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Judgment
D.V. Sehgal, J.—This judgment shall dispose of C. Rs. Nos. 3260, 3261, 3262, 3803 of 1986 and 24 of 1987. In spite of the fact that all these revision petitions arise out of different suits in which separate orders have been passed, the questions of law and fact involved therein are identical. It is, therefore, convenient to dispose them of together. Reference to the facts and the parties shall, however, be made from C.R. No. 3260 of 1986.
The Petitioner was in possession of the land in dispute belonging to Gram Panchayat Respondent No. 1 it initiated proceedings against him before the collector under Sections 5 and 7 of the Punjab Public Premises and Lands Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 (for short ''the Act''). The Collector, Panchayat Lands, Kapurthala, passed an order dated 21-3-1986 directing the Petitioner to deliver possession of the land within 30 days. The Petitioner, therefore, filed a suit in the trial Court for declaration that the aforesaid order of the Collector was illegal and not enforceable and that he continues to be the lessee of the land in dispute and that the Gram Panchayat Defendant could not take possession of the same in pursuance of the said order. He also sought consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from dispossessing him from the suit land or from recovering damages from him under the Act. He also filed an application under Order XXX X, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on which the learned trial Court granted an ex-parte order of status quo but later, on hearing counsel for both the parties. Dismissed the application and vacated the stay order on 13-6-1986. The Petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Kapurthala, who dismissed the same and maintained the order of the trial Court vide judgment dated 18-10-1986. The Petitioner has, thus, approached this Court through the present revision petition.
The contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that the land in dispute was originally allotted to him under the provisions of the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949, (for short ''the 1949 Act''), on lease for a period of 20 years. The lease could be determined only by the District Collector. The Collector, Panchayat Lands, had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 21-3 1986 under Sections 5 and 7 of the Act. The steps to take possession from the Petitioner could only be taken u/s 7 of the 1949 Act By an elaborate discussion of all the aspects, the learned Additional District Judge affirmed the view that nothing has been brought on the record to show that the land was originally allotted to the Petitioner under the 1949 Act. The land admittedly belongs to the Panchayat and proceedings under the Act could therefore, be taken by the Collector, Panchayat Lands under Sections 5 and 7 of the Act.
Learned Counsel for the Petitioner made an effort to show by reference to the order dated 21-3-1986 passed by the Collector, Panchayat (Sic)ands, Kapurthala, that the contention of the Petitioner has been noticed therein that the land was originally allotted to him under the 1949 Act and the same had not been disputed He, however, could not bring any document on the record in support of this assertion. When a contention in this respect was raised before the Collector, Panchayat, lands he had to notice the same, but that by itself cannot be made the basis of the claim which is sought to be raised in the suit or in the present revision petition. It has been held by the final Court in The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Balanger, Hyderabad and Anr. v. Ajit Parsad Tarway, Manager (Purchase and Stores) The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and Another, Balanagar Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, , and The The Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Shri Suresh Chandra Jaipuria and Another, that an order refusing or granting an injunction passed by the Courts below should lot be lightly interferred with by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction in revision u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has not been shown to me that the order passed by the Courts below is either perverse or without jurisdiction or that it suffers from material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction. I, therefore, find no infirmity in the same
Consequently, all these revision petitions are dismissed. The parties, however, left to bear their own costs
