Chaudhary Bhatta Company vs Commissioner of Trade Tax

Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.—Heard Trapti Gupta holding brief of Sri Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the applicant-revisionist and Sri B.K. Pandey, learned standing counsel for the respondent.

With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this revision is being heard on the following questions of law:

"Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal and the authorities below are legally justified in not accepting the daily production and enhancing the same without any cogent materials or reason ?

Whether the Trade Tax Tribunal and the authorities below ere legally justified and correct in law in not granting the claim of the applicant regarding the riffling of yellow bricks ?

Whether the order of the Tribunal is correct in the eyes of law so far as it relates about the rate of bricks during the Assessment Year in question ?"

Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the Tribunal has committed a manifest error of law in determining the number of bricks manufactured despite the fact that the firing period was accepted by the First Appellate Authority. She submits that the selling rate applied by the Tribunal is based on no evidence. The sale of bricks made by the applicant were supported by books of accounts maintained in the ordinary course of business.

Learned Standing Counsel supports the impugned order of the Tribunal.

I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties.

Perusal of the impugned order of the Tribunal and the order of the First Appellate Authority dated 25.5.2005 shows that the firing period, as disclosed by the assessee was accepted by the First Appellate Authority to determine the number of bricks manufactured. The Authority adopted the same basis, as was determined by the Tribunal in the just preceding year, i.e. the average production of 25,000 bricks in one day. Based on the above, the First Appellate Authority determined the production of bricks at 9,50,000 bricks. He allowed the deduction of 5% towards breakage.

Undisputedly, opening stock of the assessee outside the brick kiln was 8,58,000 bricks and inside it there were 4,59,000 bricks. As per books of accounts, the closing stock of bricks was nil. Consequently, the first appellate authority correctly determined the sale of 22,19,500 bricks.

In the absence of any acceptable evidence on record, the claim of the assessee with regard to use of 1,97000 bricks in huts was rejected. The selling rate of Rs.350/- per thousand bricks was determined by the Tribunal in Second Appeal No.457 of 1989 relating to the just preceding year. No material has been placed before this Court to indicate that the order of the Tribunal in Second Appeal No.457 of 1989 determining selling rate of Rs.350/- per thousand bricks has been set aside or modified. Thus, the First Appellate Authority has not committed any error of law or fact in determining the selling rate of Rs.370/- per thousand bricks for the assessment year in question. No error of law or fact in the impugned order of the Tribunal could be pointed out could be pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant-revisionist.

Under the circumstances, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order of the Tribunal.

In view of the above discussions, I find no merit in this revision. Consequently, the revision fails and is hereby dismissed. The questions of law, as quoted above, are answered accordingly.