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Judgment
Mathew, J.—This is an application to review an order passed by this court on an application u/s 66(3) of the Income Tax Act treating the same as an original petition filed under Article 226. The respondent to this review petition filed an application u/s 66(1) of the Income Tax Act before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal on April 18, 1966, praying for referring certain questions of law arising out of its order dated October 21, 1965. The Tribunal found that the application was barred by limitation. It, therefore, dismissed the same. The respondent had filed another application before the Tribunal stating that if time was calculated from the date of its order, namely, March 14, 1966, passed on the application filed by the respondent before it u/s 35 of the Income Tax Act, the application u/s 66(1) would be in time. That application was also dismissed by the Tribunal. This court treating the application filed by the respondent u/s 66(3) as a petition under Article 226 upheld the contention of the respondent that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable to a proceeding u/s 66(1) of the Income Tax Act and directed the Tribunal to consider the question whether there was sufficient ground for condoning the delay in filing the application u/s 66(1) of the Act.
The review petitioner contends that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to a proceeding before the Tribunal as the Tribunal is not a court, and, therefore, this court committed a patent error of law in saying that Section 5 is applicable to a proceeding u/s 66(1). We think that our order is vitiated by an error of law. A reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be sufficient to show that an application under that section will lie only for condonation of delay in filing an application or appeal before a court, and that Section 5 cannot apply to a proceeding before a Tribunal like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. As we overlooked the clear provision of Section 5 in passing the order dated June 7, 1967, we set aside the order in review.
As Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings u/s 66(1), we see no merit in the writ petition. We, therefore, dismiss the writ petition, but make no order as to costs.
