High CourtsSingle Bench(1966) 01 P&H CK 0008

Chandra Datt vs Amar Nath Jolly and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 4 January 1966 · Citation: (1966) ACJ 26

HON’BLE JUDGES
H.R. Khanna, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
F.A.O. 77D of 1959

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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 659 words

H.R. Khanna, J.—This first appeal filed by Chandra Datt is directed against the order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Delhi, by which the application of the Appellant for compensation was dismissed as time barred.

2.

The brief facts of the case are that the Appellant filed an application u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the recovery of Rs. 41,360/- as compensation for the injuries sustained by him on 26th May 1958 when he was knocked down by motor car No. D.L.A. 7725 belonging to Amar Nath Jolly, Respondent No. 1, and driven by Govardhan Kumar, Respondent No. 2, who is son of Respondent No. 1. The Premier Life Assurance and General Insurance Company Limited was impleaded as Respondent No. 3 as the car had been insured with that Company. The application was filed on 27th November 1958.

3.

The application was resisted by the Respondents, and an objection was raised that the application was barred by limitation as it had not been filed within the prescribed period of sixty days.

4.

Following preliminary issue was framed by the Tribunal:

Whether there is sufficient cause as pleaded in para 1 of the application for condonation of delay and is the application within time ?

5.

The issue was decided against the Appellant, and the application was dismissed as time barred.

6.

Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act prescribes that no application for compensation under that section shall be entertained unless it is made within sixty days of the occurrence of the accident. A proviso is, however, added that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of sixty days if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. In the present case the Appellant sustained injuries on 26th May 1958 and the application was made on 27th November 1958, more than six months after the sustaining of injuries. The application having not been filed within the prescribed period of sixty days, the only question which arises for consideration is whether the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. The Appellant gave two reasons for condoning the delay. The reason, according to the Appellant, was that he had been advised by friends that claim in respect of injuries could be made within one year from -the date of the accident. No names of any such friends are mentioned, and it is not clear as to whether they were well versed in law. Some talk with a layman about the time within which an application for claim can be filed can certainly be not a good ground for extending the time for filing the application, and I agree with the learned Tribunal in this respect.

7.

The other ground mentioned by the Appellant is that he got certificate about the assessment of his injuries from the hospital authorities on 25th November 1958. The Appellant examined in this connection Dr. V.P. Yadav. The doctor, however, admits that the Appellant was discharged from Safdarjang Hospital on 14th June 1958 and was thereafter advised to continue treatment as an out-door patient in the hospital. In my opinion, the delay in obtaining that certificate could not have stood in the way of the Appellant filing the application within the prescribed time. The certificate was a piece of evidence and I agree with the learned Tribunal that the time spent in collecting such kind of evidence cannot be said to have been utilized for a purpose which would justify the extension of the period for filing the application.

8.

I, therefore, uphold the finding of the Tribunal that no sufficient cause has been shown for filing the application after the expiry of the period of sixty days. The appeal, consequently, fails and is dismissed. The parties, in the circumstances of the case, are left to bear their own costs.