Centre of Indian Trade Unions and Another vs State of M.P. and Others

D.M. Dharmadhikari, J.

The petitioner No. 1, Centre of Indian Trade Unions claims to be Confederation of Indian Trade Unions of different industries. Petitioner No. 2 M. P. Lawyers Union, claims to be State Unit of All India Lawyer''s Union.

Two petitioners have approached this Court in what they now describe at Public Interest Litigation, to assail the policy of the State Government, published in the newspaper by name ''Acharan'' dated 27.7.1994 (Annexure P/l). The impugned policy contained in the letter dated 30.7.1994, framed by the State of Madhya Pradesh in its General Administration Department, is now on record with the return filed by the respondents / State and is marked as Annexure R/l. The policy of the State Government, contained in its letter (Annexure R/l), is in the nature of advice or instruction to all Departments of the State of Madhya Pradesh to discontinue the services of daily-rated employees who were recruited after 31.12.1988 on different posts. In the policy-decision, it has been observed that the State Government has information in its possession that ignoring the earlier G. A. D. instructions, issued on 15.9.1989, which had imposed complete ban on recruitment of daily-rated employees, various Departments made appointments and employees so appointed have to be terminated to reduce the financial burden on the State. The impugned policy, letter contains directions to the concerned authorities in various Departments of the State to scrutinise the cases of appointments made during the ban period or after 31.12.1988 and terminate their services latest by 1st of August, 1994.

The two petitioner Unions which represent industrial workers and Lawyers respectively, contend that the impugned policy letter, issued on 30.7.1994, containing the directions to authorities in various Departments working under it, to forthwith terminate by 1.8.1994 the services of all daily rated workers who came to be employed after 31.12.1988 is arbitrary and in breach of principles of natural justice. It is submitted that the impugned policy containing direction for large scale termination of daily-rated employees, ignores the provisions contained in several industrial enactments (Central and State). It is submitted that the employees likely to be affected are all poor, oppressed and unorganised and they have no common forum of their own to approach this Court for relief. The petitioners, thus, claim a right to champion their cause because, it is said, that all daily-rated employees are low-paid, poor and unable to approach this Court individually.

Before examining the stand taken by the State Government in its return to the petition as also in its oral submission made on its behalf by the learned Additional Advocate General, Shri Anup Chaudhari, it is necessary to mention the interim directions made by this Court during pendency of this petition. On the date this petition came up for hearing on admission and grant of interim relief before a Division Bench of this Court, in its order passed on 1.8.1994, it prima facie found that implementation of the impugned policy-decision of the State Government by the concerned authorities in making large-scale terminations of daily rated workers would be in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, M. P. Industrial (Employees Standing Orders) Act, 1961 and the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench, therefore, directed that until hearing of the petition by this Court, "the State or its instrumentalities should not take any action to terminate the services of any such employee in pursuance of the policy decision".

At the time of hearing of this petition, the learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the respondent/State; raised a preliminary objection that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present so-called Public Interest Litigation. It is contended mat the grievance brought before this Court by the two Unions is "Service matter'''' which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Courts expressly barred in relation to that matter under Article 323-A of the Constitution read with Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1985). It is contended that in the name of Public Interest Litigation, this Court cannot assume jurisdiction on a forbidden subject relating to the conditions of service of daily-rated employees. It is submitted that the forum of State Administrative Tribunal is open to daily-rated employees, as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Deep Chand Pandey and another, Reliance is also placed in support of the preliminary objection, based on want of this Court, "the State or its instrumentalities should not take any action to terminate the services of any such employee in pursuance of the policy decision."

At the time of hearing of this petition, the learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the respondent/State; raised a preliminary objection that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present so-called Public Interest Litigation. It is contended that the grievance brought before this Court by the two Unions is "service matter" which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Administrative Tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is expressly barred in relation to that matter under Article 323-A of the Constitution read with Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1985). It is contended that in the name of public Interest Litigation, this Court cannot assume jurisdiction on a forbidden subject relating to the conditions of a service of daily-rated employees. It is submitted that the forum of State Administrative Tribunal is open to daily-rated employees, as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Deep Chand Pandey and another, Reliance is also placed in support of the preliminary objection, based on want of the policy-decision was taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh at Bhopal which was made applicable to all daily-rated employees in all the Departments of the State of Madhya Pradesh. An action to challenge the policy decision, therefore, could only be filed at the Main Seat of this Court and not at the Gwalior Bench where no part of cause of action arises.

