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Judgment
K.A. Swami, C.J.—The aforesaid writ appeals are preferred against the interim order dt. 24.2.1995 passed in W.M.P. Nos.7898, 7916 &
8236/95, filed in W.P. Nos. 4804, 4991 and 4821/95.
When these writ appeals came up for consideration, we considered it necessary to hear the writ petitions along with the writ appeals, as the
points involved in the writ petitions and writ appeals, are one and the same, and accordingly, we directed the writ petitions to be posted along with
these writ appeals. Accordingly, the writ petitions are also posted along with the writ appeals and we have heard both sides in the writ the appeals
and in the writ petitions. As the decision in the writ petitions would have the bearing on the writ appeals, we will take up the writ petitions first for
consideration.
In the aforesaid writ petitions, the petitioners have sought for quashing the Circular bearing Ref.No. 14/005/131/95 dt. 20.3.1995, issued by the
Council for Leather Exports, Madras, calling upon the writ petitioners and others to pay 5% of export duty on the finished leather products and
also for quashing the public notice under Ref. No. 67/Exp(PN)/92-97, New Delhi dt. 16.3.1995, issued by the Director General of Foreign
Trade, New Delhi.
At the outset, we may point out that the public notice under Ref. No. 67/Exp.(PN)/92-97 dt. 16.3.1995, cannot be held to be invalid or illegal,
and in fact, no contention was advanced as to the invalidity or illegality of such a public notice. The aforesaid public notice only amends the earlier
public notice under Ref.No. 15/ETC/PN/92-97 dt. 31.3.1993 which deals with the free export in relation to paragraph 123 of the Export Policy.
Under the amended public notice, a new condition has been added as (ii), after the existing condition as (i), to the following effect:
Registration of exports with Council for Leather Exports.
The case of the writ petitioners is that the Council for Leather Exports is a company registered under the Companies Act. Though it is
recognised as an authority for the registration of the exports, as per paragraph 143 of Chapter XIII, read with paragraph 123 of Chapter XI, of
the Export and Import Policy for the period from 1.4.1992 to 31.3.1997, of the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, the fact that the
exports are to be registered with the Council for Leather Exports, Madras, does not empower it to levy and collect 5% Development fee on real
F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, which was existing earlier and which came to be abolished with effect from 1.4.1995, as per the budget
passed by the Parliament for the financial year 1995-96. Therefore, the impugned circular issued by the Council for Leather Exports, demanding
development fee at 5% on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment from the member-Exporters of the Council against the registration of
finished leather exports, as notified by the Government, is unauthorised and the Council for Leather Exports; that while performing the functions of
registration of exports, discharges functions and powers of the Central Government, only as an authority to regulate the exports and imports and as
such to the extent, the Council for Leather Exports performs that function, it performs the function of the Central Government, and therefore its
(Council for Leather Exports) action is liable for challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when the action of the Council for
Leather Exports in demanding development fee at 5% on real F.O.B. value of finished leather, is not an internal affairs of the company, confined to
the members of the company and it affects the entire export trade, in finished leather goods.
On the contrary, it is contended by the learned Senior Counsel Mr.S.Govind Swaminathan"", appearing for Council for Leather Exports, that
when the Central Government abolished the export duly levied at 5% on the value of the finished leather products to be exported and at the same
time it recognised the Council for Leather Exports at Madras for registering the exports with it by the exporters of finished leather goods and such
a function or power exercised by the Council for Leather Exports should carry with it and that is necessary to effectively exercise its powers, to
levy and demand 5% on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, and such an action justifiable (sic), especially when the said fee collected is
used for the development of leather industry as a whole and also for maintaining the ecological balance and for eliminating the pollution created by
the leather industries, in the interest of general public. Thus the fee so collected is used not only for the development of the leather industries but
also in the interest of general public, that when the circular in question was passed in the Board of Directors of the Company, namely the Council
for Leather Exports, in which the writ petitioners are also Members of the Council, it is not open to them to challenge the said circular, under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether or not the Council for Leather Exports, exercises its powers as an authority recognised to register
the exports, nevertheless, it docs not cease to be a company, and therefore, if any member of the company or Council, or those who are not
members of the company, are aggrieved by the decision of the company, can very well invoke the provisions contained under the Companies Act
or under any other law and not by way of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Thus it is the case of the Council for Leather
Exports that the writ petitioners are not entitled to seek any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and there is no justification for this
Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in their favour and exercise to discretionary jurisdiction in favour of
the writ petitioners, would result in affecting the public interest and consequently it will result in causing incalculable damage to the environment as
well as to the public at large.
