Central Transmission Utility Of India vs Rays Power Infra Limited & Ors.

(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA)

These appeals arise out of the common order dated 09.09.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 35002/2024 c/w Writ Petition No. 21533/2024 (GM-RES). By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge partly allowed the writ petitions, set aside the orders dated 30.08.2024, 02.09.2024 and 09.09.2024 issued by the Central Transmission Utility of India Limited (CTUIL). Since all the appeals arise from the common order, they have been heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.

The Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) in exercise of its powers under Sections 79 and 178 of the Electricity Act, 2003 [Electricity Act], notified the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Grant of Connectivity, Long-term Access and Medium-term Open Access in inter-State Transmission and related matters) Regulations, 2009 [Connectivity Regulations, 2009] governing grant of connectivity to the Inter-State Transmission System (ISTS). The concept of a power park developer was introduced for the first time by the Fifth Amendment to the Connectivity Regulations, 2009, notified on 15.05.2015, pursuant to the policy initiatives of the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), where under a company authorised by the Central Government as a Solar Power Park Developer was recognised as an eligible applicant for connectivity, and its application could be considered by the Central Transmission Utility only if it was so authorized. By the Seventh Amendment, notified on 09.01.2019, the expression was widened to 'Renewable Power Park Developer' (RPPD) and the power to authorize such a developer was extended to the State Governments as well.

The regulatory framework was thereafter replaced by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Connectivity and General Network Access to the Inter-State Transmission System) Regulations, 2022 [GNA Regulations] which came into force on 07.06.2022 and repealed the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 while retaining the requirement of governmental authorisation for an RPPD. Regulation 5.8(vii) of the GNA Regulations, as originally framed, required an RPPD to furnish, with its application for connectivity, an authorisation issued by the Central Government or the State Government, as applicable, to undertake infrastructural activities including arrangement for connectivity on behalf of solar or wind power generators. By the First Amendment Regulations notified on 01.04.2023 and again by Second Amendment notified on 19.06.2024, Clause (vii) of Regulation 5.8 was substituted in its present form, where under the authorisation [sub-clause (a)] is required to be furnished in combination with the prescribed land documents [sub-clause (b)] or a bank guarantee [sub-clause (c)]. By the Second Amendment Regulations notified on 19.06.2024, which came into effect from 15.07.2024, sub-clauses (b) and (c) were substituted and, significantly, Regulation 3.5 was substituted to provide that an application containing deficiencies other than the notified minor deficiencies shall be treated as incomplete and rejected.

The brief facts relating to the Writ Petitions are :

M/s Rays Power Infra Limited [the writ petitioner], claiming to be an RPPD, proposed to establish renewable energy parks in the State of Karnataka with connectivity to ISTS at the Tumkur II and Bellary pooling sub-stations. By e-mail dated 13.06.2024 (supplemented on 13.09.2024), it requested the State Government and the Karnataka Renewable Energy Development Limited [KREDL] to issue the authorisation contemplated under Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) without insisting upon a Government Order. As no decision was forthcoming, it instituted W.P No. 21533/2024 (GM-RES) on 07.08.2024 seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the State Government and/or KREDL have the power to issue such authorisation and a direction to consider its application. By an interim order dated 08.08.2024, CTUIL was directed to consider the petitioner's application for grant of connectivity on the basis of seniority, without insisting on the authorisation. Between 13.08.2024 and 29.08.2024, the petitioner, through its special purpose vehicles [SPVs], submitted applications before CTUIL seeking connectivity at the Tumkur-II and Bellary sub-stations (aggregating 890 MW and 600 MW respectively). In terms of the amended Regulation 3.5, CTUIL had, on 15.07.2024, published a list of deficiencies categorising the absence of the authorisation under Regulation 5.8 (vii)(a) as a major deficiency; accordingly, by orders dated 30.08.2024, 02.09.2024 and 09.09.2024, CTUIL closed the applications on the ground that the mandatory authorisation had not been furnished.

The petitioner thereafter amended the writ petition and specifically challenged the constitutional validity of Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) on the ground that it violates Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India by imposing an additional requirement only upon RPPDs, while similarly situated renewable energy developers are not subjected to such a condition. It was further contended that neither the GNA Regulations nor the Karnataka Renewable Energy Policy 2022-2027 [the RE Policy] prescribes any procedure, competent authority or timeline for grant of such authorisation, rendering the requirement arbitrary and impossible to comply with.