In reply to the first ground of preliminary objection, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Slid H. N. Upadhyaya and Shri Arum Mishra, Advocates, submitted that under the provisions of the Act of 1985, and the rules framed thereunder, a Public Interest Litigation cannot be filed in and entertained by the Tribunal. The Tribunal is competent to entertain individual disputes and complaints with regard to "service matters'''' defined in Section 3 (q) of the Act of 1985. Reference is made to Full Bench decision of Kerala Central Administrative Tribunal in K. Murleedharan v. S. Padmakumar (1993) 25 ATC 95 and a decision of the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal in Madan Mohan Bhandari v. State of M.P., reported in 1989 MPLSR 9. In the above decision, the M. P. Tribunal has taken a view that the public interest litigation cannot be filed in the Administrative Tribunal.

The second limb of the argument in reply to the preliminary objection is that majority of the daily-rated employees are employed in such Departments and branches of the Government which fall within the definition of "Industry'''' under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and as industrial workers, they have a choice of forum, either to approach the Industrial or Labour Court (the State or Central, as the case may be) or Administrative Tribunal under the Act of 1985. It is submitted that service matters with regard to industrial workmen do not fall outside the jurisdiction of this Court and they arc expressly saved u/s 28 (b) of the Act of 1985.

On the question of jurisdiction of the Bench of this Court at Gwalior, lire reply on behalf of the petitioners is that the impugned policy-decision may have emanated from the concerned Department of the State located in the capital at Bhopal, but large number of employees in the Gwalior region are likely to be affected by it. Part of the cause of action, therefore, does arise within the jurisdiction of the Gwalior Bench of this Court and the petition could be entertained here.

In order to ''decide the first preliminary objection with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court in the light of the bar contained in Section 28 of the Act of 1985 read with Article 323-A of the Constitution, it would be necessary to examine the relevant provision. Article 329-A of the Constitution empowers the Parliament by law to constitute Administrative Tribunal for adjudication and trial of "dispute and complaints" with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public service or those in connection wide the affairs of the Union or of any State. Sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 323-A expressly empowers the Parliament by law to exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts including of the High Court with respect of the "dispute or complaints'''' referred to in clause (1) of the said Article. The Act of 1985 has been held to be a valid piece of legislation referable to Article 323-A of the Constitution and the Supreme Court in the case of Sampat Kumar (supra) upheld its validity and repelled challenge to the same on the ground that Constitution permits conferral of jurisdiction on Tribunal in respect of Service-matters and provides for constitution of a forum of Tribunal as substitute of High Court.

The expression "service matters" is defined in Section 3 (q) of the Act of 1985.

Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.-

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(q) "service matters" in relation to a person means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respect -

(i) remuneration (including allowances) pension or other retirement benefits;

(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, revision, premature retirement and superannuation;

(iii) leave of any kind;

(iv) disciplinary matters; or

(v) any other matter whatsoever;

The provisions contained in Section 28 of the Act of 1985, barring the jurisdiction of the High Court read as under:

Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. - On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, power and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matter concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any service of persons appointed to any service or post, no Court except. -

(a) the Supreme Court; or

(b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or any other corresponding law for the time being in force shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such requirement or such service matters.

From the provisions aforesaid, undoubtedly, jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted on any matter which is "service matter" as defined in Section 3 (q) of the Act of 1985. A controversy raised, however, before us is whether the present so-called Public Interest Litigation is a "service matter" as defined in Section 3 (q) of the Act of 1985 in which the jurisdiction of this Court is completely excluded. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, they have approached this Court not for decision of any dispute or complaint with regard to an individual daily rated employee or class of employees. According to the petitioners, this Public Interest Litigation has been brought before this Court and is directed against the policy-decision of the State Government which is likely to have ill effect on the society in general as it would generate large scale unemployment and social discontent. The petitioners submit that they do not claim relief in favour of any individual workman or class of workmen employed in the State as daily-rated employee. What they have challenged is that the policy-decision taken to make wholesale termination of all daily rated workers en masse is not fair, reasonable and just. Implementation of it will have far reaching adverse effects on society and working class in particular.

