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Judgment
O R D E R
K. V. Jayakumar, J.
This Review Petition is preferred under Order XLVII Rule 1 r/w Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the judgment of this Court dated 15.07.2026 in DBA No.9/2025.
The review petitioner herein is the petitioner in DBA No.9/2025. The DBA was filed by the petitioner seeking a declaration that the petitioner is not required to obtain permission from this Court for letting out the Maidan other than for beautification/construction activities as ordered in Annexure A2 order. It is stated in the review petition that the above DBA was finally heard along with W.P.(C) Nos. 24435/2025 and 34749/2025. By a common judgment dated 15.07.2026, this Court disposed of the DBA and the connected writ petitions, permitting the petitioner to let out the Kshethra Maidan for the purposes stated in Annexures A18 and A19, subject to the restrictions and limitations.
The review petitioner has challenged the judgment dated 15.07.2026 on the following grounds:
A. The impugned judgment, to the extent it imposed restrictions and limitations on the petitioner in letting out the Maidan, is erroneous and incorrect.
B. The dictum laid down in N Prakash v. The Travancore Devaswom Board and others1 for imposing the restrictions and limitations does not apply to the facts of this case.
C. The Maidan cannot be termed as a place or premises used as a place of public religious worship so as to attract the provisions contained in the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 (for the sake of brevity, ‘the Act of 1988'). This Court failed to consider the crucial aspect that Students' Corner, Nehru Mandapam, Labour Corner and Vivekananda Square are the famous spots where historical events had taken place, and famous persons and Prime Ministers had given their speeches when they visited Thrissur City in 1952 and 1982.
D. This Court ought to have held that the provisions contained in the the Act of 1988 do not apply to the facts of this case.
E. This Court ought to have held that the dictum laid down in Sinilkumar E. K. v. Travancore Devaswom Board2, Hindu Seva Kendram v. State of Kerala and others3, Major Vellayani Devi Temple Advisory Committee v. State of Kerala4 and Vishnu Sunil (Adv.), Panthalam @ Vishnu Sunil v. Kadakkal Temple Advisory Committee Represented by its Secretary, Thiruvananthapuram5 does not apply to the facts of this case because in those cases, the activities were within the temple compound. In the present case, the venue is the Maidan, where the historic Thrissur Pooram is conducted.
F. In Annexure A9 judgment, this Court interdicted the installation of hoardings and advertisement boards in the Maidan. In the impugned judgment, no permission was granted for putting up advertisement boards and hoardings during the various programs permitted by this Court.
G. Sections 3 to 6 of Act 41 of 1988 would clearly show that the said Act cannot be made applicable to Maidan because the said Act was enacted to prevent the misuse of religious institutions for political and other purposes.
H. The finding in paragraph 54 of the impugned judgment to the effect that events and programs of all departments of the State Government cannot be permitted in the Kshethra Maidan is liable to be reviewed. Further, permission was granted to events related to the Devaswom Department without accepting any licence fee/rent is arbitrary. Maidan is given for Independence Day celebrations, school youth festivals, etc. So, if the direction in paragraph 54 is not reviewed, the petitioner has to claim fee/rent for such programmes also.
Heard.
Before we proceed with the discussion, it would be useful to extract Order XLVII Rule 1 and Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
“1.Application for review of judgment.-(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved,-
(a)by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b)by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c)by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2)A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.
Explanation. The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”
“114.Review-. Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a)by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b)by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or
(c)by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.”
In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi6, the Apex Court held as under:
” 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’.”
In Lily Thomas v. Union of India7, the Apex Court observed that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed, no further petition of review can be entertained.
In Shanti Conductors Private Limited v. Assam State Electricity Board and Others8, a bench of three Honourable Judges of the Apex Court, following Parsion Devi and Others (supra), dismissed the review petitions, holding that the scope of review is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-agitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and decided.
In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others9, the Honourable Supreme Court observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The Apex Court summarised the principles governing the maintainability of review petitions, including the circumstances in which a review petition is maintainable and those in which it is not. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below:
"20.Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i)Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii)Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii)Any other sufficient reason.
