High CourtsSingle Bench(2012) 01 DEL CK 0525

Coir Board vs Harbans Kaur Sethi

Delhi High Court · Decided on 12 January 2012

HON’BLE JUDGES
Indermeet Kaur, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
R.C.R. 144 of 2010

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Judgment

5 paragraphs · 715 words

Indermeet Kaur, J.—Order impugned before this Court is the order dated 15.04.2010 vide which the application filed by the tenant M/s Coir Board (public sector undertaking) seeking leave to defend in a pending eviction petition u/s 14 (1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the ''DRCA'') filed by the landlady Harbans Kaur Sethi had been dismissed. The premises in dispute are a showroom on the back portion of property No. 16/A, 1, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi; original owner Bhai Sunder Dass, the father of the petitioner had died on 27.10.1963 and during his life time, he had executed a registered Will dated 22.01.1964 pursuant to which this property had devolved upon his wife Somawanti; Somawanti had expired on 03.10.1991; she had died intestate; registered relinquishment deeds qua the said property had been executed by the other legal heirs of Somawanti in favour of the present petitioner Harbans Kaur Kohli and as such she has become the owner of the suit premises. There is no dispute to this averment; it is admitted that the petitioner is in fact the owner of this property. Record shows that an application u/s 27 of the DRCA had also been filed by the respondent claiming the petitioner to be her tenant and as such the submission of the petitioner that he is the owner/landlord of the property is further fortified.

2.

The contention in the eviction petition is that the petitioner hails a high status in society; her husband has retired as a Colonel from the Army; he had been allocated a petrol pump by Indian Oil Company at Bhikajicama Place but due to some problem the license of the said petrol pump had been revoked and now the husband of the petitioner has no means of income; the pension which accrues in their account falls short for them for running their households needs and as such the premises which are located in a main commercial area of Delhi is required bonafide by the petitioner and her husband to run a business therefrom the disputed premises for earning the livelihood for the family.

3.

The leave to defend application merely states that the petition has been filed with a malafide intent to compel the respondent to increase the rate of rent; further contention being that no notice has been served upon the respondent before filing of the present petition which the trial Court has aptly noted that a petition u/s 14 (1)(e) does not have to be preceded with a notice.

4.

The only argument which has been urged before this Court is that the husband of the petitioner admittedly had a license which has been revoked but no steps had been taken by the landlady and her family to get that license renewed; no writ petition had been filed by the petitioner claiming the petrol pump back and this itself reflects that the need of the landlady to acquire the present premises same is not bonafide; she does not need any additional income. This submission carries no merit. Admittedly for one reason or the other, the license of the petrol pump of the husband of the landlady has since been cancelled and the income which the husband was earning from the said petrol pump is not now available to them. Premises in dispute are admittedly a showroom on Asaf Ali Road which is in the heart of Delhi and it is a viably commercial area from where the intent of the landlady and her husband to run a profitable business is substantiated. The need of the petitioner in these circumstances to claim back possession of this showroom can in no manner be said to be malafide; her bonafide stands established.

5.

No triable issue has been raised in the application for leave to defend. The tenant cannot in a routine or in a mechanical manner be granted leave to defend in proceedings u/s 14 (1)(e) of the DRCA; if the defences sought to be raised are sham, moonshine or illusory, which clearly are so in the present case, no leave to defend can be granted or should be granted. Impugned order decreeing the eviction petition and dismissing the application of the tenant seeking leave to defend in no manner suffers from any infirmity. Dismissed.