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B.R. Tuli, J.—The petitioner, Chaman Lal, was appointed as Sub-Inspector Taxation in the Department of Excise and Taxation Punjab on probation for a period of two years on 8th March, 1961. He completed the period of probation and continued to be in service even after the expiry of the period of probation, and according to the rules applicable to him, the petitioner has asserted that he was deemed to be confirmed after the expiry of the said period of probation of two years. He therefore, claims to have been confirmed since 8th March, 1963.
the petitioner received an order No. 2612-E-iii dated 26th May, 1965, from the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, respondents 2 informing him that he was being given one month''s notice in terms of the conditions of his service and thereafter his services shall stand terminated. A copy of the order is Annexure ''A'' to the writ petition. The petitioner has alleged that before issuing the said order he was not given an opportunity to show cause against the proposed action of termination of his services and no enquiry was held in his presence. As he was confirmed and he was entitled to the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. The simple order of termination of services amounted to an order of dismissal and removal from service by way of punishment and since no enquiry was held and no opportunity'' of hearing was given before the order was passed the order is wholly illegal void and without jurisdiction. The petitioner had filed a representation before the Excise and Taxation Commissioner which was not decided and the reminders sent were met with no response. He filed an appeal against that order before the State of Punjab which was rejected by order dated 18th November, 1966, without giving any reasons. The petitioner than filed this writ petition for the quashing of the orders dated 26th May 1965 and 18th November. 1966 and for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate him in service with retrospective effect from the date of his removal from service with all benefits of arrears of pay, increments, allowances, and all other service benefits to which he would have become entitled if the impugned orders had not been passed.
To the writ petition the return has been filed by Shri V. K. Khanna, I.A.S., Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, on behalf of respondents 1, 2 and 3, wherein it is admitted fiat the petitioner had been appointed initially on probation for two years but it is asserted that the period of his probation was extended for another year.
It is, further, asserted that the petitioner could not be deemed to have been automatically confirmed as Taxation Sub-Inspector after the completion of the maximum probation period of three years unless the competent authority passed a positive/affirmative order to that effect. It has further been emphasized that the petitioner held a temporary post and could not be deemed to have been confirmed after the expiry of the period of probation. The term of his appointment was as under:
So long as he remains temporary, his services are liable to termination on one month''s notice on either side provided that it will be open to Government to pay in lieu of the notice to the official his salary including allowances etc. for the period by which the notice falls short of one month and vice-versa.
It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the termination of his service was in accordance with the service rules and was not by way of punishment and the provisions of Article 311 were not attracted.
On behalf of the petitioner-reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in L.P.A. 354 of 1963, (Dharam Singh v. The State of Punjab) (1965)67 P.L.R. 312, in which it was held as under:
As observed by the Supreme Court in that very decision a rule of service can certainly provide for automatic confirmation in certain contingencies, and, as I view the service rules governing the appellant, they do provide by making it impossible for the period of probation to be extended beyond three years that if the person concerned does continued to hold the same post and his services are not dispensed with at the end of three years and he is not reverted, then he must be taken to have been confirmed. It is clear that the appellant in fact continued to hold the post for more than two years after the maximum period of probation had expired and he must, therefore, be taken to have so continued in substantive capacity.
Against that decision, the State of Punjab filed an appeal in the Supreme Court which was decided on 2nd January, 1968. The State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh 1968 S.L.R. 247, in which their Lordships held as under:
Immediately upon the completion of the extended period of probation on October 1, 1960, the appointing authority could dispense with the services of the respondents if their work or conduct during the period of probation was in the opinion of the authority unsatisfactory. Instead of dispensing with their services on completion of the extended period of probation, the authority continued them in their posts until sometime in 1963, and allowed them to draw annual increments of salary including the increment which fell due on October 1, 1962. The rules did not require them to pass any test or to fulfill any other condition before confirmation. There was no compelling reason for dispensing with their services and re-employing them as temporary employees on October 1, 1960, and the High Court rightly refused to draw the inference that they were so discharged from services and reemployed. In these circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the respondents must be deemed to have been confirmed in their posts. Though the appointing authority did not pass formal orders of confirmation in writing it should be presumed to have passed orders of confirmation by so allowing them to continue in their posts after October 1, 1930 After such confirmation, the authority had no power to dispense with their services under Rule 6(3) on the ground that their work or conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory. It follows that on the dates of the impugned orders, the respondents-had the right to hold their posts. The impugned orders deprived them of this right and amounted to removal from service by way of punishment. The removal from service could not be made without following the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and without conforming to the constitutional requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution. As the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 was not followed and as the constitutional protection of Article 311 was violated, the impugned orders were rightly set aside by the High Court.
That was a case of employees who were officiating in permanent posts and under Rule 6(3) of the Punjab Educational Service (Provincials Cadre) Class III Rules, 1961, they continued to hold those posts on probation in the first instance for one year. The maximum period of probation fixed by the rules was three years and after the expiry of that period the respondents had continued to hold their posts although no formal orders confirming them in their posts were passed. Since they were officiating against permanent posts, they had the right so hold those posts after completion of the period of probation if during that period their services had not been dispensed with but a public servant holding a temporary post on probation does not get a right to hold that post after the expiry of the period of probation because the post is temporary and could be abolished at any time. The service rule set out above also shows that as long as the petitioner was a temporary hand his services could be dispensed with on giving him one month''s notice or pay in lieu of one month''s notice. The termination of his services was, therefore, in accordance with the terms of his employment and was not by way of punishment. The rule laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned case relates to persons who are on probation against permanent posts and does not apply to persons who are on probation against temporary posts. The order terminating the services of the petitioner was therefore, a perfectly legal order and his appeal had been rightly rejected.
No other point has been argued before me.
For the reasons given above this petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs.