Chetna Aggarwal vs Grihum Housing Finance

10.

The principal question which arises for consideration is whether the Applicant has disclosed any legally sustainable and sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the accompanying Securitization Application challenging the measures taken under the SARFAESI Act.

11.

The record itself reveals that the Applicant was admittedly aware of the impugned measures from at least 04.02.2026, which according to the Applicant is the earliest notice giving rise to the cause of action. The Applicant has also specifically pleaded that the statutory period of 45 days expired on 21.03.2026. Thus, the Applicant was fully conscious of the relevant proceedings and of the limitation period prescribed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act.

12.

The explanation furnished in the application primarily revolves around alleged fraud by certain private parties, difficulties in obtaining documents, filing of a criminal complaint, assurances allegedly given by some respondents, and the Applicant's expectation that the dispute would be amicably resolved. In the considered opinion of this Tribunal, none of these circumstances constitute a legally acceptable explanation for not approaching the Tribunal within the prescribed period. A litigant seeking condonation of delay is required to satisfactorily explain the entire period of delay. The application does not disclose any specific facts explaining the delay on a day-to-day basis nor does it demonstrate any circumstances which prevented the Applicant from approaching the Tribunal within time.

13.

It is also well settled that limitation under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act commences from the measure taken under Section 13(4) of the Act. Proceedings under Section 14, appointment of a Receiver, notices regarding taking possession, or actual physical possession are merely consequential and ancillary steps taken for enforcement of the measure already initiated under Section 13(4). Such subsequent actions do not furnish a fresh cause of action nor do they extend or revive the period of limitation.

14.

This Tribunal is guided by the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Property Company (P) Ltd. Vs. Rohinten Daddy Mazda & Ors., 2026 Supreme (SC) 36, wherein it has been authoritatively held that statutory tribunals and quasi-judicial authorities cannot invoke powers of condonation beyond those expressly conferred by the governing statute and that provisions of the Limitation Act do not automatically apply to special statutes unless specifically incorporated. The said principle squarely applies to proceedings under the SARFAESI Act.

15.

The Applicant has relied upon decisions advocating a liberal approach in matters of condonation of delay. However, even a liberal approach presupposes the existence of a sufficient cause. Mere assertions regarding hardship, alleged fraud by third parties, pendency of criminal complaints, or subsequent negotiations cannot substitute the statutory requirement of explaining the delay. The Tribunal cannot ignore the mandate of limitation on equitable consideration alone.

16.

From the material available on record, it is evident that the Applicant has failed to disclose any sufficient, cogent, or convincing reason explaining the delay in approaching this Tribunal. The explanation furnished is vague, general in nature, and does not cover the entire period of delay. Consequently, no ground is made out for exercise of discretion in favour of the Applicant.

17.

In view of the foregoing discussion, I.A. No.699/2026 seeking condonation of delay is hereby dismissed. Consequently, the accompanying Securitization Application, having been filed beyond the period prescribed under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and being barred by limitation, is also dismissed as not maintainable.