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Judgment
THANIKKACHALAM, J. :
At the instance of the Department, the Tribunal referred the following question for the opinion of this Court, under s. 256(1) of the IT Act, 1961,
hereinafter referred to as the Act :
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the provision for excise duty is accrued liability of
the year 1977-78 and that it should be allowed as a deduction even though the provision included the duty payable in respect of goods
manufactured in the earlier years?
The assessee is a company engaged in the manufacture of electrical equipments. It was manufacturing ceramic fuse bodies, which are in turn
used in the manufacture of HRC fuse links. The assessee had been manufacturing this item from 1968 onwards. At that time the central excise
authorities tested some samples of the fuse bodies, but did not pursue the matter further and determined that those goods were not liable to excise
duty. In November, 1973 the central excise authorities revived their claim and demanded that the assessee should take out a licence and pay duty
on HRC fuse links. Though the assessee challenged this demand and was successful, but in November, 1976 the assessee was advised that
ceramic fuse bodies were themselves liable to excise duty. This advice was given on the basis of observation made to that effect by the High Court
in the litigation, which is reported as The English Electric Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The Superintendent, Central Excise and Others, . Thereafter the
assessee felt that it would be most appropriate and advisable to take out a licence for the manufacture of the particular component and subjecting it
to excise duty. The assessee applied for a licence and it was issued on 1st Feb., 1977.
On being required to furnish the quantities of fuse bodies manufactured and cleared since its inception, with the view of levy duty, by a letter, dt.
16th March, 1977, the assessee furnished the required particulars in June, 1977 and in July, 1977, the excise authorities demanded a sum of Rs.
5,98,895 from the assessee towards the duty payable on the goods it manufactured for the period from 1973 to 1977. This duty was worked out
by adopting a rate of 25%. The assessee then moved the High Court praying that the rate of duty should be 15% and not 25%. In the said
proceedings the High Court also granted stay and during the pendency of the petition, the excise authorities themselves reduced the rate to 15%.
Accordingly, the demand was revised to Rs. 3.79 lakhs. Thereafter, the High Court directed the matter to be disposed of in the usual course by
the appellate authorities. An appeal was then filed before the appellate collector contending that since the excise authorities were aware from 1968
onwards of the manufacture of ceramic fuse bodies by the assessee, the retrospective demand made by them from 1973 was not in order. The
appellate collector accepted this argument and directed that the demand for the period of one year only should be made from the assessee.
Thereafter, the assessee preferred a revision petition against the order of the appellate collector, which was pending at that time.
Under these circumstances, while closing the accounts for the year ended 31st March, 1977, which is the year relevant for the year under
reference, the assessee made a provision in the accounts of a sum of Rs. 5,75,000 as payable towards excise duty and claimed the same as a
deduction. Both the ITO and the CIT disallowed the claim. Both of them took the view that since the demand from the central excise authorities
was received only in July, 1977, that is, after the accounting year had ended, no legally enforceable demand arose in the accounting year which
could be allowed as a deduction. The events that took place and which forced the assessee to provide for Rs. 5,75,000 were placed before the
authorities below, but this was not considered by them. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view
that the assessee was entitled to the deduction. The argument advanced before the Tribunal was that even though the demand was received on
11th July, 1977, i.e., after the accounting year had ended, because the accounts were open, the assessee could make a provision in its account.
Even otherwise, it was open to the assessee to estimate the liability and make a provision for it, because the liability to pay excise duty arose not
when a demand was raised but as and when the manufacture of the excisable item took place.
So the contention of the assessee was that the taxable event was the point of manufacture and not the raising of the demand. The Tribunal
accepting the assessees contention held that under the Excise Duty Act, the liability to pay duty arises as and when manufacture took place. This
conclusion as arrived at on the basis of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Century Enka Ltd.,
. In that decision it was held that in all fiscal statutes, the point of taxation is the happening or occurrence of the taxable event. In the case of excise
duty, the taxable event is the production or manufacture of goods. This was also the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the decision
reported as Shinde Brothers etc. Vs. Deputy Commissioner and Others, etc., . In this decision the Supreme Court pointed out that the taxable
event in the case of duties on excise is the manufacture of goods and the duty is not directly on the goods, but on the manufacture thereof. The
Tribunal also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported as Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Wealth
Tax, (Central) Calcutta, , wherein the Supreme Court held that a liability accrues as soon as the taxable event occurs and that liability is known as
debitum in praesenti solvendum in futuro. Therefore, the computation made by the taxing authorities during the course of assessment proceedings
was not of any real consequence insofar as the accrual of a liability is concerned. The Tribunal also relied upon another decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of The Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, (Central), Calcutta, in order to come to the
abovesaid conclusion. Further, the Tribunal relying upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs.