During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, the writ petitioners and its five SPVs [hereafter collectively referred to as ‘the writ petitioners’] instituted W.P. No.35002/2024 on 19.12.2024 seeking a direction to the State Government to grant the authorisation contemplated under Regulation 5.8(vii)(a), without insisting upon issuance of a separate Government Order, within a fixed time. By an interim order dated 19.12.2024, the State Government was directed to consider the petitioners' application for grant of authorisation without insisting on the submission of a Government Order specifically approving the petitioners' projects at Tumkur and Bellary.^{11.The State's appeal against the said order, being W.A. No.1938/2024, was subsequently closed as infructuous on 08.10.2025 upon disposal of the writ petitions.} By further interim order dated 16.01.2025, CTUIL was directed to reserve 890 MW at the Tumkur-II sub-station and 600 MW at Bellary sub-station for allotment to the petitioners, while remaining free to grant connectivity to other applicants beyond the reserved portion, until further orders.

During the pendency of the writ petitions, the petitioners sought leave to approach CERC for relaxation of the requirement of authorisation in exercise of its power under Regulation 41 of the GNA Regulations. By order dated 17.03.2025, the learned Single Judge permitted the petitioners to make a representation and directed CERC to consider the same. The petitioners' representation dated 10.03.2025 was, however, rejected by CERC by its order dated 11.04.2025, holding, inter alia, that the requirement of authorisation is neither prohibitive nor discriminatory, and that it was open to the petitioners to seek the authorisation of the Central Government (MNRE) under Mode-6 of the Solar Park Scheme.

By the common order under appeal, the learned Single Judge partly allowed the writ petitions. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Reliance Energy Limited v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Ltd.,^{22.(2007) 8 SCC 1} the learned Single Judge held that the petitioners had been denied a level playing field, inasmuch as the GNA Regulations prescribe no guidelines or timeframe for the competent Government to grant the authorisation; that the State Government had compounded the difficulty by insisting upon a Government Order, although no such requirement is found in the GNA Regulations; that CERC, though empowered to remove difficulties, had failed in its duty to do so; and that in a single queue operated on a first-come-first-served basis, the connectivity would stand exhausted by the time an RPPD secured the authorisation. Accordingly, the learned Single Judge;

The learned Single Judge, however, consciously did not strike down or read down Regulation 5.8(vii)(a). Subsequently, by order dated 24.10.2025 passed on I.A. No.6/2025 filed by the writ petitioners, the learned Single Judge modified the order dated 09.09.2025 by;

Aggrieved by the common order, (i) M/s Rays Power Infra Limited has preferred W.A. No. 569/2026, and along with its five SPVs, W.A. No. 570/2026, contending that the learned Single Judge failed to adjudicate the constitutional challenge to Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) and granted only conditional relief.

During the pendency of these appeals, the Government of Karnataka issued the requisite authorisation in favour of M/s Rays Power Infra Limited on 31.01.2026. By an interim order dated 10.02.2026 in W.A. Nos.1961/2025 and 1992/2025, this Court stayed the operation of the impugned order, observing, prima facie, that although the constitutional validity of Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) has been questioned, the Regulations had neither been struck down nor read down, and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge therefore appeared to be contrary to the GNA Regulations. Subsequently, by order dated 18.03.2026, this Court clarified that the interim order would not prevent CTUIL from processing the applications of M/s Rays Power Infra Limited from the date of grant of the government authorisation, namely 31.01.2026.

Sri K. G. Raghavan and Sri G. S. Kannur,- learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submit that the appellant is an established RPPD proposing to establish renewable energy parks in the State of Karnataka. It is submitted that Regulation 4.1 (d) of the GNA Regulations specifically recognizes an RPPD as an eligible entity entitled to seek connectivity to the ISTS.

It is contended that Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) however, imposes an additional condition requiring RPPD alone to obtain prior authorisation from the Central Government or the State Government before applying for connectivity, whereas no such requirement is imposed upon any other renewable energy generator or generating company seeking the very same connectivity. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the classification is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, since there exists no intelligible differentia, having any rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It is further submitted that the GNA Regulations themselves do not prescribe the competent authority, procedure or timeline for issuance of such authorisation. Likewise, the RE Policy is completely silent. It is argued that the writ petitioner approached the Government of Karnataka as early as June 2024, but no decision was taken for several months. Consequently, by the time authorisation is issued, the available transmission margins at important sub-stations, such as Tumkur II and Bellary, stand exhausted because connectivity is processed on a first-come-first-served basis.