The Points for consideration are:--
Whether the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would lie against the Council for Leather Export at Madras?
Whether the Council for Leather Export at Madras is competent or authorised to levy and demand 5% development fee on real F.O.B. value of
finished leather shipment, from the Member-Exporters of the Council against the registration of finished leather products?
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, even if it is held that the Council for Leather Exports is not authorised and competent to levy
and demand development fee on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, is it a case for declining to grant the relief?
Point No 1: As per Article 246 of the Constitution of India, read with Entry Nos. 41 and 83 of List I of Seventh Schedule, it is the Parliament
which is competent to levy duty on exports.
Article 366(28) of the Constitution defines the expression ""taxation"" including the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or
special and ""tax"" shall be construed accordingly.
It is not in dispute that prior to 1.4.1995, the excise duty was levied on the finished leather exports. However, the Central Government thought
it necessary to abolish the duty in the Budget presented for the financial year 1995-96, in which, it was specifically made clear that to promote the
export of finished leather and make it more competitive, the export duty on the finished leather is abolished. In paragraph 87 of the Budget speech
of the Finance Minister, while presenting the Budget for the financial year 1995-96, it is specifically stated thus:-
To promote exports of finished leather and make it more competitive, I propose to abolish the export duty on finished leather.
Therefore, the export duty on the finished leather products came to be abolished. Nothing was stated in the Budget speech, nor any provision was
made in the Budget about the continuation of the said export duty in any other form or imposition of the same through any other agency.
The Export and Import Policy for the period from 1.4.1992 to 31.3.1997, provides free exports. Paragraph 123 of Chapter XI of the Export
and Import Policy, of the Government of India, states thus:-
All goods may be exported without any restriction except to the extent such exports are regulated by the Negative List of Exports or any other
provision of this policy or any other law for the time being in force. The Director General of Foreign Trade may, however, specify through a public
notice the terms and conditions according to which any goods not included in the Negative List of Exports may be exported without a licence.
Such terms and conditions may include minimum export price (MEP), registration with specified authorities, quantitative ceilings and compliance
with other laws, rules, regulations.
(Emphasis supplied )
Therefore, the exporters were required to register the exports with the specified authorities and these specified authorities, known as Export
Promotion Councils are also enumerated in Paragraph 143 of Chapter XIII of the said Policy. Council for Leather Exports (CLE), Madras, is
found at item 13 in the Export Promotion Council, as one of the specified authorities. Pursuant to that, the public notice No. 67-EXP/PN/92-97
dt. 16.3.1995, came to be issued, amending the earlier public notice 15 ETC (PN)/92-97, dt. 31.1.1993. The said public notice No. 67-EXP
(PN)/92-97, dt. 16.3.1995 reads thus:
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE
Public Notice No. 67-EXP (PN)/92-97, New Delhi dated the 16th March, 1995.
Attention is invited to S.No. 13 of Annexure to public notice No. 15-ETC-(PN)/92-97 dated 31st March, 1993 appearing at Appendix XLIII-I
of Hand Book or Procedures, Vol.1, April, 1992, March, 1997 (Revised Edition: March, 1994).
The existing condition against the above entry shall be numbered as (i).
The following condition shall be added as (ii) after the existing condition appearing at (i).
Registration of exports with Council for Leather Exports.
This issues in Public interest.
Sd/-Director General of Foreign Trade.
Thus the registration of the leather export with the Council for Leather Exports became compulsory for those who wanted to export the finished
leather products.