Orient Supply Syndicate, held that when the licence was issued, the starting point for the taxable event has come into existence. Therefore,
according to the Tribunal, the liability to pay duty for the goods manufactured in 1973 also arose in the year under reference. On considering these
facts the Tribunal ultimately held that the liability to pay excise duty of Rs. 5,75,000 arose in the year under reference and it was an allowable
deduction and it could not be said to be a contingent liability as held by the CIT(A) while negativing the claim of the assessee.
The learned senior standing counsel appearing for the Department submitted that if the excise authorities had fixed demand only on 11th July,
1977, which was long after the accounting year had ended, no enforceable liability came upon the assessee and consequently the assessee was not
entitled to deduction of any sum. The provision made for Rs. 5,75,000 in the accounts was made only after the demand for Rs. 5,75,000 was
received, because the accounts by then happened to be kept open. Otherwise the assessee could estimate for the purpose of making the provision
of Rs. 5,75,000. Nothing prevented the assessee from doing it much earlier and provide for it in the accounts in each of the respective accounting
years. It is the service of demand notice on the assessee some time in July, 1977 that prompted the assessee to make the provision and that being
the starting point the assessee is only trying to relate it back to the accounting year which in the present system of law should not be permitted. It
was further submitted that as a result of various proceedings, the excise duty was levied only for a period of one year, and therefore, that one year
liability can be allowed when it was actually paid. The judgment in The English Electric Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The Superintendent, Central Excise
and Others, , was delivered on 12th Feb., 1975 wherein it was held that it is difficult to regard HRC fuse-link as porcelainware merely because
one of its components is made of porcelain. The whole thing, viz., HRC fuse-link is manufactured article and one of its components is porcelain.
But merely because that component forms part of the finished article, that by itself will not come within Entry 23B, for it must be a porcelainware
as such. Hardly HRC fuse-link can be described as porcelainware as we commonly understand the phrase. Therefore, according to the learned
senior standing counsel, if at all the liability arose, it arose for payment of excise duty in the asst. yr. 1973-74. Hence, it was submitted that the
liability which arose for payment of excise duty can be allowed only in that year when the liability arose. In order to support this contention,
reliance was placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court reported as Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa Vs. Kalinga Tubes Ltd., wherein
the Supreme Court held that when the assessee is following the mercantile system of accounting in the case of sales-tax payable by the assessee,
the liability to pay sales-tax would accrue the moment the dealer made sales, which are subject to sales-tax. At that stage the obligation to pay tax
arose. The raising of a dispute in this connection before the higher authorities would be irrelevant.
The learned senior standing counsel also relied upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Mysore Tobacco Co. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner
of Income Tax, Karnataka-II, Bangalore, wherein the Karnataka High Court held that the expenditure which can be claimed as a deduction in any
assessment year should have been incurred in the relevant accounting year. The entire exercise in the computation and assessment of business
profits is to arrive at the true profits of the year which are liable to tax. The unit of assessment is the year and the receipts and expenditure which
have to be taken into account must relate to the accounting year. Therefore, if the expenditure of an earlier year is taken into account in a later
year, the true profits of the later year cannot be determined and the result would be lopsided and unreal.
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of Allahabad High Court in Saraya Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, wherein
the Allahabad High Court held that in a case where the assessee paid rent for the last ten years in a lamp sum during the current year under
consideration cannot be allowed as a deduction in that year, since the liability accrued in each of the years for which the payment was now made.
Reliance was also placed upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. S.P. Jaiswal Estates (P.) Ltd.,
wherein the Calcutta High Court held that the liability for luxury tax accrued in the earlier years cannot be deducted in a later year, since the luxury
tax was paid in a lump sum under protest as directed by the Supreme Court.
Assistance was also sought from the decision of the Supreme Court reported as Shinde Bros. vs. Dy. Commissioner, Raichur (supra) wherein
the Supreme Court held as under :
These cases establish that in order to be an excise duty, (a) the levey must be upon goods; (b) the taxable event must be the manufacture or
production of goods. Further, the levey need not be imposed at the stage of production or manufacture, but may be imposed later.
