Charanjeet Kaur @ Charanjit Kaur vs District Magistrate-cum-Appellate Authority, Union Territory, Chandigarh & Ors.

Kirti Singh, J.

By way of the present petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 24.01.2024 (Annexure P-4) passed by the Additional District Magistrate-cum-Maintenance Tribunal, Union Territory, Chandigarh, whereby she has been directed to vacate House No.446, Sector 44-A, Chandigarh and hand over its vacant possession to respondent No.3, as also the order dated 29.08.2024 (Annexure P-5) passed by the District Magistrate-cum-Appellate Authority, Union Territory, Chandigarh, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the aforesaid order has been dismissed. The petitioner has also prayed for such other order or direction as this Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Briefly stated, as per the pleaded facts, respondent No.3-Mohinder Kaur, mother of the petitioner and a senior citizen, instituted proceedings under Sections 21 and 22 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter, ‘the Act’), seeking protection of her life and property and eviction of the petitioner from House No.446, Sector 44-A, Chandigarh, claiming herself to be the owner thereof and alleging harassment and interference at the hands of the petitioner. The property has an antecedent history which is relevant to the controversy. It was initially acquired in the names of the petitioner and her brother, Jagmohan Singh, through an agreement to sell and General Power of Attorney dated 06.10.1997. Thereafter, an agreement to sell and General Power of Attorney dated 31.03.2006 came to be executed in favour of respondent No.3, followed by a Conveyance Deed in her favour in the year 2011. The petitioner has, however, questioned the nature and effect of the aforesaid transfer. She instituted a civil suit in the year 2023 before the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chandigarh, seeking, inter alia, declarations in respect of House No.446, Sector 44-A and certain other properties, besides asserting rights in the estate of Late Sh. Kartar Singh, father of the petitioner and husband of respondent No.3. The said suit is stated to be pending. During the pendency of the aforesaid civil proceedings, respondent No.3 initiated proceedings under the Act. The Additional District Magistrate-cum-Maintenance Tribunal called for reports from the concerned authorities. The Chandigarh Housing Board confirmed that the house stood in the name of respondent No.3, while the police inquiry recorded material regarding the allegations of harassment and possession of the premises. On the basis of the material so collected, the Additional District Magistrate-cum-Maintenance Tribunal, vide order dated 24.01.2024, directed the petitioner to vacate the premises within 30 days and hand over possession to respondent No.3, besides directing police assistance for implementation of the order and protection of the life and property of respondent No.3. Aggrieved thereof, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 16 of the Act. The District Magistrate-cum-Appellate Authority, vide order dated 29.08.2024, dismissed the appeal and upheld the conclusion that respondent No.3 was the owner of the property and that the petitioner could not claim a right to continue in the premises against the wishes of the owner. Hence, the present petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned orders proceed on the premise that respondent No.3’s title to the property is absolute and beyond dispute, whereas the very nature and effect of the transaction pursuant to which the property came to stand in her name is the subject matter of a pending civil suit instituted by the petitioner. It is submitted that the petitioner had originally acquired the property jointly with her brother and that the subsequent transfer in favour of respondent No.3 has specifically been questioned before the competent Civil Court. Learned counsel submits that the proceedings under the Act are summary in nature and cannot be permitted to operate as a substitute for adjudication of disputed questions of title or beneficial ownership. It is further contended that, although the authorities under the Act possess the power to protect a senior citizen and, in an appropriate case, to direct eviction, such power has to be exercised upon due consideration of the competing claims and the necessity of adopting the extreme measure of eviction, particularly where the nature and effect of the transaction forming the basis of the claimed title is already under consideration before a competent Civil Court. Reliance has been placed upon Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2025 INSC 404, to contend that eviction cannot be treated as an automatic consequence merely because the property stands in the name of the senior citizen and that the statutory authority is required to consider whether eviction is truly necessary before directing such relief.

Per contra, learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No.3 submits that there is no infirmity in the impugned orders. It is contended that respondent No.3 is a senior citizen and her ownership of the house stands reflected in the official record and that the documents culminating in the Conveyance Deed in her favour cannot be brushed aside merely because the petitioner has subsequently instituted a civil suit questioning the transaction. It is further submitted that the petitioner was afforded due opportunity before the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority and that the proceedings were supported by the reports of the concerned police authorities and other material on record, which corroborated the grievance of respondent No.3 regarding harassment and interference. Learned Senior counsel thus submits that the mere pendency of a civil dispute regarding the property does not, by itself, denude the authorities under the Act of their jurisdiction to order eviction where such course is considered necessary for protection of the senior citizen, and that the authorities were justified in exercising their statutory jurisdiction to secure the life, property and peaceful residence of respondent No.3.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material on record.

No doubt, the Act is a beneficial legislation intended to secure the life, dignity, property and peaceful residence of senior citizens. Equally, the jurisdiction of the competent authority to direct eviction, in an appropriate case and where such course is necessary to advance the protective object of the enactment, cannot be doubted. The question, however, is whether, in the facts of the present case, that power has been exercised upon a proper consideration of the circumstances relevant to the relief of eviction.

