Chairman of District Cane Service Authority vs Mohd. Usman Ikramul Haq and Others

V.S. Sirpurkar, C.J.—The appeal is by the Chairman of District Cane Service Authority, Udham Singh Nagar. The respondent No. 4 in the writ petition has come up before us in this appeal, being aggrieved by the judgment of learned single Judge, allowing the writ petition.

The writ petition was filed by one of the employees of the appellant Society, as he was sought to be retired at the age of 58 years. It was his case that owing to a Government order dated 26.2.2003, the retiring age of the employees like him, had been increased from 58 to 60 years. The learned single Judge entertained the writ petition and took a view that the said G.O. was applicable to all the Cooperative Societies, and as such the original respondent No. 4, the appellant herein, also being the Cooperative Society, the G.O. was applicable and consequently the retiring age had to be 60 years and not 58 years. It is this judgment of the learned single Judge which is in challenge before us.

The learned counsel for the appellant firstly invited our attention to the said G.O. dated 26.2.2003, the first paragraph of which, reads as under :

^^ftyk lgdkjh cSadksa] ''kh"kZ lgdkjh lfefr;ksa rFkk dSMj lsok cSadksa ,oa mi�e esa dk;Zjr vzU; deZpkfj;ksa @ vf/kdkfj;ksa dh vf/ko"kZrk vk; yksdfgr esa 58 ds LFkku ij 60 o"kZ djus dh jkT;iky egksn; lg"kZ Lohd`fr iznku djrs gSaA**

The plain English translation of this would be as under ;

"The Hon''ble Governor is pleased to enhance the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years of the employees/Officers of District Co-operative Banks, Apex Cooperative Societies and other Cadres Service and also the employees of the Banks and other undertakings."

The learned single Judge took the view that this was applicable to all the Co-operative Societies etc. The learned counsel however drew our attention to Regulation 47 of U. P. Cane Co-operative Service Regulation, 1975. Regulation 47 provides that the age of retirement is 58 years. The learned counsel says that therefore the present G.O. firstly was not applicable and secondly it could not be said that the regulation itself was amended because of the said Government order. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, as well as the Government Pleader, however point out towards paragraph 3 of the said G.O., which runs as under :

^^lEcfU/kr lsok&fu;ekofy;ksa dks rnuqlkj bl gn rd la''kksf/kr le>k tk; A**

Meaning thereby that the concerned service regulations should be deemed to be amended or modified as per this order. If we take this into consideration, the first argument that the regulations were not amended and the concerned regulations still stood unaffected, must be rejected. After all these were only regulations framed u/s 122 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act, therefore they could always be varied by a Government order of the nature. The Government order dated 26.2.2003 was in the nature of the policy statement by the Government under Article 162 of the Constitution of India and it always has the effect of modifying the regulation.

The learned counsel for the appellant however argues that there is no specific mention of the Cane Cooperative Societies in the said G.O., which was a separate entity and which was always treated as separate entity. We are not prepared to read the starting portion of the G.O. in a restricted manner because the language of the G.O. itself is clear and is meant to be broad. It cannot be forgotten that this G.O. has been issued by the Co-operative Department. We cannot countenance the position that only few classes of Co-operative Societies would be contemplated by the G.O. and the employees therein would be benefited depriving the employees of the other classes of Co-operative Societies of that benefit. We do not think that was the idea of the Government. Learned Government Pleader also supports this argument by suggesting that the words ^^cSadks ,oa mi�e esa dk;Zjr vU; deZpkfj;ksa** would include the other Cooperative Societies also.

Learned counsel however drew our attention to the judgment of the learned single Judge, allowing the writ petition, in which the learned single Judge has relied on his own judgment in Writ Petition No. 383 (S/S) of 2003. In that judgment the learned Judge has gone on the term "Registrar" and has held that the term "Registrar" used in the Notification dated 26.2.2003 would include the ''Registrars'' appointed by the Government for all the Co-operative Societies. The learned counsel points out that the copy of this G.O. was not sent to the Registrar, Cane Cooperative Union/Cane Commissioner and therefore probably this G.O. was not meant to take into its sweep the Cane Co-operative Societies. The argument is that if the Government did not think it necessary to send the copy of this G.O. to the Registrar, dealing with the sugar affairs, then it was obvious that the G.O. was not meant for the Cane Co-operative Societies. In our opinion the argument is not correct. In the first place when we go to the judgment of the learned single Judge we find that the learned single Judge was dealing with the same argument and in that the learned Judge held that the very definition of the term "Registrar" was inclusive of all the officers working in all kinds of Co-operative Societies. In our opinion it was not necessary for the learned single Judge to go into the definition of the "Registrar" at all. In order to see as to whether the G.O. included the Cane Co-operative Society or not, all that was required to be taken into consideration, was the language of the G.O. and not the list of the authorities to which the copy of the G.O. was sent. The list of the Officers, to whom the copy was directed to be sent for information has got nothing to do and has no nexus with the real import of the G.O. The argument made before learned single Judge was therefore obviously incorrect. The learned single Judge has otherwise taken the view that the. G.O. included the Cane Co-operative Societies, which view we hereby endorse. In that view we do not think it necessary to entertain this appeal.

The appeal is dismissed.