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Judgment
R. Jayasimha Babu, J.—The following two questions have been referred to us at the instance of the Revenue :
(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the medical
expenditure to the extent of Rs. 2,54,994 incurred on an employee should be allowed as a valid business expenditure in the hands of the assessee
u/s 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ?
(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the medical expenditure
to the extent of Rs. 2,54,994 incurred on an employee could not be considered to be a perquisite and, therefore, could not be disallowed u/s
40A(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ?
They arose out of the assessment of the respondent company in which the public are not substantially interested, under the Income Tax Act for
the assessment year 1986-87. During the assessment year, the assessee purchased air tickets for Sri A. M. M. Arunachalam, his wife, Smt. A. R.
Lakshmi, and his relative Smt. Valli Alagappan, for their travel to the U. K. at the cost of Rs. 70,994. It also purchased demand draft and
travellers cheques in foreign currency for Sri Arunachalam''s treatment and the living expenses of Sri Arunachalam, his wife and relative in the U.
K. Their visit to the U. K. was for a by-pass surgery for Sri Arunachalam. The amount so spent was not an amount which the company was
required to spend under the terms of the contract of employment of Sri Arunachalam by the company.
It is not disputed that Sri Arunachalam had been appointed as an adviser to the company by letter dated January 17, 1981, which sets out the
terms of his employment. In terms of that letter of appointment, he was to be paid a sum of Rs. 4,250 towards monthly salary, Rs. 450 per month
towards engagement of a private servant. He was also to be provided medical facility for himself and his wife to the extent available under the
assessee company''s medical insurance scheme. In addition, the company was to reimburse to him the actual amount incurred towards medical
expenses for him and his wife, which were not reimbursed by the insurance company subject to Rs. 4,500 per annum. He was also to be provided
with a car together with a driver for private purpose and the company was to pay club subscription on his behalf for two clubs and reimburse the
entertainment expenses incurred by him in connection with the business of the company.
The said Sri Arunachalam was not a whole time adviser of the company. The Tribunal has noted the fact that he was the chairman of the board
of directors of three companies, Tube Investment of India Ltd., Carborandum Universal Ltd., and South Asian Financial Exchange Ltd. He was
also the deputy chairman of Ashok Leyland Ltd., and W. S. (India) Ltd.
On April 3, 1985, the board of directors of the assessee-company passed a resolution resolving to bear the full expenditure for the by-pass
surgery, which the said Arunachalam was required to undergo on the advice of doctors who had recommended that the surgery be done in the U.
K. The reason given by the board of directors for so resolving was for the valuable advice that the company had received from him from time to
time for the benefit of the group companies. The resolution was passed by the board by circulation. The recommended surgery was performed in
the U. K. in April, 1985. Sri Arunachalam and his wife and relative remained in U. K. for seven weeks during April and May, 1985.
It is not in dispute that Sri Arunachalam has not sought any financial help from the assessee-company.
The Income Tax Officer as also the Commissioner of Income Tax held that the amount spent by the assessee-company for the medical
treatment of the said Sri Arunachalam, and stay of his wife and his relative in the U.K. for seven weeks could not be allowed as business
expenditure u/s 37 of the Income Tax Act, in the view that the amount so spent was only a gratuitous expenditure and could not be regarded as
expenditure incurred for the purpose of the assessee''s business. They also took the view that the payment was hit by the provisions of Section
40A(5) of the Act.
The assessee having appealed against the order of the Commissioner to the Tribunal, the tribunal disagreeing with the view of the Commissioner
held that this payment did not attract Section 40A(5). It also held that the expenditure was incurred for the purpose of the assessee''s business, as
the said Sri Arunachalam had offered valuable advice to the assessee-company and the other group companies in the past and considering his
standing in the business world, the advice rendered by him was valuable.
The Revenue being aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the above two questions have been referred to us at the instance of the Revenue.
We may dispose of the second question first as the true scope of Section 40A(5) of the Act has now been explained authoritatively by the
Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay, etc. Vs. M/s. Mafatlal Gangabhai and Co. (P) Ltd., , wherein it has been
held that cash payments are outside the purview of Section 40A(5) of the Act. The expenditure incurred by the assessee having been incurred by
way of payments made in cash such payments do not attract Section 40A(5) of the Act. The second question referred to us, is required to be and
is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that the expenditure incurred by the assessee-company on the medical treatment, travel and stay of
Sri Arunachalam, his wife and his relative was only a gratuitous expenditure that it was not an expenditure which could be regarded as justified on
grounds of commercial expediency and that the expenditure was not one which was wholly and exclusively or even necessarily incurred for the
purposes of the assessee''s business. It was submitted that the contract as between the assessee and Sri Arunachalam did not provide for any such
payment. The expenditure on medical expenses reimbursable as also the expenditure for the medical treatment which is available under the asses-
see-company''s medical insurance scheme have been spelt out in the letter of appointment. It was further submitted that the said Sri Arunachalam
at no point of time requested for such payment being made and it was not the case of the assessee or of the said Sri Arunachalam that the salary
that was being paid to him under the agreement was in any way affected by this sum being paid in the event of his having to undergo by-pass
surgery. The reason given by the board of directors for making the payment being the benefit obtained by the company from his services in the past
could not afford the justification for this payment. This justification for this payment cannot be regarded as sufficient for treating the expenditure as
business expenditure in the light of the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gordon Woodroffee Leather
Manufacturing Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, .
