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Judgment
This order will dispose of CM. No. 725-C-II of 1977 and C.M. No. 726/C-II of 1977 alongwith F.A.O. 81 of 1977 and F.A.O. No. 82 of 1977. For disposal of this case only facts of F.A.O. No. 81 of 1977 are mentioned.
This is an application u/s 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for condonation of delay in first appeal i.e., F.A.O. No. 81 of 1977. An award was pronounced on 15th of September, 1976 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Amritsar. Application for copy of judgment was filed on 18th of September, 1976 and it was ready on 23rd of October, 1976. The period of limitation accordingly was to expire on 19th of January, 1977, after excluding 36 days for supply of copy. The appeal was however, filed in the Registry of this Court on 18th of February, 1977, i.e., after about 30 days delay. The only ground taken in this application is that in the letter addressed by the counsel for the Company-Appellant dated 1st of November, 1976, it was written that appeal can be filed in the High Court upto 19th February, 1977 and that accordingly the Petitioner reached Chandigarh on 18th of February, 1977 to engage the counsel. We have seen the letter of the counsel dated 1st of November, 1976, although its envelope is not forthcoming on the record. In the letter it has been stated by the counsel that 67 days are to be added to 90 days for calculating the period of limitation for purposes of filing this appeal. This clearly shows negligence on the part of the counsel which resulted in delay in filing the appeal. Otherwise also in the absence of the envelope this letter seems to be suspicious as it is not very difficult to procure such a letter. Mr. Maharaj Baksh Singh in support of this case relied upon The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and Others, . In this case there was a delay of two days only and their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it was a bona fide mistake of the counsel but the facts of the present case are entirely different. In the present case the counsel seems to be clearly negligent and having regard to the facts of this case his negligence can not be condoned. It is a consistent view of this High Court that delay on account of the negligence of the counsel for a party cannot be condoned. Reference can, in this behalf, be made to Sarmukh Singh Vs. Chanan Singh and Others, where although there was no negligence and it was only due to ignorance of law on the subject that the counsel wrongly advised the concerned party, even then their Lordships of the (sic. Punjab High court held that the ignorance of the) elementary provision of Section 39 of the Punjab Courts Act, is not excusable in the case of a legal practitioner, whatever be his standing at the Bar and cannot, by itself, constitute a sufficient cause within the purview of Section 5. Similar view was taken in Dina Nath Vs. Munshi Ram and Others, Union of India v. Shree Ram AIR 1958 P&H. 165 AIR 1938 81 (Lahore) and AIR 1918 Lah 67. The Appellant Company as well as its counsel have been negligent in calculating the period of limitation. The Assistant Divisional Manager of the Company-Appellant is not an illiterate or so ignorant person who could not calculate the period of limitation. Such like appeals are filed by such companies daily. The facts of this case clearly show, as observed earlier, that the mistake is not bona fide and the Appellant has failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay. For the reasons recorded above both the Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 725-C-II of 1977 and 726/C-II of 1977 are dismissed. Consequently both the appeals i.e. F.A.O. Nos. 81 and 82 of 1977 are also dismissed as barred by limitation.