On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State, submits that whatever may be the form of the petition, in substance, what the petitioners claim is relief against apprehended termination of employees throughout the State, in various Departments of the State working on daily-wages. It is. therefore, clearly a "service matter'''' within the wider definition of the expression contained in Section 3 (q) and particularly, sub-clause (v) thereof which expressly includes within the expression "any other matter whatsoever".

In order to appreciate the contention advanced by the learned counsel before us, we have carefully perused the contents of the petition which have been filed by the two Unions representing the employees and the lawyers. The only relief claimed is for quashing the policy-decision which was published in the news items (Annexure P/l) with a view to protect the life and livelihood of large number of daily-rated employees in the State of Madhya Pradesh. In the petition, there is no mention of any particular employee or employees and no relief is claimed in relation to any individual employee or employees. Public Interest Litigation is the technique encouraged by this Court to extend benefit and protection conferred by the Constitution to underprivileged, poor and the needy, who because of their social and economic disability, are unable to approach Court themselves. The public-spirited citizens, groups or association are, therefore, allowed to approach the Court on behalf of such class of underprivileged sections of the Society and for that purpose, the strict rule of locus standi is relaxed. The question before us is whether the provisions contained in Section 28 take away the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its constitutional power under Article 226 so as to extend constitutional protection to such poor and needy persons who can bring their cause only through public-spirited citizens, groups or associations. Attention of this Court was invited to Rule 4 (5) of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987 which allows the application to be jointly filed in favour of a class, group or category of employees through association representing such class, but only with the permission of the Tribunal. The exact wordings of Rule 4 (5) (a) and (b) are as under:

Procedure for filing applications. -

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(5) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) to (3), the Tribunal may permit more than one person to join together and file a single application if it is satisfied, having regard to the cause of action and the nature of relief prayed for, that they have a common interest in the matter.

(b) Such permission may also be granted to an association representing the persons desirous of joining in a single application provided, however, that the application shall disclose the class, grade, categories of persons on whose behalf it has been filed : Provided that at least one affected person joins such an application. 14. Two questions need to be considered for deciding the preliminary objection regarding want of jurisdiction of this Court. Firstly, whether the petition, as disclosed from its contents, is "service matter'''' within the definition contained in Section 3 (q) of the Act of 1985. Secondly, whether the petition, in its present form, by the two units or associations can be filed in the Tribunal. As the provisions of Article 323-A and the Act of 1985, quoted above, would go to show that the Tribunal is constituted to try and adjudicate upon "disputes and complaints" with regard to the service conditions. The question is whether a public interest litigation brought by public-spirited citizens, groups or associations, in the interest of public in general or society in general is a dispute and complaint with regard to service matter. As has been held by the Supreme Court in a series of cases on Public Interest Litigation that the Court entertains such litigation at the instance of citizens, groups or persons, who are not themselves directly affected, to extend the benefits and protection available in the Constitution to the poor and the needy who have no means of direct access to the Court. The public Interest Litigation, therefore, is basically a litigation in favour of general public and society. In the instant case, the two petitioners, Unions, seek to assail only the policy-decision of the State Government to en masse terminate a large number of daily-rated employees with effect from a particular date and without any provisions in the policy-decision that due opportunity against the proposed termination would be granted to them under the relevant law applicable to their service conditions. The petitioners in the petition as also in their oral submission stated that the State in the Directive Principles of State policy contained in the Constitution is enjoined to generate employment instead of rendering a large number of persons unemployed. It is also stated that the implementation of such harsh and arbitrary policy of mass termination might result in resentment, agitation and large-scale unemployment which is not conducive to a peaceful social order. Such a petition with such a relief claimed in it cannot constitute "service matter'''' and is not in the nature of the "dispute and complaint'''' by any individual employee or class of employees. It may be noticed that even under the procedure in Rule 4 (5), a joint application for a class, group or category of employees can be preferred with the permission of the Tribunal only by an association who represents such employees, meaning thereby that such employees should be either members of the association or should be affiliated to it. The two petitioners Unions nowhere stated that the daily-rated employees likely to be affected by the implementation of the impugned policy are either their members or, in any manner, associated with them so as to give them a right to legally represent them before the Tribunal. It would not be possible, therefore, for these two Unions to file a case before the Tribunal for and on behalf of the employees likely to be affected by the implementation of the impugned policy. In the opinion of this Court, therefore, the litigation brought before this Court is not a "service matter" as defined by Section 3 (q) of the Act of 1985 which can be held to be exclusively entertainable by the Tribunal and in which the jurisdiction of this Court is barred. At this stage, it may be stated that the High Court is a Constitutional Court with a duty to uphold the Constitution and the laws which is to be distinguished from a Tribunal which may be constituted under a law permitted to be enacted by the Parliament by the provisions of Article 323-A of the Constitution. Any provision of law, therefore, placing a bar on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court has to be strictly construed. There is no express bar in the provisions of Section 28 or Article 323-A of the Constitution on the High Court to entertain a Public Interest Litigation in order to extend helping hand to the poor, needy and down-trodden and to enforce their fundamental right. Public Interest Litigation is different from traditional model of adversarial litigation. This is endorsed by the Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta Vs. President of India and Others, In a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Forward Construction Co. and Others Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and Others, distinction is shown between the public interest litigation and adversarial litigation in the following words :

