Chajju Ram Yadav vs Dyal Singh

A.P. Chowdhri, J.

The brief facts leading to this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are that the respondent Dayal Singh filed complaint (Annexure P1) dated January 6, 1986, against the petitioner under Section 7(1)(d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955. The petitioner was then working as General Manager, District Industries Centre and the respondent was working as Functional Manager (M&E) under him. The respondent belongs to the Chamar community which is one of the Scheduled Castes. In July, 1985, the petitioner read aloud a news item in the newspaper relating to one Mr. Lal Singh, J.C.S., SubDivisional Magistrate, Kurukshetra, uttering a comment which hurt the feelings of the complainant. Again, on October 1, 1985, the petitioner made a remark which had reference to the respondent and he described the respondent in derisive language which hurt his feeling and self respect. With these averments the aforesaid complaint was filed. By a fairly detailed order (Annexure P2) dated April 26, 1986, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, summoned the petitioner for the aforesaid offence. Through the present petition, the petitioner seeks quashing of the complaint as also the summoning order as an abuse of the process of the Court. A reply has been filed by the respondent traversing the averments made in the petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced two contentions. Firstly, it is submitted that the remarks attributed to the petitioner were apparently uttered in the discharge of official duties of the petitioner and, therefore, prior sanction of the appropriate government was necessary before cognizance could be taken. Reliance has been placed in support of the above contention on Pardeep Singh Kalka v. State of Punjab and another, 1985(1) C.L.R 404. His second submission is that facts and circumstances of the case make it plain that the alleged words were of a general character and were not uttered or addressed to any individual including the respondent.

After going through the record and hearing the learned counsel for both the parties I find no substance in the petition. Merely because the petitioner held the office of General Manager did not mean that he could break the law with impunity and seek protection under the provisions relating to sanction for prosecution of public servants. The words ultered were not at all even remotely connected with any official action of the petitioner. In any case without intending to decide this aspect of the case, it is expressly made clear that at the appropriate stage, apart from other objections as may be available, it will be open to the petitioner to urge that such a sanction was required. It will be equally open to the Court below to decide the question according to law.

With regard to the second submission the facts as alleged show that the only person belonging to the Scheduled Caste was the petitioner and uttering of the words denigrating a certain community could possibly have no meaning except to insult the respondent. The authority relied upon by the learned counsel relates to an altogether different Act namely the Untouchability Act and, as pointed out above, there was no element of discharge of official duties on the part of the petitioner while uttering the offensive words.

For the foregoing reasons the petition is dismissed. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear in the trial Court for further proceedings according to law on February 7, 1991.