Chairman And Ors vs Aleya Begum And Ors

Heard Mr. D.C. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. S.C. Das, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondents.

This is an appeal under Section 96 of the CPC from the judgment and decree dated 01.12.2018 delivered in M.S.49 of 2015. The plaintiff-respondents instituted a suit under Section 1A of the Fatal Accident Act, 1855 claiming compensation to the extent of Rs.13,97,200/- for death of one Tarab Ali, the father of the plaintiff-respondents No.1, 3,4 and 5 and the husband of the plaintiff-respondent No.2.

It has been pleaded that for sheer negligence of the appellant one live H.T. line was snapped and fallen on the land owned and possessed by the deceased. While he was in the said paddy land in the early morning for purpose of cultivating and also looking after the crops, he got electrocuted on 05.06.2013 at the age of 51 years. For a long time, when the deceased was not returning home, the plaintiff-respondent No.3 discovered that his father was lying on the ground entangled in a live electric wire. The other people, on registering his cry, appeared there. In that circumstances, the police was informed and the police shifted the dead body to Sonamura Hospital for post-mortem examination as Tarab Ali was electrocuted. Tarab Ali suffered a casual death. Sonamura P.S. Case No.10/2013 was registered under Section 174 of the Cr.P.C. for making inquiry into the unnatural death. After the local investigation, the police had accepted the incidence of accident. But such negligence which did not constitute any individual criminal liability. The said suit was instituted for realisation of damage/compensation from the appellants.

After recording of the evidence, the trial court by the judgment dated 01.12.2018 has observed that the plaintiff-respondents are entitled to compensation to the extent of Rs.7,84,000/- along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the day of institution of the suit. It has been also observed that the wife of the deceased shall be entitled to 50% of the total awarded sum and the remainder of compensation shall be shared by the other plaintiff-respondents in equal share. If the money is not paid as directed that shall carry enhanced interest at the rate of 9% till such realization.

By means of this appeal, the appellants have raised the solitary question which they had raised by filing their written statement before the trial court. The question is whether the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation.

In that respect the trial court while deciding the issues No.1 and 2 together has condoned the delay of 209 days in terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. According to Mr. Nath, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, the said condonation is completely against Section 3 of the Limitation Act as the discount granted by Section 14 of the Limitation Act cannot be extended firstly, for the reason that the permanent lok adalat as constituted under Section 22(b) of the Legal Services Act, 1987 is not a court and Section 14 of the Limitation Act clearly provides that time for the proceeding pursued bonafide in the court having not the jurisdiction can be discounted.

Mr. Nath, learned counsel has stated that the wrong forum should be the court of the first instance or of appeal or of revision against the defendant. For wasting any time by proceeding in such court bonafide that time can only be discounted and taken out from the delay in filing the appropriate action as required under law. Secondly, Mr. Nat, learned counsel has strongly advanced his plea that even the action before the permanent Lok Adalat was instituted after the period of limitation. There is no doubt that the limitation for institution of the suit under Section 1A of the Fatal Accident Act is two years. Mr. Nath, learned counsel has submitted that the date of electrocution is 05.06.2013 and the period of limitation i.e. two years [vide Article 82 of the schedule of Limitation Act, 1963] had expired on 04.06.2015. But action in the permanent Lok Adalat was instituted on 11.06.2015 and the Lok Adalat disposed that case on 06.11.2015.

Since in the Permanent Lok Adalat, the action was instituted after the period of limitation, the plaintiff respondents are not entitled to get any benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, Mr. Nath, learned counsel has contended. From the records, it appears that the suit was instituted on 17.11.2015 in the court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.1, West Tripura, Agartala being M.S.49 of 2015. No other ground has been projected by the appellants.

Mr. S.C. Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has in his reply submitted that the contention that the suit being barred by limitation is not sustainable, is preposterous inasmuch as before instituting the action in the Permanent Lok Adalat, the notice under Section 80(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was served on the state-defendants on 18.04.2015 providing the statutory period to satisfy the demand. According to Section 80(1) of the CPC, the action against the public officer or the state can only be brought only on expiry of two months next after the notice in writing is served, not before that subject to provisions of Section 80(2) of the CPC. Hence, in terms of Section 15 of the Limitation Act, sixty days is available to the plaintiff-respondents. Section 15 of the Limitation Act provides, inter alia, that in computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required, in accordance with the requirements of any law for the time being in force, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. Since such notice is a statutory requirement.

Since, the notice is a statutory requirement under Section 80(1) of the CPC, the said period has to be excluded under Section 15 of the Limitation Act. Thus, the action that has been instituted before the Permanent Lok Adalat has to be deemed to be within time.

In support of his contention, Mr. Das, learned counsel, even though the statutory provisions are very clear, has relied on a decision of the apex court in Shakti Tubes Limited versus State of Bihar and Others reported in (2009) 1 SCC 786 where the apex court has in unequivocal terms, observed that in terms of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if a statutory notice of sixty days is required to be served, the said period shall be excluded for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation.

So far the objection that has been raised questioning the application of Section 14, Mr. Das, learned counsel has submitted that the Permanent Lok Adalat is a statutory forum and the proceeding bonafide before such forum would enable the plaintiff to urge for benefit of discount under Section 14 of the L.A. Act. According to Mr. Das, learned counsel, if discount is allowed, the institution of suit is well within limitation as the suit was instituted on 17.11.2015.

Having appreciated the rival contention this court is of the opinion that there cannot be any amount of doubt that for purpose of serving a statutory notice, if any time is to be given to the defendants that statutory time has to be added with the period of limitation for purpose of instituting any suit or action. So far the other material objection as raised is that in the given circumstances, implying the provisions for discount under Section 14 was grossly illegal. This court is of the view that Section 22(b) of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 itself provides that every award of Permanent Lok Adalat under the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 shall be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court and the Civil Court having local jurisdiction shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by the said court. As such, the Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under Section 22(b) of the Legal Services Authority Act has all trappings of a court and it has to be considered as the court for purpose of discounting under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.

Having observed thus, this court finds that the trial court who did not commit any wrong by excluding the period that was wasted in the proceeding before the Permanent Lok Adalat as no claim of the plaintiff-respondents could have been determined except under a suit instituted under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855.

Having observed thus, this court does not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly, the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 01.12.2018 delivered in M.S.49 of 2015 stands affirmed.

Draw the decree accordingly.

Send down the records thereafter.