While Public Interest Litigation is brought before the Court not for the purpose of enforcing the right of individual against another, as happens in the case of ordinary litigation, it is intended to prosecute and vindicate public interest which demands that violation of constitutional or legal rights of a large, number of people, who are poor, ignorant or socially and economically in disadvantaged position, should not go unnoticed, underdressed for that would be destructive of the rule of law.

A service dispute taken to an Administrative Tribunal under the Act of 1985, therefore, cannot be equated with the Public Interest Litigation as the latter is of a different kind of litigation altogether. Few more identifying or distinguishing features of Public Interest Litigation are, amongst others, the following:-

(i) Relief is often prospective, flexible and remedial having broad impact on many persons, rather than limited to Redressal of past wrong given only to a party to the litigation.

(ii) The Subject-matter of the laws unities a ''grievance'' about public policy, and is not a private suit filed. See, Abram Chayes "The Role of Judge in Public Law Litigation'''' 89 HLR. 7,128 (May 1976), at p. 1303 as have been noted in the Book "Public Interest Litigation in quest of Justice'''' by Dr. Sonia Hurra.

The other kind of distinction between the two kinds of litigation, i. e. traditional adversarial and the Public Interest, is that in the former, "the ''right'' and ''remedy'' are totally irritated. The ''form of relief is designed ad hoc. It does not flow from the determination of liability. The determination of liability is not simply a pronouncement of legal consequences of past events. But, it is, to some extent, a prediction of what is likely to be in future. In Public Interest Litigation ''relief is not terminal, compensatory transfer, but is it an effort'' to devise a programme to contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the range of interests involved.

See Abram Chayes "The Role of Judge in Public Law Litigation" 89 Harvard Law Review, No. 7,128 (May 1976) at p. 1293 at 1294. "Public Interest Litigation is a strategy evolved by the judiciary to give teeth to law, empowering the victims to use to courts to force the government to fulfill what it commits. It is a check to see that statutes are implemented as legislatures intended them to be." [See, "Public Interest Litigation. In Quest of Justice" by Dr. Sonia Hurra, at p. 258.]

