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Judgment
Three convicted persons are the
appellants in these two appeals. They were the accused in
Sessions Case no.70/2003/Sessions Trial no.38/2005 in
which judgment dated 29th June, 2015 was passed by the
Additional Sessions Judge, Katwa. The appellants in
Criminal Appeal no.529/2015 had been found guilty of
charges for offences punishable under sections 323 / 325 of
the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellant in Criminal
Appeal no.545/2015 was found, in addition to the above,
guilty of the charge for offence punishable under section 302
of the IPC.
Katwa P.S case no.201/1999 dated 26th November,
1999 under sections 143 / 326 / 34 IPC was initiated on the
basis of written complaint dated 26th November, 1999. Later,
section 302 IPC was added on the death of one Anil Kumar
Hazra. The police submitted charge-sheet dated 27th March,
2002 under sections 341 / 323 / 325 / 302 / 34 IPC on
completion of investigation. Charges were framed accordingly
and trial took place.
The written complaint dated 26th November, 1999 was
that at about 3:00 in the afternoon trouble took place
between the appellants and the said Anil Kumar Hazra, since
deceased over the issue of drainage of water from the house.
The appellants accompanied by 5/6 persons physically
assaulted the deceased, his wife, also since subsequently
deceased, his daughter Jayanti Hazra and son Sandip Hazra.
All of them sustained serious bleeding injuries. Local people
took them to Katwa hospital and admitted them there. The
complaint stated the deceased was struggling for life and his
wife also critical.
It appears from the inquest report that upon
information received at 09:45 hrs. on 27th November, 1999,
inquiry was made. The body of Anil Kumar Hazra was found
in the male ward on the ground floor of Katwa S.D.Hospital.
The post-mortem report, also dated 27th November, 1999
states, inter alia, one haematoma (3"x2") over the mid-
portion of fronto parietal region depressed at the middle of frontal bone and one haematoma over the right
supraclavicular region (7"x3/4"). The doctor opined that
cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage as a result
of injuries which were ante-mortem but could not say
whether nature of injuries was accidental or homicidal.
Widow of the said deceased died on 10th October, 2006
and as such could not be examined in the trial. It may be
mentioned here that the scribe and the complainant were
respectively PW 1 and PW 2, the latter being the brother of
the deceased. The daughter of the deceased was PW 3 while
the son PW 4. Retired sub-inspector of police Sri S.
Acharyya, who was entrusted with the investigation, was PW
12.
The prosecution case at trial was that all the
prosecution witnesses had fully corroborated each other,
particularly the eye witness accounts, about the incident and
the roles played by the accused in the assault whereby one person died and three others were severely injured.
Furthermore, the medical evidence fully corroborated the
prosecution case and eye witness versions.
At trial two main contentions of defence were made out.
Firstly that the scribe is admittedly an active worker of
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and a resident of different
locality, far away from the residence of the deceased. There
was no earthly reason to pick up such a political person for
writing the complaint when the complainant himself could
have easily gone to the P.S and stated to the police officer
whose duty was to record the same. The reason is not far to
see since this contention of the defence was that Anil Kumar
Hazra was a butcher and he used to sell meat of hogs which
enraged the Muslims of the locality and in order to save his
skin he took shelter of the BJP. Since the accused are
supporters of Communist Party India (Marxist) [CPI(M)]
party, a false complaint was lodged against them. The
second line of defence was that when the deceased was returning home on 26th November, 1999 at about 3:30 p.m.,
he was heavily drunk and as a result fell down in Pana
Pukur where garbage, pieces of tin, glass and other unused
materials were thrown. Existence of Pana Pukur near alleged
place of occurrence was admitted. The daughter (PW 3) had
stated that her father fell down in Pana Bon. It was evident
that the deceased received injuries when he fell down in the
Pana Pukur and the other alleged persons also received
injuries when they too fell down in the Pana Pukur while
attempting to lift the deceased. It was quite possible that in
drunken state the deceased had accidentally fallen down and
received injuries. In any event, the investigation was slip
shod. The I.O (PW 12) did not seize, inter alia, any blood
stained earth. The seizure of the wooden buttam, alleged to
be the murder weapon, is shrouded in mystery since even
though there were many respectable persons in the locality
but none of them were made witnesses to the seizure. The
seizure was purportedly witnessed by a hawker of Katwa bus
stand (PW 5) having no reason to be present at the place of
occurrence and as such was highly suspicious. The seizure became material exhibit-I but the said exhibit is nothing but
a piece of wood lying in the house of the deceased which was
falsely shown by the prosecution as the weapon of offence.
