Chittoori Rangavalli Tayaramma and Another vs The Revenue divisional Officer Guntur and Another

Viswanatha sastri, J.—In Writ Petition No. 127 of 1956 the Chairman of the Guntur Municipality applies for a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the proceedings of the meeting of the Municipal Council, Gunitur, dated 17th February, 195G, at which a motion.

expressing want of confidence in the Chairman was carried with the support of the three-hfths o.i5 the sanctioned strength of the council. The two Respondents to the petition are respectively the Revenue Divisional Officer, Guntur and the State of Andhra. The facts are not in dispute-The sanctioned strength of the Municipal Council, Guntur is 35. in pursuance of a notice of a motion of no-confidence to be moved against the Chairman given by 23 members of the council on 26th December, 1955, the revenue Divisional Officer, the first Respondent herein, convened a meeting of the council Section of the motion on 20th Janum A. M., at the municipal council 1 January, 1956,the Petitioner for of 1950 on fix'' file of the Vis! r ha. i Cunlur again the first iv-spool alia for an injunction restraining the meeting on 20th January, 1556.

An interlocutory application 1. A of 1956,for a temporary injunction filed along with theplaint. On leih .herniary, 1950, the District Muusi C passed an ex prate estraining the first Respondent from holding a meeting of the municipal council on 29th January, 1956, as notified by him. Tin: order of injunction was served on the first Respondent on 20th January, 1956. By reason of the temporary injunction, the first Respondent was unable to hold the meeting on 20th January, 1950, at 11 A. M. and he recorded this fact in the minutes book and adjourned the mooting to the February, 1950, subject to the order of the Court. I. A.. No. 197 of 1956 was con by the first Respondent and on 7th February 56, the Court vacated the temporary injunci granted on 19th January, 1954.

Oat of the several grounds ugerd in the petition, the only one relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner at the hearing was 1''or-mulatnl in para 4 (ii) of the petition as follows:

The Revenue Divisional Oilieor could not have acted on the previous requisition given for the meeting to he held on 20ih J a unary, 1956. The meeting fixed for 20th January, 1956, not having been adjourned for the reason mentioned in Section 40-A (4) and (5), a fresh requisition is necessary to move a resolution expressing want of confidence. The Revenue Divisional Officer acted illegally in calling for the meeting basing on the old requisition. The old requisition has become ineffective as the meeting could not be held on 20th January, 1956. If the meeting was not gone through on 20th January, 1956, for the reason mentioned in Section 40-A (4) and (5), no fresh requisition would be necessary.

It is not a case of the Revenue Divisional Officer being unable to preside at the meeting, but is a case of the Revenue Divisional Officer being restrained by Court from holding the'' meeting which is not contemplated by section ''40-A (4) and (5). In this view of the matter as a fresh requisition was not given by the councillors, the Revenue Divisional Officer acted illegally in fixing a meeting and all the proceedings of the meeting held on 17th February, 1956, are illegal and must be set aside.

It was argued that the meeting fixed. for 20til January, 1956, could not be held by reason of the injunction order passed by the District. Mini and not on account of any personal disability, infirmity or incapacity of the first respond, and that the meeting lied for 20th January, 1556,''had nut been properly or legally adjourned u/s 40-A (5) of the Act. It was also pointed out that as the meeting convened for 20th January, 1956, had not been held there court not have been any adjournment of such a meeting, ft was further urged that the first Respondent had recorded no reason for the adjournment u/s 40A and therefore the meeting fixed for 20th January, 1956, could not be regarded as legally adjourned.

This is an incorrect statement because the minutes recorded by the first Respondent clearly show that he was unable to hold the meeting at 11 A. M. on 20th January, 1956, on account of the injunction order passed by the District Munsif, Guntur, in I. A. No. 197 of 1950 in O. S. No. 39 of 1956 on 19th January, 1956 and served on the first Respondent on 20th January, 1950. Again it was suggested that even if the meeting had been held on 20th January, 1956, it is possible that there might not have been a quorum and if that were so, the meeting could not have adjourned in view of Section 40-A(6). This is pure speculation not based on any facts or evidence.

It was urged that the meeting fixed for 20th January, 1950, should be regarded as having been cancelled and a motion of no-confidence in the Chairman could not have been passed except at a fresh meeting duly convened after the notice required by/under Section 40-A (3) of the Act had been given and after the expiry of 6 months as provided by Section 40-A (13). It was contended that the proceedings of the meeting of the Municipal Council, dated 17th February, 1956, wore illegal arcl deserved to be quashed. For the Respondent it was argued that the proceedings were all conducted according to law and that the action of the first Respondent in sending of a copy of the minutes of the meeting, dated 17th February, 1956, together with a copy of the motion and the result of the voting thereon, to the Government as required by Section 40-A (10) of the Act, was administerial act which could not be quashed by certiorari.

