C.N. Nambudiri vs Edwin Israel

Ramamurti, J.—This revision petition arises out of the proceedings initiated under S. 10 (3) (c) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (18 of 1960) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the ground that the landlord required the shops in occupation of the tenant as additional accommodation for the business which the landlord was carrying on. The landlord is the owner of the building which contains three shops and in the occupation of some tenants. The landlord is carrying on business in the sale and repair of watches, and he was a tenant under one Gomathi Ammal, opposite to the premises in question. This Gomathi Ammal appears to have filed a suit, obtained a decree for eviction of the landlord and therefore the landlord was obliged to vacate the premises. Hence, the landlord filed a petition, for obtaining possession of the shops in question.

From the record, it appears that, before the petition was disposed of by the Rent Controller, the landlord had obtained possession of one of the shops from the tenant thereof. Naturally this was relied on by the tenant (petitioner here) as a strong circumstance to resist the application of the landlord that the landlord having obtained possession of one shop could not claim that he required the other two shops for additional accommodation for his business.

The tenant was also sought to be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent, and, on that question, all the Courts have found against the landlord, and, therefore, no reference need be made to that portion of the case.

The Rent Controller, the appellate authority and the learned District Judge in revision held that the business activities of the respondent were such that he undoubtedly required all the three shops for his requirements. It is sufficient to refer to paragraph 7 of the order of the learned District Judge, as it contains all the details and discussion of the relevant facts. In his judgment, the learned District Judge has adverted to the important fact that the building is an old one, that there are cracks in the walls of the shops requiring immediate attention and repair, and that the landlord cannot carry out the repairs, unless he obtained possession of all the three shops. This is a pure question of fact, and no ground whatsoever has been made out for interference under S. 115, C.P.C. when all the authorities have found against the tenant on this portion of the case.

Mr. Subramania Iyer, Learned Counsel for petitioner, urged, before me that this case is governed by proviso to S. 10 (3) (c) of the Act, that the tenant could be evicted only if, under the proviso, the authorities found that, on a consideration of the relative hardship and advantage, the hardship that would be suffered by the landlord would outweigh the inconvenience and hardship that the tenant might be put to. It is true that there is no no specific reference to this proviso ; but, on a reading of the order of the Rent Controller and the District Judge, I am satisfied that the authorities below had undoubtedly in their mind the proviso to S. 10 (3) (c) and it was only after being satisfied that the hardship that would be caused to the landlord would outweigh the hardship of the tenant, that the claim of the landlord for eviction was uphold. In this connection, I may mention that this point based on the proviso to S. 10 (3) (c) was not raised in the Courts below.

In the course of the arguments, Learned Counsel for the petitioner relying on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Mangilal v. Suganchand AIR 1965 S.C. 101 contended that, as no notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was given to him, the proceeding for eviction was misconceived and liable to be dismissed in limine. He also drew my attention to the order of Srinivasan J. in W.P. 1124 of 1963, in which the learned Judge has expressed an opinion that this point which was also raised therein is an important point of law requiring consideration by a Full Bench of this Court. But, as this point was not raised in the Courts below nor even in the grounds of revision, I am not inclined to allow Learned Counsel to raise the same at this belated stage. It is a matter for consideration whether the decision of the Supreme Court would apply to a proceeding under the Rent Control Act and not a suit in enactment and whether it would apply to a proceeding for eviction when it is not based upon default in the payment of arrears of rent but upon other grounds of eviction provided under the statute. The question as to how far the decision of the Supreme Court referred to earlier which turned upon the peculiar provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Rent Control Act would apply to proceeding (not a suit) under the Rent Control Act requires careful investigation, in the light of the view taken by the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype and Others Vs. Aba Maruti Mali and Others, and Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das (1962) 2 M.L.J. 161 S.C. It is unnecessary to refer to this aspect of the matter in detail, as I am not allowing Learned Counsel to raise that point in this revision petition. The revision petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. The tenant shall have time to vacate till 10th October 1965. If the tenant does not vacate and hand over possession to the landlord within the time mentioned, the landlord will be entitled to vacate the tenant by taking execution proceedings.