Learned Senior Counsel submits that the result is that although Regulation 4 recognizes an RPPD as an eligible applicant, Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) renders such right wholly illusory. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to grant complete relief by declining to decide the constitutional validity of Regulation 5.8(vii)(a). According to the learned Senior Counsel, the relief granted by the learned Single Judge is illusory since it continues to make restoration of connectivity subject to obtaining the very authorisation which constitutes the source of the grievance. On these grounds, they seek that Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) is unconstitutional or, in the alternative, that it be read down.

Sri Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General of India and Sri S.S. Naganand, the learned Senior Counsel submit that the CTUIL is the entity notified by the Central Government as the Central Transmission Utility under Section 38 of the Electricity Act, and is bound to discharge its functions strictly in accordance with the GNA Regulations. It is submitted that CTUIL is merely the statutory implementing authority under the Electricity Act. It is submitted that the GNA Regulations constitute subordinate legislation framed by the CERC under Sections 79 and 178 of the Electricity Act and have statutory force. It is submitted that Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) expressly mandates government authorisation before an RPPD can seek connectivity to ISTS. It is submitted that CTUIL has no jurisdiction to waive, relax or ignore the statutory requirement. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge, while consciously declining to strike down Regulation 5.8(vii)(a), nevertheless issued directions compelling CTUIL to act contrary to the Regulations. Such directions virtually rewrite the statutory Regulations. It is argued that what cannot be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. They further submit that if the petitioner was genuinely aggrieved by the implementation difficulties, the appropriate remedy was to invoke the powers of CERC under the GNA Regulations – the power of relaxation under Regulation 41 and the power to remove difficulties under Regulation 42. It is contended that the distinction between RPPD and an ordinary generating company is a reasonable classification that is founded on the principle of intelligible differentia. Further that the Regulations serves a legitimate regulatory purpose of ensuring that only government recognized RPPD can seek connectivity to the ISTS on behalf of multiple generating stations. It is therefore, submitted that there is no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

The learned counsel appearing for Essar Renewables Limited submits that the appellant is a competing renewable energy developer. The reservation of 890 MW at Tumkur II and 600 MW at Bellary in favour of the writ petitioner, directly prejudices other eligible applicants. The statutory queue mechanism under GNA Regulations is disturbed by judicial orders. It is submitted that the impugned directions confer an undue preference upon an applicant who admittedly did not satisfy the mandatory requirement.

The learned counsel appearing for AMPIN Energy Utility submits that the appellants were impleaded before the learned Single Judge as affected parties. The reservation of transmission capacity in favour of the petitioners have adversely affected the rights of all competing applicants and that the learned Single Judge could not have granted equitable relief to the petitioner, contrary to the statutory Regulations.

Sri Ruben Jacob, the learned Additional Advocate General, submits that the State Government has no dispute regarding issuance of authorisation. However, the State is required to satisfy itself regarding eligibility before issuing authorisation. He submits that subsequent to the institution of these appeals, the authorisation has been granted to the writ petitioner on 31.01.2026.

In light of the rival submissions, the following points arise for consideration:

The controversy essentially centres on the validity and implementation of Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) of the GNA Regulations.

The Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) is set out below :

The challenge is mounted on the ground that the Regulation requires an RPPD alone to obtain a prior authorisation from the Central Government or the State Government before seeking connectivity to the ISTS, whereas no such requirement is imposed upon other renewable energy developers. The expression ‘Renewable Power Park Developer’ is defined in Regulations 2.1 (ai) of the GNA Regulations, which reads thus :

To examine the validity of the constitutional challenge to the Regulation 5.8(vii)(a), it is necessary to refer to the statutory and regulatory framework under which the impugned Regulation has been framed.

The Electricity Act was enacted with the object of consolidating the laws relating to generation, transmission, distribution, trading and use of electricity and to promote competition, efficiency and development of electricity industry. Under Sections 79 and 178 of the Electricity Act, CERC has been vested with the power to regulate ISTS of electricity and to frame regulations having statutory force for carrying out the provisions of the Act. Sections 79 and 178 of the Electricity Act reads as under :

x x x

The CTUIL is the implementing agency responsible for processing applications for connectivity and general network access strictly in accordance with the Regulations framed by CERC. It exercises no independent legislative or policy making power and is bound to implement the Regulations as they stand.