The present Public Interest Litigation is also aimed at avoiding the ill effect of the impugned policy-decision and in fact, is an attempt to check future action proposed to be taken thereunder which, according to the petitioners, is likely to adversely affect a large number of daily-rated employees throughout the State who are poor, ignorant and socially and economically in disadvantaged position. They also constitute a section of the society which is unorganised and has no forum of its own to agitate for Redressal of their grievance. In the petition, no relief is claimed on any "service matter'''' as the policy-decision had yet to be implemented when the two petitioners approached this Court. The grievance brought before this Court in this case is about the public policy and not any dispute or complaint with regard to a "service matter". Such a Public Interest Litigation cannot be entertained by the Administrative Tribunal having a limited jurisdiction on a specified field conferred under the Act and by the provisions of Article 323-A of the Constitution. This Court, as a Constitutional Court, conferred with powers to issue writ and direction, both for enforcement of fundamental right, legal right and for any other purpose, has a plenary and much wider jurisdiction than that conferred on Tribunal. May be, that the Public Interest Litigation brought before it, to some extent, will require issuance of writ or direction having some relation with the "service matter'''' affecting a small or large section of servants employed by the State. The provisions of the Act of 1985 and the rules framed thereunder do not permit Tribunal to entertain a Public Interest Litigation at the instance of public spirited citizens or bodies who have no locus standi in the matter brought before it. No objection, therefore, can be taken to the jurisdiction of this Court in entertaining the present Public Interest Litigation for the limited purpose of examining whether the impugned policy is in accordance with the Constituently and statutory law or whether its implementation would result in infraction of Constitutional and legal rights of a large number of employees. The relief that this Court can grant in this litigation is to be of a general nature and which cannot be granted to the employees in the service dispute before the Tribunal.

For the reasons aforesaid, we overrule the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State. In the instant subject-matter which is in the nature of a Public Interest Litigation, the jurisdiction of this Court is not barred and exclusive jurisdiction does not vest in the State Tribunal.

The other preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of this petition at the Gwalior Bench of the Court has very little substance. It is true that the policy decision is taken at the seat of the Government in the capital at Bhopal, but large number of employees in the Gwalior region are likely to be affected by it. Contention on behalf of the State cannot be accepted that no part of cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Gwalior Bench. The second preliminary objection, therefore, is also rejected.

We now proceed to decide the petition on merits. The learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the impugned decision is unjust and arbitrary as it is taken on 30.7.1994 with a direction contained therein to discontinue the services of daily-rated employees in various departments from 1.8.1994. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that but for the timely intervention made by this Court by granting an interim relief, a large scale termination of daily-rated employees would have taken place in the whole of the State giving rise to around discontent and suffering to large number of employees and their families. The learned counsel submitted that by issuing the direction contained in the policy proposing termination of all daily-rated employees employed after 31.12.1988, the State Government totally ignored that even daily rated employees have some protection of law in various State and Central enactments, such as Industrial Disputes Act, M. P. Standing (Standing Orders) Act and in the Constitution. It was also contended that a long continuance in service on daily basis gives rise to a right to such employees for being considered for regularisation in service. Learned Counsel for the petitioners state that proposed termination of employment abruptly without giving any notice is, in fact, deprivation of ''right to life'' which includes ''right to livelihood'' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that seen from any angle of the Constitution and the relevant laws, the policy-decision is unduly harsh, illegal and apparently unconstitutional.

The learned Additional Advocate General, for the State, in reply to the arguments advanced on merits of the case, firstly submits that the impugned policy decision is being misinterpreted by the petitioners. It came to the notice of the State Government that large scale illegal and unauthorised recruitments were made in various Departments of employees on daily basis in disobedience and breach of clear directions earlier issued by the State Government from time to lime, copies of which are annexed to the return as Annexure R/2 and R/3. He submitted that in fact, a complete ban was imposed by the State Government by circular dated 1.4.1987 on all daily rated employment. Disregarding the clear instructions and directives of the State Government, many authorities in many departments of the State made appointments on daily-wage basis which are illegal. It is for the above reason that a decision was taken by the State Government to weed out all such employees, illegally appointed through the back-door. It is also submitted that continuance of such large scale illegal appointments on daily wages is causing tremendous financial strain on the public exchequer and the burden cannot be allowed to be borne by the State Government when there is no work for such employees and there are no sanctioned posts on which their services can be utilised. The learned Additional Advocate General submits that no right of regularisation exists either in the Constitution or any Law. Where the State Government finds that appointments are illegal and there is surplus labour employed, it has an inherent right to make large-scale retrenchments. The impugned policy nowhere says that the concerned Department will not comply with the necessary formalities provided in various enactments such as of paying retrenchment compensation, wherever necessary u/s 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, service of notice or payment of salary in lieu therefore as a condition precedent for retrenchment. The learned Additional Advocate General read in detail the impugned policy to show that due discretion has been left in it to the concerned authorities to review and scrutinise the cases of individual employees under their department and to take suitable steps only in case it is found that initial appointment was made during the ban period or contrary to the directions of the State Government. He submitted that the impugned policy subserve a common public interest of reducing financial burden on the State exchequer and there is no vice in such policy which needs Redressal in this so called Public Interest Litigation. So far as direction contained in the impugned policy, issued on 30.7.1994 to discontinue service of daily-rated employees w. e. from 1. 8.1994, who came in employment after 31.12.1988, is concerned, the learned Additional Advocate General submits that because of the intervention of this Court by way of interim direction, no terminations have, in fact, taken place and the date specified, i.e. 1st of August, 1994 has already expired on which the action was to take place. Our attention is invited specifically to a portion of the averments contained in paras 9 and 10 of the additional return submitted on behalf of the State. They read as under:

