 54 of the Act and a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Section 49 also vests the power in the Collector to refer, if any question arises as to whether any land proposed to be taken under the Act does or does not form part of a house, manufactory or building within the meaning of that section, to the Court for determination of such question. From the provisions of the Act noted above, it would thus be clear that the scheme of the Act is complete in itself. The claim putforth by the contesting private respondents in their suits filed before the Agency Court can be gone into by the Court under the provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court in S. Vanathan Muthuraja Vs. Ramalingam alias Krishnamurthy Gurukkal and Others, , held that by virtue of provisions of Tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the said Act stands excluded. This declaration was made by the Supreme Court on the ground that the said Act provides for the jurisdiction of the Tribunals in matters relating to abolition of feudal system of land tenures and conferment of the ryotwari patta on the tiller of the soil, and hierarchy of appeals/ revisions are provided thereunder giving finality to the orders passed thereunder. The Supreme Court also held that the Civil Court''s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy in the special enactment to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit.
The Supreme Court in Laxmi Chand and others Vs. Gram Panchayat, Kararia and others, , held that the suit filed by the appellant therein assailing the validity of the acquisition and of the award is not maintainable on the ground that the Land Acquisition Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act, by necessary implication, stood barred and that the Civil Court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. In the instant case, the petitioners as well as the contesting private respondents are parties to the land acquisition proceedings. Whatever may be their respective claims, they are entitled to putforth the same before the Land Acquisition Officer or the Court exercising jurisdiction under Sections 18 or 30 or 31 of the Act and the Court is bound to decide those claims.
In N. Swaminatha Aiyar and Another Vs. Kuppuswami Aiyar alias Ramaswami Aiyar and Others, : Wadsworth, J., held that when rival claimants come before the Court on a reference u/s 31, Land Acquisition Act, the Court has a duty to decide which of the two claimants is entitled to the money deposited in Court. According to the contesting private respondents-the plaintiffs, they are entitled to the entire compensation. If they raise such plea before the Land Acquisition Officer, he is bound to deposit the amount of compensation in the Court to which reference u/s 18 would be submitted, and the Court is duty bound to decide such claim. The Act provides for reference to seek enhancement of compensation u/s 18 of the Act, by way of reference to the Court. The Act has created adjudicatory forums to decide the rival claims and provides for appeal to the High Court and further appeal to the Supreme Court u/s 54 of the Act. Therefore, the parties to the land acquisition proceedings have to resort to the remedies provided under the Land Acquisition Act. The view expressed by the Supreme Court in Laxmi Chand''s case (supra) was reiterated by the Supreme Court in S.P. Subramanya Shetty and others v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and others 1997 (4) SC 5. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a civil suit relating to acquisition proceedings is not maintainable and by implication, cognizance of such suit u/s 9, CPC is barred.
It is well-settled established principle, as could be gathered from the pronouncements of the Courts in Stevensv. Jeacotce (1898) 11 QB 731 : (1898)17 LJ QB 163 : (1898)116 ER 647, West v. Downman (1880) 14 Ch. D. 111 : (1880)42 LT 340 : (1880)29 WR 6, and Ram Chandra v. Secretary of State for India in Council (1889) 12 Mad. 105, that where by an Act of Legislature powers are given to any person for a public purpose from which an individual may receive injury, if the mode of redressing the injury is pointed out by the statute, the ordinary jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ousted. For all the reasons stated supra, it should be held that the jurisdiction of the Agency Court to try the suits filed by the contesting private respondents is impliedly ousted by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
There is one more reason not to sustain the impugned orders passed by the Agency Court. The contesting private respondents-the plaintiffs in their suits have not assailed the validity of the land acquisition proceedings or of the awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer. In law, they are also not entitled to assail the validity of the land acquisition proceedings or the awards or decrees passed by the Land Acquisition Officer or the Court under the Act or civil suits. They can be assailed only by the modes prescribed under the Act or by invoking the power of judicial review vested in the Constitutional Courts, as the case may be. If the impugned orders are upheld and if the Agency Court is permitted to try and dispose of the suits, there is possibility of the Agency Court passing decrees which may be in conflict with the awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer, or the orders or decrees that may be passed by the Court u/s 18 or 30 or 31 as the case may be. Such a situation will never be permitted in law.
In the result, I hold that the reasons given by the Agency Court to reject the applications of the petitioners are unsound and untenable. A case is made out for interference. Hence, the writ petitions are allowed with no order as to costs. The impugned order in each of the writ petition is quashed. The applications filed by the petitioners raising objections to the maintainability of the suits are allowed. The suits filed by the contesting private respondents in the Agency Court are dismissed as impliedly barred by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.