The regulatory framework relating to connectivity has undergone gradual evolution. As noticed above, the Connectivity Regulations, 2009 initially governed grant of connectivity to the ISTS; the Fifth Amendment, notified on 15.05.2015 introduced the Solar Power Park Developer, authorized by the Central Government, as an eligible applicant; The Seventh Amendment notified on 09.01.2019, substituted the wider expression 'Renewable Power Park Developer' and extended the authorising power to the State Governments. The GNA Regulations which replaced the earlier Connectivity Regulations, 2009, have substantially retained the same requirement vis-a-vis Regulation 5.8(vii)(a).

The above legislative history assumes considerable significance. The requirement of government authorisation is not a condition introduced for the first time under the GNA Regulations, 2022. It has existed in one form or another since 2015 and has consciously been retained through successive regulations by and amendments framed by the expert regulatory body. Such continuity demonstrates that the requirement forms a part of the legislative policy governing RPPD and that it cannot be viewed as accidental or arbitrary stipulation.

The principal submission of the petitioners is that Regulation 5.8 (vii)(a) violates Article 14 of the Constitution as it discriminates between RPPD and other renewable energy developers. The further grievance is that while the Regulation insist upon government authorisation, neither the GNA Regulations nor the RE Policy prescribes any procedure or timeline for grant of such authorisation, resulting in practical impossibility. Consequently, by the time the authorisation is obtained, the available connectivity margin in the relevant sub-stations stands exhausted.

The learned Single Judge accepted this submission to the extent of holding that the absence of any mechanism for grant of authorisation, created hardship for RPPD. Nevertheless, the learned Single Judge consciously refrained from declaring Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) as unconstitutional or reading down the provision. Despite upholding the continued existence of the Regulation, the learned Single Judge directed CTUIL to restore and process writ petitioners’ applications and reserved transmission capacity in their favour, subject to eventual production of the government authorisation. We note that the correctness of the order has to be examined in the light of the settled principles governing judicial review of subordinate legislation.

The law relating to judicial review of subordinate legislation is well settled, the constitutional validity of a legislative enactment can be challenged only on limited grounds, when it is ultra vires the parent statute, violates any constitutional provision, exceeds the limits of the delegated power or is manifestly arbitrary. The legislation cannot be struck down merely because the Court does not concur with the wisdom of enacting it or doubts its efficacy. It is wholly impermissible for the Court to test the validity of the legislation on the ground that there may be some other measures which could perceivably better serve the object of the legislation.

In Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Limited and Others vs Union of India and Others^{33.(1985) 1 SCC 641}, the Supreme Court held that a piece of subordinate legislation does not enjoy the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which the plenary legislation may be questioned; in addition, on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made; that it is contrary to some other statute; or that it is manifestly arbitrary and therefore offends Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court further observed that subordinate legislation cannot be questioned on the ground of the violation of the principles of natural justice, which is a ground available against administrative action. The relevant paragraphs, at para Nos. 75, 77 and 78, read as under :

In State of A.P. and Others vs McDowell and Company and Others^{44.(1996) 3 SCC 709}, the Supreme Court held that no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary as under :

The Supreme Court considered the Indian Express judgment in Shayara Bano and Others vs Union of India and Others^{55.AIR 2017 SC 4609} and held at para Nos. 260, 279 and 283, which are set out below :

The Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (supra) explained that legislation may be invalidated when it is capricious, irrational, without any adequate determining principle or where it is excessive and disproportionate.

It is not the case of the petitioners that the impugned Regulation was introduced mala fide or by any ulterior motive. Bearing the principle in mind, we are unable to accept that the impugned Regulation is to be set aside on the ground that it is manifestly arbitrary or falls foul of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The distinction between RPPD and an ordinary renewable power developer is neither artificial nor illusory. An RPPD develops common infrastructure, acquires land, provides pooling arrangement and facilitates establishment of several generating stations within an integrated renewable energy park. Such developers occupy a distinct position in the regulatory framework.

The requirement of government authorisation ensures that only projects recognized by the appropriate government are treated as renewable power parks for the purpose of seeking connectivity to the ISTS on behalf of the generating stations to be established within such parks. The object sought to be achieved is orderly development of the national transmission network, proper planning of transmission infrastructure, and avoidance of speculative blocking of valuable transmission capacity.

The classification therefore rests upon an intelligible differentia. The differentia has a direct and rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved under the Electricity Act and the GNA Regulations.