Therefore, according to the learned senior standing counsel for the Department that in the present case the liability to pay excise duty arose when
the goods were manufactured and the liability for payment of excise duty pertaining to a particular assessment year can be allowed only in that
assessment year and the earlier liability arose during the earlier years cannot be allowed in the later assessment year simply because the assessee
was contesting the levy, where the assessee followed mercantile system of accounting.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the assessee, while supporting the order passed by the Tribunal, and relying upon the
decisions cited in the order passed by the Tribunal, submitted that even before the end of the accounting year the assessee applied for licence, i.e.,
on 1st Feb., 1977 and obtained the licence before the end of the accounting year. i.e., 31st March, 1977 and it was in consequence of this licence,
the liability to pay excise duty arose and that, therefore, the assessee was entitled to claim deduction. According to the learned counsel, the liability
for Rs. 5,75,000 covered the period of manufacture. But no provision in the accounts could be made because the rate of exercise duty was not
determined. Had the rate been known to the assessee, it would have made a provision for it in the accounts in each of the years. Since the rate of
excise duty was indeterminate, having assumed finality only in the year under appeal, the liability became quantified and it was that point of time at
which the liability got quantified, that should determine the year in which the liability should be allowed as a deduction. According to the learned
counsel, the liability to pay excise duty arose when the assessee started to manufacture the excisable goods and there was a demand by the excise
department to take licence for manufacture of the goods, in pursuance of that advice, licence was taken on 1st Feb., 1977. Demand notice was
issued by the excise department demanding a sum of Rs. 5,75,000 in July, 1977. This amount represents the excise duty payable for the period
from 1973 to 1977. This was on the basis of the particulars filed by the assessee as per the requisition made by the excise department on 16th
March, 1977. The assessee was following mercantile system of accounting and the account was kept open till 31st March, 1977. Hence the
assessee made a provision for Rs. 5,75,000 demanded by the Excise Department. Therefore, the assessee made a claim for deduction of the
provision made for payment of excise duty in the asst. yr. 1977-78. As already pointed out, in order to support this line of argument, the assessee
relied upon the various decisions, which were cited in the order passed by the Tribunal.
We have heard the learned senior standing counsel appearing for the Department as well as the learned counsel appearing for the assessee.
The point for consideration is, whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the liability to pay the excise duty had accrued or not
under the statute. If, under the statute the liability had accrued merely because it had not been quantified or merely because demand notice had not
been served, it could be said that the liability had not accrued because they become irrelevant for determining accrual of liability, even though they
become relevant for the purpose of quantification and recovery of the money.
Quantification and recovery of money due under the Act should not be confused with the accrual of a liability. If under the system of
accounting the liability accrued, then the assessee is entitled to deduction. In the present case, the assessee was following the mercantile system of
accounting. The assessee in its accounts for the year ended 31st March, 1977, which is the relevant year under appeal, made a provision in its
account for a sum of Rs. 5,75,000 towards excise duty and claimed the same as a deduction. The Department disallowed the claim on the ground
that the demand from the excise department was received only in June, 1977 after the accounting year was over and consequently no demand
arose in the accounting year, which could be allowed as a deduction. According to the Department, the deduction could be allowed at the time of
the actual payment.
