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Judgment
Heard Mr. Chiragkumar Upadhyay, learned Asst. Government Pleader for the applicants.
At the outset, Mr. Upadhyay, learned AGP, would tender the draft amendment. The draft amendment is taken on record and it is hereby allowed. The necessary amendment shall be carried out by the applicants forthwith.
This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act, 1963’) seeking condonation of delay of 1093 days in filing the Second Appeal by the State and Range Forest Officer of Dantiwada, State of Gujarat.
Mr. Upadhyay, learned AGP would submit that there is no intentional or mala fide delay on the part of the applicants not to file an appeal within stipulated time, but due to administrative exigency and the procedure set out by the State before filing an appeal, which caused delay in filing the second appeal.
It is submitted that the applicants have explained the delay in a satisfactory manner and due to involvement of various authorities who were required to take appropriate decision before filing an appeal, the delay occurred in filing the appeal, which may be condoned by this Court by exercising its powers under Section 5 of the Act,1963.
Mr. Upadhyay, learned AGP would further submit that by imposing reasonable cost upon the applicants, whereby the other side can be compensated, this Court may condone the delay in filing the appeal, failing which the meritorious matter of the State may not be decided on its own merits.
Making above submissions, learned AGP would request this Court to admit and allow this delay application.
No other and further submissions being made by learned AGP.
Having heard learned AGP and upon perusal of the delay application, it appears that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court on 19.04.2023, whereas the Second Appeal appears to have been filed on 15.07.2026, whereby there was a delay of 1093 days in filing the second appeal. After going through the delay application, it appears that it is a case of a sheer carelessness and lackadaisical approach on the part of the Government Officials who did not take appropriate decision for quite long time, as they moved the file from one office to another, which ultimately resulted into gross delay in filing the Second Appeal.
As can be seen from paragraph-7 of the application, the Deputy Conservator of Forest, Wildlife, Banaskantha, vide letter dated 21.08.2023, recommended to the Conservator of Forest, Wildlife, Gandhinagar Circle, State of Gujarat, to file an appeal in the matter. In paragraph-8, it was stated that Chief Conservator of Forest, Wildlife, Gandhinagar, vide his letter dated 12.02.2025, has remanded back the recommendation and requested the concerned Officer to correct the recommendation. There is no explanation forthcoming from the side of the applicants as to what happened between 21.08.2023 and 12.02.2025. There was a substantial delay on the part of the Chief Conservator of Forest, Gandhinagar to take the said decision, which he could have easily taken in no time if he found that recommendation sent by his sub-ordinate officer was not in proper format. In no case, the Chief Conservator could have sit tight over the proposal for more than 1 ½ year from its receipt.
Moreover, rest of the paragraphs would indicate that due to administrative procedure, lots of time consumed which could have been easily avoided if the applicants were seriously thinking to challenge the impugned judgment and decree by way of second appeal. The approach of the applicants to file the appeal after substantial delay would not inspire any confidence at least to this Court that there was a bona fide delay on the part of the applicants to approach this Court by way of Second Appeal; rather, upon perusal of the delay application, it shows gross negligence and inordinate delay on the part of the applicants to file the Second Appeal.
It is now well settled position of law that the delay occurred due to administrative contingency and / or approval to be obtained from the higher authority cannot not be a ground to condone the delay unless it has been shown that there is a justifiable cause on the part of the higher officials who could not take appropriate decision within reasonable time. Nothing has been brought to the notice of this Court in this regard.
At this stage, it is apposite to refer to and to rely upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in 2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:
“10.There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a Court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that the words ‘sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:
“21.1.(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2.(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.
21.3.(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4.(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6.(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7.(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8.(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is also profitable to refer to and to rely upon ratio of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 : 2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after referring to its previous decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of limitation vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of "sufficient cause". It has been so observed and held as under:
"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i)Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii)A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii)The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv)In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v)Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi)Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii)Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii)Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied)
It is also not out of place to rely upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of case of Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81, wherein it is held as under:-
“15.The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Even, in last year as well, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (DEAD) By Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. reported In 2025 INSC 1104, in clear terms held that where there is delay/laches on the part of the applicant in not prosecuting the legal remedy, in the absence of any sufficient cause made out by the applicant, the Court should not condone the delay while exercising its power under Section 5 of the Act. In the case of Shivamma (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: -
“258.The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.”
(emphasis supplied)
According to my considered view, the aforementioned exposition of law applied with full force to the application for condonation of delay filed by the State and or its instrumentality, as everyone is equal before the court of law. This Court, being Constitutional Court, a protector of fundamental rights, cannot permit violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and shall, under no circumstances, treat these applicants differently than other applicants (whether natural or juristic person). The applicants must understand that with the advancement of technology, movement of files between the offices can be significantly expedited. Furthermore, the legal advisor available in every department of the State apart from the Government Pleader’s office in every district, unnecessary delays in decision making can surely be reduced by the higher officials, who ordinarily base their decision on legal advice.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and having not found explained the delay in a satisfactory manner, and as such, there is no explanation for the period of delay between 21.08.2023 to 12.02.2025, I am of the considered view that no sufficient cause is made out by the applicants in this application and as such, the gross and inordinate delay of 1093 days in filing the Second Appeal cannot be condoned by this Court even by imposing any condition upon the applicants, including costs. It is needless to say that as per settled law, the merits of the matter should not be considered by this Court while adjudicating the application for condonation of delay.
Thus, for the foregoing discussion and reasons, I don't find any merit in this application. Accordingly, it is hereby rejected. No order as to cost.
Registry shall refuse the registration of the Second Appeal and Civil Application for stay, if any.