Chhagan Lal vs State of Rajasthan and Others

Sobhag Mal Jain, J.—This writ petition is directed against the order dated the 18th November, 1985, of the Revenue Appellate Authority, staying the operation of the no-confidence motion passed by the Municipal Board, Sheoganj on 19th October, 1985, against Shri Ghisulal, respondent No. 3.

The only contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this writ petition is that the Revenue Appellate Authority has acted without jurisdiction in interfering with the non-confidence motion passed by the Municipal Board. The provision of Section 300 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (here in after referred to as ''the Act'') do not authorise the Revenue Appellate Authority to examine the validity of a no confidence motion passed by a Board. Section 300 reads thus :

Power to call for Record. -(1) The State Government or any authorithy authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, for the purpose of being satisfied as to the correctness legality or propriety of any order passed or purporting to have been passed, under this Act, by or on behalf of any Board, its Chairman, Vice Chairman, any member or officer, or a Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government in that behalf call for the relevant record and may in doing so direct that pending the examination of such record such order shall be held in abeyance and no action in furtherance there of shall be taken till the decision of the State Government or of the authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government under subsection (2).

(2) On examining the records the officer or authority authorised as aforesaid may reverse or modify such order.

As per Section 65 of the Act, on a non-confidence motion being adopted by the Board, the Chairman is deemed to have vacated his office forthwith. A perusal of the provisions of Section 300, set-out above, shows that it is only an order passed or purported to have been passed under the Act by or on behalf of any Board, its Chairman, Vice Chairman, any member the Collector or other officer appointed by the State Government which is subject to revision by the State Government. The principal question for consideration in this writ petition therefore is whether a no-confidance motion passed u/s 65 of the Act can be treated as an order to attract the provisions of Section 300 of the Act. The "no-confidence motion belongs to the category of ''motion'' which is a mode to express collective view on a proposal made before a deliberative body. The word "motion" is not synonymous with the word ''order'' used in Section 300. The word ''order'' in Section 300 has been used in the sense of a direction or mandate which emates from a superior body meant to be beyond as a command. Section 300, therefore, does not comprehend non-confidence motion passed by a Municipal Board. The no confidence motion is not, therefore subject to correction by the State Government or its delegates in exercise of the powers u/s 300 of the Act.

As regards the order passed by the Collector give effect to the no-confidence motion adopted by the Board on 19th October, 1985, it is merely a consequential direction and as contended by the counsel for the respondent even if this direction may not have been given by the Collector, it would not make any difference.

I am, therefore of the view that the Revenue Appellate Authority had no competence to interfere with the no-confidence motion passed by the Board on October 19, 1985. The order issued by the Revenue Appellate Authority on 18th November, 1985, staying the operation of the no-confidence motion deserves to be quashed being without jurisdiction.

The result is that the writ petition is allowed and the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated the 18th November, 1985, staying the operation of the no-confidence motion dated 19th October, 1985 passed against respondent No. 4, is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.