From 1968 the assessee is manufacturing ceramic fuse bodies used as a component in the manufacture of HRC fuse links. The excise
authorities who have made an attempt to levy excise duty on this item of manufacture, appear to have dropped the matter apparently satisfied that
the items produced are not dutiable. Again in November, 1973 the excise authorities revived their claim and demanded that the assessee should
take out a licence and pay duty on HRC fuse links. The assessee challenged this demand and it was held that fuse links were not subjected to duty
merely on the ground that they contained ceramic fuse bodies. However, in November, 1976 the assessee was advised that ceramic fuse bodies
were themselves liable to duty based upon the observation made to that effect by the High Court in The English Electric Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The
Superintendent, Central Excise and Others, . Thereafter the assessee applied for a licence and secured it on 1st Feb., 1977. On 16th March, 1977
the excise authorities required the assessee to file particulars about the number of fuse bodies manufactured and cleared since its inception with a
view to levy duty. The required particulars were furnished to the Excise authorities in June, 1977. In July, 1977 the Excise authorities demanded a
sum of Rs. 5,98,895 from the assessee, representing the duty payable for the period from 1973 to 1977 working it out on the basis of 25%. This
was later on reduced to 15%. As a consequence, the demand was revised to Rs. 3.79 lakhs. Again, as per the judgment of the High Court, the
assessee approached the appellate authority. In the appeal filed by the assessee, the appellate authority sustained the demand for one year. It is in
this background, the assessee in its account for the year ended 31st March, 1977 made a provision in its account for a sum of Rs. 5,73,000
towards excise duty and claimed the same as deduction. The Calcutta High Court in CIT vs. Century Enka Ltd. (supra), held that in all fiscal
statutes, there will be three stages; the first is a charge is created, which may also be described as declaration of liability indicating what would be
liable to taxation. The second stage is the quantification of that liability in the form of an assessment. The third stage is the recovery. Thus, in fiscal
statutes the point of taxation is on the happening or occurrence of the taxable event. Different enactments may provide different kinds of taxable
events. The Central Excise and Salt Act imposes duty on the production or manufacture of goods.
In order to appreciate the liability under central excise, it is necessary to refer to certain provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
Sec. 3 provides that there shall be levied and collected in such manner as may be prescribed duties of excise on all excisable goods, other than
salt, which are produced or manufactured in India, and a duty on salt manufactured in, or imported by land into, any part of India as, and at the
rates, set forth in the First Schedule. Rule 7, which is in Chapter III deals with levy and refund of and exemption from duty, provides for the
recovery of duty. Rule 9 of the said Rules deals with the time and manner of payment of duty. Rule 9A deals with the provisions of data for
determination of duty and tariff valuation.
The Calcutta High Court in the above cited decision ultimately came to the conclusion that the taxable event under the Central Excise and Salt
Act, 1944, is on the manufacture or production of excisable goods irrespective of or independent of future user, either in the manufacture of further
goods or in the sale of the said goods. In the case of Union of India (UOI) Vs. Delhi Cloth and General Mills, , the Supreme Court emphasized
that excise duty was on the manufacture of goods and not on the sale.
In the case of Shinde Brothers vs. Dy. CIT (supra), the Supreme Court referred to the decision of the Full Bench in the case of In Re Bill to
amend s. 20 of the Sea and Customs Act, 1878 AIR 1963 SC 1760 wherein it was observed by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court as under :
This will show that the taxable event in the case of duties of excise is the manufacture of goods and the duty is not directly on the goods, but on
the manufacture thereof.
The Supreme Court in the case of Kesoram Industries & Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. CWT (supra), while dealing with the question of what is the
meaning of debt owed, under s. 2(m) of the WT Act, 1957, referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kalwa Devadattam and
Others Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, and held that under the Indian IT Act, liability to pay Income Tax arises on the accrual of the
income, and not from the computation made by the taxing authorities in the course of assessment proceedings; it arises at a point of time not later
than the close of the year of account.
In Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. CIT (supra) the Supreme Court held that the moment a dealer might either purchase or
sell goods, which were subject to taxation, the obligation to pay the tax would arise and the liability was attracted and although that liability could
not be enforced till the quantification was effected by the assessment proceedings; the liability for payment of tax was independent of the
assessment. The Supreme Court accordingly held that in that case the assessee was entitled to deduction of the sales-tax liability in computing its
total income under the IT Act.
In CIT vs. Orient Supply Syndicate (supra) the Calcutta High Court held that it is not in all cases, correct to say that a statutory liability
discharged in a particular year became eligible for deduction in the year in question under the mercantile system of accounting. It depends on the
facts and circumstances of the case and on the statutory provisions.
In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd., the Calcutta High Court, while considering liability arising on
the basis of notice issued by the excise department, it was held that the excise duty liability arose on the basis of show cause notices issued by the
central excise department and hence the excise duty liability demanded by the notice is deductible in the assessment year under consideration when
the demand notice was issued.
In Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. India Foils Ltd., the Calcutta High Court held that the exemption from excise duty was granted by the
notification effective from 5th Jan., 1981. Accordingly, the goods manufactured and cleared prior to the said notification were liable to duty. It was
not correct to contend that since the goods were not manufactured during the relevant previous year, the assessee was not entitled to deduction of
excise duty. In this case, the show cause cum demand notice was issued during the relevant previous year and, accordingly the demand, although
earlier disputed, became real and enforceable and, therefore, the same is allowable as deduction in the previous year in question.
In Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Gujarat High Court held that ""merely because an
expense relates to a transaction of an earlier year, it does not become a liability payable in the earlier year, unless it can be said that the liability was
determined and crystallized in the year in question on the basis of maintaining accounts on the mercantile basis.
In ABAD FISHERIES Vs. COMMISSIONER OF Income Tax. (AND VICE VERSA)., , the Kerala High Court held that a provision in the
accounts made by an assessee following the mercantile system of accounting for liability to sales-tax (although disputed) is yet liable to be allowed
as business expenditure, if there is a bona fide reasonable apprehension on the part of the assessee that the amount will become payable. The
question to be considered is whether on the date on which the provisions was made in the accounts, the assessee could have had a reasonable
apprehension of the liability being cast on it.
It is clear in the present case the liability to pay central excise arises as soon as the assessee manufactured or produced the excisable items. It
could not provide for the liability in accounts because of the difficulty in ascertaining the rate of duty. Till a licence was applied on 1st Feb., 1977
there was a genuine doubt in the minds of both the assessee and the excise department as to the dutiability of the goods manufactured. It was only
when the assessee based upon the observations made by the High Court, applied to the excise authorities for a licence and when the licence was
granted, the liability to pay excise duty not only got cleared but crystallised. Therefore, till the application of the assessee for the issue of a licence
on 1st Feb., 1977, the doubts that till then existed in the minds of the Department and the assessee got cleared and the liability to pay duty on
excisable goods arose and that arising was in the accounting year, relevant for the assessment year under consideration. If the settled law is that the
liability to pay excise duty arose no sooner the excisable commodity was manufactured or produced, since the commodity in this case was
produced from 1973 onwards, the liability to pay excise duty subsisted from that date and if that were so, the liability to the earlier period could
not be allowed as a deduction in the year under consideration, but it is only a liability relating to this year under consideration. In the earlier years
the assessee started manufacturing goods right from the year 1968 and the excise authorities had examined this aspect and came to the bona fide
conclusion that these were not liable to duty. They again revived the matter some time in November, 1973 when the assessee successfully
contested. During that time as per law prevailing the assessee is not liable to excise duty. When that was the law, the assessee cannot be excepted
to have incurred a liability to pay exercise duty on the items it manufactured. But it was in November, 1976 that the assessee was advised that
since ceramic fuse bodies were themselves liable to duty and since there was an observation to that effect in the judgment of the High Court, the
assessee subjected itself to levy of duty by applying for licence and that since that event took place in February, 1977, which is the relevant year
under consideration. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the liability to pay excise duty arose only in February, 1977, even though the
manufacture was earlier to that period. In the earlier period the assessee was entertaining only a honest doubt as to the levy of duty. Since the
liability under law had accrued, consequently the assessee made a provision in the accounts and in that case the liability related to that period. The
assessee contested the liability and succeeded and, therefore, it can be said that under the law, no liability had accrued. Subsequent subjection to
levy of duty, therefore, alone can be taken as the starting point. On 1st Feb., 1977 the assessee applied for a licence. The amount of provision
made is a matter of calculation. The assessee had the advantage of knowing it correctly on the basis of subsequent events. As a matter of fact, the
claim made by the assessee now turned out to be more than the actual claim because the assessee made a provision in the accounts on the basis
that the rate of duty was 25%, which was later on reduced to 15% on which basis the demand was about Rs. 3 1/2 lakhs. It was also brought to
our notice later on that the appellate authority reduced the liability only for one year. Since the matter is proceeding on the footing that the assessee
had incurred a liability under the statute to pay excise duty and the assessee had a reasonable belief about the rate of duty, the Tribunal was of the
opinion that the assessee is entitled to the deduction for the entire sum for which provision was made in the accounts, subject to the other
provisions of the law, which could be invoked if the assessee had obtained any benefit by way of cessation or remission or otherwise in subsequent
years in respect of this provision. The Tribunal was, therefore, correct in its view that the amount of Rs. 5,75,000 was in the nature of accrued
liability in the year under consideration and, therefore, it is allowable as deduction.
The reasons given by the Tribunal for allowing Rs. 5,75,000 as deduction in the year under consideration appears to be very sound and,
therefore, we see no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal on this aspect. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the
affirmative and against the Department. No costs.