It is pursuant to the inclusion of the Council for Leather Exports as one of the Export Promotion Councils and making registration of the leather
exports with it as compulsory, the Council for Leather Exports has issued the impugned Circular. It may be pointed out here that though the
Council for Leather Exports, Madras is a registered company under the Companies Act, nevertheless, for the purpose of exporting the finished
leather goods, it is recognised as one of the Export Promotion Councils, for the purpose of regulating the exports, with the basic object of
promoting and developing the exports in the country and making each Council responsible for the promotion of particular group of products and
services. Thus the function which the Central Government was required to perform, has been entrusted with the Council for Leather Exports.
Therefore, in discharging such functions, the Council for Leather Exports will be acting as an instrumentality of the Central Government and not as
a company. In the case of an instrumentality of the State, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is permissible and there is
no limitation in that regard, except the self imposed limitation in exercising that power, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Council for Leather Exports that it (Council for Leather Exports) is a
company, and therefore, it is not open to the petitioners to seek any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be countenanced.
There is also another contention raised that the petitioners in W.P.No. 4821 of 1995 as members of the Council, are bound by the resolution
passed by the Board of Directors. As long as there are writ petitions filed by others who are not members of the Council, it is not necessary for us
to consider whether the petitioners in W.P.No. 4821 of 1995 are entitled to challenge the impugned circular, because we are required to go into
the question at the instance of other petitioners.
The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Council for Leather Exports has placed reliance on the following decisions:--
The North Arcot District Pawn Brokers'' Association v. The Secretary to Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi 1975 I MLJ 290;
Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, ;
Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar and Others Vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Another, ;
Govt. Press Employees Assn., Bangalore v. Govt. of Mysore AIR 1962 Mysore; 25.
Rup Diamonds and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, .
As far as the decision in North Arcot District Pawn Brokers'' Association v. Secretary to Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi 1975
I MLJ 290 is concerned, it may be pointed out that a different view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court on referring the said decision
in State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. S.B. of Bikaner & Jaipur Emp. Assn. 91 WLR 638, and therefore, the proposition made in North Arcot
District Pawn Brokers''Association v. Secretary to Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi 1975 I MLJ 290 cannot be accepted as
correct.
The decision reported in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, related to the right of persons to
challenge No objection Certificate issued for the purpose of establishing a cinema under the provisions of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954. In that
case, it was held by the Supreme Court:
In order to have the locus standi to invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner should be an ''aggrieved person''. The expression ''aggrieved
person'' denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an inclusive concept. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content
and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific, circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner''s interest
and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him.
In the said decision, it was held that persons challenging the actions of rival trader could not be considered to be an ""aggrieved person."" Therefore
the said decision, depended upon the right enjoyed by the objector and as such, the proposition laid down therein should be confined to the facts
and the law concerned therein.
In Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar and Others Vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Another, the question that was considered was in respect of
enforcement of rights of petitioner-association members, as distinguished from its own rights. In that case, it was held that--
An association of persons registered or unregistered, can file a petition under Article 226 for enforcement of the rights of its members as
distinguished from the enforcement of its own rights--(1) in case of members of such an Association are themselves unable to approach the court
by reason of poverty, disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position (little Indians); (2) in case of a public injury leading to public
interest litigation provided the association has some concern deeper than that of a wayfarer or a busybody, i.e., it has a special interest in the
subject matter; (3) where the rules or regulations of the association specifically authorise it to take legal proceedings on behalf of its members, so
that any order passed by the court in such proceedings will be binding on the members. In other cases, an association whether registered or
unregistered, cannot maintain a petition under Article 226 for the enforcement or protection of the rights of its members, as distinguished from the
enforcement of its own rights.