As to para 9 of the rejoinder the contention of the petition that services of the employees will be discontinued without following the statutory provisions is meritless. As has been stated above all precautions have been taken to follow the procedure and statutory provisions and the respondent submits that all the workers who will be discontinued will be discontinued only after following the statutory provisions and not otherwise.

That the contention of the petitioner that policy Annexure R-I is against the fundamental right and violative of Article 14,16 & 21 of the constitution of India is totally erroneous. The policy is neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional nor unreasonable as is evident from the policy. If any retrenchment compensation will be payable to the workers who will be discontinued all mandatory and statutory conditions will be complied and after scrutinising the cases as required under the Act or law applicable, the action will be taken.

Relying on the above-quoted averments in the return, it is stated that whatever little vice or rigour, the impugned policy-decision contains, has been softened by the timely intervention of this Court. Type present stand of the State Government is that no daily rated employees shall be terminated abruptly without complying with the due provisions of the relevant industrial law applicable to him. Wherever necessary, notice will be served and retrenchment compensation shall be paid. With regard to their nature of appointments, due scrutiny and review shall be made by the concerned authority before taking the action. In the light of the above averments and the changed stand, it is urged that no interference should be made by this Court in the policy decision of the State Government which has been taken in general public interest, may be that it may adversely affect a section of the daily-rated employees. It is also pointed out from the policy that no terminations are to take place of categories of employees employed on work-charged or contingency service as is mentioned in para 5 of the impugned letter. It is also pointed out that the proposed retrenched daily rated employees found to have been either illegally appointed or appointed during the ban period would not be rendered jobless, but have been directed to be considered for appointment in various projects in the Departments. The concerned departments have been advised to provide alternative avenues of employments to such retrenched employees.

The Constitution does not expressly guarantee any fundamental right to a citizen of ''right to work or employment'' the Directive Principles under Article 39 (d) and 41 to promote opportunities of employment and to ''equal pay for equal work'' have been read by the Court as a right to receive equal treatment in the matter of employment guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (See Randhir Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 879 ; Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P and T Department Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ; Dhirendra Chamoli and Another Vs. State of U.P., ; Dharwar District PWD Employee''s Assn. v. State of Karnataka (1990) 2 SCC 393; Surinder Singh and Another Vs. Engineer-in-chief, C.P.W.D. and Others,

Recognition of this right or equality gave rise to a claim for being considered for regularisation in service by those who were denied "equal pay for equal work". This claim, however, cannot affect the right of employer to terminate services of such employees who are either unfit, inefficient or renderable surplus. No employee can be forced on the employer when his services are found undesirable or not needed. The only constitutional inhibition under Articles 14 & 16 read with Articles 309 and 311 of the Constitution, is that a termination of service should not be arbitrarily made, meaning thereby that it should be based on some cogent existing reason and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

No exception can, therefore, be taken to the decision of the Government to weed out illegally appointed daily-rated employees or to retrench such number of employees who are found surplus.

