AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with the consent of the parties.
The petitioner who is Sarpanch of Grampanchayat challenges the order dated 07.01.2026 passed by the Chief Executive Officer of respondent No.3, to the extent of appointing the Administrator, thereby removing her and further challenges the Notification dated 31.12.2025 directing bifurcation of Rahalpatti Tanda and Banwadi Tanda
Heard learned Advocate for the petitioner, learned AGP for the State and learned Advocate for the respondents.
By relying on Section 4 (2) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayat Act, 1959 (for short, ‘the said Act’), learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that there is no effective consultation with the Panchayat before issuing the impugned notification of bifurcation. Therefore, by relying on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Village Panchayat, Dharna Wadhona, Buzruk and Ors. vs. Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur and Ors. reported in 1967 Mh.L.J.354, he submits that the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set-aside.
Learned AGP and learned Advocates representing the respondents submit that, the Grampanchayat has passed the resolution of bifurcation by majority and the petitioner is a signatory to the said resolution. By relying on the decision of this Court in Sheshrao Bhaurao Jadhav vs. Commissioner, Aurangabad Division Aurangabad and others reported in 1982 Mah LJ 787 (FB), they submit that the decision relied upon by the petitioner is no more a good law, as the Full-Bench has differed with the said decision. They submit that appropriate procedure is followed before bifurcating the village Rahalpatti Tanda and Banwadi Tanda. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner.
Perusal of the record indicates that before bifurcating the village Panchayat of Rahalpatti Tanda and Banwadi Tanda, the prescribed procedure is followed. The same is reflected in the report submitted by the Chief Executive Officer, wherein it is categorically stated that, as per the Government Resolution dated 12.02.2004, if a separate Grampanchayat is to be established, the said village should have a revenue status. Its population must be minimum 2000 and only in exceptional cases (for example, Tribal and Tanda or where the distance between two villages is more than 3 kms.), the minimum population should be 1000. There is 8 kms. distance between Rahalpatti Tanda and Banwadi Tanda. For their daily needs and other Government-related works the villagers of Banwadi Tanda have to approach Rahalpatti Tanda, which is at a considerable distance. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a new Grampanchayat at Banwadi Tanda. It is further stated that all the criteria laid down by the Government for bifurcation of the villages and for establishment of a new Grampanchayat are fulfilled in the present case.
It is a matter of record that the Gramsabha has passed a resolution by a majority of 61:32 in favour of creation of a separate Grampanchayat. The petitioner has signed the said resolution as Sarpanch. Resolution is also signed by the Village Panchayat Officer and the Block Development Officer. Thus, the prescribed procedure for bifurcation is scrupulously followed. Since, Gramsabha has passed a resolution in support of the bifurcation and for creation of a new Grampanchayat, we find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that even the member is to be separately consulted.
The Full-Bench in Sheshrao Bhaurao Jadhav (supra) has made following pertinent observations :
“15.The third contention of Mr. Bora also appears to be equally misconceived though finds support in the ratio of Dharna's case AIR1967Bom447 (supra). It is true that the member lose the status of an elected member and rights and privileges flowing therefrom, when they are required to vacate the office on the separation and virtual dissolution of the Panchayat. Their claim to be heard before being required to face such a loss and the adverse effects, if considered in isolation, is attractively plausible, as denial thereof apparently smacks of the breach of rules of natural Justice. Validity of such a claim, however, has to be weighed and evaluated by reference to their relative importance under the overall set up of the Act and its governing object. In the first place, action under Section 4 of the Act is essentially of an administrative and not of an adjudicative nature. Contemplated consultation is aimed at ascertaining the representative opinion of the people as far as possible. This is the practical substitute for the principles of natural justice on the possible limited scale. Secondly, all the members of then Panchayat get on opportunity to have their say when the proposal is discussed at its meeting before the resolution is passed. Members elected thereafter must be deemed to be aware of such previous decisions, and to have accepted the office with its implications and possible consequences. They cannot complain of any adverse effect if the same flow naturally from such previous decisions. Thirdly, such individual interests of the members have always to yield to the overall interests of the Panchayat in the event of any conflict between them. Fourthly, the requirement of vacating office and consequential loss of status and benefits cannot be held to be adverse when such dissolution of the Panchayat or separation, flows from its legally effective decision and out of their own acts of commission or omission. Continuance of such membership is incompatible with the required dissolution of the Panchayat on exclusion or inclusion of any local areas. The members cannot claim any independent right against such dissolution, separation or merger, if the decision is arrived at in accordance with the statutory provision.
16.Then, section 4(2) of the Act contemplates consultation with (1) the Panchayat concerned and (2) the Standing Committee. Omission of the requirement of consultation with the members individually clearly demonstrates legislative intent to exclude them from consultation and the principles of natural justice involved in a limited scale. No question of their breach can arise, when there is implied or express exclusion thereof under the statute. This is just in keeping with the legislative policy in the matter of corporate bodies created under different enactments. No right of being heard against the proposal to supersede or divide is conferred on the individuals liable to be affected thereby under the concerned statutes though Corporations are so armed with such rights. Such exclusion, to our mind, appears to be deliberate in view of the above considerations. The contention thus is devoid of any merit.
17.With a great respect, we are unable to agree with the views (1) that the members of the Panchayat individually can claim any right of being heard on any such proposal of separation under section 4 of the Act, apart from what they are entitled to say at the meeting of the Panchayat, or (2) that opinion of the Panchayat at the date of Commissioner's decision alone is relevant under section 4(2) or (3) that the newly constituted Panchayat is entitled to independent consultation, even when the Panchayat itself initiated the proposal or it was consulted in regard to the same before the elections. We have indicated reasons for our different conclusions. Any expansion of the scope of "Consultation" in disproportion of the relative importance of the factors involved is bound to be obstructive of the process and defensive of the very underlying object. With great respect, we differ and are unable to follow the ratio of the judgment in Dharna's case.”
In the light of above observations, we are unable to agree with the submissions of the petitioner. The members of Panchayat individually cannot claim any independent right of hearing under the procedure prescribed by Section 4(2) of the said Act.
In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in the petition. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule stands discharged. Civil Application accordingly, stands disposed of.