Mr. Jayanta Narayan Chatterjee, learned advocate
appeared on behalf of the appellants. He submitted that
without abandoning the contentions of defence made out at
trial the alternative contention in appeal is that the
conviction under section 302 IPC should be converted to one
under section 304 Part II IPC and the other two appellants
acquitted. According to him at best the principal accused
had knowledge that the injury inflicted would cause death
but not intention. He submitted, it would be clear from the
evidence that the principal accused without premeditation in
a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel
had committed culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
In the facts and circumstances the principal accused was
covered under exception 4 in section 300 IPC. He relied on
several judgments of the Supreme Court of India submit that defective investigation can lead to conversion of conviction, if
not acquittal.
i) Surajit Sarkar v. State of West Bengal reported
in (2013) 2 SCC 146, paragraphs 49 and 63 to
65.
ii) Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana reported in
(2002) 3 SCC 327, paragraphs 14, 17 to 19 and
21.
iii) Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharastra
reported in (2013) 3 Calcutta Criminal Law
Reporter (SC) 826, paragraphs 6 and 27.
iv) Judgment dated 25th September, 2014 in
Criminal Appeal no.111 of 2008 ( Murlidhar
Shivram Palekar and Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra, paragraphs 19 and 20.
He also relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in
the case of Noyel Barla v. State of West Bengal reported in
2006 (2) CHN 442, paragraph 18.
Mr. Saibal Bapuli, learned advocate, Additional Public
Prosecutor on behalf of the State submitted that impugned
judgment was well reasoned and should not be interfered
with in appeal. The eye witnesses were correctly held to be
credible witnesses. The prosecution had proved its case to
the hilt regarding the principal, other accused and the
occurrence which resulted in death of the victim and injuries
to the others assaulted. There was no omission in the
investigation fatal to the prosecution case. The wooden
buttam had been duly seized and marked as material
exhibit-1. The defence could not contradict the prosecution
case. Lastly, the inconsistent contentions of the defence
being one of communal and political overtones and the other
of accident did not merit consideration. He relied on a
judgment dated 8th March, 2011 of the Supreme Court in
the case of State of U.P vs. Naresh And Ors . in particular to
the following passages therein:
"23........The evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage being a stamped witness, thus, his presence cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very reliable and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence and this lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law. The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence.
............
In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to lapse of time or due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the omissions amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other witnesses also make material improvement while deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters which do not affect the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground on which the evidence can be rejected in its entirety......."
The Sessions Court held there is no legal requirement
that the FIR should contain each and every aspect of the prosecution case. Relying upon a decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of State of U.P v. Hari Ram reported in
AIR 1983 Supreme Court 1081, the said Court found it to
be so settled. In Hari Ram (supra) the Supreme Court said
the FIR does not contain full or meticulous details of the
incident but is merely meant to narrate the brief facts which
led to the incident, viz., names of the assailants and the
place of occurrence, etc. The Sessions Court went on to find
that the prosecution case is based mainly on the evidence of
two eye witnesses namely, PW 3 and PW 4. They stated that
they got injured in the incident. The said Court found these
witnesses had totally corroborated each other and the
prosecution case. These witnesses had also stated in detail
how the incident happened, the context thereof, respective
roles and actions of each of the accused in the same and also
the injuries received by the deceased and others. They were
extensively cross-examined by the defence but their evidence
was in no way shaken. For appreciation of evidence of
injured witnesses the said Court relied upon the law as
declared by the Supreme Court in the cases of- 1. Ramaswamy Ayyangar vs. State of Tamil
Nadu, AIR 1976 SC 2027;
State of U.P. vs. Kishan Chand, (2004) 7
SCC 629;
Vishnu & Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan, (2009)
10 SCC 477;
Kartik Malhar vs. State of Bihar (1996) 1
SCC 614;
Sonelal vs. State of MP, AIR 2009 SC 760;
and
Akhtar & Ors. vs. State of Uttaranchal
(2009) 13 SCC 722
The said Court also relied on the case of Hari Narayan
Singh vs. State of West Bengal decided by a Division Bench
of this Court reported in 2009 Criminal Law Journal 4001
(Cal) for the view taken that the number of prosecution
witnesses does not matter in a criminal case as long as those
who have been examined remain cogent and credible even
after cross-examination by the defence, to resist the
argument on behalf of the defence that there were many others who could have been but were not produced as
witnesses by the prosecution.
At this point it is necessary to deal with what we
noticed being that the I.O (PW 12) had said in cross-
examination, he had examined the daughter of the deceased
(PW 3) who stated before him that her father fell down in
Pana Bon. The said Court found it to be a stray statement
which could not wither away the entire prosecution case,
particularly the eye witness versions which stood searching
and extensive cross-examination. The I.O (PW 12) in his
examination-in-chief had said, inter alia, the following:
"I searched for arresting the accused persons but on that date I could not arrest them. I examined available witnesses and recorded their statements u/s 161 Cr.P.C . I met the injured persons in Katwa S.D. hospital. I examined Sushil Hazra, Sandip Hazra, Kalpana Hazra, Jayanti Hazra, Mithu Ghosh, Md. Maniruddin, Lalu Rajbanshi, Nayan Hazra, Falguni Rudra and Mina Bhaduri as witnesses."