The word "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki (AIR 1922 PC 112), and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Others (1955 (1) SCR 520) to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. and Others (2013 (8) SCC 337).
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -
(i)A repetition of old and overruled arguments is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii)Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii)Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv)Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v)A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi)The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii)The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii)The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court; it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix)Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta10, while explaining the term “error apparent “ G. S. Singhvi J., speaking for the bench, observed as follows:
“22.The term “mistake or error apparent” by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently, an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.”
In the instant case, the principal contention of the review petitioner is that the statutory provisions of the Act of 1988 are not applicable to the Maidan. Section 3 of the Act prohibits the religious institutions from using any premises belonging to or under the control of the institution for the promotion or propagation of any political activity. Section 2(d) of the Act defines the term ‘political activity’, and Section 2(e) of the Act defines the term ‘political party’. Section 2(f) of the Act defines the term ‘religious institution’ as an institution for the promotion of any religion which includes any place or premises used as a place of public religious worship, by whatever name or designation known. The term ‘political activity’, as defined in Section 2(d), includes any activity promoting or propagating the aims or objects of a political party, organising meetings, demonstrations and processions.
In view of the strict prohibition of political activity in Section 3 of the Act and on going through the definitions of the terms ‘political activity’ and ‘religious institution’, we are unable to accept the contentions of the learned counsel for the review petitioner that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the Thekkinkadu Maidan.
Another contention advanced by the learned counsel for the review petitioner is that several historical events have taken place in the Maidan and that eminent dignitaries, including Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers, have addressed public gatherings at various locations within the Maidan, such as the Students' Corner and Nehru Mandapam, during their visits to Thrissur City. In this regard, it is clarified that this Court has neither interdicted nor intended to restrict visits by such dignitaries or the delivery of public addresses by them at the Maidan. The observations and directions issued in the judgment under review cannot, therefore, be construed as imposing any such prohibition or restriction.
We had only issued a general guideline that the places of religious worship shall be kept in a serene and tranquil manner, free from any political activities, protests and demonstrations, in tune with the provisions of the Act of 1988. It is for the Board to exercise its discretion and take a decision in such matters.
Another submission of the learned counsel for the review petitioner is that in Annexure A9 judgment, this Court interdicted the installation of hoardings and advertisement boards in the Maidan. No permission was granted for putting up advertisement boards and hoardings during the various programmes permitted by this Court.
In Annexure A9 judgment, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, by referring to the judgment in Satheesh v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others11 observed that the Board shall ensure that no hoardings, advertisement boards etc., or any temporary structures are erected on the right of way or pedestrian facilities of the public roads around the premises of the temple under its management, in connection with annual festivals or other religious ceremonies. On this point, we direct the Board to prepare a detailed protocol with regard to the putting up of hoardings and advertisement boards, in the interest of the deity and devotees and to comply with it scrupulously.
Another challenge raised by the learned counsel for the review petitioner is that this Court has interdicted the programmes of the other Departments of the State Government and the same is liable to be reviewed. Further, it is submitted that the grant of permission to all events related to the Devaswom Department without accepting any licence fee is arbitrary. It is also submitted that the Maidan is given for Independence Day celebrations, School Youth Festivals, etc. According to the learned counsel for the review petitioner, if paragraph No. 54 of the judgment under review is not reviewed, the petitioner will be forced to claim rent even for such programmes.
We are of the view that the above assertions are misconceived. We have not interdicted the programmes or events organised by the other Departments; likewise, we have not interdicted the conduct of events like Independence Day celebrations, School Youth Festivals, etc. We have issued a general guideline to the Cochin Devaswom Board that the financial aspects should also be considered while granting permissions to other Departments to conduct events in the Thekkinkadu Maidan. The Board may exercise its discretion on all these matters in a prudent manner, protecting the interests of the deity and the devotees.
The review petition is disposed of with the above directions.