It may be pointed out here that the petitioners herein are enforcing collectively their right to trade, which includes exporting of finished leather
goods as a part of their trade. Article 265 of the Constitution of India, specifically provides that no tax shall be levied or collected without any
authority of law. It is this provision, the petitioners are seeking to enforce and inasmuch as the Council for Leather Exports, according to the
petitioners, has no authority of law to demand and collect Development Fee on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, when the same was
being collected as export duty prior to 1.4.1995 and which came to be abolished by the Central Government. Therefore, the said decision
reported in Umesh Chand Vinod Kumar and Others Vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Another, , is of no assistance to the stand taken by the
Council for Leather Exports. We may also point out here that even though one of the petitioners may be a member of the Council, but in the
petition filed herein, that petitioner is not enforcing its right as a member of the Council, but it is only seeking to enforce the provisions of the
Constitution to the extent, it gives right to every citizen or the Association, representing its members, in the matter of enforcing the rights of its
members.
18(A). The decision reported in Government Press Employees'' Association, Bangalore v. Government of Mysore AIR 1962 Mys 25 is also of no
assistance to the Council for Leather Exports, because what was considered in that case was as to whether an association can advance the cause
of its members in relation to the action taken against them on the administrative side by the State Government. In that case it was held that each
Government servant, against whom action is taken, is entitled to maintain the writ petition and he alone can be said to be an ""aggrieved person"" and
the Association has no locus stand to maintain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the personal and individual grievances of some of
the members and not of the association itself.
Thus, we are of the view, that in view of the function that has been entrusted to the Council for Leather Exports, which is part and parcel of the
functioning of the Central Government, it cannot escape from the judicial review of its decision insofar as it relates to demanding development fee
at 5% on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, from the exporters against the registration of exports.
In Rup Diamonds and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, the Supreme Court has held at page 677 ECC 19, para 6 that it is essential that
persons who are aggrieved by orders of the Government should approach the High Court after exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or
order with utmost expedition.
In the instant case, there is no alternate efficacious remedy available to the petitioners. We have already held that the Council for Leather
Exports is exercising the powers which the Central Government was to exercise and to that extent, it becomes the instrumentality of the State and
as such. the actions of the instrumentality of the State, in the absence of any alternate efficacious remedy, are open to judicial review. Hence, the
said decision is also of no assistance to the Council for Leather Exports. The nature of the function entrusted to the Council for Leather Exports,
which is part and parcel of the Central Government it cannot escape from the judicial purview inasmuch as it has demanded 5% as Development
Fee on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, from the exporters as against their registration of their exports.
For the reasons stated above, Point No. 1 is answered in the affirmative.
Point No. 2:--
While dealing with Point No. 1, we have pointed out that under Article 265 of the Constitution no tax shall be levied or collected except by
authority of law. We have also pointed out that it is the Parliament which alone is competent to levy export duty, having regard to the provisions
contained in Article 265 read with Entry 41 and Entry 83 of List I, under VII Schedule. It was in exercise of that power only the export duty at 5%
on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment had been levied and it was in force till 31.3.1995, and which came to be abolished with effect
from 1.4.1995. These facts are not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the Export and Import Policy for the period from 1.4.1992 to 31.3.1997
has introduced free exports, as per paragraph 123, Chapter 11 and also has prescribed a condition that such exports apart from complying with
other conditions should also have a registration with the specified authorities. The said authority has also been specified as Export Promotion
Councils. The Council for Leather Exports (CLE) at Madras has also been recognised as one of the Export Promotion Councils, as per Entry 30
in paragraph 143(a) of Chapter XIII of the Export and Import Policy. Not only this, the public notice 15-ETC(PN)/92-97 dt. 31.3.1993, has also
been amended by another public notice No. 67-EXP/(PN)/92-97 dt.16.3.1995, making registration of exports as compulsory with the Council for
Leather Exports. We have already extracted the public notice No. 67 dt.16.3.1995.
Therefore the position that emerges is that for any exporter of finished leather products, he has to register the exports with the Council for
Leather Exports, which is recognised as one of the Export Promotion Councils. Apart from this, there is no other notification or order and no
provision has been made in the Export and Import Policy or in the Budget for the financial year,1995-96, authorising the Export Promotion
Councils to levy and collect any fee or any amount under the name ""Development Fee"", while discharging their duties as Export Promotion
Councils, in registering the exports.