Then in cross-examination he had stated, inter alia, :
"I examined witness Jayanti Hazra (PW 3). She stated before me that her father fell down on ''Pana Ban''."
Though it appears from the cross-examination of PW 3
suggestion was put to her that she had stated before the I.O
her father had fallen down on Pana Bon, she having denied
the same, but we do not find the requirements of the proviso
under sub-section (1) of section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 were complied with by the defence. In our
view such statement not duly proved could not be of use to
the accused.
Now to consider the new plea made before us. All the
three accused in their respective explanations under section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 said they were
willing to answer questions put to them and made
statements but not about a sudden fight in the heat of
passion upon a sudden quarrel nor had any of them claimed
to have any injury. The eye witness (PW 3 and PW 4) accounts of the incident are that in the afternoon while the
deceased was returning from office, upon hearing altercation
and noise they along with their mother, since subsequently
deceased, rushed to the place of occurrence. They witnessed
the principal accused assault the deceased on the head with
wooden buttam. The deceased had caught hold of his head,
sat down having sustained bleeding injury and his brain
materials came out. The other accused also assaulted them.
They in their respective cross-examination stated, inter alia,
as follows:
PW 3: "We came to the P.O. from the first floor of our house. It is fact that when we came to the P.O. my father was shouting but it is not a fact that he was shouting for his drunken state."
PW 4: "It is outright false to say that on that date my father went for cutting hogs as butcher. Not a fact that I have falsely stated that there was shouting for killing my father in the afternoon of 26.11.99. Not a fact that none of the accused persons assaulted my father or my mother or my elder sister or to me as alleged by me. Not a fact that we received injuries due to fall into Pana Pukur."
Applicability of exception 4 in section 300 IPC has to be
upon analysis of the evidence. The evidence is that there was
altercation and noise upon hearing which the eye witnesses
along with their mother, since subsequently deceased, went
to the place of occurrence. Evidence points to the place of
occurrence as being on the path or passage leading to the
house of the deceased. The accused were found to be with
the deceased. The deceased was shouting but not because he
was drunk. The principal accused assaulted the deceased
with wooden buttam and the other accused assaulted him
and the eye witnesses. On receiving injury from the principal
accused the deceased caught hold of his head, sat down and
his brain materials came out. He then became senseless
(cross-examination of PW 3) and died later that evening at
10:40 p.m. This with the absence of any injury inflicted on
the accused persons makes it difficult for us to accept the
argument on behalf of the appellants that there was a
sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel.
The evidence is clear that the deceased was alone at the
place of occurrence where the accused were present and he had been assaulted on the head with a wooden buttam by
the principal accused. The deceased became senseless and
later died. There is no evidence either ocular or
circumstantial to indicate that there was a sudden fight in
the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel between the
accused and the deceased person. In this context, defence
case put to the eye witnesses was confined to suggestions
that the deceased was not returning from office at the time of
occurrence and that he was drunk.
In view of our finding as above it is to be seen whether
the authorities cited on behalf of the appellants are in their
aid. The Supreme Court in Sukhbir Singh (supra) found the
circumstances of the case to be that after altercation over the
splashing of mud and receiving two slaps on his face, the
accused had declared he would teach the complainant party
a lesson and went home. Immediately thereafter he along
with others came on the spot and, as held by the High Court,
wanted to remove the obstructions caused in the flow of water. As the common object was not discernible, it could,
at the most, be held that Sukhbir Singh intended to cause
the fatal blow to the deceased and the other accused
accompanied him for the purpose of removing the
obstruction or, at the most, for teaching a lesson to the
complainant party. The said Court explained that to avail
the benefit of exception 4, the defence is required to
probabilise that the offence was committed without
premeditation and the offender had not taken any undue
advantage nor acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Sudden
fight, though not defined under the Act implied mutual
provocation. The said Court found that in the case
concededly there was no enmity between the parties and that
the occurrence took place when, inter alia, the deceased gave
slaps to his assailant for no fault of his. In the case before
us, suggestions were put to the eye witnesses (PW 3 and PW
4) that they did not even know the identities of the accused,
that the accused were not related to each other and, most
significant of all, not their neighbours. In this regard the
Sessions Court found as follows: "45........However, from the Order Sheet of this case, it is found that before framing of Charge, accused Bula Mallick @ Paul @ Gouranga Paul @ Mafizul Haque filed an application for discharge from the case raising a similar plea. The said application was dismissed by this Court taking into consideration the fact that accused Bula Mallick @ Paul @ Gouranga Paul @ Mafizul Haque, after being granted bail in the matter, furnished bail bond in the name Bula Paul @ Gouranga @ Mafizul Haque and he was released after acceptance of such bail bond. The Court also found that thereafter he appeared on several dates by filing Haziras in the matter and he did not raise any objection in this regard at the time of commitment. Furthermore, this Court noted that the other two accused of this case never raised any objection regarding this and never stated that they were not the wife and son of the accused Bula Mallick @ Paul @ Gouranga Paul @ Mafizul Haque. Later Charge was framed by this Court on 27.07.2005. It is also found from the record of this case that even after framing of Charge the said accused filed Haziras on the dates of trial as sometimes as "Mafizul Haque @ Bula Paul" or sometimes as "Mafizul Haque @ Bula"."
