Commissioner of Income Tax vs Ghewar Chand Soni

Heard learned counsel for the appellant.

The appeal relates to the assessment year 1988-89. The only question sought to be raised by the Revenue in this appeal is that since the amendment made in Section 139(8) where any regular assessment is made for the first time, whether u/s 143 or u/s 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the purpose of levy of interest, it is still governed by the provision of Section 139(8).

The Supreme Court has laid down in Modi Industries Limited, Modinagar and Others Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Another, that (headnote) : "The ''regular assessment'' has been defined in Section 2(40) to mean the assessment made u/s 143 or 144. In the context of Sections 140A, 141 and 141A ''regular assessment'' could only mean the original assessment made u/s 143 or 144. Having regard to the scheme of the Act and use of the phrase ''regular assessment'' in various sections of the Act. In Section 214 ''regular assessment'' has been used in no other sense than the first order of assessment passed u/s 143 or 144. If any consequential order has to be passed by the Income Tax Officer to give effect to an order passed by the higher authority, that consequential order cannot be treated as ''regular assessment'' nor can the date of the consequential order be treated as the date of the regular assessment."

By way of amendment u/s 139(8) where no regular assessment has been made u/s 143 or 144 in the first instance, the assessment u/s 147 is also to be treated as regular assessment.

However, in the present case from the finding of the Tribunal, it is apparent that the original assessment for the assessment year 1988-89, was made on December 2, 1986, (sic) and thereafter reassessment was made by resorting to Section 148. No interest was levied in the course of the original assessment. The interest has been sought to be levied by way of reassessment u/s 147. Apparently, the contention raised by the Revenue is ill founded on the facts. In view of the meaning of "regular assessment" which has already been determined by the Supreme Court and the provisions of Section 138 have also made it clear that reassessment u/s 147/148 is deemed to be a regular assessment only in such cases where assessment under Sections 143 and 144 is not made in the first instance.

Apparently the facts of the present case does not fall within the ambit of deeming provision. In such view of the matter it cannot be said that any substantial question of law is involved for consideration in this appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.