Admittedly, Respondent No.3 is the recorded owner of the property on the strength of the Conveyance Deed executed in her favour. This circumstance is undoubtedly relevant while considering her claim for protection under the Act. At the same time, the petitioner’s claim cannot be regarded as wholly extraneous to the property or as having been raised merely by way of defence to the proceedings under the Act. The record reflects that the property was initially acquired in the names of the petitioner and her brother in the year 1997, followed by the transaction of 2006 and the subsequent Conveyance Deed of 2011 in favour of respondent No.3. The petitioner has instituted a civil suit questioning the nature and effect of the said transaction and asserting civil rights in the property.

This Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, is neither required nor competent to adjudicate upon the validity, nature or legal effect of the aforesaid documents or upon the competing proprietary claims of the parties. Those questions fall within the domain of the competent Civil Court. The question before this Court is a narrower one, namely, whether, in the presence of the pending civil dispute, the drastic relief of summary eviction could have been granted without adequate consideration of that dispute and of the necessity for such eviction.

The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Samtola Devi (supra) is instructive in this regard. The mere fact that a property stands in the name of a senior citizen does not, by itself, make eviction an inevitable consequence where the person sought to be evicted asserts competing rights in the property and such rights are already the subject matter of adjudication before a competent Civil Court. The statutory authority is required to consider the circumstances in their entirety, including whether eviction is necessary for securing the protection sought by the senior citizen, without adjudicating upon or prejudging the civil dispute.

Tested on the aforesaid principle, the impugned orders cannot be sustained insofar as they direct eviction of the petitioner. The Additional District Magistrate-cum-Maintenance Tribunal proceeded principally on the basis of the official verification showing respondent No.3 as the owner and the reports concerning the allegations made by her. The Appellate Authority, in turn, proceeded on the footing that the petitioner was merely a licensee and, being in occupation at the instance of respondent No.3, could be required to vacate upon withdrawal of such permission.

What, however, does not appear to have received adequate consideration is the pendency of the civil proceedings in which the petitioner has questioned the nature and effect of the very transaction pursuant to which respondent No.3 claims exclusive rights over the property. The existence of the Conveyance Deed is undoubtedly relevant material; nevertheless, in proceedings of a summary nature under the Act, its existence could not, by itself, conclude the competing civil claim so as to make the pending dispute irrelevant while determining whether summary eviction ought to be ordered.

The distinction is important. This Court is not holding that the pendency of a civil suit constitutes an absolute bar to exercise of jurisdiction under the Act. Nor is any finding being returned in favour of the petitioner on the question of title. The finding is confined to this: where competing civil rights in respect of the property are already pending adjudication before a competent Civil Court, such circumstance is a relevant consideration which the statutory authority is required to take into account while determining whether eviction is necessary to secure the protection contemplated under the Act.

At the same time, the material on record, including the police inquiry, does indicate discord between the parties and allegations of harassment made by respondent No.3. Such material cannot be disregarded, particularly keeping in view the protective object of the Act. The setting aside of the eviction direction, therefore, cannot be construed as conferring upon the petitioner an indefeasible right to remain in the property irrespective of the outcome of the civil proceedings or her future conduct. Respondent No.3, equally, cannot be left without protection against harassment or unlawful interference.

The appropriate course, therefore, would be to set aside the orders to the limited extent that they direct eviction of the petitioner, while preserving the right of respondent No.3 to seek appropriate protection in accordance with law. The competent authority shall remain at liberty to pass such protective orders as may be permissible under the Act, subject to the statutory framework and without adjudicating upon the disputed title of the parties.

For the reasons aforesaid, the present writ petition is allowed in following terms.

The order dated 24.01.2024 passed by the Additional District Magistrate-cum-Maintenance Tribunal, Union Territory, Chandigarh, and the order dated 29.08.2024 passed by the District Magistrate-cum-Appellate Authority, Union Territory, Chandigarh, are set aside to the extent that they direct eviction of the petitioner from House No.446, Sector 44-A, Chandigarh.

It is, however, made clear that respondent No.3 shall remain entitled to seek appropriate protection of her life, dignity and property under the Act, and the competent authority shall remain at liberty to pass appropriate protective orders in accordance with law. The petitioner shall not harass, intimidate or unlawfully interfere with the peaceful residence of respondent No.3.

Nothing contained herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion upon the on the validity, genuineness, nature or legal effect of the agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney, Conveyance Deed or any other document relating to the property; or as an adjudication title or other civil rights of the parties. The same is left open for determination by the competent Civil Court.

The pending civil proceedings shall also be decided by the competent Civil Court on their own merits and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation made herein. It shall be open to either party to seek appropriate interim relief before the said Court.

It is further clarified that, in the event of any subsequent conduct independently warranting recourse under the Act, respondent No.3 shall be at liberty to avail of such remedy as may be available to her in accordance with law.

Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.