The learned Senior Counsel for the Council for Leather Exports further contended that the excise duty (sic) came to be abolished pursuant to
the representation made by the Leather Councils. Therefore, it could be construed that the abolition of export duty at 5% and recognition of
Council for Leather Exports at Madras as one of the Export Promotion Councils and authorising the said Council to register the exports, would
impliedly and inevitably mean that the Council for Leather Exports is empowered to impose and collect 5% Development Fee at 5% on real
F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, otherwise, it is not at all possible for the Council for Leather Exports to perform its functions and it
would result in rendering the power conferred upon the Council for Leather Export, illusory, nor it will be able to fulfil the objects with which it has
been recognised as one of the Export Promotion Councils. It is also the case of the Council for Leather Export that it has been doing great work
for the development of the leather industry for making the atmosphere pollution free, by maintaining the ecological balance, at great cost, therefore,
for this public service also, the Council is entitled to levy and collect the development fee at 5% on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment.
It is no doubt true that one of the objects of the Export Promotion Council in question is to promote and develop the exports of the country in
leather goods, and each Council is responsible for the promotion of a particular group of products and service. However, it is not necessary to
examine whether the Council for Leather Export is doing its service for the benefit and interest of any particular industry or in the interest of public
in general, because, it is not the purpose which alone justifies the levy of duty or development fee, but it is the authority to collect fee that justifies
the levy and collection of development fee. We have already adverted to the relevant taxation provision contained in the Constitution as well as in
the Export and Import Policy for the period from 1.4.1992 to 31.3.1997, and also the public notice Ref.No. 67/Ex.(PN)/92-97 dated 16.3.1995.
We find it difficult to read or interpret the provisions contained in the Export and Import Policy or the public notice No. 67 dated 16.3.1995 in
such a way that it enables or empowers the Council for Leather Exports to levy and collect Development Fee at 5% on real F.O.B. value of
finished leather shipment. The imposition and collection of development fee at 5%, on the real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, is not an
internal affair nor it is an affair between a company and its members. It is the public duty or the duty of the Central Government that the Council for
Leather Export is exercising or performing.
26(A). Before referring to the several decisions of the Supreme Court on which reliance was placed, we may also point out that even in the case of
statute, levying and collecting fees, it has been held that unless there is a specific empowerment, levy and collection of such fees, is not permissible
in law, whatever the objects may be, whereas in the case of the Council for Leather Exports, it is a company registered under the Companies Act,
and therefore, it would be far-fetched on the part of the company to demand and collect any Development Fee or to assert any right to claim or
demand such fee.
In State of Kerala and Others Vs. P.J. Joseph, , the question that arose for consideration was whether the Board of Revenue, could collect
commission at 20% of the price of liquor, on the basis of the endorsement made on the licence. It was held that the endorsement was not a
statutory order passed by the State in exercise of power conferred on it by Section 17 of the Cochin Abkari Act. It was more in the nature of an
intimation given to the Board of Revenue that the Government accorded sanction, to extra quotas of foreign liquor being allowed to wholesale
licensees in Cochin on payment of the commission and such a document was nothing more than what it purported to be, namely, a departmental
instruction that the excise authorities might allow extra quotas to wholesale licensees on payment of the requisite commission. That was held to be
unauthorised.
In the decision reported in Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority Vs. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla and others, , the question
considered was whether the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, by its Regulation could levy a development fee. It was
held that in the absence of any specific provision in the Gujarat Town Planning Act, 1976 empowering the levy of such fee, it had no power to
make such a regulation on the basis of any implied or ancillary authority under Sections 91(1)(a) and 119(2)(c) of the Act. The relevant portion of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in paragraph 7, reads thus:
After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr. Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter, it will not be proper to
hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/
or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that
the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the
theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. The facts and circumstances in the
case of District Council or Jowai are entirely different. The exercise of powers by the Autonomous Jaintia Hills Districts are controlled by the
constitutional provisions and in the special facts of the case, this Court has indicated that the realisation of just fee for a specific purpose by the
autonomous district was justified and such power was implied. The said decision cannot be made applicable in the facts of this case or the same
should not be held to have laid down any legal proposition that in matters of imposition of tax or fees, the question of necessary intendment may be
looked into when there is no express provision for imposition of fee or tax. The other decision in Khargram Panchayat Samiti and Another Vs.