Inference drawn can only be in support of our finding from
either of the two following situations. One situation as per
the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 is that there was altercation
in the morning, when the deceased was leaving for office,
regarding drainage of water from the house of the deceased linking that incident to the occurrence in the afternoon. That
would be consistent with the said witnesses knowing the
accused to be related to each other and being their
neighbours. Such situation militates against inference of
there being later in the afternoon a sudden fight in the heat
of passion upon a sudden quarrel. However, if the accused
had not held out as being related to each other and were not
neighbours of the deceased, their presence at the place of
occurrence and plea of a sudden fight in the heat of passion
upon a sudden quarrel between them and the deceased
persons is based on no evidence. In the circumstances we
find the court below had taken a lenient view in being of the
opinion that the elements of "prior meeting of minds" or "pre-
arranged plan" or "suddenly formed plan" was not proved for
the charge under section 34 IPC against the appellants.
In Surajit Sarkar (supra) while the Apex Court was not
prepared to accept as a broad proposition of law that in no
case can defective or shoddy investigation lead to an acquittal as it would eventually depend on the defects
pointed out, on the facts of that case being, inter alia, the
nature of injuries, the said Court held it was difficult to
accept the view that the accused intended to cause death of
the deceased or that the injuries were so imminently
dangerous that they would, in all probability, cause death.
The injuries were (1"x1/2") cut mark over the right fronto
parietal region and (1/2") cut mark over the back of right
parietal region. There were some abrasion marks over right
ear and right knee and the right parietal bone was fractured.
The membrane and brain matter were ruptured. Two ribs
and a right radius was also fractured and dislocation of the
right elbow joint. The doctor had deposed that the injuries
to the parietal region may be caused by contact with a hard
and blunt weapon or even by a fall. In the case before us the
injury was (3"x2") over the mid-portion of fronto parietal
region depressed at the middle of frontal bone and one
haematoma over the right supraclavicular region (7"x3/4").
The nature of injuries inflicted on the deceased in this case
were imminently dangerous, the evidence being that the deceased became and died later that evening. We are unable
to hold that in the facts and circumstances the principal
accused in inflicting such injuries did not have intention to
kill.
In Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad (supra) the Supreme Court
in paragraph 27 said as follows:
"27. Coming back to the case at hand, we are of the opinion that the nature of the simple injury inflicted by the accused, the part of the body on which it was inflicted, the weapon used to inflict the same and the circumstances in which the injury was inflicted do not suggest that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased. All that can be said is that the appellant had the knowledge that the injury inflicted by him was likely to cause the death of the deceased. The case would, therefore, more appropriately fall under section 304 Part II, IPC ."
The above decision is not applicable on facts. In Murlidhar
Shivram Palekar (supra) the accused were husband and
wife. It was their contention that the wife was raped by the
deceased and on the day next when they were proceeding to
report the incident, the deceased had tried to obstruct them. A scuffle broke out and according to the accused, the
deceased had a knife on which he fell and injured himself
causing his death. The prosecution case of murder led to
conviction up to the High Court but such conviction was
converted by the Supreme Court to a conviction under
section 304 Part II, IPC . The conversion was essentially upon
the following reasons given in the judgment:
"14.........The fact that all the above witnesses saw the incidence of scuffle is not disputed; however they entered the scene only after they heard the shout of Asaram. What transpired prior to that, between the accused and the deceased has not been corroborated by anyone save the accused no.2. None of the witnesses seem to know the cause of the scuffle and neither were they able to hear the altercation that was going on between them.
Further, all the witnesses saw accused no.1 inflicting injury to deceased-Asaram by way of a knife that was later produced as the murder weapon. However, none of the witnesses have stated anywhere that the knife belonged to the accused no.1, therefore, the question that who had actually possessed the knife first is still unknown."
This Court in Noyel Barla (supra) acquitted the accused for
non-examination of two eye witnesses. The said decision is
not applicable in the present case.
The appellants have thus failed to make out any ground
for interference with the impugned order. Their plea of
conversion of conviction and acquittal is also without
substance. The impugned order is confirmed. As such the
appeals fail and are dismissed. The appellants will serve out
their respective sentences.