It is argued that the Supreme Court in the case of Olga Tellis and Others Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, has recognised "right to life", guaranteed under Article 21 to include in it "right to livelihood". Properly understood, the above decision cannot be read as recognising in every citizen an additional right to work or employment. It is not expressly guaranteed in the Constitution. It is only a Constitutional goal contained in Directive Principles of State Policy under Article 41 of the Constitution of India. The Articles guaranteeing fundamental rights in the Constitution can be interpreted by the Court, but they do not confer any power on it to read new fundamental rights in the Constitution. Such power does not exist in the Court as it would amount to usurping constituent power to frame a Constitution which, in a democratic policy, vests, only in the people.

The decision in Olga Telllis (supra) has, therefore, to be understood to mean that source of livelihood of a citizen cannot be snatched from him in circumstances and manner that thereby he is deprived of his life. Olga Tells (supra) was the case of pavements dwellers engaged in petty occupation for their livelihood who were suddenly threatened to be evicted by Bombay Municipal Corporation without giving them any time to shift to an alternative place. The facts in that case, therefore, distinguish it from the case in hand and the law laid down therein has to be understood in the light of the facts found therein.

An employee engaged on specific statutory or non-statutory terms of contract can claim no right in the Constitution against his employer of being continued in uninterrupted service regardless of the nature and terms of his appointment and the need of the employer. Right in a master to terminate services of his servant, subject to the compliance of any law on the subject, is inherent in his right to employ or engage a servant. Negation of such right to a master would not be conducive to public interest and would compel him to suffer inefficiency and deprive the needy and deserving of due opportunity of employment.

The State has now come forward in its return clearly that no employee shall be terminated abruptly without complying with the provisions of relevant industrial or service laws applicable to his case. It has also been stated that the concerned authorities in the concerned departments shall be given the opportunity to scrutinise each case before taking any adverse action against the individual employee or calls of employees. The date specified in the policy-decision, i. e., 1st August, 1994 has long back expired and no new date has been fixed or specified proposing the date on which the contemplated action shall come into effect. The stand now taken by the State in its return in the matter of implementation of its policy impugned in this petition, leave no scope for any arbitrariness and likelihood of commission of any illegality.

The last question which remains is as to what relief the two petitioners, describing themselves as Unions, are entitled to and which this Court can grant in a Public Interest Litigation of the present kind. As has been stated above, this Court cannot trench upon the jurisdiction in "service matters" exclusively reserved in the Act of 1985 to the Tribunal. The power of this Court is restricted to giving relief in a Public Interest Litigation on such a matter to a class of citizens who are disabled or incapacitated to approach the appropriate forum individual or through an association representing them. As has already been stated above, the impugned policy-decision is not liable to be quashed as with the changed stand of the State, it can no longer be described as arbitrary. The specified date therein, i, e, 1st August, 1994 on which the contemplated action was to take place is already over. This Court has stayed all proposed terminations under it. The respondent / State, in its return and in oral submission made on its behalf by the Additional Advocate General, has committed itself to scrutinise all individual cases of daily-rated employees through its concerned authorities in the concerned department and has now agreed before us to comply with all necessary formalities prescribed in several industrial and labour laws (State or Central) and / or any statutory or non statutory service rules or regulations applicable on the service conditions of particular employees or class of employees. The view, if any, in the impugned policy-decision, thus, stands removed.

In the course of hearing, Shri Aran Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the daily-rated employees likely to be affected by the policy-decision have a right of being considered for regularisation in service. Regularisation in service as of right cannot be claimed. An opportunity of being considered for regularisation in service is clearly a "service matter'''' and grievance with regard to it can be canvassed by taking it to the appropriate forum available to the employees singly or jointly under the relevant labour or industrial laws in the Central or State legislation or Administrative Tribunal under the Act of 1985.

We do not find any ground for quashing the impugned policy-decision which we hold as valid with the change made in it and the averments now made in the return by the State. We also do not think that any writ or directions are required to be issued in general public interest or in the interest of the class of daily rated employees covered by the policy.

With the above observations, the petition stands disposed of. Both the petitioners have brought a Public Interest Litigation to this Court at their own costs to interdict an objectionable conduct of the State. They are entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of litigation suffered by them. We, therefore, direct that the respondent should pay a sum of Rs. 500/- each to the two petitioners as costs.