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Judgment
S.R. Brahmbhatt, J
The petitioners herein and the respondents in Appeal (IC) No. 18/97 from the Industrial Court, Surat have approached this Court by way of
this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and in the matter of Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 challenging the
order passed by the Industrial Court, Surat on 18th May, 1995 allowing the appeal of the workman by quashing and setting aside the order
passed by the Labour Court on 28th February, 1986 in Application (T) No. 233/80 where under the workman had made grievances qua his
compulsory retirement before the age of superannuation. The appellate Court directed that the compulsory retirement, which was brought about on
30th April, 1980 was illegal and hence the workman was ordered to be treated to have been in service till 30.4.1983 and be given all dues
admissible on that basis. This order passed by the appellate Court on 18.5.1995 is assailed in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India.
The facts in brief leading to this petition as could be culled out therefrom deserve to be set out as under:--
The petitioner happened to be the Electricity Board, wherein the workman was working as a Store-keeper at Tapi Sub-Station. The respondent-
workman was born on 14.4.1925, as recorded by the Board in its service record. In view of the Standing Order No. 22, the inefficient employee
and workman could be made to compulsorily retire before the regular date of superannuation on attaining the fixed age of superannuation and in
accordance there with, the workman was made to retire compulsorily on 30.4.1980, at the age of 55 years, in exercise of the discretion and
power under Standing Order No. 22 (9) (1). The workman being aggrieved and dissatisfied with this compulsory retirement, moved Application
(T) being No. 233/80 after following the requisite procedure and the labour Court vide its order dated 28th February, 1986 held that the
Application (T) deserved to be rejected as Standing Order No. 22 permitted such compulsory retirement and when it was not brought about by
way of victimization then, the order of compulsory retirement passed on 30.4.1980 did not call for any interference. This order of the labour Court
rejecting the Application (T) vide order dated 28th February, 1986 was carried out into an Appeal (IC) No. 18/87 before the competent appellate
Court that is Industrial Court, Surat and the Industrial Court, Surat in Appeal (IC) No. 18/87 came to the conclusion that the order of compulsory
retirement not being inconsonance with the provision of Standing Order No. 22 (9) (1), the same was found to be illegal and hence, it was ordered
that the workman was required to be treated as if he was continued in service upto regular age of superannuation. The findings recorded by the
tribunal are based upon the material adduced before the Court and thereafter, the Court has come to this conclusion. Being aggrieved and
dissatisfied with the said order, the present petition is preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
The fact remains to be noted that during the pendency of this petition, the workman died and the legal heirs were brought on record. Both the legal
heirs were served, as recorded by this Court on earlier occasion, but, none appears on their behalf. The learned advocate for the Board placed on
record the communication received from his client intimating him that one of the heir namely Shri Sunil Dhanraj Kapadia i.e. respondent No. 1.1 is
not interested in prosecuting this matter any more or defending the order impugned and he is not interested in outcome of the petition. The same is
taken on record. The learned advocate for the petitioner has invited this Court''s attention to the earlier order passed by this Court (Coram: Ravi
R. Tripathi, J.) on 25.11.2011, wherein the Court has noted that the Labour Officer concerned with the area, who ascertain from the heirs as to
whether they are interested in continuing as respondents and outcome of the matter and the Labour Officer was to report it to the Government
Pleader Office, High Court of Gujarat, but, nothing is produced on record and therefore, this Court (Coram: S.R. Brahmbhatt, J.) on 5.9.2012
issued a notice once again. Today, when the matter was called out, the learned advocate for the Board placed on record the aforesaid
communication dated 14.2.2012, which indicated that one heir is not interested in the outcome of the said matter and as there was no
communication or information or intimation from respondent No. 1.2 the second heir, the Court deemed it fit to decide the matter on merits.
On merits, learned advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the order impugned is contrary to the provision of law as the Court has gone
into examining the justification for passing the order impugned namely order of compulsory retirement, when the relevant provision namely Standing
Order 22 (9) (1) unequivocally provided for Board''s power for compulsorily retire an employee before he attains the regular age of
superannuation, at the age when he is found to be inefficient and/or not fit to be retained till the regular age of superannuation. Then, in such a
situation, no further inquiry into the grounds were warranted and hence, the findings recorded by the appellate Court while quashing and setting
aside the order passed by the competent labour Court on Application (T) was incorrect and requires interference.
This Court is of the considered view that the present petition is required to be dismissed for following reasons.
The elaborate findings recorded by the appellate Court are based upon the material adduced on record and the grounds for bringing out
compulsory retirement are enumerated in the provision itself, then the non-mentioning or non-indicating the ground and when the same is
challenged, it was duty cast upon the employer to adduce those facts and justify the order in question. In the instant case, the Court though has not
accepted the plea of the workman that the Standing Order 22 was not in consonance with the provision of the Standing Order Act, it was not
found as correct submission. The fact remains to be noted that the age of regular superannuation as prevalent in GEB, as per the GEB rules all
along is 58 years and the provision of Standing Order 22 was in vogued. The provision contains several eventualities as noticed by the appellate
Court and therefore, it was duty cast upon the authority to justify its compulsory retirement order when the same is subject matter of challenge,
mere invoking the order in itself would not be sufficient as discussed by the appellate Court elaborately with regard to various authorities and
decisions of this Court and Supreme Court. The Court is therefore, of the view that the present petition is not entertained.
Before parting with the judgment, it is required to be noted that the petition is though styled and filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the
petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot be said to be maintainable as the tribunal, whose order is under challenge is not joined as
a party, as required under the law declared by the full Bench of this Court in the case of ""(The) Bhagyodaya Co-operative Bank Limited v.
Natvarlal K. Patel and another 2011 (3) GLH (FB) 39."" and therefore, this petition is required to be treated as one to have been filed only under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India and bearing in mind the inherent limitation of interfering with the Order of Industrial Court so far as Article
227 of Constitution of India is concerned, the petition is required to be dismissed, as those findings recorded are based upon the material on
record and when the Court has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court and when it is established that their exists no perversity therein and as
no misjustice is pleaded, the interference would not be called for. Hence, on this ground also the order impugned does not call for any interference
and the petition merits rejection and accordingly the petition is rejected. However, there should be no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.