It is therefore not possible to accept the contention that Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) creates hostile discrimination or violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. We are unable to hold that the Regulation is manifestly arbitrary merely because the State Government has not evolved an expeditious procedure for issuance of authorisation.

The difficulty pointed out by the petitioners undoubtedly discloses an administrative deficiency. The absence of a prescribed timeline for grant of authorisation may cause delay. However, an administrative vacuum cannot by itself invalidate an otherwise valid statutory regulations. The Courts are concerned with the constitutional validity and not the legislative wisdom. Once Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) is held to be constitutionally valid, its implementation necessarily follows. It is equally well settled that where a law prescribes that a thing has to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner alone. Regulation 5.8 (vii)(a) expressly requires government authorisation before an RPPD becomes eligible to seek connectivity. Neither the CTUIL nor this Court can dispense with such a statutory requirement. Regulation 5.8 (vii)(a) continues to remain valid. Though the learned Single Judge consciously declined to strike down or read down the Regulations, once the validity of the Regulations was preserved, the consequential direction compelling CTUIL to process the application without fulfilment of the mandatory statutory requirement could not have been issued. Such directions though equitable in appearance, have the effect of rendering statutory requirements otiose. We note that the Courts exercising judicial review cannot indirectly suspend the operation of a statutory Regulation while simultaneously declining to declare it unconstitutional. The contention of the petitioners that CERC ought to have exercised its enabling powers of relaxation or removal of difficulties (under Regulation 41 and 42 of the GNA Regulations) cannot advance the writ petitioners’ case. Regulations 41 and 42 of the GNA Regulations reads as under :

With the leave of the learned Single Judge (order dated 17.03.2025), the writ petitioners made a representation to CERC seeking relaxation of the requirement in exercise of its power under Regulation 41 of the GNA Regulations. CERC, by an order dated 11.04.2025, declined the request. Such enabling powers are vested in the expert regulatory authority; and the Court, in exercise of judicial review, cannot exercise these powers in substitution of the regulator.

There is, however, a necessity to recognize that the grievance projected by the petitioners is not wholly without substance. The material placed before the Court demonstrates that the State of Karnataka did not have a clearly defined, transparent and a time-bound mechanism for grant of authorisation under Regulation 5.8(vii)(a). Such uncertainty has the potential of adversely affecting genuine RPPDs, particularly in a regime where transmission capacity is allocated on the first-come-first-served basis.

During the pendency of these appeals, the State Government has issued the requisite authorisation in favour of the writ petitioner on 31.01.2026. Pursuant to the clarificatory orders dated 18.03.2026 and 09.04.2026 issued by this Court, CTUIL has proceeded to consider the writ petitioners’ applications keeping the date of priority as 31.01.2026, in accordance with the GNA Regulations. Consequently, the immediate grievance regarding non-consideration of the applications no longer survives. Nevertheless, the larger issue concerning administrative implementation requires attention. While this Court cannot rewrite Regulation 5.8 (vii)(a) or dispense with its mandatory requirements, nothing prevents the Court from observing that the State Government should consider an appropriate regulatory or administrative mechanism prescribing a transparent procedure, the competent authority and a reasonable timeline for the grant of authorisation. Such measures would advance the object of the Regulations and avoid recurrence of similar disputes without disturbing the statutory framework.

For the foregoing reasons, answering the points for consideration, we hold that Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Connectivity and General Network Access to the Inter-State Transmission System) Regulations, 2022 is not liable to be struck down or read down on the ground that it is manifestly arbitrary in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the learned Single Judge, having sustained the Regulation, was not justified in issuing directions inconsistent with its mandatory requirement. The impugned order therefore warrants interference to that extent. Accordingly, W.A. Nos. 569/2026 and 570/2026 preferred by M/s Rays Power Infra Limited are hereby dismissed. W.A. Nos. 1961/2025 and 1992/2025 preferred by the CTUIL, W.A. Nos. 1703/2025 and 1708/2025 preferred by Essar Renewables Limited and W.A. Nos. 1963/2025 and 1965/2025 preferred by AMPIN Energy Utility Private Limited and connected appellants are hereby allowed. It is held that the Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) of Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Connectivity and General Network Access to the Inter-State Transmission System) Regulations, 2022 is valid and the challenge to the constitutional validity of Regulation 5.8(vii)(a) of the GNA Regulations, raised by the petitioner-M/s Rays Power Infra Limited, is hereby rejected.

The pending applications in all the appeals stand disposed of.