Centenary Methodist Church vs M. Manohar

P. Venkatarama Reddi, J.—This Civil Revision Petition is filed against the order passed by the Chief Judge, City Civil Court confirming the order of III Assistant Judge granting temporary injunction in favour of the respondent-plaintiff pending the disposal of the suit.

The respondent herein filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant-Church (petitioner herein) from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule premises. The Case of the respondent is that in consideration of the services rendered by him to the Christian children, he was permitted by the Church authorities to occupy the cellar portion of three rooms which is part of the Church building complex. He states that he has been occupying the suit premises for more than twelve years. The respondent alleges that on 27-1-1994, the defendant threatened the family members of the respondent of dire consequences if the premises was not vacated by 31-1-1994. This was followed by further threats, according to the respondent. As the police did not take action, the suit was filed to protect his possession.

The petitioner-defendant contended that the respondent was allowed to reside in the suit premises on humanitarian grounds for a short time as he was a member of the Church. Subsequently, the respondent constructed a house bearing Number 5-5-366 at Patel Nagar behind Gandhi Bhavan. As the suit premises was required for the purpose of certain Church activities, the Church authorities called upon the respondent in June, 1990 to vacate the rooms which he was occupying. This was followed by reminders by means of letters dated 4-2-1993 and 30-4-1993. It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent assured the petitioner that he would vacate the premises by 15-5-1993 soon after the schools were closed. There was a further request to extend the time for celebrating his daughter''s marriage in June, 1993. Though a letter was addressed by the petitioner to vacate the premises by 27-9-1993, the respondent refused to receive the letter. On 29-11-1993, the co-ordination committee of the Church decided to authorize the Chairman of property subcommittee to take necessary action to evict the respondent. The respondent, in response to final notice gave a categorical undertaking that he would vacate the premises within one month, i.e., by 29-1-1994. Thereafter, he filed the suit and obtained an ex-parte injunction. The alleged threats are denied by the defendant.

The factum of execution of letters dated 20-5-1993 and 29-12-1993 (Exs. B-5 and B-11) requesting a short time for vacating the premises was denied in the reply-affidavit filed by him in I.A.89 of 1994. In the letter dated 29-12-1993, the respondent committed himself before the elders including the petitioner that he would vacate the building by 29-1-1994. It is described as a final and last commitment and it is mentioned that the Church was at liberty to occupy the premises thereafter. The Church was also requested not to demand any rent.

The appellate Court as well as the trial Court felt that the respondent, not being a trespasser, cannot be evicted by force. The appellate Court commented that the truth and genuineness of the letters had to be gone into in the suit and even if there was breach of undertaking, the petitioner-defendant is not entitled to dispossess the respondent by use of force taking the aid of police. Pending the C.R.P. I called for a report from the trial Court. The III Assistant Judge was directed to report whether Exs. B-5 and B-11 were executed by the respondent. The learned Judge reported that "on the material available on record, it makes me to believe that Exs. B-5 and B-11 letters were executed by the plaintiff in favour of defendant requesting the latter to grant time to vacate the suit premises". Of course, this is only a prima facie finding recorded by the trial Court. Nevertheless, it shows prima facie that the respondent who has no semblance of right to squat on the Church building has filed a suit to perpetuate his illegal possession in order to wriggle out of the commitment made by him. Even if the respondent-plaintiff''s case is accepted, his possession was only permissive in nature. Prima facie, the respondent has no legal or moral right to remain in possession, that too, free of charge, especially when the premises is required by the Church for an institutional purpose.

All this notwithstanding, I am not in a position to say, in exercise of revisional power u/s 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the lower Courts have committed any illegality or error of jurisdiction in granting the injunction. The approach that a person in permissive possession has to be protected against forcible dispossession cannot be faulted. At the same time, the respondent should not be allowed to remain in the possession free of charge; otherwise, it would amount to placing a premium on the unreasonable and litigious conduct of the respondent-plaintiff. While protection can be given to the plaintiff to maintain his possession till the disposal of the suit, it is only proper that a condition should be imposed that he should pay reasonable compensation for unauthorized use and occupation of the property the owner of which is a public religious institution. The grant of preventive relief by way of injunction is essentially equitable in nature and it should not result in inequity to either party. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of a case, the Court which is expected to prevent forcible dispossession is also duty bound to see that the plaintiff does not derive an unjust advantage from his recalcitrant attitude. He has no right to insist that the Court should not only protect his possession but also grant him immunity from pecuniary liability for the actual advantage enjoyed by him.

I therefore confirm the injunction granted by the trial Court on condition of the respondent paying to the petitioner-Church a sum of Rs. 500/- per month commencing from 1st April, 1997 on the fifth of every month and on the further condition that a sum of Rs. 250/- per month is paid from February, 1994 onwards upto March, 1997, i.e., for thirty-eight months within a period of two months from today. The payment shall be made by taking out demand drafts in favour of the Church. In default of the payment, the injunction petition shall stand dismissed

The order in C.M.A.282 of 1994 is accordingly modified and C.R.P. is partly allowed, No costs.

The suit shall be disposed of before the end of the year 1997.

Copy of the order be despatched in two weeks.