There is no substance in the contentions of the Petitioner. In the case of meetings of share-holders of a company it has been held that an adjournment meeting might be regarded as a continuation of the original meeting and that where a meeting of shareholders held for the purpose of confirming a special resolution was adjourned for bona fide reasons to a date more than a month from the date of the meeting at which the extraordinary resolution was passed and the resolution was confirmed at the adjourn ed meeting, it was a valid resolution. Neuschild V. British Equatorial Oil Co. 1925 Ch. 346 (A). Several pages of Maxwell''s Interpretation of Statutes were read to impress upon us the duty of construing words and phrases used in enactments according to their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise, in their ordinary meaning. Reference was made to Law Lexicons and Dictionaries for an elucidation of the meaning of the words ''meeting'' and ''adjournment.'' In our opinion, the language of Section 40-A is not only plain but admits of only one meaning.

5.Meet'' in its intransitive sense, is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as follows:

Of the members of a more or less organized body, a society or regular assembly: To assemble for purposes of conference, business, worship or the .like. Often with cellulite noun as subject.

Meeting is defined as the action of coming together from opposite or separate directions into one place or into the presence of each other of assembling for the transaction of business". Section 40-A of the Act refers to the several stages of convening, adjourning, commencing, holding and concluding a meeting. The word ''meeting'' has to be interpreted in the context in which it occurs in Section 40-A. The convening of a meeting u/s 40-A (3) means only fixing a date and place for the meeting in advance.

It is not the same thing as the holding of as meeting. Section 40-A (7) refers to the commencement of the meeting which refer to a stage when the meeting enters upon the transaction of the business for which it was convened. In between Section 40-A (3) and (7) are found Section 40-A (4) to (G) dealing with adjournment of the meeting. An adjournment of the meeting is prohibited u/s 40-A (0) except for the reasons stated in Section 40-A (4) and (5). u/s 40-A (5), which is now relevant, it is the Revenue Divisional Officer alone that is empowered to adjourn the meeting and the councillors have no voice.

A meeting might have been convened but may not be held and u/s 40-A (5) the Revenue Divisional Officer is empowered to adjourn the meeting if he is unable to preside at the meeting. The adjournment contemplated by Section 40-A (5) refers to a stage before the meeting i.s held, for a meeting u/s 40-A could be held only under the presidency of the Revenue Divisional Officer who is ex hypothesi unabie to preside. Convening, adjourning, holding and concluding a meeting are four different and successive stages in the procedure prescribed by Section 40-A. The Revenue Divisional Officer must preside at a meeting if it is held but if he is unable to preside, he is empowered to adjourn the meeting to another date.

In that event, the meeting is not held but postponed. Section 40-A is a special and self-contained statutory provision for dealing with an extraordinary situation arising in the course of Municipal administration and the normal procedure prescribed by Schedule ITT of the Rules for the conduct of meetings of the Municipal Council is wholly superseded. The Revenue Divisional Officer who is a stranger and not a member of the council is to preside a meeting of the council convened u/s 40A. The power to convene the meeting is vested in him The power of adjourning a meeting which normally vests in the assembly is taken away and vested in him and that too under limitations.

Once the meeting commences its business under the presidency of the Revenue Divisional Officer it cannot be adjourned. In these circumstances it is no use calling in aid the analogy of meeting of shareholders of companies. In the context of Section 40-A (5) adjournment precedes the holding of the meeting and the general rule that a meeting cannot be adjourned before it is commenced or held cannot be applied in construing the section. It was pointed out by Mellor, J., in Fitzgerald''s Case (1869) 5 QBD 1 at p. 10 (B), that the word ''adjourn'' must be construed with reference to the object of the enquiry and with reference to the object of the context and that in the particular case the word ''adjourn'' should be taken as used in the popular sense of deferring or postponing the inquiry to a iuturo day.

The further contention of the Petitioner is that the adjournment of the meeting by the first Respondent on 20th January, 1956, was illegal because it could not be said that he was unable to preside at the meeting on that day. It was said that he was present at spot and had not been incapacitated by illness or other physical impediment from presiding. It was also'' argued that toe inability to preside should be due to a cause personal to the Revenue Divisional Officer and not to a restriction superimposed by any outside authority.

