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Judgment
I.A. 20408/2025 (BY DEF 1-U/O7 R11- FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT)
The instant application has been filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for rejection of the plaint on the ground that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the provision under Section 19 of the CPC, which governs the question of territorial jurisdiction in suits for compensation for wrongs to person, manifests that the same are to be instituted either at the place where the defendant resides, or where the cause of action for the suit arose.
She submits that in the present case, neither has the purported cause of action arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, nor do any of the defendants reside therein. She further points out that the present suit being in respect of the alleged wrong to the plaintiff’s person by way of defamation, the cause of action for the same can be deemed to have arisen at the place of his residence, where a substantial part of his reputation can be said to exist. She submits that the plaintiff is a permanent resident of Uttar Pradesh, as specified in Document no. L filed along with the plaint. She further asserts that the plaintiff’s claim of being a resident of Delhi is only on the basis of the temporary accommodation allotted to him in his capacity as a Member of Parliament, and the same does not confer territorial jurisdiction on this Court. Therefore, according to her, the present suit ought to have been instituted in Uttar Pradesh, where the cause of action arose.
I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.
The provision under Section 19 of the CPC governs the question of territorial jurisdiction of Courts in suits arising out of wrongs to person. Under the said provision, such suits may be instituted either at the place where the cause of action arose, or at the place where the defendant resides. The said provision is extracted below, for reference:
“19.Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or movables.—Where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property, if the wrong was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of another Court, the suit may be instituted at the option of the plaintiff in either of the said Courts.”
In paragraph no. 62 of the plaint, the plaintiff avers that the cause of action for the present suit arose in Delhi. For the sake of clarity, the said paragraph is extracted below:
“62.That in the present case the cause of action has firstly arose on 09.03.2025 and thereafter the defendant no-01 she again posted on 03.06.2025 and lastly on dated 02.07.2025 till date. That the defendant no-01 is till posting defamatory and derogatory post which tarnished the reputation of plaintiff from publication and circulation of defamatory material against the Plaintiff form the social media platforms of Defendant no.2-4. The cause of action has further originated owing to damage and loss of reputation caused to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff is member of Parliament and resides in Delhi, this substantial damage has been caused in his official circle in Delhi amongst other member of parliaments and parliamentary staff in Delhi, social circle and also amongst his official staff and public in Delhi besides across India and his parliamentary constituency. That the original affidavit of the few people for the kind perusal is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE- N”
This Court, in the case of Dr. Shama Mohamed vs. Smt. Sanju Verma1 has considered the decision in the case of Escorts Ltd. v. Tejpal Singh Sisodia2 and Arvind Kejriwal v. State3, and held that the cause of action in defamation suits would be deemed to arise at the place where the maximum damage to the plaintiff’s reputation was suffered. While considering the pronouncement of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court, in paragraph no. 29, the Court has drawn the following conclusion:
“29.A comprehensive reading of the aforementioned paragraphs in Tejpal Singh Sisodia elucidates the following principles regarding jurisdiction in defamation suits, particularly in the context of cyber defamation, under the framework of Section 19 of the CPC, 1908:-
a. In cases of cyber defamation, the cause of action may arise across multiple jurisdictions due to the widespread dissemination of the alleged defamatory content. However, the multiplicity of jurisdictions in which the cause of action arises does not confer upon the plaintiff an unfettered right to initiate proceedings in any or all such jurisdictions. Under Section 19, the plaintiff has the option to sue where the wrong has been done which is generally at the place of his/her residence whereby the reputation of the plaintiff is affected.
b. However, in cases wherein the wrong was done in the same jurisdiction wherein the defendant resides than the plaintiff has no option other than to institute the suit wherein the defendant resides.
c. Where the plaint avers that the maximum harm or damage was suffered in a particular jurisdiction as compared to different jurisdictions wherein wrong was done, that place shall ordinarily be considered the appropriate territorial jurisdiction for instituting the suit.
d. Ordinarily, the maximum damage in defamation cases is presumed to occur at the place where the plaintiff resides or, in the case of a company, where it is headquartered, unless the plaint explicitly states otherwise.
e. However, in cases wherein maximum reputational harm occurred at some place else and defendant resides in another jurisdiction, then by virtue of Section 19 CPC, the plaintiff has the option to chose forum as per choice.”
Appreciation of the aforenoted decision indicates that the cause of action in defamation suits could generally be presumed to arise in the place of the plaintiff’s residence, since that is where the plaintiff can reasonably be said to enjoy his reputation. However, in case the plaintiff claims that the damage to his/her reputation has been caused in other places, he/she is required to specifically state how reputational damage has occurred in such other place to establish that the cause of action arose therein.
In the plaint, the plaintiff unequivocally asserts that he is a Member of Parliament, residing at Delhi. It is further stated that the alleged defamatory content affected his reputation in his official circle, among fellow Members of Parliament, which are in Delhi, apart from the public at his parliamentary constituency. It is, thus, seen that the plaintiff has consciously chosen the jurisdiction of this Court claiming that substantial damage to his reputation has occurred in Delhi.
It is trite law that while adjudicating applications under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, only the plaint averments and the documents relied on therein are to be considered. Reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra)(D) Thr Lrs and Ors4.
“12.2.The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
12.3.Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.
12.4XXX
12.5.In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
12.6.At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration.
12.7.The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I & Anr., which reads as :
“139.Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.” In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact…”
In light of the aforestated conspectus of law, the Court finds that at this stage, it cannot be conclusively determined as to where the substantial damage actually had occurred.
Such an issue can only be determined once the parties are allowed to adduce their evidence and the Trial be allowed to continue.
Under these circumstances, the instant application stands dismissed.