State of West Bengal and Others, also deals with the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of administrative law and the same
does not deal with the power of imposing tax and fee.
Hence, we are of the view, that in the absence of any specific authority conferred by law on the Council for Leather Exports to levy and collect the
development fee at 5% on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, such a demand is unauthorised and illegal. Accordingly point No. 2 is
answered in the negative.
Point No. 3:--
It is claimed by the Council for Leather Exports that it has been doing great service to the leather industry and the public in general by spending
crores of rupees, and as such, the demand and collection of development fee, in the interest of the leather industry, the general public and also in
the interest of the members of the Council, should not be interfered with.
We have already pointed out that the levy and collection of such development fee is not an internal affair of the Council for Leather Exports
and it relates to the whole leather export trade. As we have already pointed out that as per Article 265 of the Constitution, no tax shall be levied or
collected, except by authority of law, though it is termed as ""development fee"", it is nothing but export duty, demanded and collected under the
guise of ""development fee"" by the Council for Leather Exports, without the authority of law. Therefore, the levy and collection of Development Fee
not being permissible in law, it cannot be permitted.
We must also keep in view the fact that the Central Government has specifically abolished the export duty on the export of finished leather
goods and no provision has been made for collecting any fee in any other form. The Council for Leather Exports being a company, not being
specifically authorised in this regard by any authority of law, cannot be held to have any power to levy and collect the ""development fee"" as
demanded, however good its objects may be. Accordingly, Point No. 3 is answered in the negative.
For the reasons stated above, the writ petitions are allowed. The impugned circular bearing No. 14/005/131/95 dated 20.3.1995, issued by
the Council for Leather Exports, Madras is quashed. Issue writ of mandamus to the Council for Leather Exports, Madras to refrain from levying
and collecting 5% development fee on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, from the members of the Council and others against the
registration of finished leather export, and at the same time, shall not deny or refuse the registration of finished leather exports on that ground.
In view of the orders passed in the writ petitions, the writ appeals are allowed. Consequently, the order dated 24.4.1995 passed in
W.M.P.Nos.7898, 7916 and 8236 of 1995 in W.P.Nos. 4808, 4821 and 4991 of 1995 by the learned single Judge is set aside.
The learned Counsel for the petitioners in W.M.P.Nos. 23185 to 23187 of 1995, has been heard on the merits of the matter. Consequently,
those petitions are allowed. The other writ miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petitions and the civil miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ
appeals are disposed of accordingly. The bank guarantee furnished pursuant to the interim order passed in W.M.P.Nos. 7898, 8236 and 7916 of
1995 dated 24.4.1995 shall stand revoked and the concerned bank guarantee already furnished are directed to be returned to those who have
furnished.
Regarding the refund, we direct that, as the writ petitions have been allowed and as it has been held that the Council for Leather Exports has
no authority to levy and collect ""development fee"" on real F.O.B. value of finished leather shipment, the amount paid already towards
development fee"" pursuant to the interim order passed in W.M.P,Nos. 7898, 7916 and 8236 of 1995, shall be refunded to those who had paid
the same, within three months from today. There will be no order as to costs.
And the matter having been posted on this day for being mentioned in the presence of the said Advocates for the parties herein, the Court made
the following Order:--
The subject matter of this writ petition has been decided in the batch of the writ petitions and writ appeals, viz., W.As. 753, 754 and 755 of 1995
and W.P.Nos.4808, 4821, and 4991 of 1995 as referred to in paragraph 2 of the judgment dated 21.11.1995. However, in the cause title, the
number of this writ petition has been left out by oversight. Accordingly, it is directed that this number also be included in that judgment.