It was seriously argued that though the first Respondent was prevented from holding the meeting by an injunction issued by the Court a few hours prior to the meeting at the instance oil the Petitioner, and though he would have exposed himself to severe penalties if he had disobeyed the order of Court, still it was not a case of; his being ''unable to preside at the meeting within the meaning of Section 40A (5). The words of Section 40-A (5) are quite general and would apply to a case where the Revenue Divisional Officer is prevented from holding the meeting by a Prohibitory Order issued by a Court.

Reference was made to The Queen v. White (1867) 5 QBD 557 (C), where the words ''dead, absent or otherwise incapable of acting'' occurring in Section 36 of 5 and 6 William 4 Ch. 76 fell to be construed. Far from supporting the contention of the Petitioner, the case decided that the words ''incapable of acting'' were not confined to incapacity of acting analogous to death or absence, which no doubt were physical objections, but extended to legal objections rendering a person incapable of acting. The words ''incapable of acting'' in spite of the setting in which they were found, were not confined to in-j capacity of a physical character but were const trued so as to include legal incapacity. The position here is the same.

For these reasons, it must be held that the proceedings of the meeting of the Municipal Council held on 17th February, 1956, were regular and valid, that the motion of no-confidence in the chairman was duly carried by the requisite majority of the council and the first Respondent very properly carried out his statutory duty in forwarding to the Government a copy of the minutes of the meeting together with a copy of the motion and the result of the voting thereon.

In this view, we need not consider at length the point raised on behalf of the Respondents that this is not a ease where a writ of certiorari can issue. It has been held that the act of a Presiding Officer at an election in declaring the result of the poll is purely a ministerial or administrative act in respect of which certiorari cannot be granted, PrUoaard v. Mayor of Bancor (1838) 13 AC 2-11 (D). Veakala Nara-simha Rao v. Municipal Council Narasavaoact 60 MLJ 2 : AIR 1931 Had (15). Hera the first Respondent merely preside d at the meeting of the council held on laeary, 1956, without a right of voting or syaa Aiae a act forwarded to lac Govs, raiment the. of the medaling logoiaar with a con y of the esurience motion arid live result of the deg.

In so doing he did not pea a was Appellant or quasi-jiu''uaal formation but a a Ay acted in a inquisitor adminiseltty. There is also the other recalls for celiac the .'' claimer the couiifil e.ouve.aod for:t0ii being hold by applying for anc1 umbrae an exporter temporary injunction from Dr. ; Munsif''s Court on 10th January, IfKiG, restraining the first Respondent from holding the meagre The order-was served on the first laa-vioaA at. en 20th January, 1950, a short while before the hour fixed for the meeting.

The suit and application wore so timed as to enable the- Petitioner to get aca parte order at the last hour sopping the me that was Court vacated the interim injunction when it was appraised of the correct facts by the first Respondent. The Petitioner is rciyjeg on the incase created by the temporary injunction obtained by him without proper grounds al the last mo-i merit, for nullifying the proceedings of the adjourned meeting of. the eoue-ai. In Saigram Singh v. Ideational Tribune Aolaa, 5 SC.T 4:JI: ((5) AIR 1955 SC 45) Vivian Boso, J., delivering the judgment of lbs Supreme Court, regarded the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution as ''purely discretionary'' and observed that unless substantial injustice has ensued, the High Court should not entertain writ petitions in cases revealing ''mere errors of law which do not occasion injustice in a broad and general sense.'''' The Petitioner who has evidently forfeited the confidence of a large majority of the councillors tried to prevent the mooting of the council for considering a motion of no-confidence by an injunction suit and having failed in his attempt, is now seeking to nullify the effect of the no-confidence motion carried at a meeting of the council by the votes of three-fifths of the sanctioned strength of the council. There are no merits, legal or otherwise, in the petition which is dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 250. W. P. No. 68 of 1956.

The Petitioner is the Vice Chairman of the Municipal Council, Guntur against whom a motion of no-confidence was carried by the. requisite majority at a meeting of the council held on 20th January, 1950, under the vjroddency of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Cuolur, the first Respondent in the. petition, the second Respondent being the State of Andbra. The Petitioner prays for a writ of centenary. or oilier appropriate order quashing the proceeding of the meeting of the ''Municipal Comic), dated 20th January, 1956, At the hearing of the petition learned Counsel for the Petitioner expressed his inability to support any of the grounds on which the petition is founded. have we also looked into the records and find no error of law in the proceedings sought to be quashed. The petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100.