Learned counsel for the assessee, on the other hand sought to support the order of the Tribunal and submitted that having regard to the later
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sassoon J. David and Co. Pvt. Ltd., Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax , Bombay, , the
expenditure incurred by the assessee on the medical treatment of its adviser was required to be regarded as business expenditure.
In the case of Gordon Woodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, a Constitution Bench of the
apex court considered the question as to whether the payment of a sum of Rs. 40,000 as gratuity to a person who was the employee of the
managing agent of the assessee-company from 1922 to 1935 and also an employee of the assessee from 1935 and later its director from 1940,
the payment having been made to him during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1950-51 could not be regarded as an expenditure
laid out or expended for the purpose of the business within the meaning of Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922. There also the
payment had been made to a former employee ""in appreciation of his long and valuable services to the company"". The company there did not have
any scheme for the payment of gratuity nor was the payment of gratuity a matter of practice. There was also nothing to show that the employee had
accepted a low salary in expectation of a gratuity on retirement nor was there anything to show that the gratuity was paid for the purpose of
facilitating the carrying on of the business of company or as a matter of commercial expediency.
The apex court in the case of Gordon Woodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, held that
(headnote): ""The proper tests to apply in a case like this are whether the payment was made as a matter of practice which affected the quantum of
salary or there was an expectation by the employee of getting a gratuity or the sum of money was paid on the ground of commercial expediency
and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business"".
In this case also there is nothing on record to show that Sri Arunachalam had accepted a low salary in expectation of a benefit like the one now
conferred on him, his wife and his relative, by the assessee-company. There is also nothing on record to show that the payment was made for the
purpose of facilitating the carrying on of the business of the company or as a matter of commercial expediency. There is also nothing on record to
show that the company had a scheme of meeting the costs without any limit of its employees or advisers abroad and meeting the costs of the travel
and stay of their relatives as well.
In the case of Sassoon J. David and Co. Pvt. Ltd., Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax , Bombay, , a Bench of two learned judges of
the apex court held that the expression ""wholly and exclusively"" used in Section 10(2)(xv) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, does not mean
necessarily"" and that ordinarily, it is for the assessee to decide whether any expenditure should be incurred in the course of his or its business.
Such expenditure may be incurred voluntarily and without any necessity and if it is incurred for promoting the business and to earn profits, the
assessee can claim deduction u/s 10(2)(xv) of the Act even though there was no compelling necessity to incur such expenditure. The court also
held that the tests laid down in the case of Gordon Woodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , had
to be read disjunctively. The court in that case held that the sum of Rs. 1,27,511 paid by the assessee towards compensation for termination of
service, compensation to director and other payments were sums which were laid down wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business of the
company. The court observed that as the result of the expenditure, the appellant-company was, in fact, benefited by reduction in the wage bill.
That expenditure was held to be an expenditure on grounds of commercial expendiency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of its
business and was therefore allowable as a deduction.
The tests laid down in the case of Gordon Woodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , were laid
down by the Constitution Bench of the apex court and those tests have not been varied in the case of Sassoon J. David and Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax , Bombay, . The tests have been clarified to be disjunctive and that if the payment can be justified by
applying any one of the tests, such expenditure can be regarded as one incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business of the assessee.
Learned counsel for the assessee invited our attention to the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Commissioner of
Income Tax Vs. Steel Ingots Pvt. Ltd., and to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Mehboob Productions Private Ltd. Vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City-I, and submitted that expenditure on the travel and medical treatment of directors having been
allowed in those cases, similar allowance in this case would be justified. On a perusal of those decisions we do not find any reference in these
decisions to the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gordon Woodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. Vs. The
Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras, , and we are unable to derive any assistance from those decisions.
The tests as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gordon Woodroffee Leather Manufacturing Co. Vs. The Commissioner of
Income Tax, Madras, , as set out in the case of Sassoon J. David and Co. Pvt. Ltd., Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax , Bombay, :
(i) that the payment should have been made as a matter of practice which affected the quantum of salary,
(ii) that there was an expectation by the employee of getting a gratuity, and
(iii) that the sum of money was expended on the ground of commercial expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the
business of the assessee.
Applying these tests to the facts of this case, we are unable to hold that any one of the tests has been satisfied. The payment made was not one
which had any link with the quantum of salary and other benefits to Sri Arunachalam. It is not the case of the assessee that Sri Arunachalam had
any expectation of getting the amounts that were paid to him by the assessee for the medical treatment. In fact he did not seek any such payment
and there is nothing to show that he was in need of it. The payments so made cannot be regarded as having been made on grounds of commercial
expediency and in order indirectly to facilitate the carrying on of the business of the assessee. A gratuituous payment, like the one, made by the
assessee cannot be regarded as a matter of commercial expediency, as there is nothing to show that Sri Arunachalam would have withheld his
service, if such payment had not been made and the effecting such payment was necessary or expedient in order to retain his service. The stated
reason for the payment is ""the valuable service rendered by him in the past"". The payment is, therefore, clearly in the nature of gratuitous payment
voluntarily made in appreciation of the services which he had rendered to the assessee in the past. If the payment of a sum of Rs. 40,000 as
gratuity to a person who had served the company for a period of over 27 years cannot be regarded as an expenditure which was commercially
expedient and for the purpose of facilitating the carrying on of the business of the company, the payment of a substantial sum of Rs. 2,54,994 to an
adviser who was obviously a part time adviser and to whom many valuable facilities had been provided under the agreement and who had not in
put the money from the company and was not in need of such payment, cannot also be regarded as an expenditure which was commercially
expedient and was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business of the company.
We, therefore, answer the first question referred to us in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
