High CourtsDivision Bench(1930) 10 MAD CK 0006

Chinnan and Others vs Ranjithammal

Madras High Court · Decided on 22 October 1930 · Citation: AIR 1931 Mad 216 : (1931) ILR (Mad) 554 : (1931) 33 LW 455 : (1931) 60 MLJ 709

HON’BLE JUDGES
Curgenven, J

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Judgment

38 paragraphs · 899 words

Curgenven, J.—In the suit out of which this appeal arises the plaintiff, as owner of land--a claim not now disputed--sued to eject the

defendants from a portion of it. Her case was that one Poonjolai had served her predecessor-in-title as waterman, and had been permitted to put

up a hut and live on a small portion of the land. The defendants are relatives of Poonjolai, and have succeeded him in occupation of the suit site,

and have moreover, according to the plaintiff, encroached upon a further area. There are thus two questions arising for decision:

(1) Can the plaintiff eject the defendants from the site which Poonjolai was allowed to occupy?

(2) Can she eject them from the area encroached upon?

2.

It is agreed that Poonjolai was allowed to occupy the site as a licensee, Since the license was granted the property has changed hands, the

plaintiff''s mother purchasing it from the Administrator-General in 1902 and settling it upon her daughter, the plaintiff, in 1922. It ft not very easy to

decide what is the effect upon a license in India of a transfer of ownership. u/s 59 of the Easements Act,

When the grantor of the license transfers the property affected thereby, the transferee is not as such bound by the license.

and u/s 62 a license is deemed to be revoked

(a) When, from a cause preceding the grant of it, the grantor ceases to have any interest in the property affected by the license.

3.

These provisions do not in terms lay down that a license is revoked by a conveyance of the property. On the other hand, the English Law, which

undoubtedly forms the basis of the Indian Statute, seems clear that the license terminates. ""If a man gives a license and then parts with the property

over which the privilege is to be exercised,"" says Pollock, C.B., in Coleman v. Foster (1856) 1 H. & N. 36 : 156 E.R. 1108, ""the license is gone.

A license is a thing so evanescent that it cannot be transferred."" The same view is to be found expressed in Wallis v. Harrison (1838) 4 M. & W.

539 : 150 E.R. 1543. There can be no doubt that the transferee is not bound by the license. But does the licensee, from the moment the transfer

takes place, become a mere trespasser, or should he be considered until the contrary appears, to hold under an implied license? We do not think

that it will become necessary in this case to decide that point, because, if the information given to us is correct (no evidence was taken), Poonjolai

died in or about 1904. and there seems no doubt that the license expired with his death. The learned City Civil Judge seems to be in error in

holding that the defendants came in as licensees, if by that he means that, after Poonjolai died, the license was (renewed) in their favour. Nor do

we think, that the license granted to Poonjolai became vested in them as his successors. A license is not annexed to the property in respect of

which it is enjoyed, nor is it a transferable or heritable right, but is a right purely personal between grantor and licensee. Unless a different intention

appears, it cannot even be exercised by the licensee''s servants or agents (S. 56). Accordingly in their occupation of the plot, and especially so

since the death of Poonjolai, the ""defendants have been mere trespassers. We have been invited to hold, on the analogy afforded by a Bombay

decision, Krishnaji Ramachandra v. Antaji Panduranga ILR (1893) B. 256 that the occupation was permissive and not adverse. That case related

to the successors to a , life-tenant deceased, and it was held that the occupation was of that character unless and until an adverse title was

expressly set up. But in two later Bombay cases, Kantheppa v. Sheshappa ILR (1897) B. 893 and Chandri v. Daji Bhau ILR (1900) B. 504, it

has been held that the possession of a tenant holding over is wrongful, and time begins to run against the landlord under Article 139 of the

Limitation Act as soon as the term of the lease expires--a view which is not easily reconcilable with the position that the occupation of tenant''s

successors is to be deemed permissive. We need not however look further for authority than to Vedapalli Narasimham v. Dronamraju

Seetharamamurthy ILR (1907) Mad. 163 : 18 M.LJ. 26 for the proposition that the representatives of a tenant on sufferance are mere trespassers,

since they cannot be regarded as succeeding to any interest in the tenancy; and what is true of a tenant on sufferance would seem to be true also of

a licensee. We think therefore that at least from the date of Poonjolai''s death the possession of the defendants became adverse to the owner of the

property. It will now be for the Lower Court to decide upon evidence whether the claim to that portion of the site is barred.

4.

With regard to the area said to have been encroached upon--a matter not dealt with at all by the Court below--it will be for decision whether

the plaintiff''s suit is within time.

5.

For trial of these questions, allowing the appeal and setting aside the decree, we remand the suit to the Lower Court. Costs to abide the event.