Chhote Lal vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Others

Anil Kumar, J.—The petitioner has challenged his order of dismissal dated 24th October, 2007 and rejection of his appeal dated 8th February, 2008 pursuant to the departmental inquiry on the allegation that he had demanded and accepted an amount of Rs. 45,000/- as consideration for securing the appointment of another person in the Government job and which were challenged by him in its original application No. 301/2009 titled as Chhote Lal v. Govt. of NCTD, which was dismissed by order dated 12th February, 2009.

The petitioner was working as head constable in Delhi Police and the departmental proceedings were initiated against him for demanding and accepting an amount of Rs. 45,000/- for securing the appointment of another person in a Govt. department.

We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. The counsel for the respondent has appeared on an advance notice. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has referred to testimonies of PW-2, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 and has contended that the charges are not made out against the petitioner on the basis of statement of the said witnesses. The Tribunal has considered the testimonies of these witnesses and has held that the evidence against the petitioner is in abundance to show his guilt. In any case, in exercise of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal was not to re-appreciate the entire evidence and only has to consider whether the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in accordance with the Rules and Regulations and the adequate opportunity was given to the petitioner and there had not been violation of principal of natural justice.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to establish that it is a case of no evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence is not to be gone into by this Court in any case. Perusing the statement of PW-1 to PW-6 it is apparent that there are no grounds to differ with the findings of the Tribunal that the evidence against the petitioner is sufficient and in abundance.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner is also unable to show that the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are based on surmises and conjectures. Considering the testimonies of the witnesses as is reflected from the inquiry report, the same cannot be rejected merely on the ground that the persecution witnesses were related to the complainant. The fact that the wife of the petitioner had returned only Rs. 17,000/-has not been specifically denied and therefore, on the preponderance of probabilities, it cannot be held that there sufficient evidence is lacking against the petitioner.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to make out any perversity in the findings of the Disciplinary Authorities. In the facts and circumstances and there are no grounds to rely on the testimony of the defense witnesses and reject the testimonies of prosecution witnesses.

The Tribunal has referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) Vs. Parma Nanda, ; B.C. Chaturvedi v. UOI 1985 (6) SCC 743 and Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Others Vs. P.C. Kakkar, to buttress the pleas that the Tribunal should not have interfered with the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authorities, if the conclusions of the Inquiry Officers and the competent authority were based on evidence. The Tribunal while exercising the power of judicial review should not normally substitute its own conclusion of penalty and impose penalty other than what is imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.

The learned Counsel for the petitioner had also contended that in the facts and circumstances, departmental proceedings ought not to have been initiated by the respondents as only the criminal case could be registered against the petitioner. The plea of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not sustainable as Rule 15(2) of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules empowers the authorities either to initiate the departmental inquiry or to get a criminal case registered.

The learned Counsel is unable to show any cogent ground why the departmental proceedings could not be initiated against the petitioner in the present facts and circumstances. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any ground to interfere with the order of the Tribunal dated 12th February, 2009. There are no such illegalities or irregularities in the order of the Tribunal which will require interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

The writ petition is without any merit and it is therefore dismissed.