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Judgment
B. Subhashan Reddy, J.—This writ petition has been filed questioning the constitutional vires of Section 10(2)(v) of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rent Control Act.")
The petitioner was a tenant of non-residential premises situated at Topkhana Road, Osmangunj, Hyderabad, of which, the 3rd respondent is the owner and was the landlady. The 3rd respondent had instituted proceedings for eviction of the petitioner in RC No.2091 of 1986 on the file of the IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad pleading several grounds including that of the petitioner''s securing alternative accommodation which is a ground available u/s 10(2)(v) of the Rent Control Act. The Rent Controller had found only the said ground of alternative accommodation for passing his order for eviction of the petitioner from the premises and the same was upheld in appeal by the Court of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes, Hyderabad. The same was questioned in a revision to the High Court, but the order of eviction was upheld and even the Apex Court had confirmed the order of the High Court. Now, as a last resort, the petitioner has challenged the constitutional validity of the above provision of the Rent Control Act.
Mr. Gopal G. Naik, the learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously contends that the tenant enjoys statutory protection and that such statutory protection should be common to all the citizens in India and it cannot be separate and distinct for each and every State. He took us to the statutes of some other States in India and submits that the same thing should be read into the A.P. Rent Control Act. He also submits that unfettered discretion is granted to the Courts to interpret what is alternative accommodation and it is not stated with precision in the Rent Control Act as to what factors govern such alternative accommodation for evicting the tenant. These arguments are based on the touch-stone of Article 14 of Indian Constitution. The other ground is Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution on the premise that the petitioner is trading in the premises and as such, his eviction on the basis of alternative accommodation offends his fundamental right to carry on his trade guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution.
At the outset, the writ petition is not maintainable for the reason that the petitioner having chosen all through from the Court of Rent Controller to the Apex Court to challenge the action of the 3rd respondent only on factual basis and having lost the cause finally, cannot turn back and challenge the provision itself. By this, we are not saying that the petitioner was precluded from challenging the provision. The plea for challenging the provision was available, but the same was not availed of. Even assuming that the plea could not have been raised in the proceedings arising under the Rent Control Act and this writ petition is maintainable, we see no force in the contention of the learned Counsel either on the touch-stone of Article 14 or Article 19 of the Indian Constitution. The Rent Control Act is enacted by the State and each State has got its own enactments. It is not necessary that one State should copy the provisions of the other State. It is also not necessary that the tenants all over Indian had to be guided by analogous provisions. Bach State, by virtue of its legislative competence, is entitled to enact its own laws and what is to be seen is whether the enactment of the Rent Control Act by the State of Andhra Pradesh lacks legislative competence or violates fundamental rights. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, could not demonstrate before us as to how the A.F. Legislature lacks legislative competence. In our considered view, there is a legislative competence for the Andhra Pradesh Legislature. Even assuming that the Rent Control Act is not traceable to Entry 18 of List II of Article 7 and even if it is assumed to be of a concurrent list, as there is assent of the President and as there is no Act contra to the A.P. Rent Control Act enacted by the Parliament the Rent Control Act is valid and intra vires the Constitution.
As already stated above, each State has got power to legislate and as such, the provisions of A.P. Rent Control Act need not be similar to the other States. '' It is a settled law that legislation will always be general and will not be specific, as, the Legislature cannot comprehend the situations arising for adjudication and it is always left to the Courts for interpreting the statutory provisions or the Rules framed thereunder. The Legislature enacts a provision and the same is interpreted by the Court having regard to the facts of the case and that is the essence of the Administration of Justice and as such, the contention that unfettered discretion is conferred on the Courts is" untenable. The other contention regarding infraction of Article 19(1)(g) of Indian Constitution has got absolutely no relevance to challenge the instant provision of the Rent Control Act and the said contention is only stated to be rejected, as the legal proceedings available for the landlord/ landlady for evicting the tenant can never be traced to the fundamental right to trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
For all the reasons stated above, this writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
