Central Banking Corporation of Travancore Ltd. (In Liquidation) vs N. Velupillai and Others

M.M. Pareed Pillay, J.—The revision petitioner is a banking company ordered to be wound up by the order of this court in B. C. P. No. 4 of 1962.

In the course of liquidation proceedings, the official liquidator obtained a certificate for payment due from the debtors u/s 45D of the Banking. Regulation Act, 1949. The certificate was sought to be executed by filing Execution Petition No. 63 of 1980. The contesting respondents who are the legal representatives of the first respondent resisted the execution on the ground that it is barred by limitation.

Admittedly, the decree was passed on July 26, 1966. The execution petition was filed only on June 21, 1980. The earlier execution petition filed by the revision-petitioner was dismissed on September 29, 1973. That dismissal was by a judicial order. The Sub-Judge held that the subsequent execution petition is barred by limitation.

The revision petitioner contended that, in view of Section 45O of the Banking Regulation Act, there is no limitation at all for the execution of the certificate for payment issued by the High Court u/s 45D. Section 45O provides that, in computing the period of limitation prescribed for a suit or application by a banking company which is being wound up, the period commencing from the date of presentation of the petition for the winding up of the banking company shall be excluded. Relying on the above section, counsel for the revision-petitioner contended that the execution petition is not barred by limitation. Such a contention is not tenable as Section 45O does not postulate that there is no time limit for filing execution petition before the civil court.

The object of the Legislature in enacting Section 45O(1) was that the period subsequent to the presentation of the petition for winding up should not be taken into account, in computing the period of limitation. The entire period has to be excluded from consideration if the limitation had begun to run prior to the presentation of the petition for winding up. Section 45O does not say that, after the certificate has been issued, it is open to the official liquidator to present the execution petition at any time of his choice. Once the official liquidator gets a certificate, he has to take appropriate steps to execute it before the court. In the absence of any law allowing the official liquidator to file the execution petition ignoring the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, he cannot take the stand that no period of limitation is prescribed under the Banking Regulation Act to file the execution petition within a particular time and so the execution petition can be filed at any time.

Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides a period of 12 years for the execution of any decree other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction or order of any civil court. As the decree is sought to be executed before the civil court, the period of limitation as provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act cannot be circumvented. The contention of the revision-petitioner that the provisions in the Limitation Act have no application to execution petition filed by the official liquidator representing the banking company in liquidation is not tenable. As the execution petition was filed before the civil court, Article 136 squarely applies. As the execution petition was filed beyond the period of 12 years, the Sub-Judge was justified in holding that it is barred by limitation.

There is no merit in the C. R. P. and hence the same is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.